Chontel M. Miller v. Polaris Laboratories, LLC

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 14‐2621
C HONTEL M. MILLER ,
Plaintiff‐Appellant,
v.
P OLARIS LABORATORIES, LLC,
Defendant‐Appellee.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.
No. 1:11‐cv‐01004‐TWP‐DML — Tanya Walton Pratt, Judge.
____________________
A RGUED A PRIL 1, 2015 — D ECIDED A UGUST 13, 2015
____________________
Before WOOD, Chief Judge, FLAUM, Circuit Judge, and
KENNELLY, District Judge.*
WOOD, Chief Judge. Chontel Miller began work as a sam‐
ple processing technician at Polaris Laboratories in Indian‐
apolis in August 2009. Judging from reports of her daily
productivity, her performance left something to be desired.
* Of the Northern District of Illinois, sitting by designation.

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2 No. 14‐2621
In April 2010, Miller was fired for repeated failures to meet
an average daily quota of 260 samples processed per day. Yet
that is not the whole story. Miller, who is African‐American,
asserts that during her employment at Polaris she suffered
from racial discrimination that had an effect on her work
performance. She sued Polaris, contending that it violated
Title VII as well as 42 U.S.C. § 1981 in several ways. The dis‐
trict court granted summary judgment to Polaris. There is no
doubt that this is a close case. But construing the record in
Miller’s favor, as we must do, we conclude that Miller has
shown a genuine issue of material fact on both her discrimi‐
nation and retaliation claims. We therefore return the case to
the district court for further proceedings.
I
Our account of the facts comes from the evidence Miller
presented at summary judgment, taken in the light most fa‐
vorable to her. Miller started her job as a sample processor at
Polaris on August 17, 2009; she was the only African‐
American in her area. Her task was to review samples of var‐
ious fluids that customers submitted and record information
about them in a computer database. Miller’s direct supervi‐
sor was Rhonda Ballard; Ballard’s supervisor was Debbie
New. Polaris expected Miller to process an average of 260
samples a day, but she had difficulty meeting that number.
In February 2010, Ballard wrote a performance appraisal re‐
port for Miller analyzing her work from her first day
through the end of 2009. Miller’s average of 22 samples
logged per hour, Ballard wrote, was “much lower than we
would like to have her logging,” although Ballard acknowl‐
edged that Miller had “been given several challenging cus‐
tomers and has adequately logged those samples.” Her daily

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No. 14‐2621 3
average of 123, Ballard wrote, was far below the required
number. Ballard concluded the appraisal by giving Miller
the goal of 260 samples per day on average by the end of
March 2010. Miller did not meet this goal.
Not long after Miller began working at Polaris, Miller
learned from her fellow processor Amanda Saperstein that
someone in her department—Saperstein was not sure who—
had referred to Miller as “the colored girl.” (Miller testified
that Saperstein told her that Ballard called her “the colored
girl.”) That day, September 18, 2009, Miller had an argument
with another processor, Sharon Holmes, according to a re‐
port that New filed a few days later. The situation apparent‐
ly escalated. Miller complained in person to New’s supervi‐
sor, Joe Culp, that no one had been helping her finish her
work that day, that Holmes, Ballard, and another processor
named Gina Kemp were racists, and that someone had
called her “the colored girl.” Culp referred Miller’s com‐
plaint to the company’s department of human resources,
which interviewed Miller, Saperstein, Ballard, and other em‐
ployees. The investigation did not resolve who made the
“colored girl” comment. From that point forward Ballard re‐
fused to train and even to talk to Miller. Miller complained
several times to New about Ballard.
While Miller worked at Polaris, at least one employee
aside from Miller heard other workers use racially derogato‐
ry language when referring to Miller. A sample processor
named Bobbie Jo Young testified that Kemp was discussing
Miller’s poor performance at work with Ballard and said, “It
wouldn’t bother me if that stupid nigger bitch did not come
back here.” Young said that when Kemp made this com‐
ment, Ballard “laughed and said, [‘]I’m in that same boat

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4 No. 14‐2621
with you.[’]” Young also witnessed Kemp “mix[ing] up a
tray before she gave it to Chontel,” and Ballard giving
“Chontel trays that were more difficult that [sic] those she
gave to other [sic] white employees.” In particular, Young
discussed an incident that occurred after the September 18
incident between Miller and Ballard. In that instance, Young
testified, Ballard told Young not to take a particular tray be‐
cause Ballard intended it for Miller, telling Young, “[D]on’t
you see what I’m trying to do here?” That tray, Young said,
“was the hardest tray” because it had samples from “28 dif‐
ferent customers”; a tray containing samples from multiple
customers “really slows you down.” (Young also testified
that she understood Ballard to be saying she was trying to
make Miller’s work harder.) In another instance, Young wit‐
nessed Kemp “unshuffling” samples on a tray intended for
Miller and “taking them out of order.” Once Kemp realized
that Miller could see her, Young testified, Kemp went back to
the tray and “fixed” it, announcing that she knew “that bitch
[Miller] is going to go complain.”
Miller testified that she spotted Ballard changing the
composition of the samples Miller was to process in order to
make her job more difficult. On one occasion when she came
back early from lunch, Miller said, she “caught [Ballard]
moving my samples around in my trays.” At other times she
“would end up with … just out‐of‐the‐blue samples that was
[sic] not there” before she went to lunch. On a couple of oth‐
er occasions, Miller caught Kemp and Ballard putting sam‐
ples into Miller’s tray that were missing labels. This too
slowed down Miller’s work, because she had to research the
samples before she could log them into Polaris’s systems.
Otherwise, Miller testified, she was given samples from Po‐
laris accounts that took more time to work on because of the

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No. 14‐2621 5
paperwork involved, or because the trays included samples
from multiple customers. Sometimes, Miller said, she would
resort to choosing easier samples on her own while Ballard
was at lunch in order to try to boost her numbers.
Miller’s employment at Polaris lasted about eight
months; at no time did she meet Polaris’s productivity goals,
although there was some improvement. She completed a
general probationary period in February 2010, but in April
2010, she was again placed on probation for poor perfor‐
mance. The April notice, which listed Ballard as Miller’s
“appraiser,” pegged Miller’s average number of samples
logged at 189. “Chontel must speed up her logging” by the
end of April, Ballard wrote. Miller’s monthly averages for
each full month on the job were 91, 135, 150, 149, 158, 161,
189, and 184; her overall daily average was 147. Miller ex‐
ceeded the required 260 number only once: her second‐to‐
last day on the job, when she logged 288 samples. Two days
later, on April 30, 2010, before Miller’s April probation tech‐
nically had ended, New along with chief operating officer
Mark Minges and human resources director Chad Ziegler
terminated Miller’s employment. They cited her inadequate
production numbers as the reason. In July 2011 Miller filed a
complaint in the Southern District of Indiana, alleging race
discrimination and retaliation for complaining about dis‐
crimination.
The district court initially granted only partial summary
judgment for Polaris. It denied summary judgment to Polaris
on Miller’s discrimination claim because it believed that Mil‐
ler had presented sufficient evidence under a cat’s paw theo‐
ry of a causal connection between the racial bias of Kemp
and Ballard and the decision of Polaris management to fire

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6 No. 14‐2621
Miller. It granted summary judgment for Polaris on Miller’s
retaliation claim, concluding that Miller had no evidence in‐
dicating that she was treated poorly because of her com‐
plaints of discrimination, nor that the stated reason for her
firing—her poor performance—was pretextual. Polaris
moved for reconsideration of the court’s decision on Miller’s
discrimination claim, arguing that Miller had no evidence
showing that manipulation of her work product by Ballard
and Kemp “could systematically reduce” her output over
eight months of employment. The district court was per‐
suaded and ruled in Polaris’s favor on all counts; this appeal
followed.
II
We turn first to Miller’s employment discrimination
claim, which she brings under both 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e‐2 and
2000e‐5 and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1981a.
A discrimination claim under Title VII or Section 1981 re‐
quires a plaintiff proceeding under the direct method of
proof to raise an inference through direct or circumstantial
evidence that discrimination motivated an adverse employ‐
ment action. Langenbach v. Wal‐Mart Stores, Inc., 761 F.3d 792,
802 (7th Cir. 2014); see also Mintz v. Caterpillar Inc., 788 F.3d
673, 679 (7th Cir. 2015) (same standards apply in Title VII
and Section 1981 claims). Miller has not offered any evidence
that the actual decisionmakers at Polaris who decided to
terminate her employment—Culp, New, and Minges—
harbored discriminatory feelings toward her. She relies in‐
stead on the so‐called cat’s paw theory of liability, the name
of which is derived from a fable we have recounted before.
See, e.g., Smith v. Bray, 681 F.3d 888, 897 n.3 (7th Cir. 2012).
Liability for discriminatory action under this theory is prem‐

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No. 14‐2621 7
ised on the ability of the culpable actor to use an innocent
decisionmaker as an “unknowing tool” of the former’s ani‐
mus. Hutchens v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 781 F.3d 366, 373 (7th
Cir. 2015); see also Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411, 422
(2011) (“[I]f a supervisor performs an act motivated by [dis‐
criminatory] animus that is intended by the supervisor to
cause an adverse employment action, and if that act is a
proximate cause of the ultimate employment action, then the
employer is liable.” (citation and footnote omitted)). An em‐
ployer is liable under Title VII or Section 1981 when “a non‐
decision‐making employee with discriminatory animus pro‐
vided factual information or input that may have affected
the adverse employment action.” Matthews v. Waukesha Cty.,
759 F.3d 821, 829 (7th Cir. 2014). In cat’s paw cases, we regard
the biased subordinate’s actions as direct evidence of dis‐
crimination. Nichols v. Mich. City Plant Planning Dep’t,
755 F.3d 594, 600 (7th Cir. 2014).
The present case is one in which the reason for firing the
employee is straightforward at first glance. Miller was sup‐
posed to log an average of 260 samples per day; she consist‐
ently came up short; and so she was fired. End of case, Pola‐
ris says: its decision to fire Miller “was the direct conse‐
quence” of her poor performance. Miller does not fight the
numbers; she says instead that she was set up to fail, for ra‐
cially discriminatory reasons. Ballard and Kemp, she con‐
tends, acting upon their racial animus, intended to cause
(and did cause) Miller’s termination through tampering with
her work, among other tactics. The nominal decisionmakers
at Polaris accepted the numbers unquestioningly, unaware
that Miller’s ability to meet her quota had been sabotaged.

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8 No. 14‐2621
Miller cannot prevail on this theory unless she can show
a dispute of fact on the question whether Ballard and Kemp’s
actions were motivated by racial animus. Construing the
facts in Miller’s favor, we conclude that she has passed that
hurdle. There is evidence in the record from both Miller and
Miller’s coworker Young that Ballard and Kemp displayed
discriminatory feelings toward Miller. Kemp’s “stupid nig‐
ger bitch” comment obviously qualifies, considering Young’s
testimony that it could only have been intended for Miller,
the sole African‐American processor in the workplace and
the person whose performance Miller and Ballard were dis‐
cussing at the time. According to Young, Ballard explicitly
concurred with this statement, laughing and saying that she
was “in the same boat” with Kemp. Polaris’s sole response to
this allegation at oral argument was to contend that Miller
was not aware of this comment at the time. That may be so,
but it has nothing to do with whether Ballard and Kemp ac‐
tually harbored discriminatory animus. There is also the
“colored girl” comment, which Miller attributes to Ballard.
Although Saperstein, the coworker who told Miller about
the comment, testified that she did not know who said it,
Miller herself testified that Saperstein reported Ballard as the
speaker. This evidence is sufficient to show a dispute of fact
as to whether Ballard and Kemp displayed (and thus pos‐
sessed) racial animus toward Miller.
The more difficult question is whether Ballard and Kemp
took actions that proximately caused Miller’s termination.
Miller insists that her inability to hit the 260 mark during her
employment at Polaris was the result of Ballard’s sabotage of
her work as well as Ballard’s refusal to help and train her.
Polaris responds that even if Ballard sabotaged Miller’s work
on certain occasions and failed to train her, that alone cannot

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No. 14‐2621 9
possibly explain the consistently low numbers. In other
words, Polaris argues, Miller cannot possibly show that the
sabotage was “systematic.” But Miller does not have to prove
systematic tampering at this point; she need only produce
evidence that raises an inference that such tampering oc‐
curred to such an extent that it torpedoed her output.
In order to meet that burden, Miller provides evidence
from her coworker Young and from her own sworn state‐
ments that one way in which Ballard and Kemp sabotaged
Miller’s work was by deliberately creating trays for her that
were harder to complete and took more time. There is the
incident in which Young attempted to take a tray that ap‐
peared to have more time‐consuming samples on it, but Bal‐
lard told her it was for Miller, asking Young, “Don’t you see
what I’m trying to do here?” A trier of fact could draw an
inference from this exchange that Ballard, from whom
Young had overheard racist comments, was acting on that
animus to make Miller’s work more difficult. And Young tes‐
tified about another incident in which Kemp tampered with
a tray intended for Miller only to reverse her tampering once
she was aware Miller had seen her. Miller testified about
other occasions in which she would return from lunch or a
break and catch Kemp or Ballard manipulating samples on
her trays.
Polaris argues that “mathematical certainty” underlies its
assertion that Ballard and Kemp could not have meddled
with Miller’s output to the extent that it caused her poor re‐
sults. But that argument is based on the assumption that Bal‐
lard and Kemp manipulated Miller’s work only three
times—times at which they were actually seen by others—
and there is no reason to make that assumption. A trier of

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10 No. 14‐2621
fact might draw that conclusion, but it equally might find
that the observed incidents were part of a larger pattern. At
summary judgment, we must draw the latter inference, es‐
pecially in light of the evidence of Ballard and Kemp’s racial
epithets (which at this stage we must assume they uttered,
although we appreciate the fact that they have denied saying
any such things). Polaris is welcome to argue to a jury that
the sabotage of Miller’s output would have had to be so ex‐
tensive as to be practically impossible; a jury may weigh that
point against Miller’s evidence. But we are not the ones
charged with resolving this matter; it is for the trier of fact.
Polaris otherwise appears to think that the only way for cat’s
paw liability to take effect in this case would be for Miller to
prove that Ballard “hacked” Polaris’s own data system to re‐
duce Miller’s productivity numbers falsely. No one is argu‐
ing that. A jury reasonably could believe based on evidence
in this record that Ballard expressed her animus more subtly,
by manipulating the inputs in a way that dictated Miller’s
low output.
Polaris also contends that Miller is misrepresenting how
work among its sample processors is assigned. Primarily re‐
lying on an affidavit of another of its employees, Terry
Shotts, Polaris contends there is no such thing as “harder”
work among the sample processors. Shotts was the “opener”
in Miller’s department during Miller’s employment there;
she swore in an affidavit that a sample processor’s workday
began with the processor making “a few trays of their own
accounts so they could begin logging.” Then, Shotts said, she
would open boxes of samples and arrange them by custom‐
ers assigned to particular sample processors; after that, all
remaining samples were placed in trays and put on a front
table (Shotts does not say by whom). After this occurred,

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No. 14‐2621 11
“[s]ometimes the Sample Processors just grabbed whatever
tray they desired,” Shotts said, “and other times I would
pass them out.” Each processor had four of the same ac‐
counts, but she would not know what accounts other proces‐
sors “logged on a given day,” nor would she know the “es‐
timated difficulty of samples.” Shotts left this last statement
at that; she did not back it up with any explanation. Her af‐
fidavit thus did not exclude the possibility that Ballard tried
to saddle Miller with trays requiring more paperwork.
Shotts admitted that the difficulty of the paperwork can be
ascertained by removing it from a carton of samples. Shotts
also conceded that Ballard would sometimes assist her in
composing trays of samples.
In all, Shotts’s account (and Saperstein’s, which Polaris al‐
so cites) is just evidence on Polaris’s side of the balance. It
does not foreclose Miller’s and Young’s contentions about
Ballard’s and Kemp’s manipulation of Miller’s work. It is not
as if, for example, Shotts had total control over the samples.
In any event, whether Shotts or Miller is correct is a question
for a factfinder. We also note that Miller asserts that other
actions by Ballard also contributed to her low output, such
as Ballard’s failing to answer Miller’s questions, forcing Mil‐
ler to waste time by leaving her workspace to pose her ques‐
tions to New. A factfinder is entitled to hear Shotts’s state‐
ments on how work is performed at Polaris and compare it
to Miller’s and Young’s accounts of tampering. A trial is also
the time for Miller to present statistics such as those in her
reply brief, which (the trier of fact may conclude) support
the possibility that she was indeed assigned harder work
than some other processors.

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12 No. 14‐2621
It may be difficult to marshal evidence that coworkers
and lower‐level supervisors harbored discriminatory animus
against a plaintiff and thwarted her ability to perform her
work effectively, and it may be even harder to show that this
is what lies behind a decisionmaker’s adverse job action.
Taking the summary judgment record in the light most fa‐
vorable to Miller, however, as we must, we conclude that she
has made it over the line. Although Polaris has some evi‐
dence that Miller’s work could not have been manipulated to
the extent she claims, it is not ironclad. We cannot simply
eyeball the numbers, as Polaris urges, and decide that Miller
could not have made up the difference in her productivity
absent sabotage from Ballard and Kemp. Miller has demon‐
strated a dispute of material fact on her discrimination claim.
III
We briefly address Miller’s retaliation claim, on which
the district court also granted summary judgment in Pola‐
ris’s favor. In pursuing such a claim under Title VII using the
direct method of proof, “plaintiffs must offer evidence of
three elements: (1) they engaged in protected activity, (2)
they suffered adverse employment actions, and (3) there was
a causal connection between the protected activity and the
adverse employment actions.” Castro v. DeVry Univ., Inc.,
786 F.3d 559, 564 (7th Cir. 2015). We may either proceed
through these factors one by one, or else “ask the fundamen‐
tal question directly—could a reasonable trier of fact infer
retaliation?” Id. A cat’s paw theory of liability may apply to a
retaliation claim. See Smith, 681 F.3d at 897–98.
Miller can establish that she engaged in a protected activ‐
ity by complaining to New and then Culp on September 18,
2008, after Ballard (or someone in the department) had

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No. 14‐2621 13
called her “the colored girl.” She also has evidence of racially
charged language from Kemp and Ballard. Her accusation
prompted an investigation of the relevant parties. In the
course of that inquiry, both Kemp and Ballard were inter‐
viewed. Both Miller and Young testified that Ballard’s and
Kemp’s subsequent manipulation of Miller’s work occurred
after the September 18 incident. Admittedly, neither Miller
nor Young placed precise dates on the treatment they allege.
But given the evidence of discriminatory statements by
Kemp and Ballard, the timing and content of the poor treat‐
ment is sufficient to raise the inference that Ballard and
Kemp were responding to Miller’s report to New and Culp.
It is not beyond any dispute of material fact whether the ac‐
tions of these workers kept Miller’s productivity scores arti‐
ficially low. In that sense this case differs from Jajeh v. County
of Cook, 678 F.3d 560 (7th Cir. 2012), in which there was far
more mathematical and factual certainty about whether an
employee would have received a sufficient performance
score absent discriminatory meddling. Finally, it is undis‐
puted that Miller suffered an adverse action—the loss of her
job—because of her low numbers.
Given this evidence, Miller has adequately advanced a
dispute of material fact on whether Kemp and Ballard retali‐
ated against her for the September 18 incident. This claim,
too, should be resolved by a finder of fact.
IV
We R EVERSE the judgment of the district court and
R EMAND this case for proceedings consistent with this opin‐
ion.

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