Veronica Avelar v. Youth

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except*
as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The Honorable Myron H. Bright, Senior U. S. Circuit Judge for the Eighth**
Circuit, sitting by designation.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
VERONICA AVELAR,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
YOUTH AND FAMILY ENRICHMENT
SERVICES, DBA First Chance North;
FIRST CHANCE NORTH; FLOYD
BURRELL,
Defendants - Appellees.
No. 08-16948
D.C. No. 3:07-cv-00814-PJH
MEMORANDUM *
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Phyllis J. Hamilton, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted January 14, 2010
San Francisco, California
Before: BRIGHT, HAWKINS and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.**
FILED
FEB 04 2010
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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In district court, plaintiff Veronica Avelar (“Avelar”) asserted a federal § 1983
claim against defendant Floyd Burrell; the remaining claims against Burrell and
defendant/appellee Youth and Family Enrichment Services (“YFES”) involved purely
state law. Exercising supplemental jurisdiction over the related state claims, see 28
U.S.C. § 1367(a), the district court granted summary judgment in favor of YFES.
Because Avelar then agreed to dismiss her claims against Burrell, including the
federal claim, there were no federal claims remaining in the litigation at the entry of
judgment. We have frequently recognized that when federal claims are dismissed
before trial, supplemental state claims should ordinarily also be dismissed. See Jones
v. Cmty. Redevelopment Agency of City of Los Angeles, 733 F.2d 646, 651 (9th Cir.
1984); Wren v. Sletten Const. Co., 654 F.2d 529, 536 (9th Cir. 1981) (“When the state
issues apparently predominate and all federal claims are dismissed before trial, the
proper exercise of discretion requires dismissal of the state claim.”); see also United
Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966).
Although we are not required to sua sponte consider whether the district court
should have continued to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims
after dismissal of the federal claim, we are not precluded from doing so either. See
Acri v. Varian Assoc., Inc., 114 F.3d 999, 1001 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc); see also
Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 727 (“The issue whether pendent [now supplemental] jurisdiction

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We note that the statute of limitations on the supplemental state law claims1
is tolled during the pendency of the federal action. 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (d).
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has been properly assumed is one which remains open throughout the litigation.”).
This case raises “a novel or complex issue of State law,” the state law claims
“substantially predominate[] over the claim or claims over which the district court has
original jurisdiction,” and “the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has
original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(1)(2) & (3). Under these circumstances,
we conclude that relinquishment of federal court jurisdiction is warranted, and remand
with instructions that the district court vacate its judgment and dismiss the state law
claims without prejudice. See Rounseville v. Zahl, 13 F.3d 625, 631 (2d Cir. 1994);1
see also Reynolds v. County of San Diego, 84 F.3d 1162, 1171 (9th Cir. 1996),
overruled in part on other grounds by Acri, 114 F.3d at 1001.
REMANDED with instructions.

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