Michael D.j. Chenoweth v. Maui Chemical and Paper Products, Inc.

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without**
oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
LSS/Research
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MICHAEL D.J. CHENOWETH,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
MAUI CHEMICAL AND PAPER
PRODUCTS, INC.,
Defendant - Appellee.
No. 08-17058
D.C. No. 1:07-cv-00092-DAE-
KSC
MEMORANDUM *
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Hawaii
David Alan Ezra, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted November 17, 2009**
Before: ALARCÓN, TROTT, and TASHIMA, Circuit Judges.
Michael D.J. Chenoweth appeals pro se from the district court’s summary
judgment in his employment action alleging disparate treatment, hostile work
FILED
DEC 14 2009
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

-- 1 of 4 --

LSS/Research 08-17058 2
environment, constructive discharge, retaliation, and defamation under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. and the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Fair Hous. Council v. Riverside
Two, 249 F.3d 1132, 1135 (9th Cir. 2001), and we affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on the disparate
treatment claim because Chenoweth failed to raise a triable issue of material fact as
to whether the defendant’s proffered nondiscriminatory, performance-based
reasons for the demotion, pay reduction, and other alleged adverse employment
acts were pretextual. See Warren v. City of Carlsbad, 58 F.3d 439, 442 (9th Cir.
1995).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on the ADA claims
because Chenoweth testified that he had no actual disability and failed to establish
a triable issue as to whether the defendant perceived him as having a disability that
substantially limited one or more major life activities. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 12102(1)(C), (3) (the ADA protects those with a disability and those who are
regarded as having a disability).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on the hostile work
environment claim because Chenoweth failed to raise a triable issue concerning

-- 2 of 4 --

LSS/Research 08-17058 3
whether the alleged pranks, jokes, and name-calling were “sufficiently severe or
pervasive to alter the conditions of [his] employment and create an abusive work
environment.” Vasquez v. County of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 642 (9th Cir.
2003); see also Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787–88 (1998)
(stating that the working environment must be both objectively and subjectively
offensive, the alleged harassing conduct must be extreme, and simple teasing,
offhand comments, and isolated incidents generally will not amount to
discriminatory changes in the “terms and conditions of employment”).
The district court also properly determined that because Chenoweth failed to
establish a triable issue concerning hostile work environment, his constructive
discharge claim necessarily failed. See Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917,
930 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Where a plaintiff fails to demonstrate the severe or pervasive
harassment necessary to support a hostile work environment claim, it will be
impossible for [him] to meet the higher standard of constructive discharge[.]”).
Finally, the district court properly granted summary judgment on the
defamation and retaliation claims because Chenoweth failed to provide more than
conclusory allegations to support these claims. See Surrell v. Cal. Water Serv., 518
F.3d 1097, 1103 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Conclusory statements without factual support
are insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment.”).

-- 3 of 4 --

LSS/Research 08-17058 4
Chenoweth’s remaining contentions are unpersuasive.
Chenoweth’s pending motions are denied.
AFFIRMED.

-- 4 of 4 --