Florence Academia Calma v. ERIC H. HOLDER Jr., Attorney General

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The Honorable Lyle E. Strom, Senior U.S. District Judge for District**
of Nebraska, sitting by designation.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
FLORENCE ACADEMIA CALMA,
Petitioner,
v.
ERIC H. HOLDER Jr., Attorney General,
Respondent.
No. 06-70052
Agency No. A045-471-108
MEMORANDUM *
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Argued and Submitted October 6, 2009
San Francisco, California
Before: SCHROEDER and BERZON, Circuit Judges, and STROM, District**
Judge.
Florence Academia Calma Jones, a native and citizen of the Philippines,
seeks review of the denial of a good faith marriage waiver under 8 U.S.C. §
1186a(c)(4)(B). Having failed to submit a joint petition with her spouse before the
FILED
NOV 17 2009
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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conclusion of her two-year conditional permanent residency, Calma bears the
burden of showing that her marriage was entered into in good faith. See 8 U.S.C. §
1186a(c)(4).
Substantial evidence supports the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA’s”)
determination not to credit Calma’s assertions of good faith, given the
circumstances of the marriage. The record indicates that Calma and her husband
never lived together, bought or held property together, or commingled any funds.
Moreover, after a relative told Calma that she had paid Calma’s husband to enter
into the marriage, Calma continued to sign over her paychecks to a joint checking
account controlled by the relative.
Calma also challenges the denial, on grounds of marriage fraud, see 8 U.S.C.
§ 1154(c), of an immediate relative visa petition, maintaining that had the visa
been approved as it should have been, the order of removal could not stand. For
the same reasons we have given with regard to the good faith marriage waiver, the
determination that there was marriage fraud was necessarily supported by
substantial evidence. As the visa question is thus essentially mooted by our good
faith determination, we need not decide whether we may independently review the
merits of a visa denial on a petition for review from a later removal order.

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Calma next seeks review of the denial of an extreme hardship waiver under
8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(4)(A). To the extent that she relies on hardship resulting
from the break-up of her second marriage, we lack jurisdiction to consider her
argument because she did not make it before the BIA. See Barron v. Ashcroft,
358 F.3d 674, 677 (9th Cir. 2004). As Calma has not, in her petition for review,
identified record evidence of any other hardship that she would suffer upon
removal, we need not decide whether the BIA’s decision on the merits concerning
the extreme hardship waiver is reviewable in this court.
Finally, Calma argues that she was entitled to a waiver of removability
under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(H). Her argument is without merit. That provision
operates to waive removal only when predicated on inadmissibility at the time of
entry. See Garawan v. I.N.S., 91 F.3d 1332, 1334-35 (9th Cir. 1996) (interpreting
a prior version of § 1227(a)(1)(H)). Because Calma is subject to removal for
failure to file a joint petition two years after entry, she is ineligible for the waiver
in § 1227(a)(1)(H). See id. at 1335.
The petition for review is denied.

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