Chicago, Illinois 60604 Argued January 7, 2016 Decided January 22, 2016 Before FRANK… v. Di Da Import and Export, Inc

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Argued January 7, 2016
Decided January 22, 2016
Before
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge
DANIEL A. MANION, Circuit Judge
DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge
No. 15-­‐‑1480
COACH, INC., and COACH SERVICES, INC.,
Plaintiffs-­‐‑Appellees,
v.
DI DA IMPORT AND EXPORT, INC.,
Defendant-­‐‑Appellant.
Appeal from the United
States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois,
Eastern Division.
No. 13 C 7165
Samuel Der-­‐‑Yeghiayan, Judge.
Order
Coach contends in this suit under the Lanham Act that DI DA infringed its trade-­‐‑
marked double-­‐‑C logo. The district court wrote an opinion concluding that Coach is
likely to prevail and is entitled to interlocutory relief. 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22222 (N.D.
Ill. Feb. 25, 2015). DI DA immediately appealed.
The parties’ briefs disagree about what relief the district court afforded to Coach,
and consequently they disagree about the standard of review and the appropriate legal
analysis. A little searching through the record revealed the reason for this disagreement:
the district court had not awarded any relief. It issued an opinion but not an injunction

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No. 15-­‐‑1480 Page 2
and did not try to comply with Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d)(1). After the panel identified this
shortcoming during the oral argument, Coach returned to the district judge and asked
him to issue a formal order. The judge complied and entered a document captioned
“Temporary Restraining Order.” Just to make sure that we did not take that caption as a
misnomer—issuing a TRO three years into a lawsuit makes little sense—the order states
explicitly that it took effect on February 25, 2015, and expired on March 11, 2015.
The district court’s order presents DI DA with two insuperable problems. First, the
order’s caption and limited duration show that it is a genuine TRO, which canonically
cannot be appealed. Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 86 & n.58 (1974). Second, the order’s
expiration means that DI DA is not now bound by any injunctive order and cannot ap-­‐‑
peal for that reason as well; DI DA is not adversely affected by the belated TRO, which
expired before being issued.
DI DA has asked us to retain jurisdiction in case the district court should issue a pre-­‐‑
liminary injunction, as Coach has asked it to do. But, if the district court issues an ap-­‐‑
pealable order, DI DA may file a new appeal. Any such appeal will be submitted to this
panel under Operating Procedure 6(b), after an abbreviated briefing schedule that per-­‐‑
mits the parties to supplement their current briefs with arguments appropriate to what,
if anything, the district court does in response to Coach’s request. The current appeal,
which concerns the district court’s decision of February 2015 and an expired TRO, is no
longer live.
This appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

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