No. 15-­--2646 ABDUWALI ABDUKHADIR MUSE v. CHARLES A. DANIELS, Warden, FCI Terre Haute

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 15-­‐‑2646
ABDUWALI ABDUKHADIR MUSE,
Petitioner-­‐‑Appellant,
v.
CHARLES A. DANIELS, Warden, FCI Terre Haute,
Respondent-­‐‑Appellee.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Indiana, Terre Haute Division.
No. 2:15-­‐‑cv-­‐‑00213-­‐‑JMS-­‐‑DKL — Jane E. Magnus-­‐‑Stinson, Judge.
____________________
SUBMITTED FEBRUARY 22, 2016 — DECIDED FEBRUARY 24, 2016*
____________________
Before EASTERBROOK, KANNE, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.
EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. Abduwali Muse pleaded
guilty to piracy, 18 U.S.C. §2280, among other crimes, for his
role in boarding the MV Maersk Alabama in 2009 in interna-­‐‑
tional waters off the coast of Somalia and taking its captain
hostage.
* The appeal was decided by non-­‐‑precedential order on February 24,
2016. The court reissued the decision as an opinion on March 4, 2016.

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2 No. 15-­‐‑2646
Muse initially told federal agents that he was 16 at the
time of his capture, which created a potential for prosecution
under the special rules applicable to juveniles. See 18 U.S.C.
§§ 5031–42. The day before a hearing set to determine his
age, Muse told an FBI agent that he was between 18 and 19.
At the hearing Muse refused to testify. Magistrate Judge
Peck, of the Southern District of New York, concluded that
Muse was at least 18 when the crime occurred, which led to
his prosecution as an adult. He pleaded guilty and was sen-­‐‑
tenced to 405 months’ imprisonment. The plea agreement
contains a clause promising “not to seek to withdraw his
guilty plea or file a direct appeal or any kind of collateral at-­‐‑
tack challenging his guilty plea or conviction based on his
age either at the time of the charged conduct or at the time of
the guilty plea.”
Notwithstanding the waiver, Muse filed a proceeding
under 28 U.S.C. §2255 asking the Southern District of New
York to set aside his conviction on the grounds that a magis-­‐‑
trate judge lacked authority to decide whether he was an
adult in 2009 and that his lawyer furnished ineffective assis-­‐‑
tance by not pursuing that question vigorously. Chief Dis-­‐‑
trict Judge Preska denied that motion, relying on the waiver
in the plea agreement. Muse appealed, but the Second Cir-­‐‑
cuit declined to issue a certificate of appealability. Turning
to the Southern District of Indiana, where he is imprisoned,
Muse filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28
U.S.C. §2241. Again he lost, this time because the district
court concluded that §2255(e) applies.
Section 2255(e) provides: “An application for a writ of
habeas corpus in behalf of a prisoner who is authorized to
apply for relief by motion pursuant to this section, shall not

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No. 15-­‐‑2646 3
be entertained if it appears that the applicant has failed to
apply for relief, by motion, to the court which sentenced
him, or that such court has denied him relief, unless it also
appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffec-­‐‑
tive to test the legality of his detention.” Webster v. Daniels,
784 F.3d 1123 (7th Cir. 2015) (en banc), discusses when §2255
as a whole is “inadequate or ineffective to test the legality
of” federal detention. The district court properly concluded
that Muse has not identified any deficiency or inadequacy in
§2255. The reason he could not contest the magistrate judge’s
decision has nothing to do with §2255. It is, instead, the con-­‐‑
sequence of his own decision to waive any entitlement to
raise the age issue on collateral attack. That waiver would
apply equally in a proceeding under §2241, had not §2255(e)
taken precedence, for §2241 is a form of collateral attack.
Muse’s brief in this court ignores his waiver and §2255(e)
alike. Instead he presents an argument about the extent to
which 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1)(A) permits magistrate judges to
resolve contests about criminal defendants’ ages. The brief
thus gives us no reason to question the district court’s deci-­‐‑
sion.
AFFIRMED

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