United States of America v. Daniel Haslam

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 14-2641
U NITED S TATES OF A MERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
DANIEL H ASLAM ,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Indiana, South Bend Division.
Nos. 3:13-CR-013 & 3:13-CR-109 — Jon E. DeGuilio, Judge.
____________________
A RGUED S EPTEMBER 21, 2015 — DECIDED A UGUST 17, 2016
____________________
Before WOOD, Chief Judge, POSNER and S YKES, Circuit
Judges.
S YKES, Circuit Judge. Daniel Haslam pleaded guilty under
a written plea agreement to manufacturing methampheta-
mine, possessing unregistered silencers, and possessing a
firearm in connection with a drug offense. His presentence
report included as relevant conduct an incident in which
Haslam held a woman hostage in his apartment on the
mistaken belief that she was an undercover police officer.

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2 No. 14-2641
Haslam thinks the government breached the plea agreement
by giving this hostage-taking information to the probation
office and the court; he moved to withdraw his pleas. The
district judge denied the motion and imposed a sentence of
181 months in prison.
Haslam appealed, challenging the denial of his plea-
withdrawal motion. We affirm. Haslam’s plea agreement did
not limit the information the government could give the
court about the offense or his background. To the contrary,
the agreement explicitly reserved the government’s right to
fully inform the court, so there was no breach. And the judge
properly rejected Haslam’s alternative claim that he pleaded
guilty unknowingly based on a misunderstanding that the
plea agreement contained such a limitation.
I. Background
In August 2012 Haslam manufactured, used, and traf-
ficked methamphetamine in his apartment in Converse,
Indiana. He also manufactured firearm silencers and pos-
sessed numerous illegally modified firearms in furtherance
of his drug trafficking.
On August 25, 2012, Haslam invited Laci Sample to his
apartment. The two had been dating for a few weeks, and
they both used methamphetamine while she was there that
day. Things turned violent when Sample received a text
message saying she had to “get ready for training day
tomorrow.” Haslam mistakenly interpreted this message as
a sign that she was an undercover police officer. He pushed
her down on the bed and began beating her, inflicting
injuries to her head, face, arms, legs, and torso. Over the next
day and a half, Haslam prevented Sample from leaving his

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No. 14-2641 3
apartment, threatening her with a gun and more beatings.
He released her only after she said she had to pick up her
daughter from the child’s father and people would start
looking for her if she didn’t show up.
On August 30 police performed a traffic stop on a vehicle
Haslam was riding in and found him in possession of a
loaded pistol modified for a silencer. That same day the
police executed a search warrant on Haslam’s apartment and
found several firearms, silencers in various stages of produc-
tion, ammunition, and methamphetamine. A grand jury
indicted Haslam on four counts: (1) possessing an unregis-
tered firearm or silencer, 26 U.S.C. §§ 5845(a), 5861(d), and
5871; (2) manufacturing methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a)(1); (3) possessing a firearm equipped with a silencer
in furtherance of drug trafficking, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c); and
(4) possessing a firearm while using a controlled substance,
id. § 922(g)(3). Count 3 carried a mandatory 30-year mini-
mum sentence.
Plea negotiations followed. As relevant here, the prosecu-
tor sent Haslam’s counsel a proposed plea agreement that
required Haslam to admit to the beating and confinement of
Laci Sample as relevant conduct. Haslam would not admit to
this conduct and wanted this section of the agreement
deleted. The government complied. Haslam eventually
agreed to plead guilty to counts 1, 2, and 4 in exchange for
the dismissal of count 3. At Haslam’s request the factual-
basis section of the final version of the plea agreement did
not contain the Sample incident.
Three provisions of the plea agreement are particularly
relevant here:

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4 No. 14-2641
9. (d) … I expressly waive my right to appeal my
conviction, my sentence and any restitution order
to any Court on any ground, including any
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
…
(g) The defendant fully understands that the
United States of America has reserved the right to
tell the Sentencing Court the good things about
him, and the bad things about him, and has reserved
the right to fully inform the Court of the nature and
extent of his offense(s);
…
(l) Other than what is contained in this plea
agreement, no predictions, promises, or repre-
sentations have been made to me as to the spe-
cific sentence that will be imposed or any other
matter.
(Emphases added.)
A magistrate judge presiding at the change-of-plea hear-
ing placed Haslam under oath and confirmed on the record
that he had read the plea agreement, understood it, and
discussed it with his attorney. The magistrate judge also
specifically asked Haslam if the government had made any
promises that were not contained in the plea agreement.
Haslam responded, “no.” The magistrate judge found that
Haslam’s guilty pleas were knowing and voluntary and
recommended that the district court accept them.
Immediately after the change-of-plea hearing, the gov-
ernment sent a memorandum to the probation office and

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No. 14-2641 5
Haslam’s counsel detailing Haslam’s offense conduct,
including a lengthy description of the Sample incident.
About six weeks later Haslam wrote a letter to his attorney
accusing him of failing to obtain “vital” defense evidence
and complaining that “[a]fter speaking with the probation
department[,] I have found that there are many details you
failed to inform me of which definitely would have influ-
enced my decision on signing this plea.” Nonetheless,
Haslam said, “what’s done is done.” Haslam exhorted his
attorney to obtain additional evidence to discredit Sample.
Ten days later the probation office filed its draft presen-
tence report recommending several upward adjustments to
the offense level under the Sentencing Guidelines based on
Haslam’s battery and confinement of Sample. Haslam’s
attorney objected to these adjustments, contesting the facts
surrounding the Sample incident. The adjustments remained
in the final presentence report. Haslam’s attorney again
objected, contesting the facts and questioning the relevance
of the Sample incident to the drug and weapons offenses.
At sentencing the district judge adopted the magistrate
judge’s findings and recommendations, accepted Haslam’s
guilty pleas, and found him guilty. Before the government
began its evidentiary presentation, Haslam’s attorney
lodged this objection to any testimony from Laci Sample:
The plea agreement that was entered was
based on what my client admitted that he did,
and he’s taken full responsibility for the things
that he did. When the very first plea offer that
was offered to us had statements relating to
crimes of violence and different things of that
nature, we were ready to go to trial on those

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6 No. 14-2641
if … those were not taken out. … [W]e ulti-
mately got a plea that was entered that takes
out any mention of violence or any restraint or
any battery on this person. If, in fact, those had
not been taken out, we would not have entered
a plea and would have gone to trial.
The circumstances here is that what my client
has pled to, there’s nothing … related to any
crime of violence as related to the alleged con-
duct against Ms. Sample. … [W]e don’t see that
that evidence is relevant to the crimes that he
admitted to committing and, therefore, we
would ask that the Court would find that those
are not relevant.
The judge allowed Sample to testify and then called a recess,
continuing the sentencing to another day.
When the proceedings resumed, Haslam insisted that his
attorney read the following question to the court:
Why are we having a hearing on an issue that
was completely removed from my plea in or-
der for me to accept it? It was agreed that [the
prosecutor would] remove everything pertain-
ing to Laci Sample from my plea, never to be
heard of again, so wouldn't throwing her back
into the equation be a breach of his own plea
agreement offer?
The judge allowed the prosecutor to complete his eviden-
tiary presentation and ordered briefing on whether the
government had breached the plea agreement.

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No. 14-2641 7
In his brief Haslam’s counsel asked the court to set aside
his client’s guilty pleas because the government had
breached the plea agreement by presenting evidence about
the Sample incident. Alternatively, counsel argued that
Haslam had pleaded guilty based on a misunderstanding
that the Sample incident was completely off the table. Has-
lam sent his own letter to the judge claiming that his attor-
ney had convinced him that “Laci Sample and thirty to life
were removed and never to be heard of ever again!”
At the next hearing, Haslam’s attorney told the judge that
he was “livid” when he saw the government’s sentencing
memorandum and “could not believe that all of a sudden
what we had bargained for was now taken out.” He accused
the government of breaching an implied promise to not
introduce this evidence. At the very least, counsel argued,
Haslam did not truly understand the plea agreement and
should be allowed to withdraw his guilty pleas.
The judge rejected these arguments and denied the plea-
withdrawal motion. The judge later made factual findings to
support the adjustments relating to the Sample incident.
After additional proceedings, the judge imposed a sentence
of 181 months.
II. Discussion
Haslam’s appeal challenges only the denial of his motion
to withdraw his guilty pleas. Because he filed his plea-
withdrawal motion after the court accepted the pleas, it was
his burden to show “a fair and just reason for requesting the
withdrawal.” F ED. R. C RIM . P. 11(d)(2)(B). A material breach
of a plea agreement is a “fair and just reason” for withdraw-
ing a guilty plea. See United States v. O'Doherty, 643 F.3d 209,

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8 No. 14-2641
217 (7th Cir. 2011) (“The remedy for breach of a plea agree-
ment is specific performance and a remand for resentencing
before a different judge, or a remand to permit the defendant
to withdraw his plea.”). And of course a guilty plea is valid
only if it is entered knowingly and voluntarily. Bradshaw v.
Stumpf, 545 U.S. 175, 183 (2005) (“A guilty plea operates as a
waiver of important rights, and is valid only if done volun-
tarily, knowingly, and intelligently … .”). We review the
denial of a plea-withdrawal motion for abuse of discretion;
the district court’s factual findings “as to whether the de-
fendant has presented a ‘fair and just reason’ are reviewed
for clear error.” United States v. Fard, 775 F.3d 939, 943 (7th
Cir. 2015).
Before proceeding, we note that Haslam’s appeal waiver
doesn’t affect our review, at least in the circumstances of this
case. An appeal waiver is valid and enforceable if its “terms
are express and unambiguous[] and the record shows that
the defendant knowingly and voluntarily entered into the
[plea] agreement.” United States v. Sakellarion, 649 F.3d 634,
639 (7th Cir. 2011) (quotation marks omitted). An appeal
waiver stands or falls with the plea agreement itself, so if the
agreement is valid and enforceable, the waiver is too. Id.
The government agrees that the appeal waiver does not
block our review of Haslam’s claim that the plea agreement
is invalid because he signed it based on a misunderstanding
about its terms. See Hurlow v. United States, 726 F.3d 958, 965
(7th Cir. 2013). But the government does invoke the waiver as
a bar to Haslam’s claim of breach. This latter argument rests
on United States v. Whitlow, 287 F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 2002), and
United States v. Hare, 269 F.3d 859 (7th Cir. 2001). Both cases
suggest that a defendant’s appeal waiver prevents us from

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No. 14-2641 9
considering his contention that the government breached the
plea agreement. Whitlow, 287 F.3d at 640 (citing Hare,
269 F.3d at 860–61). On the other hand, we have routinely
considered a defendant’s claim of breach, appeal waivers
notwithstanding. See, e.g., United States v. Cieslowski, 410 F.3d
353, 361–62 (7th Cir. 2005); United States v. Matchopatow,
259 F.3d 847, 853 (7th Cir. 2001) (“We hold that the govern-
ment did not breach the terms of the plea agreement and
that Matchopatow’s waiver of his right to appeal is therefore
binding and valid.”); United States v. Feichtinger, 105 F.3d
1188, 1190–91 (7th Cir. 1997).
We don’t need to resolve this apparent tension in our
caselaw today. As we’ve noted, the government does not
contest our authority to address Haslam’s claim that his plea
agreement is invalid because it was not knowingly made.
That question is tightly bound with the question of breach.
Here, both questions turn on whether the agreement includ-
ed a promise that the government would not inform the
court of the Sample incident at sentencing. If there was no
such promise, as the government contends, then the agree-
ment is enforceable and it also necessarily follows that the
government did not commit a breach.
We’ll begin with the question of breach. Plea agreements
are interpreted “according to principles of contract law.”
United States v. Hernandez, 544 F.3d 743, 750–51 (7th Cir.
2008). Haslam’s claim runs into trouble right away: Nothing
in the plea agreement expressly obligated the government to
refrain from introducing evidence of the Sample incident for
sentencing purposes. Quite the opposite: The agreement
explicitly reserved the government’s “right to tell the Sen-
tencing Court the good things about [Haslam], and the bad

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10 No. 14-2641
things about [Haslam], and … the right to fully inform the
Court of the nature and extent of his offense.”
Haslam is left to argue, in effect, that the government
was implicitly prohibited from doing something that the
agreement explicitly permitted it to do. That makes little sense.
Moreover, the agreement explicitly states that the govern-
ment made “no predictions, promises, or representations”
outside the four corners of the document. The text of the
plea agreement conclusively defeats Haslam’s claim of
breach.
We confronted a similar claim in United States v. Schilling,
142 F.3d 388 (7th Cir. 1998). The defendants in that case
admitted in their plea agreements that they defrauded the
government of excise taxes on 300,000 gallons of diesel fuel.
There, as here, the plea agreements also “explicitly reserved
[to the government] its right to apprise the court of the
totality of the [defendants’] conduct.” Id. at 396 (internal
quotation marks omitted). The defendants nonetheless
insisted that the plea agreement implicitly prohibited the
government from introducing at sentencing evidence sup-
porting an amount in excess of 300,000 gallons. We rejected
this argument based on the government’s express reserva-
tion of its right to advise the court of all relevant conduct. If
the defendants’ argument was correct, we said, then “it is
difficult to fathom what good th[is] language did.” Id. at 397.
We noted as well that the government cannot withhold
relevant information from the court. Id. at 395 n.11 (“[T]he
Government does not have a right to withhold from the
sentencing judge all the salient facts of the defendant’s
conduct.”).

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No. 14-2641 11
Because the plea agreement unambiguously forecloses
Haslam’s claim, we could end our discussion here. “[W]hen
a plea agreement is unambiguous on its face, this court
generally interprets the agreement according to its plain
meaning.” O'Doherty, 643 F.3d at 217 (quoting United States
v. Monroe, 580 F.3d 552, 556 (7th Cir. 2009)). Haslam con-
tends, however, that his is one of the rare cases in which
evidence extrinsic to the plea agreement is so overwhelming
that it’s sufficient to overcome the agreement’s unambigu-
ous terms. Assuming for the sake of argument that Haslam’s
premise is correct, the extrinsic evidence he relies on to
establish an implied promise comes nowhere close to doing
so.
Haslam reminds us that the government acquiesced in
his demand to remove the Sample incident from the factual-
basis section of the plea agreement. He thinks this is evi-
dence of an implied promise not to present this evidence to
the court. We don’t see why. The government’s acquiescence
demonstrates only that it acknowledged Haslam’s refusal to
admit to the Sample incident as relevant conduct.
Haslam also notes that he and his attorney persistently
challenged the truth of Sample’s allegations throughout the
sentencing process. Relatedly, he identifies several points
along the way where he or his attorney attempted to ad-
vance an argument that the plea agreement prevented the
government from introducing this evidence. These occasions
include the initial sentencing hearing before the district
judge when his attorney objected to Sample’s testimony and
Haslam’s own letter to his counsel complaining that the
“probation department” had “many details … which defi-

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12 No. 14-2641
nitely would have influenced” his decision to sign the plea
agreement.
As the district judge saw it, this evidence showed only
that Haslam vigorously contested the truth of Sample’s
allegations, not that the government made an implied prom-
ise to forego presenting this evidence to the court. That
conclusion was eminently reasonable, and it’s also bolstered
by Haslam’s failure to formally accuse the government of
breach until well into the sentencing process. Haslam says
he didn’t move to withdraw his pleas earlier in the proceed-
ings because he was “trying to get the district court to
enforce what he believed to be the government’s obligation
rather than rushing to withdraw his guilty plea,” which
would have risked reinstatement of the count carrying the
30-year mandatory minimum. But of course there was no
such obligation, and Haslam never tried to “enforce” a
supposed promise by the government until well after the
district court accepted Sample’s testimony. Instead, he
challenged her testimony as a factual matter and also argued
that the evidence was irrelevant. The judge properly rejected
Haslam’s claim of breach.
Haslam’s second argument doesn’t fare any better. He
contends that he didn’t knowingly enter into the plea
agreement because he mistakenly thought that it prevented
the government from introducing the Sample evidence. The
judge summarily rejected this argument, and rightly so.
In his plea colloquy, Haslam told the magistrate judge
under oath that he understood the plea agreement and that
no promises were made to induce him to plead guilty other
than those contained in the written plea agreement itself.
These sworn statements directly contradict Haslam’s claim

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No. 14-2641 13
that he proceeded on the understanding that the govern-
ment had made an extrinsic promise to refrain from present-
ing evidence of the Sample incident at sentencing. Haslam’s
argument necessarily entails an assertion that he lied to the
magistrate judge. The district judge was entitled to reject this
assertion out of hand unless Haslam presented a compelling
explanation for his perjury. United States v. Peterson, 414 F.3d
825, 827 (7th Cir. 2005) (“[A] motion that can succeed only if
the defendant committed perjury at the plea proceedings
may be rejected out of hand unless the defendant has a
compelling explanation for the contradiction.”). He did not
do so.
A FFIRMED.

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