Michael A. Dawes v. GEORGE CONTRERAS, Phoenix Police Officer

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without**
oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MICHAEL A. DAWES,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
GEORGE CONTRERAS, Phoenix Police
Officer,
Defendant - Appellee.
No. 08-15528
D.C. No. 06-CV-01287-PGR
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Paul G. Rosenblatt, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted November 17, 2009**
Before: ALARCÓN, TROTT, and TASHIMA, Circuit Judges.
Michael A. Dawes appeals pro se from the district court’s summary
judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging that Police Officer Contreras
violated Dawes’s constitutional rights by ramming a van into the police car in
FILED
DEC 14 2009
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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which Dawes was seated, and by delaying medical treatment for Dawes’s injuries.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Frost v. Agnos,
152 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1998), and we affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Dawes’s collision
claim because Dawes failed to produce evidence suggesting that Officer Contreras
acted for the purpose of causing harm, see County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523
U.S. 833, 836 (1998), or acted with deliberate indifference to, or with reckless
disregard for, Dawes’s rights, see Tennison v. City & County of San Francisco, 570
F.3d 1078, 1088 (9th Cir. 2009).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Dawes’s medical
claim because Dawes failed to raise a triable issue as to whether the delay in
receiving medical treatment amounted to a constitutional violation. See Frost, 152
F.3d at 1130 (holding that pretrial detainee did not establish that defendants were
deliberately indifferent to his medical needs as to “alleged delays in administering
his pain medication, in treating his broken nose, and in providing him with a
replacement crutch”).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Dawes’s motions
for appointment of counsel because Dawes failed to demonstrate “exceptional

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circumstances” warranting appointment of counsel. Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d
1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991).
Dawes’s remaining contentions are unpersuasive.
AFFIRMED.

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