Joseph Rutledge v. City of Chicago, et. al.

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted June 15, 2016*
Decided June 17, 2016
Before
DIANE P. WOOD, Chief Judge
RICHARD A. POSNER, Circuit Judge
JOEL M. FLAUM, Circuit Judge
No. 15‐3014
JOSEPH RUTLEDGE,
Plaintiff‐Appellant,
v.
CITY OF CHICAGO, et. al.,
Defendants‐Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois,
Eastern Division.
No. 13 C 870
John Robert Blakey,
Judge.
O R D E R
Joseph Rutledge alleged in this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that the City of
Chicago and two of its building inspectors, Vallie Smith and Donald Kerksick, violated
his Fourth Amendment rights by conducting a warrantless search of his home and
discriminated against him by targeting his home for inspection because he is African‐
American. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants, and
Rutledge now asks us to overturn that decision. We affirm.
* After examining the briefs and record, we have concluded that oral argument is
unnecessary. Thus the appeal is submitted on the briefs and record. See FED. R. A PP. P.
34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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No. 15‐3014 Page 2
Rutledge owns a home on Chicago’s south side that he shared with Yolanda
Lasley, a domestic partner. (Lasley has since moved out, but that does not affect this
case.) Lasley called the city’s “311” non‐emergency municipal services number in
December 2012 to report a broken window in a neighbor’s home, believing that the City
would repair the window for free. Inspector Smith responded to the call and went to
Rutledge’s home. Smith noticed that one of Rutledge’s windows was boarded, and
knocked on the door. Lasley answered (Rutledge was not home) and Smith asked for,
and received, permission to come inside to inspect the window. Smith entered and then,
after being allowed by Lasley to use a bathroom in the basement, she heard the furnace
cut off. Lasley told Smith that it cut off periodically, and Smith responded that she
would send someone to look at it. Based on this inspection Smith later completed an
administrative complaint citing the property with several violations of the municipal
code, including broken windowpanes, a missing downspout, and general uncleanliness.
Inspector Kerksick visited the home three days later to inspect the furnace.
Rutledge was not at home, and again Lasley invited the inspector inside. Kerksick
completed an inspection report in which he wrote that the furnace was indeed
inoperable and that a cooking stove was being used as a heating device. He also noted
that the conditions in the home were “deplorable” and recommended that a “well‐being
check” be conducted on the occupants. Based on the reports of Inspectors Smith and
Kerksick, the City of Chicago issued two administrative complaints against Rutledge as
the homeowner. Following a contested hearing, the City fined Rutledge $815 for
violations of the municipal code.
Rutledge brought this § 1983 suit alleging that the two inspectors violated the
Fourth Amendment by conducting a warrantless, nonconsensual search of his home,
and that the City violated the Equal Protection Clause through its “custom or practice of
targeting African‐American neighborhoods for building inspections” and issuing
baseless citations to black homeowners.
The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants. Rejecting
Rutledge’s Fourth Amendment claim, the court concluded that Lasley had actual
authority to consent to both inspections because she had been living full‐time with
Rutledge when the inspections occurred and had been living with him “off‐and‐on” for
three years—“a significant period of time.” She also had apparent authority to consent
to both inspections, the court added, because she answered the door and told the
inspectors that she lived in Rutledge’s home. And the inspectors did not exceed the

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No. 15‐3014 Page 3
scope of her consent, the court concluded, because Lasley did not impose any limits on
the search. Finally, addressing Rutledge’s equal‐protection claim, the court found that
he failed to produce any evidence to show that the City or its employees even knew of
his race, much less that racial animus motivated the inspections of his home.
On appeal Rutledge argues that the district court abused its discretion by
upholding the searches based on the consent of Lasley, whom he characterizes as “a
third party who has no authority to consent.” Rutledge asserts that, because he also
resided in the home and objected to an inspection, the inspectors were required to
obtain a warrant before entering. An administrative inspection, as a search, must
comport with the Fourth Amendment’s requirement of reasonableness, Camara v. Mun.
Court of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 534 (1967), and therefore must be supported by
either an administrative search warrant or valid consent. See Montville v. Lewis, 87 F.3d
900, 902 (7th Cir. 1996). However, “the consent of one who possesses common authority
over premises or effects is valid as against the absent, nonconsenting person with whom
that authority is shared.” United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 170 (1974); see also
United States v. Groves, 530 F.3d 506, 509 (7th Cir. 2008). Lasley conceded at her
deposition that she allowed both Smith and Kerksick to enter the home, and despite
Rutledge’s attempt to portray her as a “third party,” it is undisputed that she lived in
the home at the time of the inspections. As a co‐resident, Lasley had legal authority to
consent to the search.
Rutledge also challenges the ruling on his equal‐protection claim. To show that
the City used a racial classification to single him out for his property inspection, he
points to the notation “Case Group[:] TARGET” that appears atop the Notices of
Violation which the City issued to him. But as the district court explained, Rutledge
introduced no evidence to support any discriminatory inference from the notation, nor
did he show that the same notation did not also appear on Notices of Violations sent to
similarly situated white homeowners. We add that Rutledge offered nothing to refute
the City’s assertion that the notation was merely an internal designation to reflect the
fact that its lawyers were handling the case during administrative proceedings (as
opposed to those from the Department of Buildings, which handles other matters). In
responding to a motion for summary judgment, a party may not rest on its pleadings,
but must affirmatively show with “competent evidence of a type otherwise admissible”
that there is a genuine issue for trial. Hemsworth v. Quotesmith.com, 476 F.3d 487, 489–90
(7th Cir. 2007); Billups v. Mehodist Hosp. of Chicago, 922 F.2d 1300, 1302–03 (7th Cir. 1991).
AFFIRMED.

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