United States of America v. Juan Magana-Colin

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JUAN MAGANA-COLIN,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 09-50333
D.C. No. 3:03-CR-00856-GT-1
MEMORANDUM *
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California
Gordon Thompson, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted December 10, 2009
Pasadena, California
Before: REINHARDT, TROTT and WARDLAW, Circuit Judges.
Juan Magana-Colin appeals from the district court’s judgment revoking his
supervised release and sentencing him to 12 months imprisonment. We have
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm.
FILED
DEC 21 2009
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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In his opening brief, Magana-Colin argued that this delay also deprived the1
district court of jurisdiction to revoke his supervised release under 18 U.S.C. §
3583(i). However, he has conceded in his reply brief that there was no violation of
§ 3583(i) in his case. Section 3583(i) limits the time in which a court may revoke
supervised release after the term of supervised release has expired. Magana’s term
of supervised release had not yet expired when his revocation hearing was held, so
§ 3583(i) does not apply.
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Magana-Colin argues that the three-year delay between the issuance of a
warrant for his arrest for violation of supervised release and the commencement of
his supervised release revocation hearing was unreasonable, in violation of Due
Process and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1. He does not contest that his1
revocation hearing was held within a reasonable time after he was taken into
custody for his supervised release violation. However, he argues that the
reasonable time for his hearing should be measured from the date that the warrant
for his violation issued.
Rule 32.1 formalizes the requirements of the Due Process Clause. See
United States v. Santana, 526 F.3d 1257, 1259 (9th Cir. 2008); see also id. at 1259
n.2 (“We treat proceedings for revocation of probation, parole, and supervised
release as equivalents for due process purposes . . . .”). As a matter of Due
Process, Magana-Colin’s argument is clearly foreclosed by Moody v. Daggett, 429
U.S. 78, 87 (1976) (identifying custody under a parole violation warrant, rather
than issuance of the warrant, as “the operative event” that triggers the requirement

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of a timely hearing). Further, the plain language of Rule 32.1 shows that it applies
only once a supervised release violator is in custody for the violation. Therefore,
we conclude that the delay that Magana-Colin challenges did not violate either
Rule 32.1 or the Due Process Clause and we AFFIRM the district court’s
revocation of his supervised release.
AFFIRMED.

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