Carol Ann Mitchell v. Akal Security, Inc.;

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without**
oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
JS/Research
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CAROL ANN MITCHELL,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
AKAL SECURITY, INC.; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
Nos. 08-16854
08-17569
D.C. No. 1:07-cv-00514-DAE-
LEK
MEMORANDUM *
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Hawaii
David A. Ezra, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted November 17, 2009**
Before: ALARCÓN, TROTT, and TASHIMA, Circuit Judges.
Carol Ann Mitchell appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment
dismissing her action alleging violations of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and
FILED
DEC 14 2009
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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various state laws. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de
novo, Rhoades v. Avon Prods., Inc., 504 F.3d 1151, 1156 (9th Cir. 2007), and we
affirm.
The district court properly dismissed the Title VII claims because Mitchell
did not plead or argue that she exhausted her administrative remedies under Title
VII. See Lyons v. England, 307 F.3d 1092, 1103 (9th Cir. 2002) (“a plaintiff is
required to exhaust his or her administrative remedies before seeking adjudication
of a Title VII claim”).
The district court properly dismissed the section 1983 claims because
Mitchell alleged these claims against private defendants, but did not allege joint
action with a state actor. See Kirtley v. Rainey, 326 F.3d 1088, 1092 (9th Cir.
2003) (“While generally not applicable to private parties, a § 1983 action can lie
against a private party when he is a willful participant in joint action with the State
or its agents.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3);
see also Ove v. Gwinn, 264 F.3d 817, 826 (9th Cir. 2001) (explaining that a district
court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over related state law
claims after it dismisses the claims over which it has original jurisdiction).

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The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying appointment of
counsel. See Johnson v. U.S. Treasury Dep’t, 27 F.3d 415, 416-17 (9th Cir. 1994)
(per curiam) (listing factors to be considered in determining whether to appoint
counsel under Title VII and stating standard of review).
Mitchell’s remaining contentions are unavailing.
Mitchell’s “Motion for Objection” is denied.
AFFIRMED.

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