Ronda K. Williams v. MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of Social Security Administration

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by Ninth Cir. R. 36-3.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RONDA K. WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of
Social Security Administration,
Defendant - Appellee.
No. 09-35194
DC No. CV 07-0101 JCL
MEMORANDUM *
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Montana
Jeremiah C. Lynch, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted January 14, 2010
Seattle, Washington
Before: KLEINFELD, TASHIMA, and TALLMAN, Circuit Judges.
Ronda Williams appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment in
favor of the Social Security Commissioner in Williams’ action challenging the
denial of her application for Supplemental Security Income under Title XVI of the
FILED
JAN 26 2010
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

-- 1 of 3 --

-2-
Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1383c. Williams contends that the
administrative law judge (“ALJ”) erred in finding her not credible and in giving no
weight to a medical assessment by her treating physician. We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
We review de novo the district court’s order upholding the denial of benefits.
See Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 855-56 (9th Cir. 2001).
1. We conclude that the ALJ’s credibility assessment was supported by
clear and convincing reasons, including that Williams’ failure to follow treatment
advice and Williams’ testimony about her daily activities were inconsistent with a
finding of disability. See Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 834 (9th Cir. 1995). An
ALJ may properly consider both of these factors in assessing how much credibility
to afford the claimant’s testimony about the severity of her symptoms. See
Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2008).
2. We also conclude that the ALJ properly discounted Williams’ treating
physician’s opinion that she could perform only sedentary work. The ALJ
reasoned that the treating physician’s opinion was inconsistent with other medical
evidence in the record and with Williams’ own testimony about her activity level.
These amount to “‘specific and legitimate reasons’ supported by substantial

-- 2 of 3 --

-3-
evidence in the record.” See Rollins, 261 F.3d at 856 (quoting Reddick v. Chater,
157 F.3d 715, 720 (9th Cir. 1998)).
Affirmed.

-- 3 of 3 --