Robert Guichard v. Universal City Studios Lllp

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without**
oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ROBERT GUICHARD,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
UNIVERSAL CITY STUDIOS LLLP,
Defendant - Appellee.
No. 08-15581
D.C. No. 3:06-cv-06392-JSW
MEMORANDUM *
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Jeffrey S. White, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted November 17, 2009**
Before: ALARCÓN, TROTT, and TASHIMA, Circuit Judges.
Robert Guichard appeals pro se from various orders of the district court in
his trademark infringement action, including summary judgment and an award of
attorney’s fees. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de
FILED
DEC 14 2009
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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novo the district court’s grant of summary judgment, Chance v. Pac-Tel Teletrac
Inc., 242 F.3d 1151, 1156 (9th Cir. 2001), and for an abuse of discretion its award
of attorney’s fees, Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 292 F.3d 1139, 1156 (9th Cir.
2002). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Universal
on Guichard’s Lanham Act claim. See Chance, 242 F.3d at 1154, 1159 (affirming
summary judgment where plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue as to whether it
was the first to use the disputed mark “in commerce”). The district court properly
denied Guichard’s motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f) because he
failed to “show how allowing additional discovery would have precluded summary
judgment.” Id. at 1161 n.6 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted); see
also Qualls by & Through Qualls v. Blue Cross of Cal., 22 F.3d 839, 844 (9th Cir.
1994) (reviewing de novo the district court’s implicit denial of a Rule 56(f)
motion).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Guichard’s claim
under California Business and Professions Code section 17200 because Guichard
failed to demonstrate an unfair practice or resulting injury. See Sprewell v. Golden
State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 992 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting that a section 17200
claim requires plaintiff to demonstrate an unlawful or unfair business practice).

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The district court did not abuse its discretion in its award of attorney’s fees
because the record supports the finding that the case was groundless and
unreasonable and supports the amount of fees awarded. See Cairns, 292 F.3d at
1156 (explaining the appropriate bases and amount of fees awarded under the
Lanham Act).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Guichard’s recusal
motion because the alleged bias stemmed from information the judge learned from
his participation in a case rather than from an extrajudicial source, and because “a
reasonable person with knowledge of all the facts would [not] conclude that the
judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” United States v. Hernandez-
Escarsega, 886 F.2d 1560, 1581 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted) (reviewing for an abuse of discretion district court’s decision
whether to grant a recusal motion).
Guichard’s request for judicial notice is denied. See Santa Monica Food Not
Bombs v. City of Santa Monica, 450 F.3d 1022, 1025 n.2 (9th Cir. 2006) (declining
to take judicial notice of documents that were not relevant to the resolution of the
appeal).
Guichard’s remaining contentions are unavailing.
AFFIRMED.

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