No. 15-­--2144 JANKO BRANKO JANKOVIC v. LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General of the United States

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 15-­‐‑2144
JANKO BRANKO JANKOVIC,
Petitioner,
v.
LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General of the United States,
Respondent.
____________________
Petition for Review of a Decision of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
No. A079-­‐‑929-­‐‑194
____________________
ARGUED DECEMBER 9, 2015 — DECIDED FEBRUARY 3, 2016
____________________
Before EASTERBROOK and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges, and
PALLMEYER, District Judge.*
EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. Janko Jankovic, a citizen of
Bosnia and Herzegovina, was admitted to the United States
as a refugee in 2003 but has been ordered removed on the
ground that he obtained that status by fraud. He had re-­‐‑
* Of the Northern District of Illinois, sitting by designation.

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2 No. 15-­‐‑2144
ceived permanent-­‐‑residence status in 2005, but the fraud
(which Jankovic concedes committing) authorized his re-­‐‑
moval. See 8 U.S.C. §1182(a)(6)(C)(i). He sought a waiver on
the ground that his removal would cause extreme hardship
for his wife Dragana, who was admitted with him in 2003
and became a U.S. citizen in 2009. See 8 U.S.C. §1182(i).
An Immigration Judge rejected that request on two
grounds: that Dragana would not suffer extreme hardship;
and that, even if his wife would suffer hardship, his history
of lying to immigration officials (the fraud used to obtain en-­‐‑
try is just part of a pattern) leads to the exercise of discretion
against relief. The IJ also discussed a third issue—whether
Jankovic had committed war crimes during the Bosnian con-­‐‑
flict by assisting in the persecution of ethnic minorities, ren-­‐‑
dering him inadmissible under a proviso to 8 U.S.C.
§1101(a)(42); see also Presidential Proclamation No. 8697
§1(b), 76 Fed. Reg. 49277 (Aug. 4, 2011)—but stated that he
did not need to reach a final conclusion on that subject. The
Board of Immigration Appeals approved this decision.
Jankovic cannot prevail in this court without upsetting
both of the IJ’s grounds, for either of them is adequate to
support removal. Yet his brief ignores the second ground,
and what’s more we lack jurisdiction to review the agency’s
discretionary decisions, which puts both rationales off limits.
8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(i)(2), 1252(a)(2)(B)(i). See, e.g., Jiménez Vi-­‐‑
racacha v. Mukasey, 518 F.3d 511 (7th Cir. 2008); Leguizamo-­‐‑
Medina v. Gonzales, 493 F.3d 772 (7th Cir. 2007).
Nonetheless, Jankovic maintains that we should review
the issue that the IJ did not decide: whether he committed
war crimes. Admissibility usually is a legal issue, and
§1252(a)(2)(D) permits courts to review the agency’s legal

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No. 15-­‐‑2144 3
conclusions. For that kind of review to be permissible, how-­‐‑
ever, the legal conclusion must make a difference, as other-­‐‑
wise the court would be rendering an advisory opinion. Le-­‐‑
gal issues cannot be reviewed when there is only one judg-­‐‑
ment, and a discretionary decision supports that judgment
no matter the answer to the legal contentions. See Powerex
Corp. v. Reliant Energy Services, Inc., 551 U.S. 224, 235–36
(2007). Given the IJ’s two rationales, the admissibility ques-­‐‑
tion does not matter to the outcome. Jankovic’s contention
that something special about immigration law requires a
court to review all legal issues, even when a non-­‐‑reviewable
discretionary judgment controls the outcome, is incompati-­‐‑
ble with INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24 (1976), which held
that a court or agency need not resolve a legal contention
that does not affect the outcome.
Jankovic presents a second line of argument that he says
is within our authority under §1252(a)(2)(D). He contends
that the IJ erred by receiving the expert testimony of Michael
MacQueen even though the agency had not furnished him,
before the hearing, with a written narrative describing
MacQueen’s conclusions. Jankovic appears to contend that
MacQueen’s testimony affected all of the IJ’s rationales,
which if so would avoid any risk of the court’s rendering an
advisory opinion, but as far as we can tell MacQueen’s tes-­‐‑
timony concerned only the agency’s contention that Jankovic
committed war crimes. MacQueen testified as an expert on
the Bosnian War and, in particular, on the activities of the
brigade in which Jankovic was a sergeant. MacQueen’s tes-­‐‑
timony does not concern how Jankovic’s removal would af-­‐‑
fect his wife or whether his habit of lying affects his suitabil-­‐‑
ity for favorable treatment. This means that any error in re-­‐‑

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4 No. 15-­‐‑2144
ceiving MacQueen’s testimony did not matter to the out-­‐‑
come.
Let us assume that this is wrong, however. Still Jankovic
cannot prevail, because he does not identify any statute,
rule, or decision by the BIA that requires a pre-­‐‑hearing writ-­‐‑
ten summary of proposed expert testimony. The Constitu-­‐‑
tion does not compel pretrial discovery even in criminal liti-­‐‑
gation. Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545 (1977). Federal
rules do require summaries of expert testimony in both civil
and criminal litigation, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2); Fed. R.
Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(G), but those rules do not apply to adminis-­‐‑
trative hearings.
Although no rule with legal effect requires pre-­‐‑hearing
disclosures, the Immigration Court Practice Manual §3.3(g)
urges litigants to include written summaries with witness
lists, in order to reduce risk that the IJ will need to grant a
continuance to allow additional preparation. The agency’s
counsel listed MacQueen as a potential witness, with this
description: “Mr. Macqueen is expected to testify regarding
the respondent’s service in the Republika Srpska Special Po-­‐‑
lice Brigade.” Jankovic thinks this inadequate. More than a
year before the hearing, Jankovic’s lawyer asked the IJ to ex-­‐‑
clude MacQueen’s proposed testimony and for permission
to present a rebuttal expert. The IJ denied the former motion
but granted him leave to present a rebuttal expert. Shortly
before the hearing, the agency’s lawyer orally described
MacQueen’s planned testimony, and Jankovic said on the
record that this proffer satisfied his concerns. After
MacQueen testified, Jankovic did not put on a rebuttal wit-­‐‑
ness or request a continuance to allow additional time for
that purpose. That failure, coupled with his concession that

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No. 15-­‐‑2144 5
the oral description sufficed, likely waives his current line of
argument, see Skorusa v. Gonzales, 482 F.3d 939, 942 (7th Cir.
2007), but even if it doesn’t we’ve explained why the argu-­‐‑
ment does not carry the day.
The petition for review is dismissed for want of jurisdic-­‐‑
tion.

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