Cecil Roy Tedder v. D. K. Butler;

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without**
oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
DRS/Research
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CECIL ROY TEDDER,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
D. K. BUTLER; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
No. 06-17399
D.C. No. CV-06-01535-MCE
MEMORANDUM *
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Morrison C. England, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted November 11, 2009**
Before: ALARCÓN, TROTT, and TASHIMA, Circuit Judges.
California state prisoner Cecil Roy Tedder appeals pro se from the district
court’s judgment dismissing his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus petition and 42
FILED
DEC 14 2009
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights complaint. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1291 and 2253, and we affirm.
The record belies Tedder’s contention that the district court dismissed his
case based on an erroneous finding that he failed to timely object to the findings
and recommendations of the magistrate judge. The district court sua sponte
dismissed the case at screening for failure to plainly state a claim upon which relief
could be granted.
The record discloses that Tedder was convicted for murder in 2000, while
serving a life sentence for a 1986 murder conviction. Following the 2000
conviction, The California Board of Prison Terms (the “Board”) recalculated
Tedder’s parole eligibility and vacated a parole hearing scheduled for September,
2001. In the instant case, Tedder claimed that the Board and prison officials
violated his constitutional rights by failing to bring him to the 2001 hearing, and
failing to release him from prison. He contended that he is entitled to release and
money damages because his life sentence for the 2000 conviction, which was made
concurrent to a prior federal sentence, expired when the shorter federal sentence
expired.
The district court properly dismissed Tedder’s habeas petition for failure to
plainly state a claim that would entitle him to relief. The Board’s decision to

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recalculate parole eligibility in light of the new conviction was not contrary to, nor
an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d). Tedder’s section 1983 claim is therefore barred, because success
“would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration.”
Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81-82 (2005); Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477,
486-87 (1994) (holding that a prisoner cannot use section 1983 to obtain damages
where success would necessarily imply the unlawfulness of a not previously
invalidated conviction or sentence).
AFFIRMED.

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