United States of America v. Derrick M. Corn

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted September 22, 2016
Decided September 22, 2016
Before
MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge
ANN CLAIRE WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge
DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge
No. 15‐3850
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Plaintiff‐Appellee,
v.
DERRICK M. CORN,
Defendant‐Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.
No. 15‐CR‐58
William C. Griesbach,
Chief Judge.
O R D E R
Derrick Corn, a Menominee Indian, called the tribal police and reported that his
6‐month‐old daughter was not breathing normally. Officers found the child
unresponsive and having seizures. The child was rushed to the hospital and diagnosed
with multiple skull fractures caused by intentional, severe trauma. A grand jury
charged Corn with committing an assault on a reservation causing “serious” bodily
injury, which carries a maximum penalty of 10 years’ imprisonment. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1153,
113(a)(6). As part of a plea agreement, however, the government dismissed that charge
and instead allowed Corn to plead guilty to an information alleging that his assault on
the reservation caused “substantial” bodily injury to a child, a change that reduced the
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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No. 15‐3850 Page 2
maximum penalty to 5 years. Id. §§ 1153, 113(a)(7). Corn agreed not to challenge his
sentence on appeal except for claims asserting (1) punishment in excess of a statutory
maximum; (2) the district court’s reliance at sentencing on a constitutionally
impermissible factor; or (3) ineffective assistance of counsel. Corn was sentenced to
5 years’ imprisonment to be followed by 3 years’ supervised release.
Despite the appeal waiver, Corn filed a notice of appeal, but his newly appointed
attorney asserts that the appeal is frivolous and seeks to withdraw under Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). Corn has not accepted our invitation to comment on
counsel’s motion. See 7TH C IR . R. 51(b). Counsel has submitted a brief that explains the
nature of the case and addresses potential issues that an appeal of this kind might be
expected to involve. Because counsel’s analysis appears to be thorough, we limit our
discussion to the issues she identifies. See United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir.
2014); United States v. Wagner, 103 F.3d 551, 553 (7th Cir. 1996).
Corn has told counsel that he wants to challenge his guilty plea, so counsel first
evaluates the possibility of contesting the adequacy of the plea colloquy. See United
States v. Konczak, 683 F.3d 348, 349 (7th Cir. 2012); United States v. Knox, 287 F.3d 667,
670–71 (7th Cir. 2002). Because Corn did not move to withdraw his plea in the district
court, we would review for plain error. See United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 59, 62–63
(2002); United States v. Davenport, 719 F.3d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 2013). The district court
ensured that Corn’s guilty plea was knowing and voluntary by substantially complying
with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11. The court admonished Corn about the
nature of the charge, the statutory maximum penalties, the trial rights he was giving up,
the role of the sentencing guidelines, and the consequences of the appeal waiver.
See FED. R. C RIM. P. 11(b); United States v. Blalock, 321 F.3d 686, 688–89 (7th Cir. 2003);
United States v. Akinsola, 105 F.3d 331, 334 (7th Cir. 1997); United States v. Lovett, 844 F.2d
487, 491 (7th Cir. 1988). Corn concurred with the written factual basis in his plea
agreement and assured the court that he was satisfied with counsel’s efforts on his
behalf. Nothing about the plea colloquy suggests that Corn’s guilty plea was
involuntary.
It follows, says counsel, that Corn’s appeal waiver must be enforced. We agree
with that assessment. See United States v. Zitt, 714 F.3d 511, 515 (7th Cir. 2013);
United States v. Sakellarion, 649 F.3d 634, 639 (7th Cir. 2011). The district court did not
rely on any impermissible factors in sentencing, and Corn’s terms of imprisonment and
supervised release are within the statutory maximum. See Dowell v. United States,

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No. 15‐3850 Page 3
694 F.3d 898, 901–02 (7th Cir. 2012); United States v. Bownes, 405 F.3d 634, 637
(7th Cir. 2005).
Finally, counsel tells us that Corn has suggested “that his trial attorney was
ineffective with respect to investigating his case and presenting evidence to contradict
the government’s evidence.” But counsel properly recognizes that claims of ineffective
assistance are best raised in a collateral proceeding where an evidentiary foundation
can be developed. See Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 504–05 (2003); United
States v. Flores, 739 F.3d 337, 340–41 (7th Cir. 2014).
Counsel’s motion to withdraw is GRANTED, and the appeal is DISMISSED.

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