United States of America v. WILLIAM BELL and LENARD DIXON

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Nos. 14‐3462 & 14‐3470
U NITED STATES OF A MERICA,
Plaintiff‐Appellee,
v.
WILLIAM BELL and
LENARD D IXON ,
Defendants‐Appellants.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Indiana, Terre Haute Division.
No. 2:13‐cr‐00021‐JMS‐CMM— Jane E. Magnus‐Stinson, Judge.
A RGUED OCTOBER 27, 2015 — D ECIDED FEBRUARY 17, 2016
Before KANNE and R OVNER , Circuit Judges and B RUCE ,
District Judge.*
R OVNER , Circuit Judge. A jury convicted William Bell and
Lenard Dixon of first‐degree murder and being an accessory
* The Honorable Colin S. Bruce, of the Central District of Illinois, sitting by
designation.

-- 1 of 24 --

2 Nos. 14‐3462 & 14‐3470
after the fact to the murder, respectively, in the death of a
fellow inmate at the federal penitentiary in Terre Haute,
Indiana. Each appeals the sufficiency of the evidence underly‐
ing his conviction: Bell contends in particular that the evidence
is insufficient to establish that he premeditated the murder,
and Dixon contends that the evidence is insufficient to estab‐
lish that he aided Bell with the intent to prevent Bell from
being held to account for the murder. Bell additionally chal‐
lenges the decision to admit evidence concerning an inculpato‐
ry statement he made regarding the murder, and Dixon
challenges the decision to shackle his legs during the trial. We
affirm the convictions.
I.
In 2011, Bell and Dixon were cellmates in the United States
Penitentiary in Terre Haute, Indiana. The cell they shared was
located on the ground floor in Unit E‐1 of the Terre Haute
facility, a two‐level unit which was triangular in shape and
housed some 121 inmates. Inmate cells occupied two legs of
the triangle, with correctional staff offices and activity, shower,
and laundry rooms occupying the third leg. A recreational
“day room” occupied the center of the unit. Six security
cameras were positioned throughout the tier, and although
none were positioned so as to record activity occurring within
individual cells (except as might be revealed by an open cell
door), the cameras did record what occurred in the common
area of the tier outside of the cells. Video recorded on the
evening of June 18, 2011, revealed the following sequence of
events.

-- 2 of 24 --

Nos. 14‐3462 & 14‐3470 3
At approximately 6:45 p.m., Bell emerged from Cell 103, the
cell that he shared with Dixon, and walked two doors down to
Cell 105, which was occupied by Brian Pendelton. Bell was
wearing a white t‐shirt and khaki pants, and he appeared to
have something in his right hand, which he kept in his pants
pocket as he walked toward Pendelton’s cell. When Bell
arrived at Cell 105, he opened the cell door with his left hand,
keeping his right hand in his pocket. He then entered the cell
and closed the door behind him.
In the meantime, Dixon emerged from Cell 103, milled
around the cell doorway for a moment, and eventually sat
down in a chair just outside of the cell, facing a television in the
day room. At one point, while Bell was inside of Cell 105, it
appears from the video that Dixon turned to look in the
direction of that cell.
Bell emerged from Cell 105 roughly 70 seconds after he
entered. When he left the cell, he was shirtless and carrying a
t‐shirt in his right hand. In his left hand, it appears he was
carrying a long, slender object. Bell walked, unhurried, back to
his own cell. As he approached, Dixon arose from his chair and
entered Cell 103 ahead of Bell.
Dixon re‐emerged from Cell 103 some 25 seconds later and
walked to Cell 113 near the end of the row of cells, carrying
clothing in his right hand. His path took him directly by
Pendelton’s cell, number 105, the door to which was open.
Pendelton was struggling to lift himself off the floor and
walk out of his cell as Dixon passed. He was, according to
witness testimony, bleeding profusely from a stab wound to
the left carotid artery on his neck. From the video recording, it

-- 3 of 24 --

4 Nos. 14‐3462 & 14‐3470
appears that Dixon turned in the direction of Pendelton and
the open door to Cell 105 as he walked by, but Dixon contin‐
ued walking without pause toward the end of the row.
When he arrived at Cell 113, Dixon stepped inside for a
period of approximately 20 seconds. The door to the cell was
ajar during that period, and another inmate could be seen on
the video surveillance standing near the cell’s sink. Dixon left
the cell again carrying clothing, walked to a trash can in the
eastern portion of the day room and placed the clothing in the
trash can underneath other objects already in it, and fluffed the
trash on top before walking away.
At that point in time, Bell left Cell 103, clad once again in a
white t‐shirt and carrying a towel, and proceeded to one of the
showers along the south portion of the unit.
Pendelton, meanwhile, after emerging from Cell 105
bleeding, had collapsed on the day room floor as he tried
unsuccessfully to reach a correctional staff officer who was
walking out of his office in response to a panic alarm Pendelt‐
on had sounded. Prison staff came to his aid but were unsuc‐
cessful in saving his life. An autopsy would later disclose that
he bled to death from the stab wound to his left neck; he also
had two superficial stab wounds to his back that likely were
non‐fatal.
In the immediate aftermath of Pendelton’s collapse, prison
authorities locked down Unit E‐1. A number of inmates had
been watching television and engaging in other activities in the
common area of the unit; they were ordered back to their cells.
Pendelton’s cellmate was in one of the showers at that time; he
was locked in the shower while correctional staff members

-- 4 of 24 --

Nos. 14‐3462 & 14‐3470 5
went about verifying that all inmates were present and
sweeping the area for evidence. Likewise, Bell, who by that
time was in a shower room, was confined there during the
lockdown.1 Dixon was locked in Cell 103.
An inspection of the trash can into which Dixon had
deposited clothing revealed what looked like a large, makeshift
ice pick, comprised of a nine‐ to ten‐inch metal rod (possibly
derived from the innards of a printer cartridge) with a sharp‐
ened point and what appeared to be a handle crafted from the
casing of an ink pen, wrapped in bloody clothing. The latter
consisted of several items, including a pair of khaki pants with
a tag bearing Bell’s name and inmate register number, a khaki
shirt bearing the name “King” (an inmate assigned to a
different cellblock), two undershirts (one a white t‐shirt, the
other a grey tank top), and a green towel. The blood on the
clothing was later determined to be Pendelton’s. No blood or
fingerprints were found on the sharpened metal rod, which
was presumed to be the weapon used to attack Pendelton. 2
Subsequent searches of individual cells in the unit un‐
earthed no weapons in Cells 103, 105, or 113. Photographs of
Cell 105 showed, inter alia, large and relatively undisturbed
pools of blood on the floor of the cell and a trail of blood and
1 Bell was later escorted to a prison lieutenant’s office for questioning.
According to a prison guard, he spat out what looked like blood while en
route.
2 The defendants argue that the sharpened rod could not have been the
murder weapon, as its size and shape were inconsistent with the nature of
Pendelton’s wounds. But the jury reasonably could have concluded to the
contrary that this was the weapon used to kill Pendelton.

-- 5 of 24 --

6 Nos. 14‐3462 & 14‐3470
bloody footprints left by Pendelton when he made his way out
of the cell in search of help.
Bell was subsequently examined twice by nurses. The first
examination, on the evening of the attack, disclosed no
apparent injuries to his hands or elsewhere on his person.
Likewise there was nothing found under Pendelton’s finger‐
nails that might have indicated he had been in a physical
confrontation. The second examination, conducted three days
after the attack, disclosed a one‐centimeter abrasion on the
inside of his lower lip. Bell would not say how he had incurred
that minor injury. There was no blood found on Bell’s shoes in
Cell 103. The doorway to Cell 105 was never dusted for
fingerprints to determine who (including or in addition to Bell)
might have recently been in Pendelton’s cell; prison authorities
assumed that too many people would have touched the door
for such an examination to yield useful information.
Dixon was interviewed on the evening of the attack and
denied knowing anything about it. When he was interviewed
a second time on the following day, he said that he had thrown
Bell’s clothes into the trash can without Bell’s knowledge
simply because he had noticed the clothes were soiled. He
acknowledged that he had never done this before. Dixon said
that he had proceeded directly to the trash can from Cell 103 to
dispose of the clothing, which of course was inconsistent with
what the surveillance video showed. He denied that there had
been any blood on the discarded clothing. 3 And although the
3 More than six months later, Dixon told a prison counselor that he had
decided to throw Bell’s clothing away after he walked past the injured
(continued...)

-- 6 of 24 --

Nos. 14‐3462 & 14‐3470 7
video indicated that Dixon had walked right by the fatally‐
injured Pendelton as he struggled out of his cell, Dixon denied
seeing anyone injured, noticing any blood (including blood on
Bell’s person), or knowing why the unit had been locked down.
He told investigators that he didn’t see Bell do anything that
evening other than go to the shower.
In May 2013, a grand jury charged Bell with committing
premeditated murder within the special maritime and territo‐
rial jurisdiction of the United States, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1111, and Dixon with being an accessory after the fact to that
murder, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 3. They were tried jointly
before a jury the following year and were both convicted.
Bell was sentenced to a mandatory life term of imprison‐
ment. Dixon was sentenced to a term of 156 months, to be
served consecutively to the federal sentence he was serving at
the time of Pendelton’s murder.
II.
A. Admission of Bell’s prior statement
On December 31, 2013, roughly 18 months after the murder,
Bell was being housed in a holding facility of the Terre Haute
complex known as the Special Housing Unit. He had been
placed in hand and leg restraints after he had covered up the
windows into his cell the day before and refused correctional
officer Dennis Morris’s instruction to uncover them. Because
Bell was in restraints, he was being given simple bagged meals
3 (...continued)
Pendelton while on his way to put the clothes into a washing machine and
blood had spurted from Pendelton onto Bell’s shirt.

-- 7 of 24 --

8 Nos. 14‐3462 & 14‐3470
rather than the meal trays that he would normally have
received. According to Morris, on the morning of the 31st, as
he passed a bagged breakfast meal to Bell through the slot in
Bell’s cell door, a visibly angry Bell said to him, “I cannot wait
to get out of these restraints and kill you like I did the nigger
across the street.” Tr. 2‐422. Morris interpreted “across the
street” to mean the penitentiary portion of the complex where
Bell was normally housed. And the government’s view, of
course, is that Bell was referring to Pendelton’s murder.
Based on Morris’s report of the incident, Bell was charged
with engaging in threatening behavior. When he was notified
of the charge, Bell, who denied the allegations, asked other
inmates in the Special Housing Unit to submit written state‐
ments as to what they had heard. Roderick Davis, an inmate in
the cell next to Bell’s, submitted such a statement. Davis would
later testify that he was lying on his bunk at approximately
7:00 a.m. on the 31st and heard the jingle of keys as a correc‐
tional officer walked by his cell. He then heard the officer call
an inmate at the end of the hall (where Bell’s cell was) a
“bitch.” Tr. 2‐464. According to Davis, the inmate did not
respond, and the officer eventually walked away.
After reviewing the papers, a Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”)
hearing officer expunged the charge based on inconsistencies
in Morris’s incident report as to the particular cell from which
the alleged threat had emanated. (Morris apparently had
written the wrong cell number in his report of the incident.)
Pursuant to the practice of the hearing office staff, the original
paperwork related to the charge was destroyed after it was
digitally scanned. And although there had been video surveil‐

-- 8 of 24 --

Nos. 14‐3462 & 14‐3470 9
lance of the Secured Housing Unit on the date of the incident,
no video of Morris’s encounter with Bell was preserved.
Bell moved in advance of the trial to exclude testimony by
Morris as to what Bell had allegedly said during this incident.
Bell contended the government had violated his due process
rights by failing to preserve exculpatory evidence related to the
matter. In particular, Bell contended that the scanned copy of
Davis’s statement was illegible, and that the Bureau of Prisons
had not preserved video of the incident, which might have
presented a picture of the alleged exchange that was favorable
to Bell. The district court subsequently convened an eviden‐
tiary hearing on the motion at which Davis and two witnesses
from the Bureau of Prisons testified.
Tammy Myers worked as an administrative assistant to the
prison’s disciplinary hearing officer, and among her duties was
the maintenance of files related to disciplinary charges. She
testified that it was her practice to scan and shred original
documentation related to a charge where, as here, the disciplin‐
ary report was expunged. Davis’s statement was digitized
pursuant to that practice. She said that the scanned copy of
Davis’s statement was illegible because the original had been
written in pencil and for that reason did not scan well. She
otherwise had no independent knowledge or recollection with
respect to the charge against Bell. Myers further testified that
the disciplinary hearings office typically does not have contact
with the United States Attorney’s office with respect to a
disciplinary matter when the prisoner also has a federal
criminal charge pending, as Bell did. Finally, Myers acknowl‐
edged that surveillance video of the Special Housing Unit was

-- 9 of 24 --

10 Nos. 14‐3462 & 14‐3470
available, but she added that it was only preserved upon
request.
David Ezekiel was the disciplinary hearing officer for the
Terre Haute federal prison complex at the time of the incident
between Morris and Bell, and it was he who ordered the charge
against Bell expunged. Ezekiel had seen a copy of Davis’s
statement and had summarized it for his own report on the
charge. With respect to video surveillance, Ezekiel testified that
video footage is not retained unless an inmate asks for it at the
initial unit disciplinary committee hearing that takes place
within five work days of the submission of an incident report
(and which the charged inmate attends); otherwise, such
footage is recorded over after an unspecified period of time.
Ezekiel recalled that Bell, at some point after that initial
hearing, had asked his staff advocate to review the video
recording of the encounter with Morris, but by the time Bell
made that request, the video was no longer available. Ezekiel
added that the video surveillance of the Special Housing Unit
did not have an audio component; further, the video would
have captured only the outside, rather than the inside, of the
cells in that unit.
Finally, Davis himself testified at the hearing. Davis
identified the scanned copy of his written statement; stated
that he had provided it when Bell requested others on the
cellblock to provide witness statements; indicated that he
would have written the statement in pencil because that was
what was available in his cell; confirmed that he could not read
the scanned copy of his statement; but said that he independ‐
ently recalled the event summarized therein and recounted the
event as set forth above.

-- 10 of 24 --

Nos. 14‐3462 & 14‐3470 11
In an oral ruling, the district judge overruled Bell’s objec‐
tion and permitted Morris’s testimony as to Bell’s alleged
remark. With respect to the poorly preserved copy of Davis’s
statement, the court observed that the original had been
scanned and then destroyed in the ordinary course of business,
and there was no indication that the illegible scan was attribut‐
able to any bad faith on the part of the government. More to
the point, the court reasoned that Davis’s testimony rather than
his written statement was the relevant evidence insofar as the
trial was concerned; resort to the written statement would have
been permissible only to refresh Davis’s recollection. But Davis
recalled the event described in his statement, and his recall was
consistent with what was summarized in Ezekiel’s report. In
short, there was no evidence lost as a result of the illegible
scan.
As to the video recording of the encounter, the court
likewise found no evidence of bad faith in the failure to
preserve the recording. Rather, the testimony was that the
BOP, in the absence of a request to preserve it, had allowed the
recording to be taped over in the ordinary course of business.
Bell could have requested that the recording be preserved at
the time the disciplinary charge was filed (the court noted that
he had representation on the criminal charge at that time), but
he had not done so; and there was no reason for the BOP to
have independently perceived the need for preservation of the
video given that Bell had been exonerated of the charge. The
failure to preserve the recording certainly was “ripe ground for
cross‐examination” at trial. Tr. 2‐223. But it was not a basis on
which to exclude Morris’s testimony.

-- 11 of 24 --

12 Nos. 14‐3462 & 14‐3470
At trial, Morris was permitted to recount Bell’s alleged
statement over Bell’s renewed objection. Davis also testified,
and he again gave a summary of the encounter between the
correctional officer and Bell that directly contradicted Morris’s
account.
On appeal, Bell has renewed his claim that the BOP’s failure
to preserve the video recording and a legible copy of Davis’s
written statement deprived him of due process. This claim is
governed by Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 109 S. Ct. 333
(1988), which in relevant part states that the government’s
failure to preserve evidence favorable to the accused does not
deprive him of due process of law unless the defendant
establishes bad faith on the part of the pertinent government
actors, id. at 58, 109 S. Ct. at 337; see also United States v.
Valenzuela‐Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 872‐73, 102 S. Ct. 3440, 3449
(1982); California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 488‐89, 104 S. Ct.
2528, 2534 (1984); United States v. Fletcher, 634 F.3d 395, 407
(7th Cir. 2011); United States v. Chaparro‐Alcantara, 226 F.3d 616,
624 (7th Cir. 2000). This in turn requires proof of an “‘official
animus’ or a ‘conscious effort to suppress exculpatory evi‐
dence,’” id. (quoting Jones v. McCaughtry, 965 F.2d 473, 477
(7th Cir. 1992)), and necessarily turns on an official’s subjective
knowledge that the evidence in question had exculpatory value
at the time it was lost or destroyed, Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 56
n.*, 109 S. Ct. at 336 n.*; Fletcher, 634 F.3d at 408. Only if bad
faith is shown does the court consider the constitutional
materiality of the evidence in question, to evaluate whether the
defendant ultimately was deprived of due process. See Jones,
965 F.2d at 477.

-- 12 of 24 --

Nos. 14‐3462 & 14‐3470 13
The district court’s finding that Bell did not demonstrate
bad faith on the part of the BOP officials was well supported
by the evidence, and certainly no clear error has been shown in
that regard. As to the video, the testimony indicated that the
recording was taped over as a matter of routine, and nothing
in the record casts the veracity of that testimony into doubt. See
United States v. Cannon, 2006 WL 3206267, at *3 (S.D. Ind. Apr.
7, 2006) (Tinder, J.). Bell had been exonerated of the disciplin‐
ary charge, and he had not asked anyone to review or preserve
the recording until it had already been taped over. Moreover,
the undisputed testimony was that there had been no contact
between the BOP’s department of hearing officers and the U.S.
Attorney’s office regarding Bell, and so, as far as the record
shows, the BOP had no awareness that the encounter between
Bell and Morris, and the video footage thereof, might be
relevant to Bell’s trial on the criminal charge.
Likewise, there has been no showing that Davis’s statement
was scanned and then destroyed in anything but the ordinary
course of business. Although the scanned copy proved
illegible, the explanation for why that was so was both plausi‐
ble and uncontested. There is no evidence suggesting that the
original was destroyed in bad faith: Bell had been exonerated
of the disciplinary charge, and again, according to the testi‐
mony, BOP staff were not in touch with the U.S. Attorney’s
office regarding Bell’s criminal case, and thus had no reason to
think that there might be a need to preserve Davis’s statement
for purposes of the criminal trial.
Even if we set aside the absence of evidence establishing
bad faith, neither the video recording nor Davis’s statement
was constitutionally material for purposes of the due process

-- 13 of 24 --

14 Nos. 14‐3462 & 14‐3470
claim. To be regarded as such, the evidence at issue must not
only have an apparent exculpatory value but be of such a
nature that the defendant cannot obtain comparable evidence
by other means. Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 489, 104 S. Ct. at 2534; see
also McCarthy v. Pollard, 656 F.3d 478, 485, 486 (7th Cir. 2011).
Insofar as Davis’s statement is concerned, Bell was able to
present testimony from Davis himself; and as Judge Magnus‐
Stinson pointed out, his testimony rather than his prior written
statement was the relevant evidence. Davis recalled the essence
of the event he had described in his statement and testified
accordingly; his testimony contradicted Morris’s account and
was plainly favorable to Bell. Bell thus was not demonstrably
harmed by the illegibility of the scanned copy of Davis’s
statement. As for the video, it is far from clear that the visual
recording of the encounter between Morris and Bell would
have been exculpatory, as the recording had no audio compo‐
nent, and so would not have disclosed what Morris and Bell
may have said to one another, and the recording did not
capture the interior of Bell’s cell such that the viewer could
have seen if he even said anything to Morris. The video would
only have shown whether Morris paused at Bell’s cell, which
in any event is something that Davis himself said Morris did.
Bell was not deprived of due process by the failure to
preserve the written statement or the video, and the court
properly admitted Morris’s testimony.
B. Sufficiency of the evidence to convict Bell of premeditated
murder
Bell was charged with committing first degree murder
within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. 18 U.S.C.

-- 14 of 24 --

Nos. 14‐3462 & 14‐3470 15
§ 1111 defines murder as “the unlawful killing of a human
being with malice aforethought.” The statute defines first
degree murder to include, inter alia, “[e]very murder perpe‐
trated by poison, lying in wait, or any other kind of willful,
deliberate, malicious, and premeditated killing[.]” Murders
that do not fall into that group or that are otherwise identified
in the statute as felony murders, constitute second degree
murders. Thus, setting aside felony murders, it is premedita‐
tion that, in the main, distinguishes first from second degree
murder. United States v. Delaney, 717 F.3d 553, 556 (7th Cir.
2013). And, of course, the government alleged here that Bell’s
killing of Pendelton was premeditated.
Premeditation requires planning and deliberation beyond
the simple conscious intent to kill. There must be an apprecia‐
ble elapse of time between the formation of a design and the
fatal act, see id. at 556 (quoting Fisher v. United States, 328 U.S.
463, 467 n.3, 66 S. Ct. 1318, 1320 n.3 (1946)), although no
specific period of time is required. See id. at 557 (quoting
district court’s jury instruction); United States v. Brown, 518 F.2d
821, 826 (7th Cir. 1975); see also United States v. Begay, 673 F.3d
1038, 1043 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc); United States v. Mulder,
273 F.3d 91, 117 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting United States v. Shaw,
701 F.2d 367, 393 (5th Cir. 1983), abrogated on other grounds by
Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 763, 107 S. Ct. 3102, 3108 (1987)).
But more is required than the simple passage of time: the
defendant must, in fact, have deliberated during that time
period. See Fisher, 328 U.S. at 467 n.3, 66 S. Ct. at 1320 n.3
(quoting district court’s jury instruction); United States v.
Catalan‐Roman, 585 F.3d 453, 474 (1st Cir. 2009) (“it is the fact
of deliberation, of second thought[,] that is important”)

-- 15 of 24 --

16 Nos. 14‐3462 & 14‐3470
(quoting United States v. Frappier, 807 F.2d 257, 261 (1st Cir.
1986)); see also Shaw, 701 F.2d at 393. Premeditation may, of
course, be proved circumstantially. See Brown, 518 F.2d at 826.
The jury in this case was given an instruction on premedita‐
tion that was consistent with the criteria we have just de‐
scribed, and Bell raises no objection to the adequacy of the
instruction. His contention, as we have said, is that the evi‐
dence on the element of premeditation was too thin to support
the jury’s finding of guilt. We will sustain the jury’s verdict so
long as there was sufficient evidence, viewed favorably to the
government, to permit a rational jury to find the essential
elements of the offense to have been proven beyond a reason‐
able doubt. See Musacchio v. United States, 2016 WL 280757, at
*5 (U.S. Jan. 25, 2016) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307,
319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979)).
Having reviewed the trial record, we are satisfied that the
jury could reasonably find that Bell both had time to contem‐
plate killing Pendelton and did, in fact, deliberate on the
murder before he actually killed Pendelton. The circumstances
suggest that Bell left his cell with a plan already in place to kill
his fellow prisoner. First, Bell walked out of his cell with
something in his hand, and when he arrived at Pendelton’s
cell, he used his other hand to open the cell door. One could
reasonably surmise from what occurred next, and from the
sharpened rod that Dixon subsequently left in the trash can,
that Bell had a weapon in his hand, and so was walking to
Pendelton’s cell prepared to engage in violence. See Begay,
673 F.3d at 1044 (“Carrying the murder weapon to the scene is
strong evidence of premeditation.”) (collecting cases). Second,
Bell was in Pendelton’s cell for only a relatively brief period,

-- 16 of 24 --

Nos. 14‐3462 & 14‐3470 17
and there were no real signs of a struggle left either in the cell
or on Bell’s person. Although there was blood everywhere in
the cell, which is not surprising given the nature of Pendelton’s
injuries, nothing in his cell was knocked over or obviously out
of place. This suggests that Bell did not stab Pendelton in the
heat of an argument, for example, but rather that he entered
the cell with a plan to kill Pendelton and executed his design
quickly and efficiently. Cf. United States v. Esquer, 459 F.2d 431,
432‐33 (7th Cir. 1972) (testimony that defendant prisoner left
his position behind steam table in dining room serving line,
walked to center of room where victim was sitting, and
attacked him from behind, seizing him around the neck and
stabbing him in the back, was sufficient to support finding of
premeditation). Third, the actions of both Bell and Dixon
appear to have been coordinated, as evidenced by the way in
which Dixon left their cell shortly after Bell did, took up post
in a chair outside the cell while Bell was inside of Pendelton’s
cell, preceded Bell back into their cell as Bell returned, left the
cell again a short time later with the bundle of clothes, and
ultimately disposed of the clothing and weapon in the day
room trash can. Fourth, both Bell and Dixon appeared to take
these actions in a calm, unhurried, and deliberate manner,
which is somewhat inconsistent with the possibility that
Pendelton’s murder was an unexpected or unplanned crime.
We may assume that the jury could have rejected this
interpretation of events, concluded that premeditation had not
been proven, and acquitted Bell of first degree murder on that
basis. But the only question for us is whether a rational jury
could have found premeditation beyond a reasonable doubt on
these facts, and for the reasons we have outlined, we believe

-- 17 of 24 --

18 Nos. 14‐3462 & 14‐3470
that it could have done so. Bell’s actions—seemingly calm,
deliberate, and efficient—and the evident concert of action
between him and Dixon, reasonably indicate that the killing of
Pendelton was pre‐planned and therefore premeditated. See
Brown, 518 F.2d at 826 (“deliberation and premeditation
involve a prior design to commit a murder”). And even if Bell
had not already deliberated and settled on a design to kill
Pendelton before he left the cell he shared with Dixon—which
the facts strongly suggest he did—he had an additional
moment during his walk to Cell 105 during which to contem‐
plate the matter, and the jury reasonably could have con‐
cluded, in light of the way events transpired, that this was an
“appreciable” period of time during which Bell considered and
settled upon what he was about to do. In short, the evidence
supports the jury’s determination that this was a “pondered”
rather than a “spontaneous” killing. Delaney, 717 F.3d at 557.
C. Whether the district court abused its discretion in ordering
that Dixon’s feet be shackled during the trial
Before the trial began, the government filed a motion
asking that Dixon be physically restrained during the trial. (A
similar request was made, and granted, as to Bell, but he does
not appeal the shackling order, so we shall confine our
discussion to Dixon. 4) The government asked only that Dixon’s
4 Among other grounds, the government asked that Dixon be shackled in
part so that there would be “symmetr[y]” in transporting Dixon with Bell,
as to whom it had made a separate request for shackling. Tr. 5‐28‐2014 at 46‐
47. As the district court expressly did not rely on that ground in granting
the request to shackle Dixon, United States v. Bell, 2014 WL 2547757, at *5 n.1
(continued...)

-- 18 of 24 --

Nos. 14‐3462 & 14‐3470 19
legs be bound, not his hands. The district court convened a
hearing on the matter. Gregory Snyder, the deputy United
States marshal in charge of the Terre Haute marshals’ office,
testified that, in his judgment, restraints were warranted in
view of both Dixon’s criminal history, which involved serious
and violent conduct, and his disciplinary history at the Bureau
of Prisons, which included, among other incidents, several
instances of Dixon possessing homemade weapons. (The
disciplinary records provided to the court indicated that
Dixon’s history also included multiple instances in which he
threatened bodily harm, and on two occasions, engaged in
sexual acts in front of female staff members.) Snyder acknowl‐
edged that Dixon had no history of escaping custody or of
attempting to do so; that there had been no problems with
Dixon during transport to the courthouse or in court in the
instant case; and that he had no information indicating Dixon
had ever been disruptive or had been shackled at any previous
court appearance or trial.
The district court granted the government’s motion, finding
that Dixon’s history presented an “extreme need that justifies
being restrained at trial for courtroom security.” United
States v. Bell, 2014 WL 2547757, at *5 (S.D. Ind. June 5, 2014).
The court cited the numerous occasions on which Dixon had
possessed dangerous weapons in prison, including a seven‐
inch piece of sharpened plexiglass in one instance. Dixon’s
disciplinary history, the court observed, reflects “a general
disregard for maximum security precautions.” Id. The court
4 (...continued)
(S.D. Ind. June 5, 2014), we need not address it.

-- 19 of 24 --

20 Nos. 14‐3462 & 14‐3470
also noted that Dixon’s criminal history included multiple
violent crimes against persons. Collectively, his criminal and
penal histories showed that Dixon was prone to outbursts of
violence. The court acknowledged that Dixon had no record of
disruptive behavior during court proceedings, but noted that
he was facing up to 15 additional years in prison if the jury
found him guilty of being an accessory after the fact to
Pendelton’s murder. The court agreed that minimum
restraints—specifically, modified leg restraints fitted with tape
and soft material to limit audible noise—were appropriate. To
protect Dixon’s interests, the court directed that the govern‐
ment and defense tables be skirted so that Dixon’s restraints
would be hidden from the jury; that Dixon (and Bell) would be
transported into and out of the courtroom with the jury absent;
and that the parties would not stand when the jury entered and
exited the courtroom, so as to minimize the possibility that the
jury might perceive that Dixon was shackled. Id.
We review the court’s decision on this matter for abuse of
discretion. E.g., United States v. Van Sach, 458 F.3d 694, 699
(7th Cir. 2006) (citing Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 629,
125 S. Ct. 2007, 2012 (2005), abrogated on other grounds by Fry v.
Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 127 S. Ct. 2321 (2007)). Consistent with the
presumption of innocence, a defendant has a right to appear in
front of a jury free from physical restraints, as such restraints
pose a danger, inter alia, that the jury will view the defendant
as both dangerous and guilty. See United States v. Cooper,
591 F.3d 582, 587‐88 (7th Cir. 2010). The defendant’s right to
participate in the trial unrestrained is not absolute, however; a
court may order the defendant restrained when justified by a
government interest specific to the trial. Deck, 544 U.S. at 629,

-- 20 of 24 --

Nos. 14‐3462 & 14‐3470 21
125 S. Ct. at 2012; Van Sach, 458 F.3d at 699, 700. As a rule,
restraints, because they are regarded as an extreme measure,
id., should be employed “only in the presence of a special
need,” Deck, 544 U.S. at 626, 125 S. Ct. at 2010—that is, when
restraints are necessary to maintain physical security in the
courtroom, to prevent escape, or to preserve courtroom
decorum, id. at 628, 125 S. Ct. at 2012; see also Cooper, 591 F.3d
at 588; Van Sach, 458 F.3d at 699; United States v. Amaro,
816 F.2d 284, 285 (7th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (witness re‐
straints); United States v. Esquer, supra, 459 F.2d at 433 (same).
Dixon’s contention is that there was no such need in this case.
He believes that the district court ultimately relied on his status
as a maximum security prisoner, without there being any
indication that he posed any sort of security, escape, or
disruptive risk in the courtroom and, indeed, without him
presenting any problems during transport to or from the
courtroom or during prior court proceedings.
The district judge did not abuse her discretion in ordering
Dixon shackled. She carefully assessed the circumstances of
Dixon’s history and the case at hand before concluding that
restraints were appropriate. See Van Sach, 458 F.3d at 700.
Dixon’s criminal history includes the commission of multiple
violent crimes against persons (including carjacking and armed
robbery) from the age of 16 onward, and his prison disciplin‐
ary history includes multiple instances of possessing weapons
and engaging in violent acts. Cumulatively, these records
presented a possibility that Dixon might jeopardize the
security of the courtroom. We take Dixon’s point that he had
no history of attempting to escape or of causing trouble during
judicial proceedings or during transport to and from such

-- 21 of 24 --

22 Nos. 14‐3462 & 14‐3470
proceedings; and we may assume, given his clean history in
that regard, that different judges might have drawn different
conclusions as to the need for shackling. But as to matters
entrusted to a trial judge’s discretion, it is often true that judges
presented with the same record may reach different conclu‐
sions. See Bracey v. Grondin, 712 F.3d 1012, 1020 (7th Cir. 2013)
(“discretion by its very nature permits different judges to reach
different—but reasonable—conclusions on the same set of
facts”); United States v. Aljabari, 626 F.3d 940, 952 (7th Cir.
2010); Bohen v. City of E. Chicago, Ind., 799 F.2d 1180, 1185 (7th
Cir. 1986). Only if no one could reasonably have decided as the
district judge did in the case before us can we say that she
abused her discretion. E.g., United Cent. Bank v. KMWC 845,
LLC, 800 F.3d 307, 309 (7th Cir. 2015). And we cannot say that
here. In view of Dixon’s record, a judge plausibly could infer,
as this judge did, that Dixon was prone to outbursts of violence
and exhibited disregard for security precautions, and thus
might have an outburst in a criminal proceeding potentially
exposing him to a 15‐year sentence on top of the 35‐year
sentence he was serving at the time of the murder. See Van
Sach, 458 F.3d at 699‐700. The district judge applied the correct
legal standard and identified the facts that, in her considered
judgment, presented a special need for restraints. The record
does not permit us to second‐guess her in that regard.
We add that the judge took appropriate precautions to
minimize risk that the jury could infer that Dixon was shack‐
led. Only his legs were restrained, and those were hidden
behind the skirted table. Because both the government and
defense tables were skirted, and both sets of parties and their
counsel were directed not to rise when the jury entered the

-- 22 of 24 --

Nos. 14‐3462 & 14‐3470 23
courtroom, the jury had no reason to perceive or suspect that
Dixon was shackled. See Cooper, 591 F.3d at 588‐89; Amaro,
816 F.2d at 285. In short, Dixon has not demonstrated that he
was prejudiced by the decision to shackle him.
D. Sufficiency of evidence to convict Dixon of being an
accessory after the fact to the murder
Dixon, of course, was charged with being an accessory after
the fact to murder. See 18 U.S.C. § 3. That charge required proof
that Bell committed the offense of murder, that Dixon knew he
had done so, that Dixon assisted Bell in some way, and that
Dixon did so with the intent to hinder the investigation or to
prevent Bell from being arrested, prosecuted, or punished. See
United States v. Osborn, 120 F.3d 59, 63 (7th Cir. 1997) (quoting
United States v. Lepanto, 817 F.2d 1463, 1467 (10th Cir. 1987)); see
also United States v. Irwin, 149 F.3d 565, 571 (7th Cir. 1998). The
jury was appropriately instructed on these elements. Dixon
argues, however, that the evidence was not sufficient to
support the jury’s verdict of guilt: he contends that there was
no direct evidence of his intent; no proof that he had any
motive to aid Bell; and no evidence of his complicity in the
murder to be found in the cell that he shared with Bell, in any
admission by either defendant, or in the statement of any
witness.
Dixon’s course of action, as revealed by the surveillance
video and the other evidence presented at trial, was sufficient
to show that he aided Bell with the intent to hinder his appre‐
hension, trial, and punishment for murder. § 3. We have
already spoken of the apparent choreography between Bell and
Dixon: Dixon left their cell shortly after Bell did, took a seat

-- 23 of 24 --

24 Nos. 14‐3462 & 14‐3470
outside of the cell, and then, as Bell returned from Cell 105
shirtless and with a bundle in his hand, arose and walked back
into their cell (103) ahead of him. A moment later, Dixon
emerged from the cell with a bundle of clothing in his hand,
walked right by Pendelton as he struggled to exit his cell and
as blood was squirting from his neck, proceeded to Cell 113,
and then walked from that cell to the day room trash can,
where he deposited the bundle and covered it over. One could
readily infer that this discarded bundle comprised Bell’s
bloody clothing and the murder weapon (as the search of the
trash can later revealed), and that Dixon was knowingly
disposing of evidence of the fatal attack on Pendelton. One
could also infer that the weapon had been cleaned while Dixon
was in Cell 113. Moreover, during the investigation into the
incident, Dixon made inconsistent and demonstrably false
statements to investigators, from which one might reasonably
infer a consciousness of guilt. See United States v. Webber,
536 F.3d 584, 598 (7th Cir. 2008); United States v. Shorter, 54 F.3d
1248, 1260 (7th Cir. 1995). Considered collectively, all of this
evidence readily and reasonably supports an inference that
Dixon was privy to Bell’s intent to murder Pendelton from the
beginning, and in particular that he gave aid to Bell after the
murder with the intent to hinder the investigation, prosecution,
and punishment of Bell for that offense. The evidence was
more than sufficient to support Dixon’s conviction as an
accessory after the fact.
III.
For all of the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the defen‐
dants’ convictions.

-- 24 of 24 --