Lawrence E. Lupien v. Harold W. Clarke

United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
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No. 04-1586
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Svetlana Ploom; Jaan Ploom, *
*
Petitioners, *
* Petition for Review
v. * of an Order of the
* Board of Immigration Appeals.
Alberto Gonzales, Attorney General *
of the United States, *
* [UNPUBLISHED]
Respondent. *
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Submitted: March 4, 2005
Filed: March 10, 2005
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Before MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, FAGG, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.
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PER CURIAM.
Svetlana Ploom and her husband Jaan Ploom, natives of Estonia, petition for
review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which affirmed an
Immigration Judge’s (IJ’s) denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under
the Convention Against Torture (CAT).
The Plooms sought asylum on the basis of Svetlana’s Russian ethnicity,
alleging that in 1990 or 1991 there was a food shortage in Estonia and Svetlana was
told that she should not receive a food-ration card because she was going to be
thrown out of Estonia and there was not enough food even for Estonians. Jaan was

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able to obtain food for them from other sources and Svetlana received her food-ration
card two or three weeks later. Because Svetlana did not speak Estonian, she was
scratched and pushed by another child at age 7 and was told by the child’s mother to
get out of Estonia; Svetlana was once pushed by gang members, and was fired from
her job as a food inspector; and she was threatened by a doctor that, unless she
learned Estonian, he would not provide her medical treatment again. Jaan was
demoted from a supervisory position at a bus company and his wages were reduced
after his boss learned that he had married an ethnic Russian. The Plooms entered the
United States in 1991 and feared returning to Estonia because they did not know
Estonian and consequently they were unsure whether they would be able to find
employment or housing.
The IJ denied asylum because the Plooms’ allegations did not amount to
persecution and any problems they might face in returning to Estonia would be
caused by their lack of knowledge of the Estonian language, which was not
persecution. The BIA dismissed the Plooms’ ensuing appeal, agreeing with the IJ that
the Plooms’ experiences did not rise to the level of persecution, and they also had not
established eligibility for withholding of removal or CAT relief. The Plooms now
argue that the BIA’s decision should be vacated because they established both past
persecution and a well-founded fear of future persecution.
After careful review of the record, we conclude that the BIA’s decision is
supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. See Menendez-Donis v.
Ashcroft, 360 F.3d 915, 917-19 (8th Cir. 2004) (standard of review);
Regalado-Garcia v. INS, 305 F.3d 784, 787 (8th Cir. 2002) (persecution is infliction
or threat of death, torture, or injury to one’s person or freedom, on account of
protected ground); Fisher v. INS, 291 F.3d 491, 497 (8th Cir. 2002) (harassment by
private citizens does not rise to level of persecution); Lim v. INS, 224 F.3d 929, 936
(9th Cir. 2000) (unfulfilled threats must be so menacing as to cause significant actual
suffering or harm to constitute past persecution); Feleke v. INS, 118 F.3d 594, 598

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(8th Cir. 1997) (isolated acts of violence do not compel finding of persecution; fears
of economic hardship or lack of opportunity do not establish well-founded fear of
persecution); Minwalla v. INS, 706 F.2d 831, 835 (8th Cir. 1983) (persecution
requires a threat to life or freedom; “economic detriment is not sufficient”).
Thus, the Plooms’ claim for withholding of removal necessarily fails as well,
see Regalado-Garcia, 305 F.3d at 788 (withholding-of-removal standard is more
rigorous than asylum standard), and we see no basis in the record for relief under the
CAT, see Habtemicael v. Ashcroft, 370 F.3d 774, 780-82 (8th Cir. 2004)
(requirements for CAT relief).
Accordingly, we deny the petition. The Plooms moved for a stay of removal
before their voluntary-departure period expired, and we therefore deem this court’s
grant of their unopposed motion to include a stay of their voluntary-departure period
as well. See Rife v. Ashcroft, 374 F.3d 606, 616 (8th Cir. 2004).
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