John F. Lance v. Mike Mahoney;

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without**
oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
LA/Research
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JOHN F. LANCE,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
MIKE MAHONEY; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
No. 08-35034
D.C. No. CV-05-00013-DWM
MEMORANDUM *
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Montana
Donald W. Molloy, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted November 17, 2009**
Before: ALARCÓN, TROTT, and TASHIMA, Circuit Judges.
Montana state prisoner John F. Lance appeals pro se from the district court’s
summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action and from the order denying
reconsideration. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de
FILED
DEC 07 2009
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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novo the grant of summary judgment, Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th
Cir. 2004), and we review for abuse of discretion the denial of a motion for
reconsideration, Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah County, Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d
1255, 1262 (9th Cir. 1993). We affirm.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Lance a continuance
to conduct discovery and to access his files in storage because Lance failed to show
that the evidence sought would defeat summary judgment. See Cornwell v. Electra
Cent. Credit Union, 439 F.3d 1018, 1026 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[A] district court abuses
its discretion only if ... the movant can show how allowing additional discovery
would have precluded summary judgment.”).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Lance’s motion for
reconsideration because Lance failed to establish good cause justifying
reconsideration. See Sch. Dist. No. 1J,, 5 F.3d at1263 (setting forth elements for
reconsideration).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying appointment of
counsel because Lance had not established probable success on the merits or an
inability to articulate his claims in light of the complexity of the issues. See Terrell
v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015 (9th Cir. 1991).

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Nor did the district court abuse its discretion by denying Lance’s motion to
amend his complaint because Lance did not provide sufficient details so that the
district court could determine whether the amendment was appropriate at that late
stage. See Pisciotta v. Teledyne Indus., 91 F.3d 1326, 1330 (9th Cir.1996) (“Leave
to amend is entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial court and will be reversed
only when such discretion has been abused.”).
In his opening brief, Lance fails to address, and therefore has abandoned,
any contentions regarding the merits of his claims.
Lance’s remaining contentions are unpersuasive.
AFFIRMED.

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