The AI workspace for legal professionals
- Legal research with access to more than 1 million sources
- Document automation
- Matter management
- Hosted in the EU and Switzerland
Try it free for 14 days (10 questions/day during trial)
The AI workspace for legal professionals
Try it free for 14 days (10 questions/day during trial)
15-3471•Beverly P. Wesley v. JULIÁNCASTRO, Secretary of the United States Department of Housing
15-3471Court of Appeals for the Seventh CircuitApr 14, 2016
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted April 13, 2016 *
Decided April 14, 2016
Before
JOEL M. FLAUM, Circuit Judge
KENNETH F. RIPPLE, Circuit Judge
DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge
No. 15‐3471
BEVERLY P. WESLEY,
Plaintiff‐Appellant,
v.
JULIÁN CASTRO, Secretary of the
United States Department of Housing
and Urban Development, and CAGAN
MANAGEMENT GROUP,
Defendants‐Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois,
Eastern Division.
No. 15 C 6833
Manish S. Shah,
Judge.
O R D E R
Beverly Wesley lost her home in Crete, Illinois, after defaulting on her mortgage
loan. An Illinois state court entered a judgment of foreclosure in April 2014 and a year
later approved a judicial sale of the property. Wesley then brought this action in federal
court, ostensibly under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that the “foreclosing entity,” Cagan
Management Group, had violated the Constitution of the United States by commencing
the foreclosure action. Wesley also listed as a defendant the Secretary of the U.S.
* After examining the briefs and the record, we have concluded that oral
argument is unnecessary. Thus the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the record.
See FED. R. A PP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
-- 1 of 2 --
No. 15‐3471 Page 2
Department of Housing and Urban Development. After Wesley failed for a second time
to attend a scheduled hearing, the district court dismissed the suit for failure to
prosecute. Because we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion, we
affirm the dismissal.
Missing a single hearing usually will not warrant dismissing a lawsuit for failure
to prosecute. See McInnis v. Duncan, 697 F.3d 661, 664 (7th Cir. 2012); Del Carmen v.
Emerson Elec. Co., 908 F.2d 158, 163 (7th Cir. 1990). But when a plaintiff misses multiple
hearings and has been warned of the possibility of dismissal, dismissal may be
warranted. See McInnis, 697 F.3d at 664; Fischer v. Cingular Wireless, LLC, 446 F.3d 663,
665–66 (7th Cir. 2006). Wesley’s case was not dismissed after a single missed hearing.
Rather, after Wesley had missed the first hearing, the district court issued a minute entry
warning her that failing to show up at the next hearing risked dismissal of her suit.
Despite this warning Wesley did not appear at the hearing two weeks later. Moreover,
Wesley has not tried to explain her absences, either to the district court in a motion to
reconsider or vacate the dismissal, see McInnis, 697 F.3d at 664–65, or in her appellate
brief. On this record, we cannot conclude that the court abused its discretion in
dismissing her suit.
AFFIRMED.
-- 2 of 2 --
Connect Omnilex to search the legal corpus from your AI assistant.