Rhonda Ezell v. City of Chicago

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
Nos. 14-3312 & 14-3322
R HONDA EZELL, et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellees/
Cross-Appellants,
v.
C ITY OF C HICAGO ,
Defendant-Appellant/
Cross-Appellee.
____________________
Appeals from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 10 C 5135 — Virginia M. Kendall, Judge.
____________________
A RGUED NOVEMBER 4, 2015 — DECIDED J ANUARY 18, 2017
____________________
Before K ANNE, R OVNER , and S YKES, Circuit Judges.
S YKES, Circuit Judge. This case returns to us with new con-
troversies arising from Chicago’s response to Heller and
McDonald, 1 the Supreme Court’s Second Amendment deci-
1 See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008); McDonald v. City of
Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010).

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2 Nos. 14-3312 & 14-3322
sions. Last time we addressed an ordinance banning shoot-
ing ranges throughout the city. See Ezell v. City of Chicago
(“Ezell I”), 651 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 2011). The range ban was
part of a sweeping ordinance adopted in the wake of
McDonald, which invalidated Chicago’s law prohibiting
handgun possession. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S.
742, 791 (2010). To replace the handgun ban, the City estab-
lished a permit regime for lawful gun possession and re-
quired one hour of range training as prerequisite to a permit,
but prohibited firing ranges everywhere in the city. Ezell I,
651 F.3d at 689–90. We held that the range ban was incom-
patible with the Second Amendment and instructed the
district court to preliminarily enjoin it. Id. at 710–11.
The City responded by replacing the range ban with an
elaborate scheme of regulations governing shooting ranges.
Litigation resumed, prompting the City to rewrite or repeal
parts of the new regime. The district judge invalidated some
of the challenged regulations and upheld others. Ezell v. City
of Chicago (“Ezell II”), 70 F. Supp. 3d 871, 882–92 (N.D. Ill.
2014). Three provisions currently remain in dispute: (1) a
zoning restriction allowing gun ranges only as special uses
in manufacturing districts; (2) a zoning restriction prohibit-
ing gun ranges within 100 feet of another range or within
500 feet of a residential district, school, place of worship, and
multiple other uses; and (3) a provision barring anyone
under age 18 from entering a shooting range. The judge
permanently enjoined the manufacturing-district restriction
but upheld the distancing and age restrictions. Both sides
appealed.
We affirm in part and reverse in part. The two zoning
regulations—the manufacturing-district classification and

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Nos. 14-3312 & 14-3322 3
the distancing rule—dramatically limit the ability to site a
shooting range within city limits. Under the combined effect
of these two regulations, only 2.2% of the city’s total acreage
is even theoretically available, and the commercial viability
of any of these parcels is questionable—so much so that no
shooting range yet exists. This severely limits Chicagoans’
Second Amendment right to maintain proficiency in firearm
use via target practice at a range. To justify these barriers,
the City raised only speculative claims of harm to public
health and safety. That’s not nearly enough to survive the
heightened scrutiny that applies to burdens on Second
Amendment rights.
The age restriction also flunks heightened scrutiny. We
held in Ezell I that the Second Amendment protects the right
to learn and practice firearm use in the controlled setting of a
shooting range. The City insists that no person under age 18
enjoys this right. That’s an extraordinarily broad claim, and
the City failed to back it up. Nor did the City adequately
justify barring anyone under 18 from entering a range. To
the contrary, its own witness on this subject agreed that the
age restriction is overbroad because teenagers can safely be
taught to shoot and youth firearm instruction is both pru-
dent and can be conducted in a safe manner.
I. Background
In Ezell I we held that Chicago’s ban on firing ranges
could not be reconciled with the Second Amendment and
ordered the district court to preliminarily enjoin its enforce-
ment. 651 F.3d at 710–11. We assume familiarity with that
opinion, though we’ll repeat the key holdings as necessary
here.

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4 Nos. 14-3312 & 14-3322
Chicago responded to our decision by promulgating a
host of new regulations governing firing ranges, including
zoning restrictions, licensing and operating rules, construc-
tion standards, and environmental requirements. (Firing
ranges operated by law enforcement and private-security
firms are exempt from the regulatory scheme; there are
currently 11 of these located throughout the city.) The
plaintiffs returned to court arguing that many of the new
regulations violate the Second Amendment. 2
In the face of this second round of litigation, the City
amended the regulatory scheme four times, Ezell II,
70 F. Supp. 3d at 876, repealing or revising some of the new
rules. The parties eventually filed cross-motions for sum-
mary judgment. Ruling on the motions, the judge invalidat-
ed some regulations and upheld others, id. at 884–93, leaving
both sides with something to appeal. And appeal they did,
though many of the judge’s rulings are left unchallenged,
helpfully narrowing the present scope of the dispute.
Three regulations remain contested. The first two are
zoning provisions limiting where shooting ranges may
locate. Section 17-5-0207 of the Chicago Municipal Code
permits ranges only in manufacturing districts with a
special-use permit. Section 17-9-0120 is a distancing re-
striction barring shooting ranges within 100 feet of another
range or within 500 feet of any district that is zoned for
2 The individual plaintiffs are Rhonda Ezell, Joseph Brown, and William
Hespen, Chicago residents who want access to a firing range within city
limits. Action Target, another plaintiff, is a leading designer and builder
of gun ranges. The remaining plaintiffs are the Second Amendment
Foundation and the Illinois Rifle Association, two nonprofits that
advocate for Second Amendment rights.

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Nos. 14-3312 & 14-3322 5
residential use or planned residential use, or any preexisting
school, day-care facility, place of worship, liquor retailer,
children’s activities facility, library, museum, or hospital.
The third contested regulation, section 4-151-100(d), prohib-
its anyone under age 18 from entering a shooting range.
The judge held that the zoning restrictions severely limit
where shooting ranges can be located and accordingly
required the City to establish a close fit between the re-
strictions and the public interests they serve. Id. at 883. The
City identified several harmful secondary effects that it
claimed were associated with shooting ranges: gun theft, fire
hazards, and airborne lead contamination. Id. at 883–84. But
it produced no evidentiary support for these claims beyond
the speculative testimony of three city officials—Zoning
Administrator Patricia Scudiero, Police Lieutenant Kevin
Johnson, and Rosemary Krimbel, the Commissioner of
Business Affairs and Consumer Protection. Id.
We’ll return to the specifics of their testimony later; for
now it’s enough to say that the judge found it wholly inade-
quate to discharge the City’s burden to justify relegating
shooting ranges to manufacturing districts. Id. Because the
City failed to establish a connection between this zoning rule
and the public interests it is meant to serve, the judge invali-
dated the manufacturing-district restriction. Id. at 884.
But the judge rejected the challenge to the 500-foot dis-
tancing requirement. She found this restriction “significantly
less burdensome” when considered “standing alone.” Id. She
likened it “to a ‘law forbidding the carrying of firearms in
sensitive places such as schools and government buildings,’”
which Heller specifically did not call into question. Id. (quot-
ing District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626–27 (2008)).

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6 Nos. 14-3312 & 14-3322
Without further analysis, the judge upheld the 500-foot
distancing restriction. She did not specifically address the
additional requirement of a 100-foot buffer zone between
firing ranges.
Finally, the judge upheld the age restriction, concluding
that “minors are not guaranteed Second Amendment
rights.” Id. at 889. Cross-appeals followed.
II. Analysis
The City asks us to reinstate its zoning restriction limit-
ing firing ranges to manufacturing districts. The plaintiffs
defend the judge’s decision to strike that rule; they argue as
well that the distancing and age restrictions fail Second
Amendment scrutiny. Our review is de novo, so we give
these issues a fresh look. See Dunnet Bay Constr. Co. v.
Borggren, 799 F.3d 676, 688 (7th Cir. 2015) (“We review the
district court’s ruling on the cross-motions for summary
judgment de novo, construing all reasonable inferences from
the record in favor of the party against whom the motion
under consideration is made.”).
A. Ezell I
We take as settled what was established in Ezell I. There
we held that resolving Second Amendment cases usually
entails two inquiries. The threshold question is whether the
regulated activity falls within the scope of the Second
Amendment. Ezell I, 651 F.3d at 701–02. This is a textual and
historical inquiry; if the government can establish that the
challenged law regulates activity falling outside the scope of
the right as originally understood, then “the regulated
activity is categorically unprotected, and the law is not
subject to further Second Amendment review.” Id. at 703.

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Nos. 14-3312 & 14-3322 7
“If the government cannot establish this—if the historical
evidence is inconclusive or suggests that the regulated
activity is not categorically unprotected—then there must be
a second inquiry into the strength of the government’s
justification for restricting or regulating the exercise of
Second Amendment rights.” Id. This requires an evaluation
of “the regulatory means the government has chosen and the
public-benefits end it seeks to achieve.” Id. The rigor of this
means-end review depends on “how close the law comes to
the core of the Second Amendment right and the severity of
the law’s burden on the right.” Id. Severe burdens on the
core right of armed defense require a very strong public-
interest justification and a close means-end fit; lesser bur-
dens, and burdens on activity lying closer to the margins of
the right, are more easily justified. Id. In all cases the gov-
ernment bears the burden of justifying its law under a
heightened standard of scrutiny; rational-basis review does
not apply. Id. at 706.
Addressing the “scope” question in Ezell I, we rejected
the City’s argument that range training is categorically
unprotected by the Second Amendment. We held that the
core individual right of armed defense—as recognized in
Heller and incorporated against the states in McDonald—
includes a corresponding right to acquire and maintain
proficiency in firearm use through target practice at a range.
651 F.3d at 704. We explained that the core right to possess
firearms for protection “wouldn’t mean much without the
training and practice that make it effective.” Id. We noted
that Heller itself supports this understanding. Id. at 704
(citing Heller, 554 U.S. at 616, 619). Finally, we held that the
City had failed to establish that target practice is wholly
unprotected as a matter of history and legal tradition in the

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8 Nos. 14-3312 & 14-3322
founding era or when the Fourteenth Amendment was
ratified. Id. at 704–06.
This holding and these observations control here. Range
training is not categorically outside the Second Amendment.
To the contrary, it lies close to the core of the individual
right of armed defense.
The City also failed to carry its burden in Ezell I at step
two of the analytical framework. We held that banishing
firing ranges from the city was a severe encroachment on the
right of law-abiding, responsible Chicagoans to acquire and
maintain proficiency in firearm use, “an important corollary
to the meaningful exercise of the core right to possess fire-
arms for self-defense.” Id. at 708. Accordingly, we applied a
strong form of intermediate scrutiny and required the City
to demonstrate “a close fit between the range ban and the
actual public interests it serves, and also that the public’s
interests are strong enough to justify so substantial an
encumbrance on individual Second Amendment rights.” Id.
at 708–09. The City did not carry this burden, so we instruct-
ed the district court to enjoin the firing-range ban. Id. at 709–
11.
All this is established law. Resisting these settled propo-
sitions, the City now asks us to revisit and modify the ana-
lytical framework established in Ezell I. In its view only laws
that substantially or “unduly” burden Second Amendment
rights should get any form of heightened judicial scrutiny.
This is an odd argument; we specifically addressed and
rejected that approach in Ezell I. Id. at 703 n.12; id. at 706. Our
reasoning flowed from Heller itself: The Supreme Court
explicitly rejected rational-basis review, making it clear that
burdens on Second Amendment rights are always subject to

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Nos. 14-3312 & 14-3322 9
heightened scrutiny. Heller, 554 U.S. at 628 n.27 (“If all that
was required to overcome the right to keep and bear arms
was a rational basis, the Second Amendment would be
redundant with the separate constitutional prohibition on
irrational laws, and would have no effect.”). In McDonald the
Court cautioned against treating the Second Amendment as
a “second-class right, subject to an entirely different body of
rules than the other Bill of Rights guarantees.” 561 U.S. at
780. The City’s proposed “substantial burden” test as a
gateway to heightened scrutiny does exactly that.
We note for good measure that most other circuits have
adopted the framework articulated in Ezell I and require
some form of heightened scrutiny when evaluating the
government’s justification for a law challenged on Second
Amendment grounds. See, e.g., Tyler v. Hillsdale Cty. Sheriff’s
Dep’t, 837 F.3d 678, 685–86 (6th Cir. 2016) (en banc); Jackson v.
City & County of San Francisco, 746 F.3d 953, 961 (9th Cir.
2014); Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobac-
co, Firearms & Explosives, 700 F.3d 185, 194 (5th Cir. 2012);
Heller v. District of Columbia, 670 F.3d 1244, 1252 (D.C. Cir.
2011); United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 680 (4th Cir.
2010); United States v. Reese, 627 F.3d 792, 800–01 (10th Cir.
2010); United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 89 (3d Cir.
2010). We see no reason to retreat from our settled approach
and now repeat what we said in Ezell I: If the challenged law
regulates activity protected by the Second Amendment, the
government “bears the burden of justifying its action[s]
under some heightened standard of judicial review.” 651 F.3d
at 706.

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10 Nos. 14-3312 & 14-3322
B. New Regulations, New Challenges
1. Zoning restrictions
This new round of litigation is somewhat different, how-
ever; this time we’re reviewing a set of zoning restrictions,
not an outright ban on shooting ranges throughout the city.
Still, the record reflects that the zoning regulations at issue
here severely limit where shooting ranges may locate. The
combined effect of the manufacturing-district classification
and the distancing restriction leaves only about 2.2% of the
city’s total acreage even theoretically available to site a
shooting range (10.6% of the total acreage currently zoned
for business, commercial, and manufacturing use). It’s
unclear how many of these parcels are commercially suitable
for siting a shooting range catering to the general public.
The plaintiffs presented evidence—including the testi-
mony of two experts—showing that in other jurisdictions
shooting ranges are treated as commercial uses and are often
attached to gun retailers, and that banishing them to a tiny
subset of the land zoned for manufacturing reduces their
commercial viability based on traffic patterns, lack of arterial
roads, and other impediments. Tellingly, years after Ezell I
no publicly accessible shooting range yet exists in Chicago.
We therefore agree with the district judge that the chal-
lenged zoning regulations, though not on their face an
outright prohibition of gun ranges, nonetheless severely
restrict the right of Chicagoans to train in firearm use at a
range.
We also agree with the judge’s decision to require the
City to establish a close fit between the challenged zoning
regulations and the actual public benefits they serve—and to

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Nos. 14-3312 & 14-3322 11
do so with actual evidence, not just assertions. 70 F. Supp. 3d
at 883. The judge’s analysis went offtrack, however, when
she examined the two zoning regulations separately and
summarily upheld the 500-foot distancing requirement as a
“sensitive place” restriction, essentially immune from chal-
lenge under Heller.
There are two problems with this approach. First, the
manufacturing-district and distancing restrictions stand or
fall together. The two zoning requirements work in tandem
to limit where shooting ranges may locate. The impact of the
distancing rule cannot be measured “standing alone,” as the
district judge thought; to meaningfully evaluate the effect of
the buffer-zone requirement, we need to know which zoning
districts are open to firing ranges. The manufacturing-
district classification now stands enjoined, and to that extent
we agree with the judge’s decision, for reasons we’ll explain
in a moment. That puts the ball squarely in the City’s court
to decide which districts it will now open to firing ranges
and on what terms. A different combination of zoning
rules—say, a more permissive zoning classification and a
less restrictive buffer-zone rule—may well be justified, if
carefully drafted to serve actual public interests while at the
same time making commercial firing ranges practicable in
the city. But the two zoning restrictions—the manufacturing-
district classification and the distancing requirement—are a
single regulatory package for purposes of Second Amend-
ment scrutiny. We can’t evaluate the degree to which these
zoning regulations, standing alone, encumber Second
Amendment rights and are responsible for the absence of
commercial shooting ranges in the city. They must be evalu-
ated as a package.

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12 Nos. 14-3312 & 14-3322
Second, the judge summarily upheld the distancing re-
strictions based on the enigmatic passage in Heller in which
the Court cautioned that its opinion should not be read as
casting doubt on “longstanding prohibitions on the carrying
of firearms … in sensitive places” like schools and govern-
ment buildings. 554 U.S. at 626–27. The judge apparently
thought this language effectively immunized the buffer-zone
rule from constitutional review. Ezell II, 70 F. Supp. 3d at
884–85.
We’re not sure that’s the correct way to understand the
Court’s “sensitive places” passage, but we don’t need to
resolve the matter in order to decide this case. The distanc-
ing requirement is not a limitation on where firearms may be
carried, so it doesn’t fall within the ambit of this language.
Moreover, any suggestion that firearms are categorically
incompatible with residential areas—recall that residential
districts are included in the City’s buffer-zone rule—is flatly
inconsistent with Heller, which was explicit that possession
of firearms in the home for self-defense is the core Second
Amendment right. Heller, 554 U.S. at 635–36. So the manu-
facturing-district classification and the distancing require-
ment must be reviewed together.
With that point explained, we return to the City’s prof-
fered justification for regulating firing ranges in this way.
The City claims that confining firing ranges to manufactur-
ing districts and keeping them away from other ranges,
residential districts, schools, places of worship, and myriad
other uses serves important public health and safety inter-
ests. Specifically, the City cites three concerns: firing ranges
attract gun thieves, cause airborne lead contamination, and
carry a risk of fire.

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Nos. 14-3312 & 14-3322 13
The City has provided no evidentiary support for these
claims, nor has it established that limiting shooting ranges to
manufacturing districts and distancing them from the multi-
ple and various uses listed in the buffer-zone rule has any
connection to reducing these risks. We certainly accept the
general proposition that preventing crime, protecting the
environment, and preventing fire are important public
concerns. But the City continues to assume, as it did in
Ezell I, that it can invoke these interests as a general matter
and call it a day. It simply asserts, without evidence, that
shooting ranges generate increased crime, cause airborne
lead contamination in the adjacent neighborhood, and carry
a greater risk of fire than other uses.
The City’s own witnesses testified to the lack of eviden-
tiary support for these assertions. They repeatedly admitted
that they knew of no data or empirical evidence to support
any of these claims. Indeed, Patricia Scudiero, the City’s
zoning administrator, conceded that neither she nor anyone
else in her department made any effort to review how other
cities zone firing ranges. She conducted no investigation,
visited no firing ranges in other jurisdictions, consulted no
expert, and essentially did no research at all.
To shore up its weak defense of the two zoning re-
strictions, the City submitted a list of 16 thefts from gun
stores and shooting ranges around the country since 2010.
Only two of these incidents involved thefts from shooting
ranges, and no evidence suggests that these thefts caused a
spike in crime in the surrounding neighborhood.
The City’s assertions about environmental and fire risks
are likewise unsupported by actual evidence. In its briefs the
City relies on a study by the National Institute for Occupa-

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14 Nos. 14-3312 & 14-3322
tional Safety and Health explaining that improperly venti-
lated shooting ranges can release lead-contaminated air into
the surrounding environment. But the report goes on to
describe appropriate filtering techniques that prevent this
danger entirely. As for the concern about fire, the City
provided no evidence to suggest that a properly constructed
and responsibly operated commercial shooting range pre-
sents a greater risk of spontaneous combustion than other
commercial uses.
Moreover, and importantly, Chicago has promulgated a
host of regulations to guard against environmental and fire
hazards and otherwise ensure that shooting ranges will be
properly constructed, maintained, and operated. These
regulations were for the most part upheld, Ezell II, 70 F.
Supp. 3d at 884–93, and the judge’s rulings are unchallenged
on appeal.
And if more were needed, the City concedes (as it must)
that law-enforcement and private-security ranges operate in
commercial districts throughout Chicago near schools,
churches, parks, and stores; the City acknowledges that they
operate quite safely in these locations. Common sense
suggests that law-enforcement ranges probably do not
attract many thieves, but the City’s theft-protection rationale
for these zoning rules is so woefully unsupported that the
distinction between law-enforcement and commercial ranges
doesn’t carry much weight. The City doesn’t even try to
argue that commercial ranges create greater fire or environ-
mental risks than law-enforcement ranges.
We explained in Ezell I that the City cannot defend its
regulatory scheme “with shoddy data or reasoning. The
municipality’s evidence must fairly support the municipali-

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Nos. 14-3312 & 14-3322 15
ty’s rationale for its ordinance.” 651 F.3d at 709 (quoting City
of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 438 (2002)).
To borrow from the free-speech context, “there must be
evidence” to support the City’s rationale for the challenged
regulations; “lawyers’ talk is insufficient.” Annex Books, Inc.
v. City of Indianapolis, 581 F.3d 460, 463 (7th Cir. 2009). Here,
as in Ezell I, the City’s defense of the challenged zoning rules
rests on sheer “speculation about accidents and theft.”
651 F.3d at 709. That’s not nearly enough to satisfy its bur-
den. The manufacturing-district and distancing restrictions
are unconstitutional.
2. Age restriction
The City’s primary defense of the age-18 limitation is to
argue that minors have no Second Amendment rights at all.
To support this sweeping claim, the City points to some
nineteenth-century state laws prohibiting firearm possession
by minors and prohibiting firearm sales to minors. Laws of
this nature might properly inform the question whether
minors have a general right, protected by the Second
Amendment, to purchase or possess firearms. But they have
little relevance to the issue at hand.
The plaintiffs do not question the permissibility of regu-
lating the purchase and possession of firearms by minors.
They challenge only the extraordinary breadth of the City’s
age restriction. Banning anyone under age 18 from entering a
firing range prevents older adolescents and teens from
accessing adult-supervised firearm instruction in the con-
trolled setting of a range. There’s zero historical evidence
that firearm training for this age group is categorically
unprotected. At least the City hasn’t identified any, and
we’ve found none ourselves.

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16 Nos. 14-3312 & 14-3322
To the contrary, Heller itself points in precisely the oppo-
site direction. 554 U.S. at 617–18 (“[T]o bear arms implies
something more than the mere keeping; it implies the learn-
ing to handle and use them … ; it implies the right to meet
for voluntary discipline in arms, observing in doing so the
laws of public order.” (quoting THOMAS M C I NTYRE C OOLEY ,
A TREATISE ON THE C ONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 271 (1868)));
see also id. at 619 (“No doubt, a citizen who keeps a gun or
pistol under judicious precautions, practices in safe places
the use of it, and in due time teaches his sons to do the same,
exercises his individual right.” (quoting BENJAMIN VAUGHAN
A BBOTT, JUDGE AND J URY : A POPULAR EXPLANATION OF THE
LEADING T OPICS IN THE LAW OF THE L AND 333 (1880))).
For the same reason, the City’s reliance on contemporary
caselaw is entirely misplaced. The few cases it identifies all
address laws prohibiting minors from possessing, purchas-
ing, or carrying firearms. See, e.g., Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am., Inc.
v. McCraw, 719 F.3d 338 (5th Cir. 2013) (upholding a state
law banning 18- to 20-year-olds from carrying handguns in
public); Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives, 700 F.3d 185 (5th Cir. 2012)
(upholding a federal law prohibiting 18- to 21-year olds from
purchasing a handgun); United States v. Rene E., 583 F.3d 8
(1st Cir. 2009) (upholding a federal law prohibiting juvenile
handgun possession); People v. Mosley, 33 N.E.3d 137 (Ill.
2015) (upholding a state law banning 18- to 20-year-olds
from carrying handguns outside the home); People v. Aguilar,
2 N.E.3d 321, 329 (Ill. 2013) (upholding a state law prohibit-
ing those under age 18 from possessing concealable fire-
arms); State v. Sieyes, 225 P.3d 995 (Wash. 2010) (upholding a
state law prohibiting those under age 18 from possessing
firearms).

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Nos. 14-3312 & 14-3322 17
Nor can the City find help from our decision in Horsley v.
Trame, 808 F.3d 1126 (7th Cir. 2015). Horsley was not, strictly
speaking, a claim about the Second Amendment rights of
minors; the case addressed an Illinois law that requires 18- to
21-year-olds to provide written parental consent to obtain a
so-called “FOID card,” a prerequisite to lawful ownership of
a firearm. Horsley discussed but expressly did not decide
whether minors are categorically excluded from the Second
Amendment right. Id. at 1131 (“We need not decide today
whether 18-, 19-, and 20-year-olds are within the scope of the
Second Amendment.”). The panel opted instead to apply
heightened scrutiny to the Illinois law at step two of the
Ezell I framework and under that standard upheld the
parental-consent requirement. Id. at 1132–34. Horsley, like the
other cases cited by the City, does not speak to the issue
before us here.
In short, no case has yet addressed a claim comparable to
this one: A challenge to an age restriction that extinguishes
even the right of older adolescents and teens to receive
adult-supervised firearm instruction in the controlled setting
of a firing range. Because the City has not met its burden to
establish that no person under the age of 18 enjoys this right,
we proceed to Ezell I’s second step.
The City staked most of its case on the categorical argu-
ment and made little effort to justify prohibiting older
adolescents and teens from engaging in supervised target
practice at a range. Its rationale rests largely on an argument
from “common sense” about public safety and the safety of
children. Yet even common sense does not lie with the City.
In what must have come as a surprise to the City, Com-
missioner Krimbel, the City’s own witness on this subject,

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18 Nos. 14-3312 & 14-3322
actually agreed with the plaintiffs’ attorney that banning
anyone under 18 from entering a shooting range goes too far
and extends beyond legitimate safety concerns. Here’s a
taste: “I will give you this: I believe [the age restriction] is
inartfully drafted because it seem[s] clear to me that the
purpose of it is to not have kids running around unsuper-
vised.” And this: “[Y]ou might want to draft that a little bit
differently” because shooting ranges are a “good place” to
teach a youngster “how to fire a rifle.” And this: “In fact, my
own son took a shooting class when he was 12, so I’m well
aware of the fact it’s okay to teach a young person how to
shoot a gun properly.” Commissioner Krimbel also conced-
ed that the City lacked any data or empirical evidence to
justify its blanket no-one-under-18 rule.
The City is left to rely on generalized assertions about the
developmental immaturity of children, the risk of lead
poisoning by inhalation or ingestion, and a handful of tort
cases involving the negligent supervision of children who
were left to their own devices with loaded firearms. No one
can disagree—and we certainly do not—that firearms in the
hands of young children or unsupervised youth are fraught
with serious risks to safety. Nor do we question the aim of
protecting children against lead poisoning. We accept as
well that the presence of young children at a firing range can
be a risky distraction during target practice, even for a
skilled marksman.
But the City has specific regulations aimed at containing
the environmental risks, as we’ve already noted. And the
remaining public-safety interests can be addressed by a
more closely tailored age restriction—one that does not
completely extinguish the right of older adolescents and teens

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Nos. 14-3312 & 14-3322 19
in Chicago to learn how to shoot in an appropriately super-
vised setting at a firing range. As presently written, howev-
er, the City has failed to adequately justify its broad age
restriction. 3
III. Conclusion
As we said in Ezell I, Chicago has room to regulate the
construction and operation of firing ranges to address
genuine risks to public health and safety. 651 F.3d at 711.
This includes setting rules about where firing ranges may
locate and the terms on which minors may enter. But the
City has not justified the three contested regulations. Ac-
cordingly, the judge was right to enjoin the manufacturing-
district restriction, and to that extent the judgment is af-
firmed. The distancing and age restrictions are likewise
invalid; to that extent the judgment is reversed and the case
is remanded with instructions to modify the injunction
consistent with this opinion.
A FFIRMED IN PART, R EVERSED
IN PART, AND R EMANDED WITH
INSTRUCTIONS.
3 The plaintiffs also mounted a First Amendment challenge to the age
restriction. We do not address this alternative argument.

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20ȱ Nos.ȱ14Ȭ3312ȱ&ȱ14Ȭ3322ȱ
R OVNER ,ȱ Circuitȱ Judge,ȱ dissentingȱ inȱ partȱ andȱ concurringȱ
inȱpart.ȱȱ
ItȱisȱnoȱsecretȱthatȱtheȱCityȱofȱChicagoȱwouldȱpreferȱtoȱreȬ
duceȱ theȱ numberȱ ofȱ gunsȱ inȱ Chicago.ȱ Theȱ Cityȱ facesȱ enorȬ
mousȱpublicȱandȱpoliticalȱpressureȱtoȱreduceȱitsȱgunȱviolenceȱ
problemȱ (4,638ȱ shootingsȱ inȱ 2016) 1 ,ȱ whileȱ atȱ theȱ sameȱ timeȱ
upholdingȱ theȱ Secondȱ Amendmentȱ rightsȱ ofȱ itsȱ citizensȱ asȱ
setȱforthȱinȱtheȱcaseȱlawȱemergingȱfromȱDistrictȱofȱColumbiaȱv.ȱ
Heller,ȱ 554ȱ U.S.ȱ 579ȱ (2008)ȱ andȱ McDonaldȱ v.ȱ Cityȱ ofȱ Chicago,ȱ
561ȱU.S.ȱ742ȱ(2010).ȱCorrectlyȱorȱnot,ȱtheȱCityȱreasonedȱthatȱ
reducingȱ theȱ numberȱ ofȱ gunsȱ travellingȱ toȱ andȱ fromȱ firingȱ
ranges,ȱreducingȱtheȱconcentrationȱofȱgunsȱinȱoneȱarea,ȱandȱ
reducingȱtheȱamountȱofȱgunfireȱinȱgeneralȱcouldȱhelpȱreduceȱ
crimeȱ andȱ shootingsȱ inȱ Chicago.ȱ Inȱ myȱ concurrenceȱ inȱ theȱ
firstȱ appearanceȱ ofȱ thisȱ caseȱ beforeȱ thisȱ court,ȱ Iȱ expressedȱ
sympathyȱ forȱ theȱ City’sȱ difficultȱ pathȱ betweenȱ thisȱ Scyllaȱ
andȱ Charybdis,ȱ butȱ notedȱ thatȱ theȱ Cityȱ hadȱ toȱ “comeȱ toȱ
termsȱ withȱ th[e]ȱ reality”ȱ imposedȱ byȱ Hellerȱ andȱ McDonald.ȱ
Andȱ indeedȱ itȱ has.ȱ Whetherȱ itȱ hasȱ comeȱ farȱ enoughȱ isȱ theȱ
subjectȱofȱtoday’sȱmajorityȱandȱmyȱseparateȱopinion.ȱ
Theȱ majorityȱ opinionȱ reachesȱ conclusionsȱ onȱ threeȱ matȬ
ters,ȱ theȱ constitutionalityȱ ofȱ limitingȱ firingȱ rangesȱ toȱ manuȬ
facturingȱdistrictsȱ(theȱzoningȱregulation),ȱtheȱconstitutionalȬ
ityȱofȱrequiringȱfiringȱ rangesȱtoȱbeȱlocatedȱ moreȱthanȱ aȱcerȬ
tainȱdistanceȱfromȱotherȱspecificȱusesȱ(theȱdistancingȱregulaȬ
tion),ȱ andȱ theȱ constitutionalityȱ ofȱ aȱ banȱ onȱ minorsȱ atȱ firingȱ
ranges.ȱ Theȱ majorityȱ findsȱ allȱ threeȱ toȱ beȱ unconstitutional.ȱ
AlthoughȱIȱagreeȱthatȱtheȱCityȱfailedȱtoȱpresentȱsufficientȱevȬ
ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ
1 Chicagoȱ Tribune,ȱ Chicagoȱ shootingȱ victims,ȱ http://crime.chicaȱ gotribȬ
une.com/chicago/shootings/,ȱLastȱupdatedȱJan.ȱ11,ȱ2017.ȱ

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Nos.ȱ14Ȭ3312ȱ&ȱ14Ȭ3322ȱ 21
idenceȱ toȱ supportȱ itsȱ manufacturingȱ districtȱ requirement,ȱ Iȱ
doȱ notȱ agreeȱ thatȱ theȱ distancingȱ requirementȱ failsȱ asȱwell.ȱ Iȱ
alsoȱwriteȱseparatelyȱtoȱnoteȱthatȱalthoughȱaȱtotalȱbanȱonȱmiȬ
norsȱ atȱ firingȱ rangesȱ doesȱ notȱ withstandȱ aȱ constitutionalȱ
challengeȱ onȱ thisȱ record,ȱ theȱ Cityȱ hasȱ aȱ strongȱ interest,ȱ andȱ
thereforeȱwideȱlatitude,ȱtoȱenactȱregulationsȱthatȱwillȱprotectȱ
childrenȱfrom,ȱasȱtheȱmajorityȱstates,ȱ“seriousȱrisksȱtoȱsafety”ȱ
fromȱtheȱinherentȱdangersȱofȱfirearms.ȱ
Asȱ theȱ majorityȱ describes,ȱ theȱ testȱ thatȱ thisȱ circuitȱ hasȱ
elucidatedȱ forȱ Secondȱ Amendmentȱ casesȱ isȱ aȱ meansȬendsȱ
testȱinȱwhichȱaȱcourtȱmustȱevaluateȱtheȱregulatoryȱmeansȱtheȱ
governmentȱhasȱchosenȱtoȱregulateȱfirearmsȱandȱtheȱpublicȬ
benefitȱ endȱ theȱ regulationȱ seeksȱ toȱ achieve.ȱ Ezellȱ v.ȱ Cityȱ ofȱ
Chicago,ȱ 651ȱ F.3dȱ 684,ȱ 703ȱ (2011)ȱ (“Ezellȱ I”).ȱ Itȱ isȱ aȱ slidingȱ
scaleȱ test—theȱ greaterȱ theȱ burden,ȱ theȱ greaterȱ theȱ justificaȬ
tionȱneeded.ȱOr,ȱasȱtheȱmajorityȱpanelȱdescribedȱmoreȱcomȬ
pletelyȱinȱEzellȱI,ȱȱ
aȱ severeȱ burdenȱ onȱ theȱ coreȱ Secondȱ AmendȬ
mentȱ rightȱ ofȱ armedȱ selfȬdefenseȱ willȱ requireȱ
anȱextremelyȱstrongȱpublicȬinterestȱjustificationȱ
andȱ aȱ closeȱ fitȱ betweenȱ theȱ government’sȱ
meansȱandȱitsȱend.ȱSecond,ȱlawsȱrestrictingȱacȬ
tivityȱlyingȱcloserȱtoȱtheȱmarginsȱofȱtheȱSecondȱ
Amendmentȱ right,ȱ lawsȱ thatȱ merelyȱ regulateȱ
ratherȱthanȱrestrict,ȱandȱmodestȱburdensȱonȱtheȱ
rightȱ mayȱ beȱ moreȱ easilyȱ justified.ȱ Howȱ muchȱ
moreȱeasilyȱdependsȱonȱtheȱrelativeȱseverityȱofȱ
theȱburdenȱandȱitsȱproximityȱtoȱtheȱcoreȱofȱtheȱ
right.ȱ
EzellȱI,ȱ651ȱF.3dȱatȱ708.ȱ

-- 21 of 39 --

22ȱ Nos.ȱ14Ȭ3312ȱ&ȱ14Ȭ3322ȱ
InȱEzellȱI,ȱtheȱmajorityȱdescribedȱtheȱrightȱatȱissueȱhere—
theȱ rightȱ toȱ participateȱ inȱ rangeȱ training—asȱ “anȱ importantȱ
corollaryȱtoȱtheȱmeaningfulȱexerciseȱofȱtheȱcoreȱrightȱtoȱposȬ
sessȱfirearmsȱforȱselfȬdefense.”ȱId.ȱInȱmyȱconcurrenceȱinȱEzellȱ
I,ȱ Iȱ describedȱ itȱ asȱ “anȱ areaȱ ancillaryȱ toȱ aȱ coreȱ right.”ȱ Id.ȱ atȱ
713ȱ(Rovner,ȱJ.,ȱconcurring).ȱForȱ theȱmomentȱweȱcanȱignoreȱ
whetherȱ thereȱ isȱ aȱ differenceȱ inȱ theseȱ twoȱ descriptionsȱ andȱ
assumeȱthatȱtheȱrightȱisȱanȱimportantȱone;ȱalthoughȱnotȱpartȱ
andȱ parcelȱ ofȱ theȱ coreȱ right,ȱ closeȱ toȱ butȱ subordinateȱ toȱ it.ȱ
Howȱfarȱsubordinateȱisȱyetȱunknown.ȱItȱcarriedȱmuchȱimportȱ
inȱEzellȱI,ȱinȱpart,ȱbecauseȱtheȱCityȱrequiredȱallȱgunȱownersȱtoȱ
obtainȱtrainingȱthatȱincludedȱoneȱhourȱofȱliveȬrangeȱinstrucȬ
tion,ȱandȱthenȱbannedȱallȱliveȱrangesȱwithinȱtheȱCityȱlimits.ȱ
Inȱ Ezellȱ I,ȱ theȱ majorityȱ heldȱ thatȱ theȱ outrightȱ banȱ onȱ firingȱ
rangesȱ inȱ theȱ Cityȱ imposedȱ aȱ severeȱ encroachmentȱ andȱ reȬ
quiredȱanȱexactingȱtest.ȱId.ȱatȱ708–09.ȱInȱotherȱwords,ȱinȱEzellȱ
I,ȱ rangeȱ trainingȱ unlockedȱ accessȱ toȱ theȱ coreȱ right.ȱ Iȱ conȬ
ceivedȱofȱtheȱrequirementȱasȱaȱbanȱonȱonlyȱoneȱtypeȱofȱtrainȬ
ingȱandȱthereforeȱdidȱnotȱbelieveȱthatȱtheȱregulationȱrequiredȱ
asȱ rigorousȱ aȱ showingȱ asȱ theȱ majorityȱ required.ȱ Id.ȱ atȱ 713.ȱ
Theȱ majorityȱ constructionȱ prevailed,ȱ ofȱ course.ȱ Inȱ theȱ caseȱ
beforeȱusȱnow,ȱhowever,ȱtheȱmajorityȱandȱIȱagree,ȱthatȱ“[t]hisȱ
newȱ roundȱ ofȱ litigationȱ isȱ somewhatȱ different;ȱ …ȱ thisȱ timeȱ
we’reȱreviewingȱaȱsetȱofȱzoningȱrestrictions,ȱnotȱanȱoutrightȱ
banȱ onȱ shootingȱ rangesȱ throughoutȱ theȱ city.”ȱ Anteȱ atȱ 10.ȱ Inȱ
otherȱ words,ȱ weȱ areȱ reviewingȱ theȱ City’sȱ regulationȱ ofȱ
where,ȱ when,ȱ andȱ howȱ firingȱ rangesȱ mayȱ operate.2ȱ Asȱ theȱ
ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ
2 Iȱ couldȱ referȱ toȱ itȱ asȱ aȱ “time,ȱ place,ȱ andȱ manner”ȱ regulationȱ butȱ thatȱ
termȱisȱheavilyȱloadedȱwithȱattachmentsȱtoȱaȱparticularȱlevelȱofȱscrutinyȱ
underȱ Firstȱ Amendmentȱ jurisprudence—aȱ quagmireȱ betterȱ toȱ avoidȱ inȱ
thisȱcase.ȱSee,ȱe.g.,ȱU.S.ȱv.ȱSkoien,ȱ614ȱF.3dȱ638,ȱ641 –42ȱ(7thȱCir.ȱ2010).ȱȱ

-- 22 of 39 --

Nos.ȱ14Ȭ3312ȱ&ȱ14Ȭ3322ȱ 23
districtȱcourtȱnoted,ȱ“[b]ecauseȱsomeȱofȱtheȱprovisionsȱentailȱ
aȱgreaterȱburdenȱonȱSecondȱAmendmentȱrightsȱthanȱothers,ȱ
[a]ȱ Courtȱ [should]ȱ notȱ applyȱ aȱ uniformȱ levelȱ ofȱ scrutinyȱ
acrossȱtheȱboard.”ȱEzellȱv.ȱCityȱofȱChicago,ȱ70ȱF.ȱSupp.ȱ3dȱ871,ȱ
882ȱ(N.D.ȱIll.ȱ2014).ȱIȱagree.ȱȱ
Theȱ majorityȱ opinionȱ combinesȱ theȱ zoningȱ andȱ distancȬ
ingȱ regulationsȱ togetherȱ andȱ states,ȱ withoutȱ anyȱ rationale,ȱ
thatȱ theȱ manufacturingȱ andȱ distancingȱ restrictionsȱ standȱ orȱ
fallȱ together. 3ȱ Inȱ thisȱ caseȱ theyȱ bothȱ fall—inȱ myȱ colleagues’ȱ
view.ȱ Iȱ disagree.ȱ Theseȱ areȱ twoȱ separateȱ regulationsȱ withȱ
twoȱseparateȱgovernmentȱrationalesȱandȱtwoȱseparateȱeffectsȱ
onȱtheȱpublicȱinterestȱofȱChicagoȱcitizens.ȱTheȱzoningȱregulaȬ
tionȱ makesȱ aȱ categoricalȱ assessmentȱ ofȱ whereȱ aȱ particularȱ
landȱ useȱ belongsȱ basedȱ onȱ theȱ characterȱ ofȱ theȱ areaȱ andȱ
broadȱsimilaritiesȱandȱdistinctionsȱwithȱotherȱuses.ȱTheȱdisȬ
tancingȱ regulationȱ makesȱ aȱ muchȱ moreȱ focusedȱ determinaȬ
tionȱ ofȱ howȱ closeȱ aȱ particularȱ useȱ (whichȱ mayȱ haveȱ uniqueȱ
impacts)ȱ mayȱ beȱ toȱ otherȱ usesȱ thatȱ haveȱ vulnerabilitiesȱ forȱ
oneȱ reasonȱ orȱ another.ȱ Underȱ theȱ slidingȬscaleȱ standard,ȱ
theyȱmustȱbeȱevaluatedȱseparately.ȱThisȱisȱallȱtheȱmoreȱtrueȱ
whenȱweȱtakeȱintoȱaccountȱtheȱfactȱthatȱitȱisȱourȱobligationȱtoȱ
evaluateȱ legislation,ȱ whenȱ possible,ȱ inȱ aȱ mannerȱ whichȱ
avoidsȱ substantialȱ constitutionalȱ questions.ȱ Unitedȱ Statesȱ v.ȱ
XȬCitementȱVideo,ȱInc.,ȱ513ȱU.S.ȱ64,ȱ69ȱ(1994).ȱThereȱisȱnoȱbaȬ
ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ
3IȱadoptȱtheȱvernacularȱofȱtheȱmajorityȱandȱreferȱtoȱM.C.C.ȱ§ȱ17Ȭ5Ȭ0207,ȱ
whichȱrelegatesȱallȱfiringȱrangesȱtoȱmanufacturingȱdistrictsȱinȱtheȱCity,ȱasȱ
theȱ “zoningȱ regulation”ȱ andȱ M.C.C.ȱ §ȱ 17Ȭ9Ȭ0120,ȱ whichȱ requiresȱ firingȱ
rangesȱ toȱ beȱ builtȱ moreȱ thanȱ 500ȱ feetȱ fromȱ hospitals,ȱ placesȱ ofȱ worshipȱ
andȱplacesȱwhereȱchildrenȱroutinelyȱgather;ȱandȱ100ȱfeetȱfromȱotherȱfirȬ
ingȱranges,ȱasȱtheȱ“distancingȱregulation.”ȱ

-- 23 of 39 --

24ȱ Nos.ȱ14Ȭ3312ȱ&ȱ14Ȭ3322ȱ
sis,ȱ therefore,ȱ forȱ theȱ twoȱ regulationsȱ toȱ surviveȱ orȱ falterȱ asȱ
one.ȱ
Toȱseeȱwhy,ȱIȱwillȱbrieflyȱexploreȱwhyȱtheȱCityȱfailedȱinȱ
itsȱ proofȱ onȱ theȱ meansȬendȱ testȱ visȬàȬvisȱ theȱ zoningȱ regulaȬ
tion.ȱThenȱIȱwillȱdemonstrateȱtheȱsubstantialȱdifferencesȱbeȬ
tweenȱ theȱ meansȱ (theȱ governmentȱ regulationȱ andȱ itsȱ purȬ
pose)ȱandȱtheȱendȱ(theȱpublicȱinterestȱbenefitȱitȱseeksȱtoȱproȬ
tect)ȱ inȱ theȱ zoningȱ regulationȱ versusȱ theȱ distancingȱ regulaȬ
tion.ȱ
Iȱ turnȱ firstȱ toȱ theȱ zoningȱ regulationȱ andȱ itsȱ purpose.ȱ
Manufacturingȱ districtsȱ withinȱ theȱ Cityȱ ofȱ Chicagoȱ areȱ “inȬ
tendedȱ toȱ accommodateȱ manufacturing,ȱ warehousing,ȱ
wholesaleȱandȱindustrialȱusesȱoutsideȱtheȱCentralȱArea.ȱTheȱ
districtȱregulationsȱareȱintendedȱto:ȱ(A)ȱpromoteȱtheȱeconomȬ
icȱviabilityȱofȱmanufacturingȱandȱindustrialȱuses;ȱ(B)ȱencourȬ
ageȱemploymentȱgrowth;ȱandȱ(C)ȱlimitȱtheȱencroachmentȱofȱ
unplannedȱresidentialȱandȱotherȱnonȬindustrialȱdevelopmentȱ
withinȱ industrialȱ corridors.”ȱ M.C.C.ȱ §17Ȭ5Ȭ0101.ȱ Residentialȱ
districts,ȱonȱtheȱotherȱhand,ȱareȱ“intendedȱtoȱcreate,ȱmaintainȱ
andȱpromoteȱaȱvarietyȱofȱhousingȱopportunitiesȱforȱindividȬ
ualȱhouseholdsȱandȱtoȱmaintainȱtheȱdesiredȱphysicalȱcharacȬ
terȱ ofȱ theȱ city’sȱ existingȱ neighborhoods.”ȱ Id.ȱ atȱ 17Ȭ2Ȭ0101.ȱ
Businessȱ andȱ Commercialȱ districtsȱ areȱ “intendedȱ toȱ accomȬ
modateȱ retail,ȱ serviceȱ andȱ commercialȱ usesȱ andȱ toȱ ensureȱ
thatȱ businessȱ andȱ commercialȬzonedȱ areasȱ areȱ compatibleȱ
withȱtheȱcharacterȱofȱexistingȱ neighborhoods.”ȱId.ȱatȱ§ȱ17Ȭ3Ȭ
0101.ȱTheyȱareȱdividedȱintoȱfurtherȱcategoriesȱdependingȱonȱ
theȱ characterȱ andȱ useȱ ofȱ theȱ surroundingȱ area.ȱ Id.ȱ atȱ 17Ȭ3Ȭ
0100.ȱ
TheȱCity’sȱrepresentativeȱtestifiedȱbeforeȱtheȱdistrictȱcourtȱ
thatȱitsȱpurposesȱforȱtheȱzoningȱregulationsȱwereȱasȱfollows:ȱ

-- 24 of 39 --

Nos.ȱ14Ȭ3312ȱ&ȱ14Ȭ3322ȱ 25
theȱ Cityȱ imposesȱ zoningȱ restrictionsȱ becauseȱ
theȱtransportationȱandȱuseȱofȱgunsȱandȱammuȬ
nitionȱcouldȱhaveȱanȱimpactȱonȱtheȱhealth,ȱsafeȬ
ty,ȱ andȱ welfareȱ ofȱ individualsȱ surroundingȱ aȱ
gunȱrange.ȱ(Def.ȱ56.1ȱSt.ȱ¶ȱ16).ȱAsȱaȱresult,ȱtheȱ
Cityȱ considersȱ firingȱ rangesȱ toȱ beȱ “highȱ imȬ
pact,”ȱandȱrestrictingȱrangeȱlocalesȱtoȱmanufacȬ
turingȱ districtsȱ offersȱ “aȱ distanceȱ awayȱ fromȱ
theȱ residentialȱ communitiesȱ inȱ mostȱ areasȱ ofȱ
theȱcity.”ȱȱ
Ezell,ȱ 70ȱ F.ȱ Supp.ȱ 3dȱ atȱ 877.ȱ Theȱ partiesȱ agreedȱ thatȱ firingȱ
rangesȱ areȱ compatibleȱ withȱ industrialȱ use,ȱbutȱ theȱ plaintiffsȱ
arguedȱthatȱtheȱrangesȱwereȱcompatibleȱwithȱcommercialȱuseȱ
asȱwell.ȱId.ȱȱ
Beforeȱtheȱdistrictȱcourt,ȱtheȱCityȱfurtherȱexplainedȱthatȱitȱ
hadȱ restrictedȱ firingȱ rangesȱ toȱ manufacturingȱ districts,ȱ asȱ
opposedȱ toȱ allowingȱ themȱ inȱ someȱ commercialȱ useȱ zoningȱ
districts,ȱtoȱavoidȱtwoȱsecondaryȱeffectsȱassociatedȱwithȱtheȱ
health,ȱ safety,ȱ andȱ generalȱ welfareȱ ofȱ Chicagoȱ residents—
theftsȱ targetingȱ firearmsȱ andȱ leadȱ contamination.ȱ Id.ȱ atȱ 883.ȱ
TheȱdistrictȱcourtȱconcludedȱthatȱtheȱCityȱhadȱnotȱsufficientȬ
lyȱsubstantiatedȱaȱconnectionȱbetweenȱtheseȱinterestsȱandȱtheȱ
ordinance.ȱId.ȱTheȱCityȱdidȱnotȱpresentȱdataȱorȱotherȱempiriȬ
calȱ evidenceȱ thatȱ theȱ presenceȱ ofȱ aȱ firingȱ rangeȱ wouldȱ inȬ
creaseȱ crimeȱ orȱ thatȱ theȱ problemȱ wouldȱ beȱ diminishedȱ byȱ
limitingȱ firingȱ rangesȱ toȱ manufacturingȱ districts.ȱ Theȱ Cityȱ
didȱprovideȱaȱlistȱofȱsixteenȱtheftsȱ(involvingȱtheȱtheftȱofȱ482ȱ
firearms)ȱfromȱgunȱstoresȱandȱfiringȱrangesȱaroundȱtheȱcounȬ
tryȱsinceȱ2010,ȱbutȱdidȱnotȱprovideȱanyȱrationaleȱforȱwhyȱloȬ
catingȱtheȱrangesȱonlyȱinȱmanufacturingȱzonesȱwouldȱreduceȱ
theftȱ orȱ otherȱ criminalȱ activity.ȱ Noȱ oneȱ fromȱ theȱ Cityȱ reȬ

-- 25 of 39 --

26ȱ Nos.ȱ14Ȭ3312ȱ&ȱ14Ȭ3322ȱ
searchedȱ zoningȱ ordinancesȱ onȱ firingȱ rangesȱ inȱ otherȱ cities.ȱ
Id.ȱatȱ884.ȱ
Likewise,ȱ theȱ Cityȱ didȱ notȱ supplyȱ robust,ȱ reliableȱ eviȬ
denceȱtoȱsupportȱitsȱclaimȱthatȱleadȱcontaminationȱfromȱtheȱ
firingȱ rangeȱ withȱ sufficientȱ ventilationȱ systems,ȱ asȱ theȱ ordiȬ
nanceȱ requires,ȱ wouldȱ causeȱ environmentalȱ effectsȱ thatȱ
makeȱ theȱ rangesȱ suitableȱ onlyȱ forȱ manufacturingȱ districts.ȱ
TheȱCityȱdidȱsupplyȱaȱreportȱfromȱtheȱNationalȱInstituteȱforȱ
Occupationalȱ Safetyȱ andȱ Healthȱ entitledȱ ”Preventingȱ OccuȬ
pationalȱ Exposuresȱ toȱ Leadȱ andȱ Noiseȱ atȱ Indoorȱ Firingȱ
Range.”4ȱThatȱdocumentȱinformsȱworkers,ȱincludingȱfederalȱ
lawȱenforcementȱofficers,ȱthatȱtheyȱmightȱbeȱexposedȱtoȱhazȬ
ardousȱleadȱconcentrationsȱatȱfiringȱranges,ȱbutȱdidȱnotȱhelpȱ
theȱ courtȱ evaluateȱ whatȱ theȱ environmentalȱ impactȱ ofȱ leadȱ
wouldȱ beȱ inȱ aȱ rangeȱ withȱ theȱ ventilationȱ requirementsȱ imȬ
posedȱbyȱtheȱCityȱinȱthisȱordinance. 5ȱOfȱcourse,ȱitȱisȱbeyondȱ
ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ
4TheȱNationalȱInstituteȱforȱOccupationalȱSafetyȱandȱHealth,ȱCDC,ȱDept.ȱ
ofȱ Healthȱ andȱ Humanȱ Serv’s.,ȱ “Preventingȱ Occupationalȱ Exposuresȱ toȱ
Leadȱ andȱ Noiseȱ atȱ Indoorȱ Firingȱ Range.”ȱ (2009).ȱ
https://www.cdc.gov/niosh/ȱ docs/2009Ȭ136/pdfs/2009Ȭ136.pdf.ȱ Lastȱ visitȬ
edȱ Januaryȱ 16,ȱ 2017.ȱ R.ȱ 227Ȭ3,ȱ Def.’sȱ Ruleȱ 56.1ȱ Statementȱ ofȱ Materialȱ
Facts,ȱEx.ȱ24ȱPageIDȱ3731 –3762.ȱ
TheȱNationalȱInstituteȱforȱOccupationalȱSafetyȱandȱHealthȱisȱpartȱofȱtheȱ
UnitedȱStatesȱCentersȱforȱDiseaseȱControlȱandȱPreventionȱwithinȱtheȱDeȬ
partmentȱ ofȱ Healthȱ andȱ Humanȱ Services.ȱ https://www.cdc.gov/ȱ
niosh/about/default.html.ȱLastȱvisitedȱJanuaryȱ16,ȱ2017.ȱ
5Thereȱisȱnoȱdoubtȱthatȱleadȱexposureȱisȱaȱknownȱandȱcontinuingȱissueȱ
forȱ firingȱ ranges.ȱ Seeȱ Beaucham,ȱ Catherine,ȱ “Indoorȱ Firingȱ Rangesȱ andȱ
ElevatedȱBloodȱLeadȱLevels—UnitedȱStates,ȱ2002 –2013,”ȱCenterȱforȱDisȬ
easeȱ Control,ȱ Morbidityȱ andȱ Mortalityȱ Weeklyȱ Report,ȱ Aprilȱ 25,ȱ 2014ȱ /ȱ
63(16);ȱ347 –351.ȱ

-- 26 of 39 --

Nos.ȱ14Ȭ3312ȱ&ȱ14Ȭ3322ȱ 27
questionȱ thatȱ theȱ Cityȱ mustȱ ardentlyȱ regulateȱ anyȱ possibleȱ
leadȱ contaminationȱ ofȱ itsȱ citizens;ȱ theȱ storyȱ ofȱ Flint,ȱ MichiȬ
gan,ȱamongȱothers,ȱteachesȱusȱthat.ȱAndȱtheȱMunicipalȱCodeȱ
ofȱChicagoȱisȱchockȱfullȱofȱregulationsȱpertainingȱtoȱlead.ȱSee,ȱ
e.g.,ȱ M.C.C.ȱ §ȱ 7Ȭ4Ȭ010ȱ throughȱ 7Ȭ4Ȭ160.ȱ Butȱ asȱ theȱ majorityȱ
notes,ȱ whenȱ lawsȱ standȱ toȱ encroachȱ uponȱ Secondȱ AmendȬ
mentȱ rights,ȱ aȱ rationalȱ basisȱ forȱ theȱ lawȱ isȱ noȱ longerȱ suffiȬ
cientȱ supportȱ forȱ theȱ law.ȱ Theȱ Cityȱ neededȱ moreȱ evidenceȱ
thatȱ itsȱ regulationsȱ wouldȱ notȱ beȱ sufficientȱ toȱ preventȱ leadȱ
contaminationȱandȱcameȱupȱshort.ȱȱ
Theȱ districtȱ courtȱ concludedȱ thatȱ theȱ City’sȱ generalizedȱ
propositionsȱ thatȱ firingȱ rangesȱ poseȱ aȱ danger—inȱ termsȱ ofȱ
bothȱ crimeȱ andȱ environmentalȱ impact—didȱ notȱ justifyȱ reȬ
strictingȱthemȱtoȱmanufacturingȱdistrictsȱonly,ȱasȱopposedȱtoȱ
otherȱ industrialȱ zones.ȱ And,ȱ likeȱ theȱ majorityȱ opinion,ȱ onȱ
thisȱrecord,ȱIȱmustȱagree.ȱȱ
Theȱ distancingȱ requirement,ȱ asȱ Iȱ notedȱ above,ȱ however,ȱ
isȱ different.ȱ Theȱ zoningȱ andȱ distancingȱ regulationsȱ togetherȱ
reducedȱ theȱ landȱ availableȱ inȱ theȱ Cityȱ toȱ aboutȱ 10.6%ȱ ofȱ
availableȱparcels.ȱTheȱdistancingȱruleȱaloneȱhasȱaȱmuchȱlessȬ
erȱ effect.ȱ Weȱ doȱ notȱ knowȱ theȱ preciseȱ numberȱ becauseȱ theȱ
City’sȱ expertȱ createdȱ itsȱ mapȱ ofȱ availableȱ parcelsȱ usingȱ theȱ
combinedȱcriteriaȱfromȱbothȱregulations.ȱSeeȱDef.’sȱRuleȱ56.1ȱ
Statementȱ ofȱ Materialȱ Facts,ȱ Ex.ȱ 19,ȱ R.ȱ 227Ȭ1,ȱ PageIDȱ 3567,ȱ
andȱ attachedȱ asȱ anȱ exhibitȱ toȱ thisȱ opinion.ȱ Nevertheless,ȱ
fromȱtheȱmapȱitȱisȱclearȱthatȱanȱexpansionȱintoȱbusinessȱdisȬ
trictsȱwouldȱincreaseȱtheȱavailabilityȱofȱsitesȱforȱfiringȱrangesȱ
appreciably.ȱ Seeȱ Id.ȱ Theȱ distancingȱ requirementȱ thereforeȱ
imposesȱ aȱ significantlyȱ lighterȱ burdenȱ onȱ theȱ placementȱ ofȱ
firingȱranges.ȱAndȱasȱEzellȱI’sȱslidingȱscaleȱdictates,ȱaȱlighterȱ
burdenȱrequiresȱaȱlesserȱjustification.ȱEzellȱI,ȱ651ȱF.3dȱatȱ708.ȱ

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28ȱ Nos.ȱ14Ȭ3312ȱ&ȱ14Ȭ3322ȱ
Althoughȱ theȱ zoningȱ regulationȱ isȱ aȱ blanketȱ prohibitionȱ
againstȱ firingȱ rangesȱ inȱ allȱ butȱ theȱ manufacturingȱ areasȱ ofȱ
theȱ City,ȱ theȱ distancingȱ regulationȱ isȱ aȱ preciseȱ andȱ targetedȱ
approachȱ toȱ protectingȱ particularȱ populationsȱ andȱ activitiesȱ
thatȱ theȱ Cityȱ routinelyȱ singlesȱ outȱ forȱ protections—placesȱ
whereȱ childrenȱ andȱ theȱ sickȱ areȱ gathered,ȱ forȱ example.ȱ Itȱ isȱ
theȱ differenceȱ betweenȱ aȱ carpetȱ bombȱ andȱ aȱ surgicalȱ strike.ȱ
Andȱ theȱ factorsȱ thatȱ enterȱ intoȱ anȱ evaluationȱ ofȱ theȱ publicȱ
benefitȱ ofȱ prohibitingȱ firingȱ rangesȱ fromȱ businessȱ andȱ comȬ
mercialȱdistrictsȱareȱnotȱtheȱsameȱasȱtheȱfactorsȱthatȱenterȱinȬ
toȱ anȱ evaluationȱ ofȱ theȱ benefitȱ ofȱ keepingȱ shootingȱ rangesȱ
awayȱfromȱschools,ȱdayȱcareȱfacilities,ȱhospitalsȱandȱtheȱlike.ȱ
Notȱ onlyȱ doȱ theȱ regulationsȱ notȱ standȱ orȱ fallȱ together,ȱ butȱ
theȱ evaluationȱ ofȱ theȱ twoȱ isȱ dissimilarȱ onȱ bothȱ sidesȱ ofȱ theȱ
meansȬendȱanalysis.ȱȱ
Moreover,ȱ theȱ distancingȱ requirementsȱ focusȱ onȱ protecȬ
tionsȱ forȱ aȱ categoryȱ ofȱ “sensitiveȱ places”ȱ thatȱ theȱ Supremeȱ
Courtȱ tellsȱ usȱ haveȱ beenȱ subjectȱ toȱ longstandingȱ historicalȱ
protectionsȱfromȱfirearmȱdangers.ȱAsȱtheȱCourtȱstatedȱinȱHelȬ
ler,ȱ
TheȱCourt’sȱopinionȱshouldȱnotȱbeȱtakenȱtoȱcastȱ
doubtȱ onȱ longstandingȱ prohibitionsȱ onȱ theȱ
possessionȱ ofȱ firearmsȱ byȱ felonsȱ andȱ theȱ menȬ
tallyȱ ill,ȱ orȱ lawsȱ forbiddingȱ theȱ carryingȱ ofȱ
firearmsȱ inȱ sensitiveȱ placesȱ suchȱ asȱ schoolsȱ
andȱ governmentȱ buildings,ȱ orȱ lawsȱ imposingȱ
conditionsȱ andȱ qualificationsȱ onȱ theȱ commerȬ
cialȱsaleȱofȱarms.ȱȱ
Heller,ȱ554ȱU.S.ȱatȱ626–27ȱ(emphasisȱsupplied).ȱThisȱlanguageȱ
couldȱ beȱ construedȱ asȱ removingȱ fromȱ Secondȱ Amendmentȱ
protectionȱprohibitionsȱonȱtheȱpossessionȱofȱfirearmsȱbyȱfelȬ

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Nos.ȱ14Ȭ3312ȱ&ȱ14Ȭ3322ȱ 29
onsȱandȱtheȱmentallyȱill,ȱinȱsensitiveȱplacesȱandȱtheȱlikeȱjustȱ
asȱweȱhaveȱnotedȱthatȱ“[t]heȱCourtȱhasȱlongȱrecognizedȱthatȱ
certainȱ ‘wellȬdefinedȱ andȱ narrowlyȱ limitedȱ classesȱ ofȱ
speech’—e.g.,ȱ obscenity,ȱ defamation,ȱ fraud,ȱ incitement—areȱ
categoricallyȱ ‘outsideȱ theȱ reach’ȱ ofȱ theȱ Firstȱ Amendment.”ȱ
Ezell,ȱ651ȱF.3dȱatȱ702.ȱIȱleaveȱthatȱforȱanotherȱday.ȱForȱnow,ȱitȱ
isȱenoughȱtoȱnoteȱthatȱifȱtheȱSupremeȱCourtȱhasȱdeclaredȱthatȱ
theȱ needȱ toȱ protectȱ sensitiveȱ placesȱ isȱ anȱ importantȱ enoughȱ
needȱtoȱallowȱforȱanȱoutrightȱprohibitionȱonȱtheȱcarryingȱofȱ
firearmsȱwithinȱthem,ȱthenȱitȱisȱcertainlyȱaȱsufficientlyȱstrongȱ
publicȱinterestȱtoȱjustifyȱregulationsȱdistancingȱsimilarȱplacesȱ
fromȱ firingȱ ranges.ȱ Theȱ burdenȱ hereȱ isȱ notȱ severeȱ (withoutȱ
theȱzoningȱregulation,ȱmanyȱmoreȱparcelsȱareȱavailable),ȱtheȱ
publicȱ interestȱ isȱ great,ȱ andȱ theȱ rulesȱ doȱ notȱ implicateȱ theȱ
heartȱ ofȱ aȱ coreȱ right,ȱ butȱ rather,ȱ atȱ theȱ veryȱ most,ȱ “anȱ imȬ
portantȱcorollaryȱtoȱtheȱmeaningfulȱexerciseȱofȱtheȱcoreȱrightȱ
toȱpossessȱfirearmsȱforȱselfȬdefense.”ȱEzellȱI,ȱ651ȱF.3dȱatȱ708.ȱ
Theȱ majorityȱ assertsȱ thatȱ firearmsȱ couldȱ notȱ possiblyȱ beȱ
incompatibleȱwithȱresidentialȱusesȱbecauseȱtheȱmainȱpremiseȱ
ofȱtheȱHellerȱdecision,ȱfromȱwhichȱtheȱ“sensitiveȱplaces”ȱlanȬ
guageȱcomes,ȱwasȱtoȱallowȱlawȱabidingȱcitizensȱtoȱkeepȱfireȬ
armsȱinȱtheirȱresidencesȱforȱselfȬdefense.ȱAnteȱatȱ12.ȱButȱownȬ
ing,ȱkeepingȱorȱevenȱcarryingȱaȱfirearmȱforȱselfȬdefenseȱposȬ
esȱ aȱ substantiallyȱ differentȱ riskȱ thanȱ doesȱ creatingȱ aȱ publicȱ
accommodationȱ whereȱ largeȱ numbersȱ ofȱ peopleȱ willȱ gatherȱ
withȱ firearmsȱ loadedȱ withȱ leadȬcontaminated,ȱ explosiveȬ
filledȱammunitionȱandȱfireȱthem.ȱFiringȱaȱgunȱposesȱsignifiȬ
cantlyȱ greaterȱ risksȱ thanȱ theȱ mereȱ keepingȱ orȱ carryingȱ ofȱ aȱ
gun,ȱ inȱ termsȱ ofȱ potentialȱ accidents,ȱ attractivenessȱ toȱ crimiȬ
nals,ȱ andȱ environmentalȱ leadȱ exposure.ȱ Fromȱ aȱ practicalȱ
standpoint,ȱIllinoisȱstateȱlawȱallȱbutȱrulesȱoutȱtheȱpossibilityȱ
ofȱlegallyȱfiringȱaȱgunȱinȱaȱresidentialȱareaȱofȱtheȱCityȱofȱChiȬ

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30ȱ Nos.ȱ14Ȭ3312ȱ&ȱ14Ȭ3322ȱ
cago.ȱ 720ȱ ILCSȱ §§ȱ 5/24Ȭ1.2,ȱ 5/24Ȭ1.2Ȭ5,ȱ 5/24Ȭ1.5.ȱ Andȱ soȱ theȱ
risksȱ associatedȱ withȱ legalȱ firearmȱ dischargeȱ willȱ ariseȱ alȬ
mostȱ alwaysȱ atȱ firingȱ ranges.ȱ Moreover,ȱ firingȱ rangesȱ canȱ
becomeȱ attractiveȱ nuisances,ȱ beckoningȱ toȱ thievesȱ lookingȱ
forȱ largeȱ cachesȱ ofȱ firearms,ȱ orȱ placesȱ whereȱ peopleȱ willȱ beȱ
comingȱ andȱ goingȱ whileȱ carryingȱ weapons.ȱ Inȱ short,ȱ theȱ
City’sȱinterestsȱinȱpreventingȱgunȱtheftȱandȱotherȱcrime,ȱandȱ
reducingȱ leadȱ contaminationȱ castȱ aȱ heavyȱ weightȱ onȱ theȱ
publicȱinterestȱsideȱofȱtheȱscale.ȱ
Asȱ Iȱ notedȱ above,ȱ theȱ lowerȱ burdenȱ andȱ theȱ significantȱ
publicȱinterestȱdecreaseȱtheȱCity’sȱburdenȱtoȱjustifyȱtheȱreguȬ
lation.ȱ Theȱ majorityȱ borrowsȱ fromȱ theȱ freeȬspeechȱ contextȱ
andȱ assertsȱ thatȱ “thereȱ mustȱ beȱ evidence”ȱ toȱ supportȱ theȱ
City’sȱ rationaleȱ forȱ theȱ challengedȱ regulations.ȱ Anteȱ atȱ 15,ȱ
citingȱ Annexȱ Books,ȱ Inc.ȱ v.ȱ Cityȱ ofȱ Indianapolis,ȱ 581ȱ F.3dȱ 460,ȱ
463ȱ (7thȱ Cir.ȱ 2009)ȱ (emphasisȱ inȱ original).ȱ Inȱ theȱ Firstȱ
Amendmentȱ context,ȱ however,ȱ theȱ Supremeȱ Courtȱ hasȱ reȬ
jectedȱ theȱ ideaȱ thatȱ theȱ governmentȱ mustȱ alwaysȱ proveȱ
“withȱ empiricalȱ data,ȱ thatȱ itsȱ ordinanceȱ willȱ successfullyȱ
lowerȱ crime.”ȱ City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc.
86 ȱAsȱtheȱCityȱpointsȱout,ȱstudiesȱshowingȱ
theȱeffectȱofȱcrimeȱinȱtheȱsurroundingȱcommunityȱareȱparticȬ
ularlyȱ helpfulȱ toȱ theȱ courtsȱ inȱ Firstȱ Amendmentȱ casesȱ beȬ
causeȱ itȱ isȱ notȱ readilyȱ apparentȱ thatȱ theȱ saleȱ ofȱ adultȱ booksȱ
andȱ mediaȱ haveȱ theȱ abilityȱ toȱ endangerȱ theȱ surroundingȱ
community.ȱGuns,ȱonȱtheȱotherȱhand,ȱareȱinherentlyȱdangerȬ
ous.ȱ Seeȱ Loitzȱ v.ȱ Remingtonȱ Armsȱ Co.,ȱ 563ȱ N.E.2dȱ 397,ȱ 404ȱ
(1990)ȱ (“Gunsȱ areȱ inherentlyȱ dangerousȱ instrumentalities,ȱ
andȱtheȱmereȱoccurrenceȱofȱotherȱexplosionsȱdoesȱnot,ȱwithȬ
outȱ more,ȱ establishȱ outrageousȱ misconductȱ orȱ someȱ otherȱ
basisȱ sufficientȱ toȱ warrantȱ theȱ impositionȱ ofȱ punitiveȱ damȬ
ages.”).ȱTheȱamountȱandȱtypeȱofȱevidenceȱneededȱtoȱdemonȬ

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Nos.ȱ14Ȭ3312ȱ&ȱ14Ȭ3322ȱ 31
strateȱaȱdanger,ȱtherefore,ȱmustȱbeȱless.ȱTheȱCity’sȱevidenceȱ
wasȱsufficientȱtoȱjustifyȱitsȱrationaleȱforȱtheȱdistancingȱreguȬ
lations.
Itȱ isȱ notȱ atȱ allȱ uncommonȱ withinȱ theȱ Chicagoȱ municipalȱ
codeȱtoȱcreateȱaȱbufferȱzoneȱbetweenȱbusinessesȱthatȱhaveȱaȱ
highȱ impactȱ onȱ theirȱ surroundingsȱ andȱ facilitiesȱ thatȱ mightȱ
serveȱchildrenȱorȱotherȱvulnerableȱpopulationsȱsuchȱasȱhosȬ
pitals,ȱ dayȱ careȱ facilities,ȱ schools,ȱ andȱ churches.ȱ Seeȱ e.g.,ȱ
M.C.C.ȱ §ȱ 4Ȭ224Ȭ011ȱ (“Noȱ machineȱ shopsȱ shallȱ beȱ conductedȱ
orȱoperatedȱonȱanyȱlotȱorȱplotȱ ofȱgroundȱofȱwhichȱanyȱporȬ
tionȱshallȱbeȱwithinȱ200ȱfeetȱofȱanyȱlotȱoccupiedȱbyȱaȱpublicȱ
orȱparochialȱschool,ȱhospitalȱorȱchurch.”);ȱM.C.C.ȱ§ȱ4Ȭ232Ȭ120ȱ
(“Noȱ personȱ shallȱ construct,ȱ conductȱ orȱ operateȱ anyȱ motorȱ
vehicleȱsalesroomȱwithinȱ200ȱfeetȱofȱanyȱbuildingȱusedȱasȱaȱ
hospital,ȱ church,ȱ orȱ publicȱ orȱ parochialȱ school,ȱ orȱ theȱ
groundsȱthereof.”);ȱM.C.C.ȱ§ȱ15Ȭ28Ȭ900ȱ(“Itȱshallȱbeȱunlawfulȱ
forȱ anyȱ personȱ toȱ storeȱ orȱ manufactureȱ nitrocelluloseȱ prodȬ
uctsȱinȱanyȱbuildingȱwhichȱisȱsituatedȱwithinȱ100ȱfeetȱofȱanyȱ
buildingȱoccupiedȱasȱaȱschoolȱbuilding,ȱhospital,ȱinstitutionȬ
alȱ[sic],ȱorȱanyȱotherȱplaceȱofȱpublicȱassembly”);ȱM.C.C.ȱ§ȱ17Ȭ
9Ȭ0119ȱ (“Noȱ retailȱ foodȱ establishmentȱ thatȱ sellsȱ liveȱ poultryȱ
orȱ otherȱ liveȱ fowlȱ atȱ retail,ȱ orȱ thatȱ slaughtersȱ orȱ causesȱ toȱ
beȱslaughteredȱ forȱ saleȱ liveȱ poultryȱ orȱ otherȱ fowlȱ atȱ retail,ȱ
shallȱbeȱlocatedȱwithinȱ200ȱfeetȱfromȱanyȱplaceȱorȱstructure:ȱ
…ȱ (2)ȱ isȱ usedȱ forȱ residentialȱ purposes;ȱ orȱ (3)ȱ isȱ usedȱ asȱ aȱ
placeȱ ofȱ religiousȱ assembly,ȱ primaryȱ orȱ secondaryȱ school,ȱ
library,ȱhospital,ȱpublicȱparkȱorȱpublicȱplayground”);ȱM.C.C.ȱ
§ȱ 10Ȭ36Ȭ400ȱ (b)(10)ȱ (“noȱ personȱ shallȱ operateȱ anyȱ smallȱ unȬ
mannedȱ aircraftȱ inȱ cityȱ airspace:ȱ …ȱ (10)ȱ overȱ anyȱ openȱ airȱ
assemblyȱ unit,ȱ school,ȱ schoolȱ yard,ȱ hospital,ȱ placeȱ ofȱ worȬ
ship,ȱ prisonȱ orȱ policeȱ station,ȱ withoutȱ theȱ propertyȱ owner’sȱ
consent,ȱ andȱ subjectȱ toȱ anyȱ restrictionsȱ thatȱ theȱ propertyȱ

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32ȱ Nos.ȱ14Ȭ3312ȱ&ȱ14Ȭ3322ȱ
ownerȱ mayȱ placeȱ onȱ suchȱ operation”).ȱ Ofȱ courseȱ noneȱ ofȱ
theseȱrestrictionsȱimposeȱonȱSecondȱAmendmentȱrights,ȱandȱ
thereforeȱtheyȱrequireȱnoȱmoreȱthanȱaȱrationalȱbasis,ȱbutȱtheȱ
vastȱ numberȱ ofȱ theseȱ lawsȱ (Iȱ haveȱ singledȱ outȱ onlyȱ aȱ veryȱ
few)ȱsupportȱtheȱCity’sȱargumentȱthatȱitsȱpurposeȱinȱpassingȱ
theȱlegislationȱwasȱtoȱprotectȱtheseȱsensitiveȱareas,ȱasȱitȱdoesȱ
inȱsoȱmanyȱotherȱcontexts.ȱȱ
Inȱ short,ȱ theȱ distancingȱ regulationsȱ doȱ notȱ riseȱ orȱ fallȱ
alongȱ withȱ theȱ zoningȱ regulations.ȱ Andȱ whenȱ separatedȱ
fromȱthem,ȱgivenȱtheȱlighterȱburdenȱimposedȱbyȱtheȱdistancȬ
ingȱregulations,ȱtheȱstrongȱpublicȱinterestȱinȱprotectingȱresiȬ
dentialȱ areasȱ andȱ sensitiveȱ areasȱ fromȱ theȱ risksȱ associatedȱ
withȱfiringȱranges,ȱtheseȱregulationsȱpassȱconstitutionalȱmusȬ
ter.ȱȱ
Asȱforȱtheȱbanȱonȱminorsȱatȱfiringȱranges,ȱIȱdoȱnotȱdisaȬ
greeȱwithȱtheȱmajorityȱthatȱtheȱCityȱhasȱfailedȱtoȱcomeȱforthȱ
withȱ evidenceȱ toȱ supportȱ theȱ exclusionȱ ofȱ allȱ minorsȱ fromȱ
firingȱrangesȱinȱallȱcircumstances.ȱToȱtheȱextentȱthatȱMcDonȬ
aldȱ andȱ itsȱ progenyȱ allowȱ forȱ firearmȱ ownershipȱ withinȱ theȱ
Cityȱ ofȱ Chicago,ȱ theȱ practicalȱ argumentȱ thatȱ parentsȱ whoȱ
haveȱ gunsȱ withinȱ theȱ Cityȱ limitsȱ mightȱ alsoȱ wishȱ toȱ teachȱ
gunȱsafetyȱtoȱtheirȱchildrenȱisȱnotȱwithoutȱmerit.ȱ(Although,ȱ
asȱIȱnotedȱinȱmyȱconcurrenceȱinȱEzellȱI,ȱ“[t]hereȱisȱnoȱbanȱonȱ
trainingȱwithȱaȱsimulatorȱandȱseveralȱrealisticȱsimulatorsȱareȱ
commerciallyȱ available,ȱ completeȱ withȱ gunsȱ thatȱ mimicȱ theȱ
recoilȱofȱfirearmsȱdischargingȱliveȱammunition.ȱItȱisȱpossibleȱ
that,ȱ withȱ simulatedȱ training,ȱ technologyȱ willȱ obviateȱ theȱ
needȱforȱliveȬrangeȱtraining.”ȱEzellȱI,ȱ651ȱF.3dȱatȱ712ȱ(internalȱ
citationsȱomitted)).ȱAndȱtheȱlegalȱargumentȱthatȱtheȱoutrightȱ
banȱisȱunconstitutionalȱhasȱmeritȱasȱwell.ȱ

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Nos.ȱ14Ȭ3312ȱ&ȱ14Ȭ3322ȱ 33
Iȱwriteȱseparatelyȱonȱthisȱpointȱtoȱnoteȱtheȱlimitedȱrightsȱ
ofȱ minorsȱ underȱ theȱ Secondȱ Amendment.ȱ Importingȱ theȱ
conceptsȱfromȱFirstȱAmendmentȱjurisprudenceȱintoȱthisȱSecȬ
ondȱAmendmentȱcontext,ȱasȱcourtsȱhaveȱcomeȱtoȱdoȱ(seeȱId.ȱ
atȱ 706–07),ȱ itȱ isȱ worthȱ notingȱ thatȱ theȱ Firstȱ Amendmentȱ
rightsȱofȱminorsȱareȱlimited—inȱsomeȱcontextsȱfarȱmoreȱthanȱ
others.ȱ Althoughȱ minorsȱ doȱ notȱ “‘shedȱ theirȱ constitutionalȱ
rightsȱtoȱfreedomȱofȱspeechȱorȱexpressionȱatȱtheȱschoolhouseȱ
gate’ȱ…ȱtheȱFirstȱAmendmentȱrightsȱofȱstudentsȱinȱtheȱpublicȱ
schoolsȱareȱ‘notȱautomaticallyȱcoextensiveȱwithȱtheȱrightsȱofȱ
adultsȱ inȱ otherȱ settings.’”ȱ Hazelwoodȱ Sch.ȱ Dist.ȱ v.ȱ Kuhlmeier,ȱ
484ȱU.S.ȱ260,ȱ266ȱ(1988),ȱcitingȱBethelȱSch.ȱDist.ȱNo.ȱ403ȱv.ȱFraȬ
ser,ȱ478ȱU.S.ȱ675,ȱ682ȱ(1986).ȱAndȱFirstȱAmendmentȱrightsȱareȱ
particularlyȱlimitedȱwhenȱtheȱinterestȱbalancedȱonȱtheȱotherȱ
sideȱisȱtheȱhealthȱandȱsafetyȱofȱminors.ȱSeeȱMorseȱv.ȱFrederick,ȱ
551ȱ U.S.ȱ 393,ȱ 407ȱ (2007)ȱ (upholdingȱ school’sȱ disciplineȱ ofȱ
studentȱ whoȱ displayedȱ proȬdrugȱ bannerȱ notingȱ thatȱ deterȬ
ringȱ drugȱ useȱ byȱ schoolchildrenȱ isȱ anȱ “important—indeed,ȱ
perhapsȱcompellingȱinterest”ȱgivenȱtheȱpotentialȱsevereȱandȱ
permanentȱ damageȱ toȱ theȱ healthȱ andȱ wellȬbeingȱ ofȱ youngȱ
people);ȱ Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville 86
ȱ (“[i]tȱ isȱ wellȱ settledȱ thatȱ aȱ Stateȱ orȱ municipalityȱ canȱ
adoptȱ moreȱ stringentȱ controlsȱ onȱ communicativeȱ materialsȱ
availableȱtoȱyouthsȱthanȱonȱthoseȱavailableȱtoȱadults.”);ȱGinsȬ
bergȱv.ȱStateȱofȱN.ȱY.,ȱ390ȱU.S.ȱ629,ȱ637ȱ(1968)ȱ(governmentȱcanȱ
prohibitȱ saleȱ toȱ minorsȱ ofȱ sexuallyȱ explicitȱ materialȱ thatȱ
wouldȱbeȱavailableȱtoȱadults).ȱȱ
OutsideȱofȱtheȱFirstȱAmendmentȱcontext,ȱitȱgoesȱwithoutȱ
sayingȱthatȱtheȱgovernmentȱmayȱrestrictȱtheȱrightsȱofȱminorsȱ
forȱpurposesȱofȱprotectingȱtheirȱhealthȱandȱwelfare.ȱAȱstate’sȱ
interestȱinȱtheȱwelfareȱofȱitsȱyoungȱcitizensȱjustifiesȱaȱvarietyȱ
ofȱprotectiveȱmeasures.ȱEveryȱjurisdictionȱinȱtheȱcountryȱproȬ

-- 33 of 39 --

34ȱ Nos.ȱ14Ȭ3312ȱ&ȱ14Ȭ3322ȱ
tectsȱtheȱhealth,ȱsafety,ȱandȱwelfareȱofȱminorsȱbyȱprohibitingȱ
themȱ fromȱ purchasingȱ alcoholȱ andȱ cigarettes,ȱ byȱ restrictingȱ
atȱwhatȱageȱtheyȱmayȱdriveȱandȱwithȱwhatȱlimitations,ȱwhenȱ
theyȱ mayȱ enlistȱ inȱ theȱ militaryȱ andȱ work,ȱ whenȱ theyȱ mayȱ
marry,ȱ whenȱ theyȱ mayȱ gamble,ȱ howȱ longȱ theyȱ mustȱ attendȱ
school,ȱ andȱ whenȱ theyȱ canȱ enterȱ intoȱ bindingȱ contracts.ȱ
Someȱ ofȱ theseȱ regulations,ȱ likeȱ thoseȱ surroundingȱ marriageȱ
andȱ pregnancy,ȱ burdenȱ fundamentalȱ rightsȱ andȱ yetȱ haveȱ
beenȱ upheldȱ regardlessȱ ofȱ theȱ increasedȱ scrutinyȱ givenȱ toȱ
suchȱ laws.ȱ See,ȱ e.g.,ȱ Plannedȱ Parenthoodȱ ofȱ Cent.ȱ Mo.ȱ v.ȱ
Danforth,ȱ428ȱU.S.ȱ52,ȱ74ȱ(1976).ȱ
Inȱadditionȱtoȱtheȱgeneralȱprotectionsȱnotedȱabove,ȱstatesȱ
andȱmunicipalitiesȱimposeȱlawsȱandȱregulationsȱthatȱprotectȱ
theȱ healthȱ andȱ safetyȱ ofȱ childrenȱ inȱ myriadȱ specificȱ ways,ȱ
manyȱ ofȱ whichȱ interfereȱ fairlyȱ significantlyȱ withȱ theȱ fundaȬ
mentalȱ rightȱ ofȱ parentsȱ toȱ makeȱ decisionsȱ concerningȱ theȱ
care,ȱ custody,ȱ andȱ controlȱ ofȱ theirȱ children.ȱ Troxelȱ v.ȱ GranȬ
ville,ȱ530ȱU.S.ȱ57,ȱ66ȱ(2000)ȱ(“weȱhaveȱrecognizedȱtheȱfundaȬ
mentalȱ rightȱ ofȱ parentsȱ toȱ makeȱ decisionsȱ concerningȱ theȱ
care,ȱcustody,ȱandȱcontrolȱofȱtheirȱchildren.”);ȱseeȱalsoȱPrinceȱ
v.ȱ Massachusetts,ȱ 321ȱ U.S.ȱ 158,ȱ 166ȱ (1944)ȱ (“Actingȱ toȱ guardȱ
theȱgeneralȱinterestȱinȱyouth’sȱwellȱbeing,ȱtheȱstateȱasȱparensȱ
patriaeȱmayȱrestrictȱtheȱparent’sȱcontrolȱbyȱrequiringȱschoolȱ
attendance,ȱ regulatingȱ orȱ prohibitingȱ theȱ child’sȱ labor,ȱ andȱ
inȱmanyȱotherȱways.”).ȱȱ
Forȱ example,ȱ Illinoisȱ lawȱ requiresȱ adultsȱ toȱ secureȱ chilȬ
drenȱ underȱ theȱ ageȱ ofȱ eightȱ inȱ anȱ approvedȱ childȱ safetyȱ reȬ
straintȱwhileȱridingȱinȱvehicles.ȱ625ȱILCSȱ§ȱ25/4.ȱItȱprohibitsȱ
childrenȱ underȱ theȱ ageȱ ofȱ fourteenȱ fromȱ beingȱ leftȱ withoutȱ
supervisionȱforȱ“anȱunreasonableȱperiodȱofȱtimeȱwithoutȱreȬ
gardȱ forȱ theȱ mentalȱ orȱ physicalȱ health,ȱ safety,ȱ orȱ welfareȱ ofȱ

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Nos.ȱ14Ȭ3312ȱ&ȱ14Ȭ3322ȱ 35
thatȱminor.”ȱ705ȱILCSȱ§ȱ405/2Ȭ3.ȱTheȱIllinoisȱAdministrativeȱ
Codeȱevenȱprohibitsȱaȱdayȱcareȱfacilityȱfromȱplacingȱaȱbabyȱ
toȱsleepȱinȱanyȱpositionȱotherȱthanȱonȱherȱback,ȱregardlessȱofȱ
theȱparent’sȱrequest.ȱIll.ȱAdmin.ȱCodeȱ§ȱ407.350(i)(1)Ȭ(3).ȱȱ
Sometimesȱ theȱ encroachmentsȱ canȱ beȱ severeȱ evenȱ whenȱ
theȱ riskȱ isȱ low.ȱ Parentsȱ haveȱ beenȱ chargedȱ withȱ neglectȱ forȱ
allowingȱtheirȱchildrenȱtoȱwalkȱtoȱaȱpark, 6ȱorȱwalkȱtoȱschool, 7ȱ
orȱplayȱunsupervisedȱinȱaȱbackȱyard.8ȱThisȱisȱtrueȱdespiteȱtheȱ
factȱthatȱtheȱrateȱofȱoccurrenceȱofȱtheȱmainȱconcern,ȱstrangerȱ
abduction,ȱisȱquiteȱlowȱ(approximatelyȱ60–100ȱperȱyear)ȱandȱ
continuallyȱdeclining. 9ȱȱ
Inȱshort,ȱstatutes,ȱregulations,ȱlawȱenforcementȱandȱsocialȱ
servicesȱ resourcesȱ areȱ employedȱ toȱ protectȱ childrenȱ fromȱ
harmȱevenȱwhereȱtheȱriskȱofȱharmȱisȱslightȱorȱnegligible.ȱAndȱ
asȱ theȱ majorityȱ states,ȱ “Noȱ oneȱ canȱ disagree—andȱ weȱ cerȬ
tainlyȱdoȱnot—thatȱfirearmsȱinȱtheȱhandsȱofȱyoungȱchildrenȱ
orȱunsupervisedȱyouthȱareȱfraughtȱwithȱseriousȱrisksȱtoȱsafeȬ
ty.”ȱAnteȱatȱ18.ȱIȱwouldȱaddȱthatȱfirearmsȱevenȱinȱtheȱhandsȱ
ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ
6 http://abcnews.go.com/Lifestyle/freeȬrangeȬparentsȬfoundȬresponsibleȬ
childȬneglectȬallowing/story?id=29363859.ȱLastȱvisitedȱJanuaryȱ16,ȱ2017.ȱ
7 http://www.timesfreepress.com/news/local/story/2016/apr/01/ȱ motherȬ
chargedȬneglectȬmakingȬchildrenȬwalkȬs/358210/.ȱ Lastȱ visitedȱ Januaryȱ
16,ȱ2017.ȱ
8 http://insider.foxnews.com/2015/06/14/floridaȬparentsȬchargedȬfelonyȬ
neglectȬafterȬ11ȬyearȬoldȬsonȬplaysȬbackyardȬ90Ȭminutes.ȱ Lastȱ visitedȱ
Januaryȱ16,ȱ2017.ȱ
9DavidȱFinkelhor,ȱHeatherȱHammer,ȱandȱAndreaȱJ.ȱSedlak,ȱ“Nonfamilyȱ
Abductedȱ Children:ȱ Nationalȱ Estimatesȱ andȱ Characteristics,ȱ ”Unitedȱ
Statesȱ Departmentȱ ofȱ Justice,ȱ Officeȱ ofȱ Justiceȱ Programs,ȱ Officeȱ ofȱ JuveȬ
nileȱJusticeȱandȱDelinquencyȱPrevention,ȱOctoberȱ2002.ȱȱ

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36ȱ Nos.ȱ14Ȭ3312ȱ&ȱ14Ȭ3322ȱ
ofȱolderȱchildren,ȱevenȱwhileȱtheyȱareȱsupervisedȱbyȱtrainedȱ
instructors,ȱ canȱ haveȱ deadlyȱ consequences.ȱ Inȱ oneȱ highlyȱ
publicizedȱ incidentȱ onȱ anȱ Arizonaȱ shootingȱ range,ȱ aȱ nineȬ
yearȬoldȱgirlȱaccidentallyȱkilledȱherȱinstructor,ȱCharlesȱVacca,ȱ
whenȱ theȱ Uziȱ sheȱ wasȱ firingȱ becameȱ tooȱ difficultȱ forȱ herȱ toȱ
control,ȱjumpingȱoutȱofȱherȱhandȱandȱfiringȱaȱbulletȱintoȱtheȱ
brainȱofȱherȱinstructor. 10ȱButȱotherȱrecentȱshootingsȱbyȱandȱofȱ
childrenȱ onȱ rangesȱ haveȱ slippedȱ byȱ withoutȱ asȱ muchȱ attenȬ
tion.ȱInȱmanyȱcasesȱtheȱaccidentsȱdidȱnotȱinvolveȱhighȱpowȬ
eredȱ weaponsȱ orȱ evenȱ aȱ childȱ asȱ theȱ shooter.ȱ Inȱ someȱ inciȬ
dents,ȱtheȱchildȱatȱtheȱrangeȱwasȱkilledȱbyȱanȱadult. 11ȱ
ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ
10 http://www.cnn.com/2014/08/26/us/arizonaȬgirlȬfatalȬshootingȬ
accident/ȱ
11ȱ ȱ Theȱ followingȱ areȱ incidentsȱ ofȱ shootingsȱ atȱ firingȱ rangesȱ sinceȱ 2012ȱ
foundȱthroughȱaȱreviewȱofȱnewsȱstoriesȱandȱmayȱnotȱbeȱaȱcompleteȱlist:ȱ
ȱ
Octoberȱ 2016,ȱ Northȱ Dakota,ȱ 14ȬyearȬoldȱ girlȱ killedȱ atȱ shootingȱ rangeȱ
http://www.kbzk.com/story/33418822/northȬdakotaȬteenȬkilledȬinȬ
accidentalȬshootingȬatȬgunȬrange.ȱLastȱvisitedȱJanuaryȱ16,ȱ2017.ȱ
ȱ
Augustȱ 2016,ȱ Iowa,ȱ 10ȬyearȬoldȱ shotȱ atȱ shootingȱ rangeȱ
http://nbc4i.com/2016/08/19/boyȬ10ȬdiesȬafterȬbeingȬshotȬatȬshootingȬ
range/.ȱLastȱvisitedȱJanuaryȱ16,ȱ2017.ȱ
ȱ
Julyȱ 2016,ȱ Florida,ȱ Fatherȱ killsȱ 14ȬyearȬoldȱ sonȱ atȱ shootingȱ rangeȱ
http://www.cnn.com/2016/07/04/us/floridaȬfatherȬshootsȬson/ȱȱȱ
ȱ
March,ȱ2016,ȱFlorida,ȱ21ȬyearȬoldȱatȱshootingȱrangeȱmisfiresȱandȱhitsȱfourȱ
childrenȱ agesȱ 8,ȱ 10,ȱ 14ȱ andȱ 15ȱ http://wfla.com/2016/03/12/fourȬchildrenȬ
twoȬadultsȬinjuredȬinȬgunȬrangeȬaccidentȬinȬocala/.ȱ Lastȱ visitedȱ Januaryȱ
16,ȱ2017.ȱ
ȱ

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Nos.ȱ14Ȭ3312ȱ&ȱ14Ȭ3322ȱ 37
ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ
Februaryȱ 2016,ȱ Idaho,ȱ 12Ȭyearȱ shotȱ atȱ shootingȱ rangeȱ (nonȬfatal)ȱ
http://www.foxnews.com/us/2016/02/25/girlȬ12ȬaccidentallyȬshotȬatȬ
idahoȬgunȬrange.html.ȱLastȱvisitedȱJanuaryȱ16,ȱ2017.ȱ
ȱ
Decemberȱ 2015,ȱ Indiana,ȱ 12ȬyearȬoldȱ shotȱ (nonȬfatal)ȱ atȱ shootingȱ rangeȱ
http://cbs4indy.com/2015/12/26/shootingȬrangeȬaccidentȬinjuresȬ12ȬyearȬ
old/.ȱLastȱvisitedȱJanuaryȱ16,ȱ2017.ȱ
ȱ
Decemberȱ2015,ȱArizona,ȱ13ȬyearȬoldȱgirlȱshotȱbyȱadultȱatȱshootingȱrangeȱ
http://www.azcentral.com/story/news/local/pinal/2015/12/01/gunȬrangeȬ
accidentȬservesȬsafetyȬreminder/76610904/.ȱLastȱvisitedȱJanuaryȱ16,ȱ2017.ȱ
ȱ
Decemberȱ 2014,ȱ Ohio,ȱ 14ȬyearȬoldȱ shotȱ byȱ adultȱ atȱ shootingȱ rangeȱ
http://www.wlwt.com/article/teenȬwoundedȬinȬaccidentalȬshootingȬatȬ
gunȬrange/3550107.ȱLastȱvisitedȱJanuaryȱ16,ȱ2017.ȱ
ȱ
Decemberȱ 2014,ȱ California,ȱ 12ȬyearȬoldȱ shootsȱ manȱ inȱ legȱ atȱ shootingȱ
rangeȱ (nonȬfatal)ȱ http://www.eastcountymagazine.org/manȬinjuredȬ
shootingȬrangeȬaccident.ȱLastȱvisitedȱJanuaryȱ16,ȱ2017.ȱ
ȱ
Augustȱ2014,ȱArizona,ȱ9ȬyearȬoldȱkillsȱinstructorȱwithȱUziȱatȱfiringȱrangeȱȱ
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/postȬnation/wp/2016/08/26/twoȬ
yearsȬafterȬ9ȬyearȬoldsȬfatalȬuziȬshootingȬinstructorsȬfamilyȬfilesȬ
wrongfulȬdeathȬsuit/?utm_term=.7072f20994eb.ȱ Lastȱ visitedȱ Januaryȱ 16,ȱ
2017.ȱ
ȱ
Januaryȱ2014,ȱFlorida,ȱ14ȬyearȬoldȱshootsȱherselfȱinȱlegȱatȱshootingȱrangeȱ
(nonȬfatal)ȱ http://www.wesh.com/article/girlȬ14ȬaccidentallyȬshotȬatȬ
gunȬrangeȬinȬmerrittȬisland/4430493.ȱLastȱvisitedȱJanuaryȱ16,ȱ2017.ȱ
ȱ
November,ȱ 2012,ȱ Tennessee,ȱ 13ȬyearȬoldȱ shotȱ byȱ adultȱ atȱ firingȱ rangeȱ
http://www.wsmv.com/story/20177364/13ȬyearȬoldȬshotȬatȬgunȬrangeȬ
cheathamȬcounty.ȱLastȱvisitedȱJanuaryȱ16,ȱ2017.ȱ
ȱ
October,ȱ 30,ȱ2012,ȱ Iowa,ȱ 8ȬyearȬoldȱ shotȱ byȱ 5ȬyearȬoldȱ sisterȱ atȱ shootingȱ
rangeȱ http://www.kwwl.com/story/19956702/accidentalȬshootingȬofȬ8Ȭ
yearȬoldȬbringsȬsafetyȬreminder.ȱLastȱvisitedȱJanuaryȱ16,ȱ2017.ȱ

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38ȱ Nos.ȱ14Ȭ3312ȱ&ȱ14Ȭ3322ȱ
Inȱ sum,ȱ whileȱ Iȱ concurȱ thatȱ theȱ outrightȱ banȱ onȱ allȱ chilȬ
drenȱunderȱtheȱageȱofȱeighteenȱenteringȱaȱfiringȱrangeȱisȱimȬ
permissible,ȱIȱsuspectȱthat,ȱgivenȱourȱlongȱhistoryȱofȱprotectȬ
ingȱ minors,ȱ evenȱ whereȱ fundamentalȱ rightsȱ areȱ inȱ play,ȱ
stringentȱ regulationsȱ forȱ minorsȱ inȱ firingȱ rangesȱ willȱ withȬ
standȱ muchȱ scrutinyȱ whenȱ supportedȱ byȱ appropriateȱ eviȬ
dence.ȱȱ
Forȱtheȱreasonsȱabove,ȱIȱdissentȱfromȱtheȱconclusionȱthatȱ
theȱ zoningȱ regulationȱ isȱ unconstitutional,ȱ andȱ concurȱ withȱ
theȱ majorityȱ regardingȱ itsȱ conclusionsȱ asȱ toȱ theȱ distancingȱ
regulationȱ andȱ theȱ banȱ onȱ minors.ȱ Theȱ City’sȱ gunȱ violenceȱ
problemȱ requiresȱ urgent,ȱ wellȬresearched,ȱ andȱ comprehenȬ
siveȱaction.ȱButȱthoseȱactionsȱmustȱbeȱtakenȱwithinȱtheȱevolvȬ
ingȱparametersȱofȱSecondȱAmendmentȱjurisprudence.ȱȱ

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