Suzanne N. Meador v. MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner, Social Security Administration

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
SUZANNE N. MEADOR,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner,
Social Security Administration,
Defendant - Appellee.
No. 08-16976
D.C. No. CV-07-02418-JF
MEMORANDUM *
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Jeremy D. Fogel, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted November 5, 2009
San Francisco, California
Before: B. FLETCHER, CANBY, and GRABER, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff Suzanne N. Meador appeals from the summary judgment in favor
of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration. On de novo review,
Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005), we affirm.
FILED
NOV 17 2009
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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1. The administrative law judge ("ALJ") provided specific and legitimate
reasons for rejecting the opinion of Plaintiff’s treating physician, Dr. Mark. Lester
v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830-31 (9th Cir. 1996). These reasons, which the record
supports, include:
• Dr. Mark’s opinion that Plaintiff’s abilities were severely limited was
inconsistent with the medical record as a whole, as demonstrated by
the observations of several other physicians who suggested that
Plaintiff was exaggerating her distress. Batson v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., 359 F.3d 1190, 1195 (9th Cir. 2004).
• Dr. Mark’s opinion that Plaintiff’s pain severely limited her abilities
was inconsistent with Plaintiff’s justification of her infrequent use of
strong pain medication by reference to side effects such as feeling
drowsy. Osenbrock v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1157, 1166 (9th Cir. 2001).
• Examination notes stating that Plaintiff was slowly improving were
inconsistent with Dr. Mark’s second residual functional capacity
questionnaire, which downgraded his assessment of her manipulative
abilities and reaching ability from no limits to only 50 percent of an
eight-hour working day.

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• The ALJ permissibly regarded Dr. Mark as an advocate, where he
appeared to be acting to assist Plaintiff and the medical record lacked
objective evidence to support his opinion. Saelee v. Chater, 94 F.3d
520, 523 (9th Cir. 1996) (per curiam).
2. The ALJ made specific findings, supported by the record, as to why he
did not find Plaintiff wholly credible in her allegations of disabling pain. The
following factors undermined her credibility:
• The discrepancy between Plaintiff’s claims of severe pain and her
infrequent use of pain medication and apparently conservative
treatment by her doctors, including Dr. Mark. Parra v. Astrue, 481
F.3d 742, 750-51 (9th Cir. 2007).
• The discrepancy between Plaintiff’s assertions and the lack of
objective evidence of her disability.
• The discrepancy between Plaintiff’s claims and Dr. Rana’s findings,
which included that Plaintiff possessed normal muscle tone and bulk
and that Plaintiff did not give full effort during the examination.
Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 958-59 (9th Cir. 2002); Meanel v.
Apfel, 172 F.3d 1111, 1114 (9th Cir. 1999).

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• The discrepancy between Plaintiff’s assertions and her admitted daily
activities. Her admission that she was teaching full-time, even though
she may have received significant accommodations, was inconsistent
with her claim to be incapable of working. Curry v. Sullivan, 925
F.2d 1127, 1130 (9th Cir. 1991).
AFFIRMED.

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