United States of America v. Tony A. Hurlburt

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 14-3611
U NITED S TATES OF A MERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
TONY A. HURLBURT,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Wisconsin.
No. 14-cr-62-jdp — James D. Peterson, Judge.
____________________
No. 15-1686
U NITED S TATES OF A MERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
JOSHUA GILLESPIE,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Wisconsin.
No. 14-cr-106-wmc — William C. Conley, Chief Judge.

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2 Nos. 14-3611 & 15-1686
____________________
A RGUED DECEMBER 2, 2015 — DECIDED A UGUST 29, 2016
____________________
Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and POSNER , F LAUM ,
EASTERBROOK, K ANNE, R OVNER , WILLIAMS, S YKES, and
HAMILTON , Circuit Judges.
S YKES, Circuit Judge. Tony Hurlburt and Joshua Gillespie
pleaded guilty in separate cases to unlawfully possessing a
firearm as a felon. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Their appeals
raise the same legal issue, so we’ve consolidated them for
decision. To calculate the Sentencing Guidelines range in
each case, the district court began with U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a),
which assigns progressively higher offense levels if the
defendant has one or more prior convictions for a “crime of
violence.” The term “crime of violence” is defined in the
career-offender guideline and includes “any offense …
that … is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion, in-
volves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that
presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” Id.
§ 4B1.2(a)(2) (2014) (emphasis added). The highlighted text is
known as the “residual clause.”
The residual clause in § 4B1.2(a)(2) mirrors the residual
clause in the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), which
steeply increases the minimum and maximum penalties for
§ 922(g) violations. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B). One year ago the
Supreme Court invalidated the ACCA’s residual clause as
unconstitutionally vague. Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct.
2551, 2563 (2015). The question here is whether Johnson’s
holding applies to the parallel residual clause in the career-

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Nos. 14-3611 & 15-1686 3
offender guideline. An emerging consensus of the circuits
holds that it does. See infra pp. 17–18.
In this circuit, however, vagueness challenges to the Sen-
tencing Guidelines are categorically foreclosed. Circuit
precedent—namely, United States v. Tichenor 683 F.3d 358,
364–65 (7th Cir. 2012)—holds that the Guidelines are not
susceptible to challenge on vagueness grounds. But Tichenor
was decided before Johnson and Peugh v. United States,
133 S. Ct. 2072 (2013), which have fatally undermined its
reasoning. Accordingly, we now overrule Tichenor. Applying
Johnson, we join the increasing majority of our sister circuits
in holding that the residual clause in § 4B1.2(a)(2) is uncon-
stitutionally vague.
I. Background
Tony Hurlburt was charged in a two-count indictment
with possessing a firearm as a felon, see § 922(g)(1), and
possessing a short-barreled shotgun, see 26 U.S.C. §§ 5841,
5845(a)(2), and 5861(d). He pleaded guilty to the felon-in-
possession count; the second count was dismissed.
Under the Sentencing Guidelines, the offense level for the
crime of unlawful firearm possession depends in part on the
defendant’s criminal history. For Hurlburt’s crime the base
offense level ordinarily is 18. § 2K2.1(a)(5). But if the defend-
ant has a prior conviction for a “crime of violence or a
controlled substance offense,” the base offense level is 22.
§ 2K2.1(a)(3). For a defendant with two or more prior convic-
tions of either type, the base offense level jumps to 26.
§ 2K2.1(a)(1).

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4 Nos. 14-3611 & 15-1686
Application Note 1 to § 2K2.1 incorporates the “crime of
violence” definition in the career-offender guideline, which
reads:
(a) The term “crime of violence” means any of-
fense under federal or state law, punishable by
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year,
that—
(1) has as an element the use, attempted
use, or threatened use of physical force
against the person of another, or
(2) is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or ex-
tortion, involves use of explosives, or other-
wise involves conduct that presents a serious
potential risk of physical injury to another.
U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a) (emphasis added). The highlighted text is
known as the “residual clause.”
Hurlburt has a prior conviction for armed burglary, and
at sentencing he conceded that this conviction qualifies as a
predicate crime of violence. The government argued that
another of Hurlburt’s prior convictions—for discharging a
firearm into a building or vehicle, see W IS. S TAT. § 941.20—
should also count as a crime of violence. More particularly,
the government argued that this second conviction qualified
under § 4B1.2(a)(2)’s residual clause. Over Hurlburt’s objec-
tion the district judge accepted this argument.
With two predicate convictions for crimes of violence,
Hurlburt’s base offense level was 26, and the recommended
sentencing range was 84–105 months. The judge imposed a
below-range sentence of 72 months. Without the second

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Nos. 14-3611 & 15-1686 5
career-offender predicate, the Guidelines range drops to 57–
71 months.
In an unrelated case in the same district, Joshua Gillespie
was indicted for unlawfully possessing a firearm as a felon,
and he too pleaded guilty. Gillespie has a prior conviction
for fleeing an officer. See id. § 346.04(3). The district judge
counted this conviction as a predicate crime of violence
under the residual clause, which increased Gillespie’s base
offense level to 20. § 2K2.1(a)(4). The resulting Guidelines
range was 92–115 months, and the judge imposed a below-
range sentence of 84 months. Without the career-offender
predicate in the mix, the Guidelines range drops to 51–
63 months.
Hurlburt and Gillespie appealed and immediately asked
us to suspend briefing to await the Supreme Court’s decision
in Johnson, which raised the question whether the residual
clause in the ACCA’s definition of “violent felony”—a
mirror image of the residual clause in § 4B1.2(a)(2)—is
unconstitutionally vague. We held the cases for Johnson and
reinstated briefing after the Supreme Court issued its opin-
ion. A panel heard argument in both appeals on the same
day. 1 The panel prepared an opinion proposing to overrule
Tichenor and circulated it to the full court in accordance with
Circuit Rule 40(e). An en banc vote followed, and a majority
of the court approved. This, then, is the opinion of the en
1 Another appeal we decide today, United States v. Rollins, No. 13-1731,
also raises the same issue and was argued the same day. Because Rollins
presents an additional issue unique to that case, we have not consolidat-
ed it here.

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6 Nos. 14-3611 & 15-1686
banc court. 2 See Buchmeier v. United States, 581 F.3d 561 (7th
Cir. 2009) (using the same procedure).
II. Discussion
In Johnson the Supreme Court held that the ACCA’s re-
sidual clause is too vague to satisfy minimum requirements
of due process. 135 S. Ct. at 2563. Hurlburt and Gillespie
argue that Johnson’s holding applies to the identically
phrased residual clause in § 4B1.2(a)(2), which was used in
their cases to increase the base offense level and thus the
recommended sentencing range under the Guidelines. The
Johnson argument is new on appeal, so our review is for
plain error. Henderson v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1121, 1124
(2013); F ED. R. C RIM . P. 52(b). Under Rule 52(b) we may
correct a forfeited error if (1) the error is “plain”; (2) affects
the defendant’s “substantial rights”; and (3) “seriously
affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of [the]
judicial proceedings.” Henderson, 133 S. Ct. at 1126–27 (quo-
tation marks omitted).
Johnson was not yet decided when the defendants were
sentenced, but plain-error review asks whether the error is
“plain” at the time of appellate review. Id. at 1130. The
defendants maintain that the Johnson error is plain: The two
residual clauses are identical, and because the ACCA’s
residual clause is unconstitutionally vague, it necessarily
follows that the residual clause in § 4B1.2(a)(2) is also uncon-
stitutional.
2 District Judge J. Phil Gilbert, of the Southern District of Illinois, served
on the original panel, sitting by designation. We appreciate his willing-
ness to assist the court.

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Nos. 14-3611 & 15-1686 7
The logic is compelling, but our decision in Tichenor
stands in the way. Tichenor held that the Guidelines cannot
be challenged on vagueness grounds. 683 F.3d at 364–65. The
defendants maintain that Tichenor has been fatally under-
mined by the Supreme Court’s decisions in Johnson and
Peugh. The government agrees, so the parties join forces in
asking us to overrule Tichenor, apply Johnson, and invalidate
the residual clause in § 4B1.2(a)(2) as unconstitutionally
vague.
Of course the parties’ agreement doesn’t relieve us of our
obligation to resolve the question ourselves. Sibron v. New
York, 392 U.S. 40, 58 (1968). Before proceeding, however, we
pause to note two important recent developments. First, the
Sentencing Commission has amended the Guidelines to
delete § 4B1.2(a)(2)’s residual clause in light of Johnson; the
amendment became effective August 1, 2016. 81 Fed. Reg.
4741, 4742 (2016). Second, the Supreme Court has granted
certiorari in a case on collateral review to address the precise
question presented here: whether Johnson’s holding applies
to the residual clause in § 4B1.2(a)(2). Beckles v. United States,
616 F. App’x 415 (11th Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 2016 WL
1029080 (U.S. June 27, 2016) (No. 15-8544). Beckles will be
heard in the Court’s upcoming term and raises additional
issues unique to its facts and procedural posture. The
Court’s decision is many months away, so we think it best
not to hold these cases for Beckles.

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8 Nos. 14-3611 & 15-1686
A. Johnson and § 4B1.2(a)(2)’s Residual Clause
The Due Process Clause 3 prohibits the government from
depriving a person of life, liberty, or property “under a
criminal law so vague that it fails to give ordinary people
fair notice of the conduct it punishes, or so standardless that
it invites arbitrary enforcement.” Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2556.
Johnson addressed persistent vagueness concerns about the
residual clause in the ACCA’s definition of “violent felony.”
The Act increases the minimum and maximum penalties for
various firearm-possession offenses if the defendant has
three prior convictions “for a violent felony or a serious drug
offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). The Act defines the term
“violent felony” as follows:
[A]ny crime punishable by imprisonment for a
term exceeding one year … that—
(i) has as an element the use, attempted use,
or threatened use of physical force against
the person of another; or
(ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves
use of explosives, or otherwise involves con-
duct that presents a serious potential risk of
physical injury to another … .
§ 924(e)(2)(B) (emphasis added). The highlighted text is the
residual clause; the residual clause in the career-offender
guideline is a carbon copy.
3 The Fifth Amendment provides: “No person shall … be deprived of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law … .” U.S. C ONST.
amend. V.

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Nos. 14-3611 & 15-1686 9
The Court began its analysis in Johnson by reaffirming the
principle that the Constitution’s prohibition of vague laws
applies “not only to statutes defining elements of crimes, but
also to statutes fixing sentences.” 135 S. Ct. at 2557 (citing
United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 123 (1979)). Before
continuing the doctrinal analysis, the Court first explained
that the residual clause mandates a two-step categorical
approach for classifying crimes as violent felonies. In the
first step, the sentencing court must evaluate the predicate
crime of conviction, hypothesizing “the kind of conduct that
the crime involves in ‘the ordinary case,’” rather than look-
ing to the actual facts of the underlying case; in the second
step, the court must assess whether this hypothesized “ordi-
nary” case of the crime “presents a serious potential risk of
physical injury.” Id.
These two features of the residual clause, the Court said,
“conspire to make it unconstitutionally vague.” Id. First, the
clause “leaves grave uncertainty about how to estimate the
risk posed by a crime” because “[i]t ties the judicial assess-
ment of risk to a judicially imagined ‘ordinary case’ of a
crime, not to real-world facts or statutory elements.” Id.; see
also id. (“How does one go about deciding what kind of
conduct the ‘ordinary case’ of the crime involves? ‘A statisti-
cal analysis of the state reporter? A survey? Expert evidence?
Google? Gut instinct?’” (quoting United States v. Mayer,
560 F.3d 948, 952 (9th Cir. 2009) (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting
from denial of rehearing en banc))). Second, the residual
clause “leaves uncertainty about how much risk it takes for a
crime to qualify as a violent felony.” Id. at 2558.
“By combining indeterminacy about how to measure the
risk posed by a crime with indeterminacy about how much

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10 Nos. 14-3611 & 15-1686
risk it takes for the crime to qualify as a violent felony, the
residual clause produces more unpredictability and arbitrar-
iness than the Due Process Clause tolerates.” Id. The Court
noted as well that the residual clause had persistently resist-
ed judicial efforts—by the Justices themselves and the lower
courts—to settle on a stable construction. Id. at 2558–63. This
interpretive struggle, the Court said, was a “failed enter-
prise,” id. at 2560, and “the experience of the federal courts
leaves no doubt about the unavoidable uncertainty and
arbitrariness of adjudication under the residual clause,” id. at
2562.
The clause’s “hopeless indeterminacy,” the Court con-
cluded, “both denies fair notice to defendants and invites
arbitrary enforcement by judges.” Id. at 2557–58. The Court
called a halt to the long-running interpretive battle and held
that “imposing an increased sentence under the [ACCA’s]
residual clause … violates the Constitution’s guarantee of
due process.” Id. at 2560, 2563.
As we’ve explained, § 4B1.2(a)(2)’s definition of “violent
felony” contains the same residual clause, and we interpret
the two provisions interchangeably, using the same categori-
cal approach that Johnson found impermissibly indetermi-
nate. See, e.g., United States v. Griffin, 652 F.3d 793, 802 (7th
Cir. 2011); United States v. Spells, 537 F.3d 743, 749 n.1 (7th
Cir. 2008). So unless the Guidelines are immune from chal-
lenge on vagueness grounds, it follows inexorably from
Johnson that the residual clause in § 4B1.2(a)(2) is also uncon-
stitutionally vague. See United States v. Vivas-Ceja, 808 F.3d
719, 722–23 (7th Cir. 2015) (applying Johnson to the similarly
phrased residual clause in the “crime of violence” definition
in 18 U.S.C. § 16(b)).

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Nos. 14-3611 & 15-1686 11
B. Tichenor
Tichenor held that the Guidelines are immune from
vagueness challenges, but that conclusion is on shaky
ground after Johnson and Peugh. Our decision in Tichenor
rested on two premises. First, we reasoned that vagueness
doctrine doesn’t apply to the Guidelines because they do not
declare any conduct illegal; they’re just “directives to judges
for their guidance in sentencing.” Tichenor, 683 F.3d at 364
(quoting United States v. Wivell, 893 F.2d 156, 160 (8th Cir.
1990)). The second premise overlaps the first: We reasoned
that vagueness doctrine doesn’t apply because United States
v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), demoted the Guidelines from
“rules to advice.” Tichenor, 683 F.3d at 364 (quotation marks
omitted). Because the Guidelines are merely advisory, a
defendant has no due-process expectation that he will be
sentenced within the recommended range, id. (citing Irizarry
v. United States, 553 U.S. 708, 713–14 (2008)), and he “cannot
rely on them to communicate the sentence that the district
court will impose,” id. at 365.
Johnson conclusively refutes Tichenor’s first premise. Cit-
ing Batchelder, 442 U.S. at 123, the Court confirmed that
vagueness doctrine applies to sentencing provisions as well
as laws declaring conduct illegal. Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2557.
We touched on Batchelder in Tichenor but dismissed it as
irrelevant, construing its reference to “vague sentencing
provisions” as “mere dictum.” 683 F.3d at 365. We now
know the Supreme Court sees things differently; the Consti-
tution’s protection against vague laws is not limited to laws
defining criminal liability. As far as vagueness doctrine is
concerned, it makes no difference that the Guidelines deal
exclusively with sentencing.

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12 Nos. 14-3611 & 15-1686
Tichenor’s second rationale has been fatally undermined
by the Court’s decision in Peugh. There the Court held that
the Guidelines, even though advisory, are subject to the
limits imposed by the Ex Post Facto Clause. Peugh, 133 S. Ct.
at 2077–78. A district judge in Northern Illinois had calculat-
ed Peugh’s sentencing range under the version of the Guide-
lines in effect at the time of sentencing, as required by
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4)(A)(ii), and this newer version yielded a
higher range than the version in effect at the time of the
crime. Id. at 2078–79. Peugh objected, arguing that applying
the harsher version of the Guidelines promulgated after he
committed the crime violated his rights under the Ex Post
Facto Clause. Based on our circuit precedent, the district
judge rejected the argument, and we affirmed. United States
v. Peugh, 675 F.3d 736, 741 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing United States
v. Demaree, 459 F.3d 791 (7th Cir. 2006)). The Supreme Court
reversed, finding an ex post facto violation.
The Ex Post Facto Clause prohibits, among other things,
“[e]very law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a
greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime,
when committed.” Peugh, 133 S. Ct. at 2081 (quoting Calder v.
Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 390 (1798) (opinion of Chase, J.)).
The “touchstone of [the Ex Post Facto Clause] inquiry is
whether a given change in law presents a sufficient risk of
increasing the measure of punishment attached to the cov-
ered crimes.” Id. at 2082 (internal quotation marks omitted).
As the Court explained in Peugh, the Ex Post Facto Clause
“ensures that individuals have fair warning of applicable
laws and guards against vindictive legislative action.” Id. at
2085. And “[e]ven where these concerns are not directly
implicated, … the Clause also safeguards ‘a fundamental

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Nos. 14-3611 & 15-1686 13
fairness interest … in having the government abide by the
rules of law it establishes to govern the circumstances under
which it can deprive a person of his or her liberty or life.’” Id.
(quoting Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513, 533 (2000)); see also
Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 429 (1987) (explaining that the
Ex Post Facto Clauses “assure that federal and state legisla-
tures [are] restrained from enacting arbitrary or vindictive
legislation” and that “legislative enactments give fair warn-
ing of their effect and permit individuals to rely on their
meaning until explicitly changed”) (internal quotation
omitted)).
Crucially here, the government argued in Peugh that be-
cause the post-Booker Guidelines are advisory, they “lack
sufficient legal effect” to be considered “law” for purposes of
the Ex Post Facto Clause. Peugh, 133 S. Ct. at 2085; id. at 2086
(“The Government … argues … that the Guidelines are too
much like guideposts and not enough like fences to give rise
to an ex post facto violation.”). The Court emphatically reject-
ed that argument, explaining that “[t]he post-Booker federal
sentencing scheme aims to achieve uniformity by ensuring
that sentencing decisions are anchored by the Guidelines
and that they remain a meaningful benchmark through the
process of appellate review.” Id. at 2083. This “anchoring”
effect, the Court said, is enough to implicate the concerns
underlying the Ex Post Facto Clause; the sentencing court’s
discretion to sentence outside the Guidelines range “[does]
not defeat an ex post facto claim.” Id. at 2081.
The Court explicitly listed the procedural rules and ap-
pellate-review standards that give the post-Booker Guidelines
a degree of “binding legal effect” sufficient to raise ex post
facto concerns. Id. at 2086. District judges must begin their

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14 Nos. 14-3611 & 15-1686
sentencing analysis with the Guidelines and correctly calcu-
late the applicable sentencing range. Id. at 2083 (citing Gall v.
United States, 552 U.S. 38, 50 (2007)). Failure to correctly
calculate the Guidelines range is procedural error. Id. (citing
Gall, 552 U.S. at 51). Variances above or below the range
must be specifically justified, and more justification is need-
ed as the variance increases. Id. In short, even though “a
district court may ultimately sentence a given defendant
outside the … range,” the Guidelines retain “force” as the
“framework for sentencing.” Id. “Indeed, the rule that an
incorrect Guidelines calculation is procedural error ensures
that they remain the starting point for every sentencing
calculation … .” Id.
And perhaps most importantly, reviewing courts may
presume that a within-Guidelines sentence is reasonable. Id.
Our circuit has adopted such a presumption. See United
States v. Mykytiuk, 415 F.3d 606, 608 (7th Cir. 2005) (“[A]ny
sentence that is properly calculated under the Guidelines is
entitled to a rebuttable presumption of reasonableness [on
appeal].”).
With all these formal procedural requirements, the post-
Booker Guidelines, though ultimately advisory, are not
“merely a volume that the district court reads with academic
interest in the course of sentencing.” Peugh, 133 S. Ct. at
2087. To the contrary, the Guidelines have real-world conse-
quences despite their demotion to advisory status. Peugh
pointed to “considerable empirical evidence” establishing
that the Guidelines continue to have “the intended effect of
influencing the sentences imposed by judges.” Id. at 2084.
Data from the Sentencing Commission “indicate that when a
Guidelines range moves up or down, offenders’ sentences

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Nos. 14-3611 & 15-1686 15
move with it.” Id. As the Court put it very recently, “[t]hese
sources confirm that the Guidelines are not only the starting
point for most federal sentencing proceedings but also the
lodestar.” Molina-Martinez v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1338,
1346 (2016).
This combination of formal legal requirements and real-
world effects led the Court to conclude that the Guidelines,
though advisory, are not immune from Ex Post Facto Clause
scrutiny. Peugh, 133 S. Ct. at 2084. The Court went on to hold
that “[a] retrospective increase in the Guidelines range …
creates a sufficient risk of a higher sentence to constitute an
ex post facto violation.” Id.
It should be clear from this discussion that Tichenor’s sec-
ond premise—that the Guidelines’ advisory status insulates
them from vagueness challenges—did not survive Peugh.
The Court held, after all, that the Guidelines are sufficiently
law-like to trigger Ex Post Facto protection. If the Guidelines
are constraining enough to require compliance with the Ex
Post Facto Clause, it follows that they are constraining
enough to require compliance with the Due Process Clause’s
prohibition against vague laws. We see no principled way to
distinguish Peugh on doctrinal grounds: The two constitu-
tional protections share the same underlying concerns about
fair notice and arbitrary governmental action.
To the extent that Tichenor relied on Irizarry, Peugh explic-
itly considered and rejected the analogy. Irizarry held that
district judges are not required to give notice before impos-
ing an above-Guidelines sentence based on the sentencing
factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). 553 U.S. at 713. Peugh distin-
guished Irizarry this way:

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16 Nos. 14-3611 & 15-1686
It is true that we held, in Irizarry v. United
States, 553 U.S. 708, 713–714 … , that a defend-
ant does not have an “expectation subject to
due process protection” that he will be sen-
tenced within the Guidelines range. But … the
Ex Post Facto Clause does not merely protect re-
liance interests. It also reflects principles of
“fundamental justice.” Carmell, 529 U.S. at 531,
120 S. Ct. 1620.
Peugh, 133 S. Ct. at 2085. The Court’s reference to “reliance
interests” is shorthand for the fair-notice principle, and its
reference to “fundamental justice” captures the Ex Post Facto
Clause’s concern about arbitrary governmental action.
Vagueness doctrine reflects the same concerns. Indeed, in
Johnson the Court concluded that the ACCA’s residual clause
both denies fair notice and invites arbitrary enforcement. But
the fair-notice principle was mostly in the background; the
Court’s chief concern was that the radical indeterminacy of
the residual clause made judicial enforcement essentially ad
hoc and arbitrary.
Irizarry is also distinguishable for another reason. It ad-
dressed a question about procedural notice: Must the sentenc-
ing court give the defendant notice and an opportunity to
respond before imposing an above-Guidelines sentence
under § 3553(a)? 553 U.S. at 712–13. Vagueness doctrine and
the Ex Post Facto Clause enforce a different notice principle:
the substantive requirement that the law must give clear
notice of the conduct that it prohibits and the consequences
that attach to a violation. See United States v. Pawlak, 822 F.3d
902, 909 (6th Cir. 2016) (explaining the difference between

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Nos. 14-3611 & 15-1686 17
“adversarial notice” and “ex ante notice”). For this addition-
al reason, Irizarry doesn’t inform the analysis here.
Finally, our dissenting colleagues warn that if vagueness
doctrine extends to the advisory Guidelines, then other
broad and open-ended provisions are vulnerable—for
example, the “sophisticated means” enhancement,
§ 2B1.1(b)(10); the “vulnerable victim” enhancement,
§ 3A1.1(b); the “abuse of trust” enhancement, § 3B1.3; and
even the foundational concept of “relevant conduct,”
§ 1B1.3, which applies to all crimes. See Dissent at pp. 27–28.
Johnson itself specially addressed this kind of objection and
rejected it. The Court explained at length that the vagueness
defect in the ACCA’s residual clause is not just its use of
indeterminate language; it’s that the clause uses indetermi-
nate language and must be applied categorically, without
regard to real-world facts. Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2557–58. The
Court could not have been clearer on this point: It’s the
combination of indeterminate language and categorical
application that makes the clause fatally vague. The same is
true of the residual clause in the Guidelines. But the categor-
ical feature is unique to the residual clause; other Guidelines
provisions are applied to actual facts on the ground. That
distinction makes a difference under Johnson.
Simply put, after Peugh we can no longer say, as we did
in Tichenor, that because the Guidelines are “advice” rather
than “rules,” they are immune from challenge on vagueness
grounds. Because Tichenor has lost its analytical foundation,
we now overrule it. Applying Johnson, we hold that the
residual clause in § 4B1.2(a)(1) is unconstitutionally vague.
With this holding, we join a growing consensus among
the circuits. See Pawlak, 822 F.3d at 907 (applying Johnson to

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18 Nos. 14-3611 & 15-1686
the residual clause in § 4B1.2(a)(2) and finding it unconstitu-
tionally vague); United States v. Madrid, 805 F.3d 1204, 1211
(10th Cir. 2015) (same); United States v. Taylor, 803 F.3d 931,
933 (8th Cir. 2015) (holding that Johnson applies to the career-
offender guideline but remanding for determination of the
vagueness question). Several other circuits have accepted the
government’s concession without further discussion or
assumed without deciding that Johnson applies to the career-
offender guideline. See United States v. Soto-Rivera, 811 F.3d
53, 59 (1st Cir. 2016) (accepting the government’s concession
that the § 4B1.2(a)(2) residual clause is unconstitutionally
vague without deciding the issue); United States v. Maldona-
do, 636 F. App’x 807, 810 & n.1 (2d. Cir. 2016) (assuming
without deciding that “the due process concerns that led
Johnson to invalidate the ACCA’s residual clause as void for
vagueness are equally applicable to the Sentencing Guide-
lines”); United States v. Townsend, 638 F. App’x 172, 178 &
n.14 (3d. Cir. 2015) (invalidating the Guidelines’ residual
clause after Johnson without extended discussion of whether
the vagueness doctrine applies). One circuit has declined to
apply Johnson to the Guidelines. See United States v. Matchett,
802 F.3d 1185, 1194–95 (11th Cir. 2015). 4
C. Remedy
For both Hurlburt and Gillespie, the Johnson error pro-
duced a Guidelines range that was too high. That’s ordinari-
ly enough to satisfy the prejudice requirement of plain-error
4 As we’ve noted, the Supreme Court has granted certiorari in a case
from the Eleventh Circuit. Beckles v. United States, 616 F. App’x 415 (11th
Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 2016 WL 1029080 (U.S. June 27, 2016)
(No. 15-8544). The Beckles panel followed Matchett, the Eleventh Circuit’s
precedent on this question.

-- 18 of 29 --

Nos. 14-3611 & 15-1686 19
review. To establish that the error affected their substantial
rights, the defendants must show “a reasonable probability
that, but for the error, the outcome of the proceeding would
have been different.” Molina-Martinez, 136 S. Ct. at 1343,
(internal quotation marks omitted). “When a defendant is
sentenced under an incorrect Guidelines range[,] … the error
itself can, and most often will, be sufficient to show a reasona-
ble probability of a different outcome absent the error.” Id. at
1345 (emphasis added). This is because the Guidelines
“inform and instruct the district court’s determination of an
appropriate sentence. In the usual case, then, the systemic
function of the selected Guidelines range will affect the
sentence.” Id. at 1346.
Hurlburt’s 72-month sentence fell below the original
Guidelines range but is above the correctly calculated range
once the Johnson error is removed. The same is true of
Gillespie’s 84-month sentence. The defendants request full
remand for resentencing.
The government argues for a limited remand akin to the
procedure we adopted in United States v. Paladino, 401 F.3d
471 (7th Cir. 2005), for Booker errors. Paladino fashioned a
“limited remand to permit the sentencing judge to determine
whether he would (if required to resentence) reimpose his
original sentence.” Id. at 484. But we’ve generally rejected
the Paladino-style limited-remand procedure when the
sentencing error involves a miscalculation of the defendant’s
Guidelines range. See United States v. Williams, 742 F.3d 304
(7th Cir. 2014). “When a district court incorrectly calculates
the [G]uideline[s] range, we normally presume the improp-
erly calculated [G]uideline[s] range influenced the judge’s
choice of sentence, unless he says otherwise.” United States v.

-- 19 of 29 --

20 Nos. 14-3611 & 15-1686
Adams, 746 F.3d 734, 743 (7th Cir. 2014). Neither judge said
otherwise here.
Accordingly, we VACATE the defendants’ sentences and
R EMAND for resentencing.

-- 20 of 29 --

Nos.ȱ14Ȭ3611ȱ&ȱ15Ȭ1686ȱ 21ȱ
HAMILTON,ȱ Circuitȱ Judge,ȱ joinedȱ byȱ P OSNER ,ȱ FLAUM,ȱ andȱ
EASTERBROOK ,ȱCircuitȱJudges,ȱdissenting.ȱ
ByȱnowȱtheȱSupremeȱCourt’sȱdecisionȱinȱJohnsonȱv.ȱUnitedȱ
States,ȱ 135ȱ S.ȱ Ct.ȱ 2551ȱ (2015),ȱ isȱ familiarȱ toȱ allȱ inȱ theȱ federalȱ
criminalȱjusticeȱsystem.ȱJohnsonȱheldȱthatȱtheȱ“residualȱclause”ȱ
inȱtheȱArmedȱCareerȱCriminalȱActȱdefinitionȱofȱaȱviolentȱfelȬ
ony,ȱseeȱ18ȱU.S.C.ȱ§ȱ924(e)(2)(B),ȱisȱunconstitutionallyȱvague.ȱ
TheȱenȱbancȱmajorityȱnowȱholdsȱthatȱtheȱreasoningȱofȱJohnsonȱ
extendsȱtoȱaȱsimilarȱresidualȱclauseȱinȱanȱadvisoryȱSentencingȱ
Guidelineȱ onȱ careerȱ offenders,ȱ holdingȱ theȱ guidelineȱ proviȬ
sionȱ unconstitutionallyȱ vague.ȱ Theȱ majorityȱ alsoȱ overrulesȱ
Unitedȱ Statesȱ v.ȱ Tichenor,ȱ 683ȱ F.3dȱ 358ȱ (7thȱCir.ȱ 2012),ȱwhichȱ
held,ȱcorrectlyȱinȱmyȱview,ȱthatȱtheȱadvisoryȱGuidelinesȱareȱ
notȱsusceptibleȱtoȱvaguenessȱchallenges.ȱ
Theȱmajority’sȱholdingȱisȱbothȱprematureȱandȱerroneous.ȱ
Thereȱisȱnoȱneedȱforȱusȱtoȱdecideȱthisȱnow.ȱThereȱisȱalreadyȱaȱ
circuitȱsplit,ȱandȱtheȱSupremeȱCourtȱisȱlikelyȱtoȱruleȱonȱthisȱ
questionȱinȱtheȱcomingȱterm.ȱSeeȱUnitedȱStatesȱv.ȱBeckles,ȱ616ȱ
Fed.ȱAppx.ȱ415ȱ(11thȱCir.ȱ2016),ȱcert.ȱgranted,ȱ136ȱS.ȱCt.ȱ2510ȱ
(2016),ȱ whichȱ shouldȱ beȱ arguedȱ inȱ theȱ autumnȱ ofȱ 2016.ȱ Weȱ
shouldȱnotȱhurryȱtoȱsendȱmanyȱcasesȱbackȱtoȱdistrictȱcourtsȱ
forȱreȬsentencingsȱthatȱmayȱwellȱproveȱunnecessary.ȱIȱrespectȬ
fullyȱdissent.ȱ
Theȱbestȱcourseȱatȱthisȱpointȱwouldȱbeȱforȱthisȱcourtȱsimplyȱ
toȱwaitȱforȱtheȱSupremeȱCourtȱtoȱdecideȱtheȱissueȱinȱBeckles.ȱIfȱ
weȱmustȱreachȱtheȱmeritsȱnow,ȱweȱshouldȱstickȱwithȱTichenorȱ
andȱagreeȱwithȱtheȱEleventhȱCircuit,ȱwhichȱdecidedȱinȱUnitedȱ
Statesȱv.ȱMatchett,ȱ802ȱF.3dȱ1185,ȱ1193–96ȱ(11thȱCir.ȱ2015),ȱthatȱ
theȱsoȬcalledȱ“residualȱclause”ȱinȱtheȱadvisoryȱGuidelineȱdefȬ
initionȱofȱaȱcrimeȱofȱviolence,ȱseeȱU.S.S.G.ȱ§ȱ4B1.2(a)(2),ȱisȱnotȱ
unconstitutionallyȱ vagueȱ becauseȱ itȱ isȱ onlyȱ advisory.ȱ Judgeȱ

-- 21 of 29 --

22ȱ Nos.ȱ14Ȭ3611ȱ&ȱ15Ȭ1686ȱ
Pryor’sȱopinionȱinȱMatchettȱisȱcarefulȱandȱpersuasive.ȱDoctriȬ
nalȱandȱpracticalȱconsiderationsȱsupportȱthatȱview.ȱAfterȱall,ȱ
howȱcanȱnonȬbindingȱadviceȱbeȱunconstitutionallyȱvague?ȱ
Toȱ beginȱ withȱ theȱ doctrine,ȱ theȱ residualȱ clausesȱ inȱ theȱ
Armedȱ Careerȱ Criminalȱ Actȱ andȱ theȱ advisoryȱ Sentencingȱ
Guidelinesȱhaveȱidenticalȱlanguage,ȱbutȱtheirȱlegalȱeffectsȱdifȬ
ferȱinȱaȱfundamentalȱway.ȱThatȱdifferenceȱshouldȱleadȱtoȱdifȬ
ferentȱanswersȱonȱtheȱissueȱofȱconstitutionalȱvagueness.ȱTheȱ
vagueȱ definitionȱ inȱ theȱ statuteȱ ledȱ directlyȱ toȱ higher,ȱ oftenȱ
muchȱhigher,ȱmandatoryȱminimumȱandȱmaximumȱsentences.ȱ
TheȱmostȱcommonȱeffectȱofȱtheȱArmedȱCareerȱCriminalȱActȱ
provisionȱwasȱtoȱrequireȱaȱfifteenȬyearȱmandatoryȱminimumȱ
sentenceȱforȱaȱfelonȱinȱpossessionȱofȱaȱfirearmȱwhenȱtheȱstatuȬ
toryȱmaximumȱwasȱotherwiseȱjustȱtenȱyears.ȱSeeȱJohnson,ȱ135ȱ
S.ȱCt.ȱatȱ2560ȱ(“Invokingȱsoȱshapelessȱaȱprovisionȱtoȱcondemnȱ
someoneȱtoȱprisonȱforȱ15ȱyearsȱtoȱlifeȱdoesȱnotȱcomportȱwithȱ
theȱConstitution’sȱguaranteeȱofȱdueȱprocess.”).ȱ
Inȱ contrast,ȱ theȱ definitionȱ inȱ theȱ advisoryȱ Sentencingȱ
Guidelinesȱ leadsȱ toȱ noȱ directȱ consequencesȱ ofȱ anyȱ kind.ȱ Itȱ
simplyȱgivesȱtheȱsentencingȱjudgeȱadviceȱaboutȱanȱappropriȬ
ateȱsentence.ȱUnlikeȱinȱstatutoryȱcases,ȱtheȱpartiesȱareȱfreeȱtoȱ
argueȱthatȱtheȱGuidelines’ȱadviceȱaboutȱtheȱdefendant’sȱcrimȬ
inalȱhistoryȱisȱeitherȱtooȱharshȱorȱtooȱlenient.ȱTheȱjudgeȱmayȱ
acceptȱtheȱGuidelines’ȱadviceȱorȱrejectȱit.ȱInȱfact,ȱtheȱlawȱreȬ
quiresȱ theȱ judgeȱ toȱ treatȱ theȱ adviceȱ asȱ onlyȱ advice.ȱ Aȱ judgeȱ
whoȱpresumesȱtheȱGuidelines’ȱadviceȱproducesȱaȱreasonableȱ
sentenceȱ commitsȱ reversibleȱ error.ȱ Gallȱ v.ȱ Unitedȱ States,ȱ 552ȱ
U.S.ȱ38,ȱ50ȱ(2007);ȱRitaȱv.ȱUnitedȱStates,ȱ551ȱU.S.ȱ338,ȱ351ȱ(2007).ȱ
TheȱdoctrinalȱfoundationȱofȱtheȱmajorityȱopinionȱisȱinconȬ
sistentȱwithȱtheȱoverallȱsweepȱofȱSupremeȱCourtȱdecisionsȱfolȬ
lowingȱUnitedȱStatesȱv.ȱBooker,ȱ543ȱU.S.ȱ220ȱ(2005),ȱwhichȱheldȱ

-- 22 of 29 --

Nos.ȱ14Ȭ3611ȱ&ȱ15Ȭ1686ȱ 23ȱ
theȱGuidelinesȱadvisoryȱasȱtheȱremedyȱforȱtheȱSixthȱAmendȬ
mentȱproblemsȱwithȱmandatoryȱsentencingȱrulesȱthatȱrequireȱ
judicialȱ factȬfinding.ȱ Sinceȱ Booker,ȱ theȱ Supremeȱ Courtȱ hasȱ
beenȱ tryingȱ toȱ maintainȱ aȱ delicateȱ balance,ȱ recognizingȱ thatȱ
theȱdifferenceȱbetweenȱ“bindingȱlaw”ȱandȱ“advice”ȱdependsȱ
onȱtheȱdifferentȱstandardsȱofȱappellateȱreview.ȱSeeȱGall,ȱ552ȱ
U.S.ȱatȱ50–51.ȱ
SinceȱBooker,ȱtheȱCourtȱhasȱtreatedȱtheȱGuidelinesȱessenȬ
tiallyȱasȱadviceȱforȱalmostȱallȱpurposes,ȱbutȱasȱcloserȱtoȱbindȬ
ingȱ lawȱ forȱ justȱ one.ȱ Forȱ purposesȱ ofȱ theȱ Sixthȱ Amendmentȱ
rightsȱtoȱjuryȱtrial,ȱtoȱproofȱbeyondȱaȱreasonableȱdoubt,ȱandȱtoȱ
grandȱjuryȱindictment,ȱtheȱGuidelinesȱareȱnowȱadvice.ȱBooker,ȱ
543ȱU.S.ȱatȱ245.ȱForȱpurposesȱofȱdueȱprocessȱnotice,ȱtheyȱareȱ
advice.ȱIrizarryȱv.ȱUnitedȱStates,ȱ553ȱU.S.ȱ708,ȱ714ȱ(2008).ȱForȱ
purposesȱofȱsentencingȱpolicy,ȱtheyȱareȱalsoȱadvice.ȱKimbroughȱ
v.ȱUnitedȱStates,ȱ552ȱU.S.ȱ85,ȱ110–11ȱ(2007)ȱ(sentencingȱcourtȱ
couldȱrejectȱguidelineȱadviceȱonȱratioȱofȱcrackȱandȱpowderȱcoȬ
caineȱsentences).ȱ
Inȱoneȱsense,ȱthough,ȱtheȱCourtȱhasȱtreatedȱtheȱGuidelinesȱ
asȱmoreȱlawȬlike.ȱForȱpurposesȱofȱtheȱExȱPostȱFactoȱClause,ȱ
theȱGuidelinesȱareȱcloserȱtoȱtheȱbindingȱlawȱendȱofȱtheȱspecȬ
trum.ȱPeughȱv.ȱUnitedȱStates,ȱ569ȱU.S.ȱ—,ȱ133ȱS.ȱCt.ȱ2072ȱ(2013).ȱ
TheȱanalysisȱinȱPeughȱwasȱbasedȱonȱtheȱpersuasiveȱeffectȱtheȱ
Guidelinesȱhave,ȱincludingȱ“anchoring”ȱeffectsȱonȱsentencingȱ
judges.ȱItȱisȱnotȱeasyȱtoȱreconcileȱPeughȱwithȱtheȱcasesȱtreatingȱ
theȱ Guidelinesȱ asȱ advisory,ȱ particularlyȱ sinceȱ constitutionalȱ
doctrineȱallowsȱcompletelyȱunguidedȱsentencingȱdiscretion,ȱatȱ
leastȱapartȱfromȱcapitalȱcases.ȱPerhapsȱPeughȱisȱtheȱfirstȱsignȱ
ofȱaȱseaȬchangeȱinȱthisȱareaȱofȱtheȱlaw,ȱbutȱgivenȱtheȱextensiveȱ

-- 23 of 29 --

24ȱ Nos.ȱ14Ȭ3611ȱ&ȱ15Ȭ1686ȱ
caseȱ lawȱ treatingȱ theȱ Guidelinesȱ asȱ trulyȱ advisory,ȱ thatȱ reȬ
mainsȱtoȱbeȱseen.1ȱ
IfȱtheȱSupremeȱCourtȱextendsȱtheȱrationaleȱofȱPeugh,ȱasȱtheȱ
majorityȱdoesȱhere,ȱandȱembracesȱwholeheartedlyȱtheȱconceptȱ
thatȱtheȱGuidelinesȱareȱlikeȱlaws,ȱthatȱresultȱwouldȱbeȱdifficultȱ
toȱreconcileȱwithȱtheȱBookerȱremedy,ȱwhichȱsparedȱtheȱGuideȬ
linesȱfromȱSixthȱAmendmentȱchallengesȱbyȱmakingȱthemȱadȬ
visory.ȱTheȱdelicateȱdoctrinalȱbalanceȱtheȱCourtȱhasȱtriedȱtoȱ
maintainȱ sinceȱ Bookerȱ wouldȱ beȱ threatenedȱ byȱ extendingȱ
vaguenessȱjurisprudenceȱtoȱtheȱadvisoryȱGuidelines.ȱ
InȱWelchȱv.ȱUnitedȱStates,ȱ578ȱU.S.ȱ—,ȱ136ȱS.ȱCt.ȱ1257ȱ(2016),ȱ
theȱSupremeȱCourtȱheldȱthatȱJohnsonȱisȱretroactive,ȱapplicableȱ
onȱ collateralȱ reviewȱ ofȱ federalȱ sentencesȱ underȱ 28ȱ U.S.C.ȱ
§ȱ2255.ȱIfȱJohnsonȱisȱextendedȱtoȱtheȱadvisoryȱGuidelines,ȱtheȱ
argumentȱwillȱbeȱpowerfulȱforȱapplyingȱthatȱnewȱholdingȱretȬ
ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ
1ȱInȱextendingȱJohnsonȱtoȱtheȱGuidelines,ȱtheȱSixthȱCircuitȱhasȱtriedȱtoȱsplitȱ
hairsȱevenȱmoreȱfinely,ȱsayingȱthatȱforȱoneȱdueȱprocessȱnoticeȱpurpose—
“adversarialȱnotice”—theȱGuidelinesȱareȱadvisory,ȱasȱinȱIrizarry,ȱwhileȱforȱ
aȱ supposedlyȱ differentȱ dueȱ processȱ noticeȱ purpose—“exȱ anteȱ notice”—
theyȱareȱcloserȱtoȱbindingȱlaws.ȱUnitedȱStatesȱv.ȱPawlak,ȱ822ȱF.3dȱ902,ȱ909–
10ȱ(6thȱCir.ȱ2016).ȱThisȱdistinctionȱcannotȱwithstandȱscrutiny.ȱTheȱhypothȬ
esisȱ ofȱ “exȱ anteȱ notice”ȱ isȱ thatȱ aȱ personȱ decidingȱ whetherȱ toȱ commitȱ aȱ
crimeȱisȱentitledȱtoȱknowȱwhatȱpunishmentȱtheȱlawȱprescribes.ȱTheȱanswerȱ
isȱtheȱstatutoryȱsentencingȱrange,ȱregardlessȱofȱtheȱGuidelines.ȱTheȱhypoȬ
theticallyȱrationalȱcandidateȱforȱprosecutionȱshouldȱknowȱalreadyȱthereȱisȱ
noȱguaranteeȱofȱaȱguidelineȱsentence.ȱUnderȱBooker,ȱGall,ȱKimbrough,ȱandȱ
§ȱ3553(a),ȱtheȱsentencingȱcourtȱwillȱbeȱfreeȱtoȱimposeȱaȱnonȬguidelineȱsenȬ
tenceȱforȱmanyȱreasons.ȱThatȱisȱexactlyȱtheȱsameȱknowledgeȱimputedȱtoȱaȱ
defendantȱ andȱ defenseȱ counselȱ onȱ theȱ eveȱ ofȱ sentencing.ȱ Givenȱ thatȱ
knowledge,ȱtheȱCourtȱheldȱinȱIrizarry,ȱdueȱprocessȱdoesȱnotȱrequireȱfurtherȱ
advanceȱ noticeȱ toȱ theȱ defenseȱ aboutȱ reasonsȱ whyȱ theȱ sentencingȱ judgeȱ
mayȱbeȱconsideringȱnotȱimposingȱaȱguidelineȱsentence.ȱ

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Nos.ȱ14Ȭ3611ȱ&ȱ15Ȭ1686ȱ 25ȱ
roactively.ȱIfȱthatȱisȱtheȱjustȱresult,ȱsoȱbeȱit.ȱButȱweȱshouldȱrecȬ
ognizeȱtheȱlikelyȱconsequences.ȱFederalȱcourtsȱwouldȱneedȱtoȱ
revisitȱthousandsȱofȱpreviousȱguidelineȱsentencesȱthatȱreliedȱ
onȱtheȱresidualȱclauseȱinȱtheȱcareerȱcriminalȱguidelines.ȱ
Andȱ whatȱ wouldȱ beȱ theȱ point?ȱ Theȱ differenceȱ betweenȱ
statutoryȱmandatesȱandȱadvisoryȱGuidelinesȱmeansȱthatȱtheȱ
practicalȱconsequencesȱofȱtheȱvaguenessȱholdingsȱdifferȱdraȬ
matically.ȱInȱtheȱArmedȱCareerȱCriminalȱActȱcasesȱaffectedȱbyȱ
Johnson,ȱmanyȱcasesȱmustȱresultȱinȱlowerȱsentences,ȱandȱinȱvirȬ
tuallyȱallȱcases,ȱlighterȱsentencesȱareȱreasonablyȱlikelyȱonȱreȬ
sentencing.ȱ Butȱ ifȱ guidelineȱ sentencesȱ areȱ remandedȱ onȱ theȱ
theoryȱthatȱJohnsonȱshouldȱapplyȱtoȱtheȱadvisoryȱGuidelines,ȱ
inȱeveryȱcaseȱthatȱisȱremandedȱtheȱdistrictȱcourtȱwillȱbeȱfreeȱtoȱ
imposeȱ exactlyȱ theȱ sameȱ sentenceȱ again.ȱ Inȱ fact,ȱ theȱ districtȱ
courtsȱprobablyȱshouldȱdoȱso.ȱ
Toȱunderstandȱwhy,ȱconsiderȱtheȱintellectualȱgymnasticsȱ
requiredȱbyȱtheȱ“categorical”ȱapproachȱtoȱrecidivistȱenhanceȬ
ments.ȱ Applyingȱ thatȱ approach,ȱ courtsȱ mustȱ focusȱ onȱ eleȬ
mentsȱofȱaȱpriorȱoffenseȱofȱconvictionȱandȱmustȱignoreȱwhatȱ
theȱ defendantȱ actuallyȱ did.ȱ Theȱ resultsȱ areȱ oftenȱ arbitrary.ȱ
See,ȱe.g.,ȱMathisȱv.ȱUnitedȱStates,ȱ579ȱU.S.ȱ—,ȱ136ȱS.ȱCt.ȱ2243ȱ
(2016)ȱ(breadthȱofȱstateȱburglaryȱstatute,ȱwhichȱincludedȱburȬ
glarizingȱ vehicles,ȱ meantȱ thatȱ defendant’sȱ priorȱ convictionsȱ
forȱ actuallyȱ burglarizingȱ occupiedȱ housesȱ didȱ notȱ countȱ asȱ
convictionsȱ ofȱ “violentȱ felonies”).ȱ Yetȱ bothȱ beforeȱ andȱ afterȱ
Booker,ȱtheȱGuidelinesȱhaveȱallowedȱsentencingȱjudgesȱtoȱexȬ
amineȱ whatȱ theȱ defendantȱ actuallyȱ did.ȱ Seeȱ 18ȱ U.S.C.ȱ
§ȱ3553(a)(1)ȱ(requiringȱconsiderationȱofȱ“historyȱandȱcharacȬ
teristicsȱ ofȱ theȱ defendant”);ȱ §ȱ3661ȱ (“Noȱ limitationȱ shallȱ beȱ
placedȱonȱtheȱinformationȱconcerningȱtheȱbackground,ȱcharȬ
acter,ȱandȱconductȱofȱaȱpersonȱconvictedȱofȱanȱoffenseȱwhichȱ

-- 25 of 29 --

26ȱ Nos.ȱ14Ȭ3611ȱ&ȱ15Ȭ1686ȱ
aȱcourtȱofȱtheȱUnitedȱStatesȱmayȱreceiveȱandȱconsiderȱforȱtheȱ
purposeȱ ofȱ imposingȱ anȱ appropriateȱ sentence.”);ȱ U.S.S.G.ȱ
§ȱ4A1.3ȱcmt.ȱ(encouragingȱdeparturesȱwhereȱguidelineȱcrimiȬ
nalȱhistoryȱisȱoverȬȱorȱunderȬrepresentative);ȱcf.ȱUnitedȱStatesȱ
v.ȱSonnenberg,ȱ628ȱF.3dȱ361,ȱ367–68ȱ(7thȱCir.ȱ2010)ȱ(applyingȱ
categoricalȱapproachȱtoȱvacateȱcareerȱcriminalȱenhancementȱ
butȱencouragingȱdistrictȱjudgeȱonȱremandȱtoȱconsiderȱdefendȬ
ant’sȱactualȱconductȱinȱcaseȱofȱchildȱsexȱabuse).ȱ
Asȱaȱresult,ȱweȱshouldȱexpectȱlittleȱgainȱinȱtermsȱofȱfairnessȱ
forȱ defendantsȱ byȱ tellingȱ sentencingȱ judgesȱ (a)ȱ theyȱ cannotȱ
useȱtheȱresidualȱclauseȱinȱtheȱcareerȱoffenderȱGuideline,ȱbutȱ
(b)ȱtheyȱremainȱfreeȱtoȱconsiderȱavailableȱinformationȱaboutȱ
theȱdefendant’sȱactualȱconductȱinȱtheȱearlierȱcrimeȱandȱtoȱsenȬ
tenceȱ accordingly.ȱ Inȱ fact,ȱ theyȱ shouldȱ beȱ doingȱ soȱ already.ȱ
Theȱ judge’sȱ jobȱ isȱ firstȱ toȱ calculateȱ theȱ guidelineȱ rangeȱ butȱ
thenȱtoȱexerciseȱjudgmentȱandȱdiscretionȱunderȱ§ȱ3553(a)ȱinȱ
lightȱofȱallȱtheȱavailableȱinformation.ȱ
Ifȱ Johnsonȱ isȱ extendedȱ toȱ theȱ Guidelines,ȱ andȱ ifȱ aȱ judgeȱ
wereȱtoȱreduceȱtheȱsentenceȱbecauseȱofȱsuchȱaȱreversal,ȱthatȱ
decisionȱmightȱbeȱevidenceȱthatȱtheȱjudgeȱdidȱnotȱdoȱhis/herȱ
jobȱatȱtheȱinitialȱsentencing.ȱNoȱfactsȱwouldȱbeȱdifferent,ȱonlyȱ
theȱadviceȱthatȱtheȱjudgeȱwasȱsupposedȱtoȱevaluateȱcriticallyȱ
theȱfirstȱtimeȱaround.ȱAbsentȱnewȱmaterialȱfacts,ȱaȱdifferentȱ
sentenceȱonȱremandȱwouldȱtendȱtoȱshowȱthatȱtheȱjudgeȱfolȬ
lowedȱ theȱ Guidelinesȱ tooȱ mechanically,ȱ perhapsȱ presumingȱ
theyȱwereȱreasonableȱwithoutȱassessingȱtheȱdefendant’sȱindiȬ
vidualȱhistoryȱandȱcharacteristicsȱandȱtheȱparticularȱcircumȬ
stancesȱofȱtheȱcase.2ȱ
ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ
2ȱFederalȱprisonersȱwhoȱwereȱsentencedȱasȱcareerȱoffendersȱbasedȱonȱtheȱ
residualȱclauseȱbeforeȱBooker,ȱwhileȱtheȱGuidelinesȱwereȱstillȱconsideredȱ

-- 26 of 29 --

Nos.ȱ14Ȭ3611ȱ&ȱ15Ȭ1686ȱ 27ȱ
Inȱconsideringȱtheȱconsequencesȱhere,ȱtheȱscopeȱofȱtheȱmaȬ
jority’sȱvaguenessȱholdingȱunderȱtheȱGuidelinesȱwillȱalsoȱbeȱ
difficultȱtoȱlimit.ȱAsȱtheȱEleventhȱCircuitȱnotedȱinȱMatchett,ȱifȱ
weȱ extendȱ dueȱ processȱ vaguenessȱ doctrineȱ toȱ theȱ advisoryȱ
Guidelines,ȱmanyȱguidelineȱsentencesȱwillȱbeȱsubjectȱtoȱchalȬ
lenge.ȱ802ȱF.3dȱatȱ1196.ȱIȱdoȱnotȱseeȱaȱprincipledȱwayȱtoȱavoidȱ
extendingȱ suchȱ aȱ holdingȱ beyondȱ theȱ residualȱ clauseȱ inȱ theȱ
crimeȱofȱviolenceȱdefinitionȱtoȱotherȱprovisionsȱinȱtheȱGuideȬ
linesȱthatȱareȱatȱleastȱasȱvagueȱifȱnotȱmoreȱso.ȱ
Consider,ȱ forȱ example,ȱ theȱ enhancementsȱ forȱ “sophistiȬ
catedȱmeans”ȱinȱfraudȱcrimes,ȱ§ȱ2B1.1(b)(10);ȱtheȱ“vulnerableȱ
victim”ȱinȱ§ȱ3A1.1(b)ȱ(definedȱasȱsomeoneȱwhoȱisȱ“unusuallyȱ
vulnerableȱdueȱtoȱage,ȱphysicalȱorȱmentalȱcondition,ȱorȱwhoȱ
isȱotherwiseȱparticularlyȱsusceptibleȱtoȱtheȱcriminalȱconduct”—
whichȱsoundsȱaȱlotȱlikeȱaȱresidualȱclause);ȱaggravatingȱrolesȱ
inȱ§ȱ3B1.1ȱ(basedȱonȱ“otherwiseȱextensive”ȱcriminalȱactivity);ȱ
orȱ“abuseȱofȱtrust”ȱunderȱ§ȱ3B1.3.ȱManyȱdepartureȱprovisionsȱ
inȱPartȱ5KȱofȱtheȱGuidelinesȱareȱquiteȱvague,ȱasȱisȱtheȱproviȬ
sionȱinȱ§ȱ4A1.3ȱforȱoverȬȱorȱunderȬrepresentativeȱcriminalȱhisȬ
tory.ȱEvenȱtheȱfundamentalȱconceptȱofȱ“relevantȱconduct”ȱinȱ
§ȱ1B1.3ȱcouldȱeasilyȱbeȱchallengedȱasȱvagueȱifȱweȱareȱworriedȱ
aboutȱ whetherȱ defendantsȱ haveȱ fairȱ noticeȱ ofȱ theȱ conseȬ
quencesȱ ofȱ theirȱ crimes.ȱ Yetȱ thisȱ pervasiveȱ vaguenessȱ inȱ
Guidelineȱprovisionsȱisȱnotȱaȱbugȱinȱtheȱsystem.ȱItȱisȱaȱfeature.ȱ
ItȱisȱintendedȱtoȱprovideȱsentencingȱjudgesȱwithȱneededȱflexȬ
ibility.ȱ
ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ
binding,ȱmightȱhaveȱaȱmuchȱstrongerȱargumentȱforȱextendingȱJohnsonȱtoȱ
theirȱ sentences.ȱ Theseȱ casesȱ doȱ notȱ presentȱ thatȱ issue,ȱ andȱ Iȱ expressȱ noȱ
viewsȱonȱit.ȱ

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28ȱ Nos.ȱ14Ȭ3611ȱ&ȱ15Ȭ1686ȱ
Perhapsȱoneȱmightȱdrawȱaȱlineȱbetweenȱtheȱresidualȱclauseȱ
andȱ everyȱ otherȱ provisionȱ ofȱ theȱ advisoryȱ Guidelines,ȱ byȱ
simplyȱdeclaringȱthatȱtheȱresultȱisȱlimitedȱtoȱcategoricalȱdeterȬ
minationsȱratherȱthanȱapplicationȱofȱvagueȱstandardsȱtoȱspeȬ
cificȱfacts.ȱButȱitȱisȱdifficultȱtoȱseeȱaȱprincipledȱbasisȱforȱsuchȱaȱ
limitedȱ rule,ȱ particularlyȱ sinceȱ §ȱ3553(a)ȱ alreadyȱ callsȱ uponȱ
judgesȱtoȱtakeȱintoȱaccountȱtheȱrealȬworldȱfactsȱofȱpriorȱconȬ
victions.ȱTheȱmajorityȱhasȱopenedȱtheȱdoorȱtoȱvaguenessȱchalȬ
lengesȱ toȱ anyȱ advisoryȱ Guidelines.ȱ Asȱ aȱ matterȱ ofȱ broaderȱ
constitutionalȱ doctrine,ȱ includingȱ theȱ differenceȱ betweenȱ
bindingȱ andȱ advisoryȱ Guidelinesȱ thatȱ isȱ essentialȱ toȱ theȱ
Court’sȱ Sixthȱ Amendmentȱ jurisprudence,ȱ itȱ wouldȱ beȱ moreȱ
soundȱtoȱmaintainȱinsteadȱtheȱdistinctionȱbetweenȱvagueȱsenȬ
tencingȱ adviceȱ (permitted)ȱ andȱ aȱ vagueȱ sentencingȱ statuteȱ
withȱmandatoryȱconsequencesȱ(notȱpermitted).ȱ
Afterȱ all,ȱ judgesȱ canȱ findȱ vagueȱ sentencingȱ adviceȱ fromȱ
manyȱsources.ȱSectionȱ3553(a)(2)ȱtellsȱjudgesȱinȱaȱvagueȱandȱ
contradictoryȱ wayȱ toȱ followȱ severalȱ conflictingȱ theoriesȱ ofȱ
punishmentȱatȱonce,ȱsoȱthatȱaȱsentenceȱshouldȱreflectȱtheȱseriȬ
ousnessȱofȱtheȱoffense,ȱpromoteȱrespectȱforȱtheȱlaw,ȱprovideȱ
justȱpunishment,ȱaffordȱadequateȱdeterrenceȱtoȱcrimes,ȱproȬ
tectȱtheȱpublicȱfromȱfurtherȱcrimesȱofȱtheȱdefendant,ȱandȱrehaȬ
bilitateȱtheȱdefendant.ȱJudgesȱcanȱfindȱfurtherȱvagueȱorȱindeȬ
terminateȱadviceȱaboutȱsentencingȱinȱlawȱreviewȱarticles,ȱphilȬ
osophicalȱreflectionsȱonȱcrimeȱandȱpunishment,ȱadviceȱfromȱ
probationȱ officersȱ andȱ lawȱ clerks,ȱ andȱ evenȱ fromȱ appellateȱ
opinions.ȱ Theȱ factȱ thatȱ someȱ ofȱ theȱ adviceȱ mayȱ beȱ vagueȱ
shouldȱnotȱrenderȱtheȱsentenceȱunconstitutional.ȱ
IȱrecognizeȱthatȱtheȱGuidelinesȱhaveȱaȱspecial,ȱelevatedȱstaȬ
tusȱamongȱthoseȱotherȱavailableȱsourcesȱofȱadvice,ȱbutȱtheyȱdoȱ

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Nos.ȱ14Ȭ3611ȱ&ȱ15Ȭ1686ȱ 29ȱ
remainȱadvisory.ȱAndȱasȱweȱandȱlaterȱtheȱSupremeȱCourtȱconȬ
siderȱtheȱvaguenessȱissueȱhere,ȱitȱisȱworthȱrememberingȱthatȱ
oneȱsimpleȱremedyȱtoȱaȱregimeȱofȱsomewhatȱvagueȱadvisoryȱ
Guidelinesȱwouldȱbeȱtoȱeliminateȱsomeȱorȱallȱofȱtheȱadviceȱandȱ
toȱleaveȱsentencingȱjudgesȱtoȱtheirȱownȱdevices.ȱTheȱpermisȬ
sibilityȱofȱsuchȱdiscretionȱhasȱbeenȱconsistentȱinȱallȱofȱtheȱSuȬ
premeȱ Court’sȱ recentȱ sentencingȱ decisionsȱ underȱ theȱ Sixthȱ
Amendment,ȱ fromȱ Apprendiȱ v.ȱ Newȱ Jersey,ȱ 530ȱ U.S.ȱ 466,ȱ 481ȱ
(2000);ȱid.ȱatȱ544–45ȱ(O’Connor,ȱJ.,ȱdissenting),ȱthroughȱBooker,ȱ
543ȱU.S.ȱatȱ233,ȱandȱAlleyneȱv.ȱUnitedȱStates,ȱ570ȱU.S.ȱ—,ȱ—,ȱ133ȱ
S.ȱCt.ȱ2151,ȱ2163ȱ(2013).ȱ
Suchȱunguidedȱdiscretionȱwouldȱbeȱtheȱvaguestȱregimeȱofȱ
all.ȱDefendantsȱwouldȱfaceȱevenȱgreaterȱuncertaintyȱaboutȱpoȬ
tentialȱsentencesȱandȱevenȱgreaterȱriskȱofȱarbitraryȱvariationȱ
inȱsentences.ȱYetȱthatȱisȱallȱperfectlyȱconstitutional.ȱWhyȱnotȱ
allowȱsomeȱvaguenessȱinȱtheȱGuidelines,ȱwhoseȱadvisoryȱstaȬ
tusȱisȱessentialȱtoȱavoidȱSixthȱAmendmentȱviolations?ȱ
AnotherȱpermissibleȱremedyȱwouldȱbeȱtoȱimposeȱmandaȬ
toryȱsentencesȱbyȱstatute,ȱdenyingȱjudgesȱanyȱflexibility.ȱButȱ
strippingȱsentencingȱjudgesȱofȱdiscretionȱleadsȱtoȱotherȱunforȬ
tunateȱ results,ȱ includingȱ delegatingȱ sentencingȱ decisionsȱ toȱ
prosecutors’ȱ chargingȱ decisions.ȱ Betterȱ toȱ leaveȱ theȱ GuideȬ
linesȱasȱtrueȱguidelines,ȱdespiteȱtheirȱvaguenessȱandȱflexibilȬ
ity.ȱ

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