Christopher Pyles v. Samuel Nwaobasi

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 14-3289
C HRISTOPHER PYLES,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
S AMUEL NWAOBASI , et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Illinois.
No. 13-CV-0770-MJR-SCW — Michael J. Reagan, Chief Judge.
____________________
A RGUED J ANUARY 13, 2016 — DECIDED J ULY 21, 2016
____________________
Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and B AUER and H AMILTON , Cir-
cuit Judges.
WOOD, Chief Judge. Christopher Pyles, a state prisoner at
the Menard Correctional Center, brought a lawsuit alleging
that Dr. Samuel Nwaobasi, Dr. Robert Shearing, and their em-
ployer, Wexford Health Sources, Inc., provided him constitu-
tionally inadequate medical care. This appeal is about
whether he can step up to the plate and take a cut at his case—

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2 No. 14-3289
something he may do only if he properly exhausted his ad-
ministrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Re-
form Act. Two grievances are at issue. Pyles does not claim to
have completed the grievance procedure for either one. In-
stead, he argues that his lack of compliance should be ex-
cused, in the first case because he had good cause for his ac-
tions, and in the second because he never received a response
to his grievance. After an evidentiary hearing, the magistrate
judge found that he had failed properly to exhaust both griev-
ances and recommended summary judgment for the defend-
ants. The district court agreed with that recommendation, but
we do not, and so we reverse the district court’s judgment in
the defendants’ favor.
I
According to Pyles’s complaint, whose allegations we ac-
cept for present purposes, his problems can be traced to July
2009, when he fell down a wet staircase and injured his back
while incarcerated at Menard. Since that time he has experi-
enced numbness and radiating pain. On September 24, 2012,
Pyles was seen by Dr. Samuel Nwaobasi, an employee of Wex-
ford, the private company that furnishes medical care at
Menard. Although Pyles complained that his current treat-
ment regimen was ineffective, Dr. Nwaobasi refused to order
additional testing or specialist care. Pyles saw Dr. Nwaobasi
again on November 2, 2012. During that appointment, Pyles
again questioned the effectiveness of Dr. Nwaobasi’s ap-
proach. Dr. Nwaobasi told Pyles to “shut the hell up” and
again refused to order additional testing or specialist care.
The Illinois Administrative Code sets out a three-stage
grievance process that Pyles tried to invoke. He began by fil-
ing a grievance on November 13, 2012, with respect to both

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No. 14-3289 3
appointments with Dr. Nwaobasi. A grievance counselor re-
ceived Pyles’s grievance on November 30, 2012, and Pyles re-
ceived the counselor’s response on December 3, 2012. Fearing
that the document setting forth his grievance might be lost in
the administrative shuffle, Pyles wanted to photocopy his
original document before filing it with a grievance officer. Ac-
cording to Pyles’s uncontroverted testimony, copies could be
made only by the law library, and it did not accept new pho-
tocopying orders until December 21, 2012. On that day, Pyles
submitted his grievance to the law library for photocopying.
By the time he received it back on January 3, 2013, the 60-day
window for filing his grievance had passed. Pyles nonetheless
submitted the grievance that day. On January 8, 2013, a griev-
ance officer acknowledged receipt of Pyles’s grievance against
Dr. Nwaobasi. On January 13, 2013, Pyles filed a separate
grievance against the library for its delay. Ironically, that
grievance was lost in the prison administrative system.
On March 1, 2013, Pyles saw Dr. Robert Shearing, another
Wexford employee. He again requested a change in treat-
ment. Dr. Shearing told Pyles that there was “[n]o showing of
Neurological Deficit in the x-ray,” and that “if medication
[didn’t] help there [was] nothing [Shearing] could do.” Pyles
requested an MRI and an examination by a specialist, but Dr.
Shearing refused to approve or seek approval for either step,
nor did he prescribe any medication that provided effective
relief. Pyles filed a grievance against Dr. Shearing on March
27, 2013. On April 11, 2013, the grievance was timely received
by the grievance officer. That grievance was denied on June
12, 2013. This time, Pyles says, the problem was that he never
received word that the grievance was denied.

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4 No. 14-3289
On July 30, 2013, Pyles filed this civil rights action in the
Southern District of Illinois, alleging that Dr. Nwaobasi, Dr.
Shearing, and Wexford violated his right to be free of cruel
and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment to
the U.S. Constitution. As directed by Pavey v. Conley, 544 F.3d
739 (7th Cir. 2008), the magistrate judge conducted a hearing
to determine whether Pyles had exhausted the administrative
remedies available to him, as required by the Prison Litigation
Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e.
At that hearing, Pyles testified that his grievance against
Dr. Nwaobasi was untimely for reasons outside his control,
namely, because of the law library’s delay in copying and re-
turning it to him. He testified that he actually submitted the
grievance the same day it was returned to him: January 3,
2013. The library’s delay, he contended, constituted good
cause for his failure to file the grievance within the allotted
time period, and that it therefore should have been consid-
ered under I LL. A DMIN . C ODE tit. 20, § 504.810(a). Unper-
suaded, the magistrate judge found that he had not shown
good cause under § 504.810(a).
Pyles also testified that he did not submit his grievance
against Dr. Shearing to the Administrative Review Board be-
cause, after submitting it to the grievance officer on March 27,
2013, he never received a response. The defendants offered
evidence that the grievance was received by the grievance of-
ficer on April 11, 2013, and denied on June 5, 2013; the chief
administrative officer confirmed the grievance officer’s denial
on June 12, 2013.
The defendants, however, submitted no direct evidence
that anyone sent the response to Pyles or that he received it.

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No. 14-3289 5
They relied instead on the assumption that Pyles’s past prac-
tice of asking about the status of the grievances when they
were not returned to him, and his failure to do so in this case,
meant something. Pyles admitted that he had followed up on
previous grievances. But this time, he explained, “[a]fter three
months having received no response, I just assumed that that
was it, I wasn’t going to receive a response, and filed the law-
suit.” Based only on this, the magistrate judge found it “im-
plausible” that Pyles did not receive a response to his griev-
ance against Dr. Shearing, and therefore held that Pyles had
failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.
II
We review a dismissal for failure to exhaust de novo, con-
struing the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party—here, Pyles. Hernandez v. Dart, 814 F.3d 836, 840 (7th
Cir. 2016) (collecting cases). Because exhaustion is an affirma-
tive defense, it is the defendants’ burden to show Pyles’s fail-
ure to exhaust. See Maddox v. Love, 655 F.3d 709, 720 (7th Cir.
2011). Summary judgment is appropriate only when there is
no dispute of material fact, and the moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. F ED. R. C IV. P. 56(a).
Under the PLRA, a prisoner must exhaust “such adminis-
trative remedies as are available” before bringing a suit “with
respect to prison conditions under section 1983 … or any
other federal law.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The exhaustion re-
quirement is interpreted strictly; thus, a “prisoner must com-
ply with the specific procedures and deadlines established by
the prison’s policy.” King v. McCarty, 781 F.3d 889, 893 (7th Cir.
2015). Unexhausted claims are procedurally barred from con-
sideration. See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93 (2006).

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6 No. 14-3289
The PLRA does not, however, demand the impossible.
Remedies that are genuinely unavailable or nonexistent need
not be exhausted. A remedy becomes unavailable “if prison
employees do not respond to a properly filed grievance or
otherwise use affirmative misconduct to prevent a prisoner
from exhausting.” Dole v. Chandler, 438 F.3d 804, 809 (7th Cir.
2006). In such cases, the prisoner is considered to have ex-
hausted his administrative remedies. See Turley v. Rednour,
729 F.3d 645, 650 n.3 (7th Cir. 2013) (collecting cases).
State law determines the administrative remedies that a
state prisoner must exhaust for PLRA purposes. King, 781 F.3d
at 894. As we noted, Illinois has created a three-stage process
for its inmates. Step one requires the inmate to attempt to re-
solve the problem through his or her counselor. See I LL.
A DMIN . C ODE tit. 20, § 504.810(a). If that does not resolve the
problem, the inmate must invoke step two, which involves the
filing of a written grievance with a grievance officer. Id. This
written grievance must be filed within 60 days after discovery
of the problem, unless the inmate can “demonstrate that [it]
was not timely filed for good cause.” Id. Properly submitted
grievances are considered by the grievance officer and the
chief administrative officer. Id. § 504.830(d). Where doing so
“is reasonably feasible under the circumstances,” the chief ad-
ministrative officer must advise the grievant of the outcome
within two months of having received the grievance. Id. If un-
satisfied with the chief administrative officer’s decision, the
inmate may, within 30 days after the date of decision, appeal
to the director of the Illinois Department of Corrections (step
three). Id. § 504.850(a). If the director determines that further
review is required, the Administrative Review Board evalu-
ates the appeal. Id. § 504.850(b).

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No. 14-3289 7
Pyles admits that he did not properly complete all three
stages of the Illinois administrative procedure for either of the
two grievances at issue here (the Nwaobasi grievance and the
Shearing grievance—his grievance against the library is not
part of this suit). Instead he argues that good cause excused
his failure to file a timely grievance against Dr. Nwaobasi, and
that the grievance he did file should therefore have been con-
sidered under § 504.810(a). As for the grievance against Dr.
Shearing, Pyles alleges that he never received a response at
the step two stage and thus there was no additional adminis-
trative remedy “available” to him. Dole, 438 F.3d at 809.
A
We begin with Pyles’s grievance against Dr. Nwaobasi. Il-
linois, to its credit, does not have a hard-and-fast ban against
considering untimely grievances. Instead, it provides that a
grievance filed after the expiration of 60 days “shall be con-
sidered” if it “was not timely filed for good cause.” I LL.
A DMIN . C ODE tit. 20, § 504.810(a). Pyles submitted his step one
grievance to his counselor on November 27, 2012, and she re-
sponded on December 3. Pyles’s problem arose because he
wanted a copy of his grievance for his records, knowing that
things sometimes get lost. He had to rely on the law library
for his copy, but that was easier said than done. Pyles alleges,
without contradiction from the defendants, that the next
available day after December 3 on which the law library
would collect orders for photocopying was December 21.
Pyles submitted his grievance for photocopying on that date,
but he did not get the grievance and copy back until January
3, 2013, two days after the 60-day filing period had elapsed.
He submitted his grievance that same day. Pyles argues that
the library’s nearly two-week delay in returning his grievance,

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8 No. 14-3289
coupled with his prompt action thereafter, constitutes good
cause for his failure to file the step two grievance on time.
The defendants argue that Pyles’s untimeliness should not
be excused because “[t]his circuit has taken a strict compli-
ance approach to exhaustion” of the state prison’s grievance
process. Dole, 438 F.3d at 809. But the task here is to interpret
what the state process itself requires, and in particular, what
“good cause” means under the regulation. Only after we
know what the state requires can we apply the rule, strictly or
otherwise.
The regulation does not define good cause. Where a regu-
latory term is undefined, we ask first “whether the language
at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning with regard to
the particular dispute in the case.” Exelon Generation Co., LLC
v. Local 15, Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, AFL-CIO, 676 F.3d 566,
570 (7th Cir. 2012). In doing so, we “giv[e] the words used
their ordinary meaning.” Lawson v. FMR LLC, 134 S. Ct. 1158,
1165 (2014) (internal citation omitted). Courts frequently look
to dictionary definitions, the construction of similar terms in
other statutes or regulations, and the purpose of the statute
being interpreted. See United States v. Patel, 778 F.3d 607, 613
(7th Cir. 2015).
All three of these resources weigh in favor of finding that
§ 504.810(a)’s “good cause” exception is a flexible, equitable
one. First, the dictionary definition of “good cause” is “a cause
or reason sufficient in law: one that is based on equity or jus-
tice or that would motivate a reasonable [person] under all the
circumstances.” WEBSTER ’ S THIRD N EW I NT’ L DICTIONARY 978
(1986); see also M ERRIAM WEBSTER ’ S DICTIONARY OF LAW 69
(1996) (“a substantial reason put forth in good faith that is not
unreasonable, arbitrary, or irrational and that is sufficient to

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No. 14-3289 9
create an excuse under the law,” synonymous with “cause
that a person of ordinary intelligence would consider a fair
and reasonable justification for an act”).
Importantly (since this is an Illinois regulation), Illinois
law treats good cause as a flexible, fact-based determination
in other deadline provisions. See, e.g., Vision Point of Sale, Inc.
v. Haas, 875 N.E.2d 1065, 1078–79 (Ill. 2007) (noting that “good
cause” is “fact-dependent and rests within the sound discre-
tion of the circuit court,” and demands that a party provide
“clear, objective reasons why it was unable to meet the origi-
nal deadline and why an extension of time should be
granted”).
Federal law takes the same approach. Interpreting the
“good cause” provision of Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Ap-
pellate Procedure, federal courts have found it “in practice …
the same standard as ‘due diligence’ before the rule” existed.
Del Raine v. Carlson, 826 F.2d 698, 704 (7th Cir. 1987). It “applies
in situations where there is no fault—excusable or otherwise.”
Sherman v. Quinn, 668 F.3d 421, 425 (7th Cir. 2012). Usually,
“good cause” is “occasioned by something that is not within
the control of the movant.” Bishop v. Corsentino, 371 F.3d 1203,
1207 (10th Cir. 2004) (quoting F ED. R. A PP. P. 4(a)(5) cmt. note
(2002)); see also United States v. Hirsch, 207 F.3d 928, 929–30
(7th Cir. 2000) (suggesting that a clerk’s “failure to perform a
ministerial act whose omission could have serious adverse
consequences for a criminal defendant” would qualify as
“good cause” for untimely appeal). Similarly, this court has
found that a U.S. Marshal’s failure properly to serve a pris-
oner’s notice of appeal “is automatically ‘good cause.’” Sellers
v. United States, 902 F.2d 598, 602 (7th Cir. 1990).

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10 No. 14-3289
We have interpreted the term this way in the context of
PLRA exhaustion. Where an inmate “has no unexhausted ad-
ministrative remedies” but “the failure to exhaust was inno-
cent (as where prison officials prevent a prisoner from ex-
hausting his remedies),” he must be permitted to exhaust any
existing remedies. Pavey, 544 F.3d at 742. Although the cases
in which we have found good cause have dealt only with the
actual filing of grievances, their logic extends to Pyles’s situa-
tion.
In Dole v. Chandler, a prisoner submitted his grievance by
the only procedure available to him: leaving it in his “chuck-
hole.” 438 F.3d at 807. The grievance never made it to the
grievance officer. Id. We held that where the prisoner
“properly followed procedure and prison officials were re-
sponsible for the mishandling of his grievance, it cannot be
said that [he] failed to exhaust his remedies.” Id. at 811. The
inmate’s grievance, we said, “remains unresolved through no
apparent fault of his own,” and that “[i]n this limited context,
prison authorities may not employ their own mistake to
shield them from possible liability.” Id.
We have also recognized “physical incapacitation” as a
possible basis for good cause. See Hurst v. Hantke, 634 F.3d
409, 412 (7th Cir. 2011). The federal analog to the Illinois reg-
ulation defines “a valid reason” excusing delay as “a situation
which prevented the inmate from submitting the request
within the established time frame.” 28 C.F.R. § 542.14(b). It in-
cludes as examples “an extended period in-transit during
which the inmate was separated from [necessary] docu-
ments” and a verified showing that “a response to the in-
mate’s request for copies” of certain documents “was de-
layed.” Id.

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No. 14-3289 11
If Pyles’s expectation that the library would return his
grievance to him within the 60-day window was reasonable,
he has demonstrated good cause. According to the record on
summary judgment, Pyles submitted his grievance to the law
library on the first possible date and filed it on the same day
he received it back. The only reason he was two days late was
the library’s glacial pace in returning his original document
(plus copy) to him. The defendants have not shown that this
was the library’s customary processing time. Nothing shows
that Pyles had any reason to expect such a long delay.
The defendants note that there were four days of sched-
uled holidays between December 21, 2012, and January 3,
2013. They argue that Pyles should therefore have expected
the delay, and that thus that the fault for the untimely filing
remains with him. We cannot draw that conclusion on sum-
mary judgment. Even subtracting those days, the record sug-
gests no reason why Pyles should have expected that it would
take nine days to photocopy several pages. The defendants
have provided no evidence otherwise. The defendants also
note that the inmate in Dole made a written (as opposed to
photocopied) copy of his grievance, and argue that Pyles
should have done likewise. But Pyles “cannot be expected to
do more than the state’s regulations required of him,” Dole,
438 F.3d at 809, and we are given no reason to think that the
prison would have accepted a handwritten, unauthenticated
copy as genuine. Pyles started the grievance process with 35
days remaining before the due date. This was enough time to
demonstrate his diligence in pursuing the grievance.
The defendants also rely on Cannon v. Washington, 418 F.3d
714 (7th Cir. 2005), but the circumstances there were different.

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12 No. 14-3289
The inmate in Cannon failed to follow the Administrative Re-
view Board’s instructions for the late grievance procedure. Id.
at 718. While Cannon held that the confiscation of the inmate’s
legal papers for three weeks did not constitute good cause for
late filing, it emphasized that the inmate had not needed them
to file a grievance. Id. In contrast, Pyles had only one copy of
his grievance signed by his counselor. Because it was in the
possession of the law library, there was no way for him to sub-
mit it before it was returned to him.
The defendants also suggest that it was irresponsible of
Pyles to have submitted his grievance for photocopying. But
as the disappearance of Pyles’s separate grievance about the
law-library delay demonstrates, grievances and other paper-
work are not infrequently lost in the prison administrative
system. It was thus reasonable for Pyles to take the precaution
of making a copy of his grievance. In fact, encouraging pris-
oners to do so effectuates one of the purposes of the PLRA’s
exhaustion requirement: improving the quality of prisoner
suits by “the creation of an administrative record that is help-
ful to the court.” Ngo, 548 U.S. at 94–95. The fact that copying
a grievance is not a required step in the administrative process
says nothing about whether Pyles did everything in his power
to comply with that process. There is no reason that Pyles
should be faulted for taking entirely reasonable action just be-
cause the process did not explicitly require it. The purpose of
the exhaustion requirement is to ensure that prisons have “a
fair opportunity to correct their own errors” through the
grievance process. Id. at 94. Finding good cause in this case
would not interfere with that purpose.

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No. 14-3289 13
Finally, there is little reason to fear the parade of horribles
predicted by the defendants. There is little incentive for pris-
oners to try to evade due dates by last-minute photocopying:
they would almost certainly gain nothing by it. (In any event,
this was not an instance of “last-minute” action.) Moreover,
evidence that the prisoner either was not diligent or had rea-
son to believe he might not receive his photocopies back in
time would preclude a finding of exhaustion. Pyles failed to
file his grievance in time through no fault of his own. The late-
ness was caused by circumstances outside Pyles’s control—
and within the prison’s. According to the record, he was dili-
gent throughout the process and followed the Illinois admin-
istrative procedures to the greatest extent possible; this adds
up to good cause for his two-day delay. The defendants there-
fore failed to show that he did not exhaust his administrative
remedies with respect to the grievance against Dr. Nwaobasi.
B
The Shearing grievance presents a different problem: what
happens when a response to a grievance does not reach the
prisoner, and so he does not know when to move along to the
next step? Pyles testified that he never received a response to
his grievance against Shearing, but the magistrate judge (and
then the district court) found that Pyles “lack[ed] credibility
on this issue.” The defendants contend that this determina-
tion is binding. We have no quarrel with the normal rule that
findings of fact, including credibility determinations, are re-
viewed for clear error. See Anderson v. City of Bessemer City,
N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 573–74 (1985). But a finding of fact is clearly
erroneous if it is “based on errors of fact or logic.” Allord v.
Barnhart, 455 F.3d 818, 821 (7th Cir. 2006). Where the evidence

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14 No. 14-3289
underlying a fact, including credibility, supports only specu-
lation about the existence or nonexistence of the contested
point, it is clear error to conclude that the point has been es-
tablished.
That is the case here. The magistrate judge’s finding that
Pyles lacked credibility was based on inferences from tangen-
tially relevant evidence: (1) that four of Pyles’s previous griev-
ances were returned, and (2) that Pyles had followed up on at
least some other grievances, but had not in this case. We must
consider whether this, standing alone (as it did), is enough to
support the judge’s finding that it was “implausible” that
Pyles’s failure to follow up on the Shearing grievance was be-
cause he never received a response.
Those two facts are at best very weak evidence for the
proposition at issue. The fact that other grievances were re-
turned to Pyles says nothing about whether this grievance was
returned to Pyles. (We do not know how many grievances are
filed each year at Menard, but it houses almost 3,700 male in-
mates, see https://www.illinois.gov/idoc/facilities/Pages/men
ardcorrectionalcenter.aspx.) Because the defendants have
provided no evidence that they timely and accurately trans-
mitted a response, they do not enjoy a presumption of receipt.
In re Nimz Transp., Inc., 505 F.2d 177, 179 (7th Cir. 1974).
Worse, there is evidence in the prison’s own records that
undermines the court’s finding and supports Pyles. True, the
records show that grievance officers responded to some ear-
lier grievances. In fact, Pyles’s Cumulative Counseling Sum-
mary shows that some were returned to him. But this sup-
ports Pyles’s account, not the defendants’: while the Counsel-
ing Summary contains an entry documenting the Shearing

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No. 14-3289 15
grievance, there is no record anywhere indicating that a re-
sponse to it was given or sent to Pyles. In fact, the Shearing
grievance does not appear at all in Pyles’s “IGRV Inmate His-
tory” of grievances. These holes in the record indicate that
Pyles never received a response.
The magistrate judge thought that Pyles’s inquiries about
other pending grievances (and the lack of any such inquiry
about the Shearing grievance) made it implausible to think
that he did not receive a response to the Shearing grievance.
This, in our view, is too much of a stretch, especially in the
face of the explanation Pyles gave for why he did not send a
status inquiry for the Shearing grievance: “After three months
having received no response, I just assumed that that was it, I
wasn’t going to receive a response, and filed the lawsuit.” The
magistrate judge pointed to nothing in Pyles’s testimony that
gave him (or us) reason to doubt this account.
As we have emphasized, it was the defendants’ burden to
prove that Pyles failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.
See Maddox, 655 F.3d at 720. The defendants, we conclude, did
not meet that burden. They practically admitted this at the
Pavey hearing, where the defendants’ counsel conceded that
there was “no proof [about exhaustion of the Shearing griev-
ance] in either direction.” But there was competent proof that
Pyles never received a response, in the form of his own testi-
mony. The magistrate judge’s conclusion to the contrary can-
not stand on this record. Pyles exhausted such remedies as
were available to him, and so summary judgment for the de-
fendants on the basis of failure to exhaust was inappropriate.

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16 No. 14-3289
III
Pyles has shown that, under I LL. A DMIN . C ODE tit. 20,
§ 504.810(a), he had good cause for failing to timely file his
grievance against Dr. Nwaobasi. In addition, the defendants
did not meet their burden of proving that Pyles failed to ex-
haust his available administrative remedies for his grievance
against Dr. Shearing. The district court’s judgment is therefore
R EVERSED as to both grievances, and this case is R EMANDED for
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

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