George Reed v. PAUL S. KEMPER and MICHELLE BONES

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted December 12, 2016 *
Decided December 12, 2016
Before
MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge
ANN CLAIRE WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge
DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge
No. 16‐1068
GEORGE REED,
Plaintiff‐Appellant,
v.
PAUL S. KEMPER and
MICHELLE BONES,
Defendants‐Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of
Wisconsin.
No. 15‐CV‐208‐JPS
J. P. Stadtmueller,
Judge.
O R D E R
The warden at the Racine Correctional Institution denied George Reed, an
inmate, the right to marry his fiancée. Reed sued the warden, Paul Kemper, and the
institution’s complaint examiner, Michelle Bones. The district court ordered the
defendants to allow him to marry but denied damages on the basis of qualified
immunity. We conclude that the complaint examiner is entitled to qualified immunity
* We have unanimously agreed to decide the case without oral argument because
the briefs and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral
argument would not significantly aid the court. See FED. R. A PP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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but that the warden must pay nominal damages. Thus we affirm in part and vacate in
part.
Reed is serving a life sentence for murder and sought to marry his fiancée,
Jerusha Bohannon, who is not incarcerated. Bohannon is his high‐school sweetheart and
the mother of his child. Under a Wisconsin state regulation, inmates may apply for a
marriage ceremony if they meet certain criteria, including counseling and financial
requirements. Once an inmate has submitted the required information, a marriage
coordinator reviews the application and makes a recommendation to the warden. The
decision to grant or deny the marriage request rests with the warden.
Reed met all the required criteria, and the marriage coordinator recommended
that he be allowed to marry. But Kemper denied Reed’s marriage request in a brief
written statement to Reed: “Taking into consideration your criminal history, sentence
structure, and your unmet program needs, I have determined that there is no justifiable
reason for this marriage to take place while at Racine Correctional Institution.” Reed
contested this decision administratively, and after reviewing his complaint, Bones
concluded that Kemper did not violate any rules.
In an affidavit supplied to the district court, Kemper elaborated that he denied
the marriage request because he thought that the marriage would not succeed. He gave
three reasons for his prediction. The first was based on Reed’s criminal history and
Reed’s attitude about it:
Criminal history is reviewed and considered because it illustrates the
background of this individual. . . . I consider whether this history will
have an impact on the relationship with the proposed wife and family. . . .
For Reed, . . . his criminal history . . . entails possession with intent to
deliver, controlled substance manufacturing/delivery, first‐degree
homicide and possession of a firearm. These are all very serious felony
convictions. . . . Reed made a statement that he believed he was innocent
of the [homicide]. . . . therefore still minimalizing his involvement in the
crime. Even more concerning to me was the impact his crime had on
others.
The second reason for predicting marital difficulty was Reed’s life sentence. He
explained:

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No. 16‐1068 Page 3
Sentence structure is considered to determine what kind of support the
inmate may be able to provide to the spouse. . . . Reed is serving a life
sentence. I considered what role Reed could/will play in the life of his
proposed spouse if he is incarcerated for the remainder of his life. I
questioned whether he could provide for her and support her in times of
crisis. I also questioned whether a marriage under these circumstances
could be successful. I believed it was irresponsible to approve this
marriage for fear it would only create another divorce in the future, which
adds additional burden to the spouse, children, society as a whole and
Reed himself.
Finally Kemper wrote that “Reed has a history surrounding drugs and at the
time of his marriage request, had yet to complete an Alcohol and Other Drug Abuse
program.” The program was not available at the prison.
Reed moved for summary judgment and won partial relief on his claim that the
defendants had violated his constitutional right to marry under Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S.
78 (1987). Turner declared that inmates retain the fundamental right to marry
established in cases such as Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978), and Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1 (1967). Turner, 482 U.S. at 94–99. While Turner recognizes that wardens can
restrict this right, the limits must be “reasonably related to legitimate penological
objectives.” Id. at 97. The district court granted Reed an injunction allowing him to
marry. It reasoned that, if the defendants were trying to promote public safety, denying
the marriage request was not reasonably related to that goal because the marriage
would not endanger anyone.
On the question of damages, the defendants argued that they were entitled to
qualified immunity, and the district court agreed. It reasoned that their conduct “d[id]
not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable
person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). According to
the court, no precedent has rejected Kemper’s rationale for preventing the marriage.
In this court Reed contends that Kemper is not entitled to qualified immunity. He
argues that Turner clearly establishes that the rationale articulated in Kemper’s affidavit
is not related to penological objectives. Penological interests include prison security,
crime deterrence, rehabilitation, and resource allocation. See, e.g., Overton v. Bazzetta,
539 U.S. 126, 133–34 (2003) (recognizing interests in security, protecting visitors, crime
prevention, and deterring substance use); Van den Bosch v. Raemisch, 658 F.3d 778, 785

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No. 16‐1068 Page 4
(7th Cir. 2011) (“[L]egitimate penological interests might include crime deterrence,
prisoner rehabilitation, and protecting the safety of prison guards and inmates.”);
Martin v. Snyder, 329 F.3d 919, 921 (7th Cir. 2003) (upholding brief delay on right to
marry to resolve a security concern); Keeney v. Heath, 57 F.3d 579, 582 (7th Cir. 1995)
(upholding rule preventing jail employees from marrying inmates out of security
concerns).
Kemper’s rationale—that he stopped Reed’s marriage to a civilian because it may
fail—is clearly insufficient under Turner because marital success is not a penological
interest. Ordinarily, “where the inmate wishes to marry a civilian, the decision to marry
(apart from the logistics of the wedding ceremony) is a completely private one.”
See Turner, 482 U.S. at 98. Kemper may be right that, because Reed is a convicted
murderer, past drug abuser, and sentenced to life in prison, Reed’s marriage to a
civilian faces enormous challenges. But the uncertain success of a marriage is not itself a
valid reason for a state official to prevent it. And Bohannon understood Reed’s
background as part of the requirements leading up to Reed’s marriage request, so her
consent is fully informed.
Rehabilitation and deterrence are valid penological goals, but Kemper never
mentions them as reasons for prohibiting the marriage. We recognize that in his
affidavit Kemper asserted that Reed has “yet to complete an Alcohol and Other Drug
Abuse program” and that Reed is still “minimalizing” his crime. But these assertions do
not imply that stopping the marriage will promote rehabilitation or deterrence. First,
Kemper provided no evidence that Reed is refusing to participate in a drug‐abuse
program. To the contrary the program is simply not available to Reed. Second, Kemper
never opines that until Reed receives drug treatment or openly declares his role in his
crime he will misuse the marriage to exploit or abuse others. Kemper has therefore not
connected the denial of Reed’s marriage to these valid prison goals. See Shimer
v. Washington, 100 F.3d 506, 509 (7th Cir. 1996).
Although Kemper has not established a basis for qualified immunity from
damages, his exposure to damages is limited for another reason. Kemper correctly
observes that under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e), prisoners
asserting only emotional and not physical injury cannot recover compensatory
damages; only nominal damages and, if willful and wanton conduct is shown, punitive
damages are possible. Gray v. Hardy, 826 F.3d 1000, 1007 (7th Cir. 2016) (citing Calhoun
v. DeTella, 319 F.3d 936, 941 (7th Cir. 2003)). In moving for summary judgment, and in
responding to the defendants’ opposition to damages, Reed presented no evidence of

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physical injury or willful misconduct. Therefore he can recover only nominal damages
on remand.
Michelle Bones, however, is entitled to qualified immunity because she did not
violate clearly established law. Complaint examiners follow the law so long as they do
their job in examining complaints in good faith. See Burks v. Raemisch, 555 F.3d 592,
595–96 (7th Cir. 2009). Bones declared that she has no authority to grant or deny
marriage requests and that she reviewed Kemper’s decision only for compliance with
the marriage regulation. Bones completed her duties as a complaint examiner in good
faith and therefore did not violate the law. See id.
A final note. The district court denied Reed’s requests for counsel because he did
not timely show that he had attempted to secure counsel on his own, see Pruitt v. Mote,
503 F.3d 647, 654 (7th Cir. 2007) (en banc). He submitted that evidence only after the
court had decided summary judgment. Because his submission came too late, the
district court did not abuse its discretion in denying his request. See id.
Reed’s motion for recruitment of counsel on appeal is DENIED as moot, and the
judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED in part, VACATED in part, and
REMANDED for an award of nominal damages of one dollar payable by defendant
Kemper.

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