Miykael Muhammad v. John Brooks Moore

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted May 11, 2015 *
Decided May 11, 2015
Before
JOEL M. FLAUM, Circuit Judge
MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge
ANN CLAIRE WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge
No. 14‐3291
MIYKAEL MUHAMMAD,
Plaintiff‐Appellant,
v.
JOHN BROOKS MOORE, et al.,
Defendants‐Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Central District of Illinois.
No. 14‐2081
Harold A. Baker,
Judge.
O R D E R
This case began as three separate federal suits filed by Miykael Muhammad
against a total of 20 defendants—including, among others, the University of Illinois, the
University’s police department, and officials of both entities. Muhammad asserted in his
complaints that the defendants, acting in conspiracy, violated the federal constitution,
* The defendants were not served with process in the district court and are not
participating in this appeal. After examining the appellant’s brief and the record, we
have concluded that the case is appropriate for summary disposition. See FED. R. A PP. P.
34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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No. 14‐3291 Page 2
contravened federal and state statutes, and committed state torts against him. The
district judge consolidated the three suits, and Muhammad submitted a single amended
complaint against all of the defendants. The judge dismissed the complaint at screening,
see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), concluding that for several reasons Muhammad’s claims were
legally barred. Ignoring the district court’s reasons, on appeal Muhammad raises
arguments about recusal, venue, and the Seventh Amendment. Because those arguments
are meritless, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
Shortly after filing his suits in early 2014, Muhammad moved for the district
judge to recuse himself and to change the suit’s venue. Citing 28 U.S.C. § 455, he
contended that the judge’s “impartiality [was] in question” because the judge had
received two degrees from the University of Illinois and had previously taught at the
University as an adjunct professor. Muhammad did not explain why he wanted venue
changed. The judge denied Muhammad’s motion. In declining to recuse himself, the
judge explained that 60 years had passed since he had received his degrees and that he
“has no existing ties or obligations to the faculty or administration of the University.”
The judge did not analyze Muhammad’s unexplained request to change venue.
After the consolidation of his suits, Muhammad amended his complaint,
attaching records that he had recently obtained, consisting mostly of incident reports
from the University’s police department. Several reports describe events from 2004. Back
then, according to one report, the head of the Student Organization Office had
complained to University police that Muhammad (a former student at the University’s
Urbana–Champaign campus) was pressuring student organizations to host events that
he could run for his own profit in violation of University policy. After receiving this
complaint, the police department suspected that Muhammad was trying to defraud the
University. Together with the Champaign County State’s Attorney, law enforcement
began investigating him. According to other incident reports from this period, the State’s
Attorney subpoenaed Muhammad’s student records and learned that he had written a
bad check for $1,690 to the University in 2001 to clear the debt of a student group that he
wanted to front an event for him. After learning of the bad check, the State’s Attorney
subpoenaed Muhammad’s bank records and discovered that he had written the check
on a bank account that was closed. Muhammad was charged with committing a
deceptive practice by writing a bad check with the intent to defraud the University,
see 720 ILCS 5/17‐1(B)(d) (2000), but the charge was dropped later in 2004.

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No. 14‐3291 Page 3
The remaining police reports describe events from 2008 and 2010. A member of
the University community complained to the police department in 2008 that
Muhammad “was harassing her.” And a 2010 report says that—because of
Muhammad’s history of causing disturbances on campus and the concerns of University
staff that he would disrupt student events—the University issued a trespass notice to
Muhammad. See 720 ILCS 5/21‐3(a)(2) (2010). (A copy of the notice was also included as
an exhibit to Muhammad’s amended complaint.)
In his amended complaint, Muhammad charged that these and related actions by
University personnel violated 42 U.S.C § 1983 and other laws. Specifically, he contended
that, by investigating him back in 2004, University employees “broke into his bank
account,” violated his constitutional rights through a subpoena of his bank records, and
unlawfully placed a hold on his student account in 2006. He further asserted that the
persons at the University who reported him to the police defamed him and that in 2011
he was unjustly prevented from entering University property. Muhammad additionally
claimed that the University’s handling of his student records violated the Freedom of
Information Act, see 5 U.S.C. § 552, the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act,
20 U.S.C. § 1232g, and the Illinois School Student Records Act, 105 ILCS 10/1 et seq.
Finally, Muhammad asserted that the statute of limitations was tolled on all of his claims
because, he said, University officials had fraudulently concealed information from him.
The district judge dismissed Muhammad’s suit. With respect to the § 1983 claims,
the judge concluded that the claims failed for several reasons. To begin with, the
University and its police department were not “persons” suable under the statute. Also,
any claims against supervisory officials could not proceed because nothing in the
complaint suggested that those officials directed any of the purportedly wrongful
actions. And claims against the non‐supervisory defendants were barred by the two‐year
statute of limitations that governs § 1983 suits arising in Illinois. The judge rejected
Muhammad’s attempt to invoke tolling because he did not allege that he had exercised
due diligence to learn of his claims, nor did he allege with particularity how the
University had committed fraud, see FED. R. C IV. P. 9(b). Finally, the judge rejected
Muhammad’s attempt to assert other statutory and common law claims. The judge
explained that the claim under the Freedom of Information Act failed because the act
applies only to federal, not state, agencies. See Union Leader Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland
Sec., 749 F.3d 45, 56 n.8 (1st Cir. 2014). The judge dismissed the claim under the Family
Educational Rights and Privacy Act on the ground that the statute does not confer a

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private right of action. See Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 290 (2002). And the judge
relinquished jurisdiction over the remaining supplemental state‐law claims.
On appeal, Muhammad does not attempt to refute the district judge’s reasons for
dismissing his suit. Instead, his three principal arguments appear to be that the district
judge improperly refused to recuse himself, erred by never explicitly ruling on his
motion to change venue, and violated the Seventh Amendment by dismissing his suit.
We reject all of these arguments.
We start with the motion for recusal. Muhammad cited 28 U.S.C. § 455 in his
recusal motion but did not state whether he was relying on subsection (a) or (b) of that
statute. To the extent that his motion was invoking subsection (a)—which requires
recusal when a judge’s “impartiality might reasonably be questioned,” id. § 455(a)—he is
precluded from challenging the district judge’s ruling because the denial of a motion
under § 455(a) can be challenged only by immediately petitioning for a writ of
mandamus, which Muhammad did not do. See United States v. Johnson, 680 F.3d 966,
979 – 80 (7th Cir. 2012); United States v. Diekemper, 604 F.3d 345, 351 (7th Cir. 2010).
Muhammad may have been relying on § 455(b)(1), which provides that a judge must
recuse himself from a proceeding “[w]here he has a personal bias or prejudice
concerning a party.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1). But to disqualify a judge under this provision,
the party must prove bias “by compelling evidence” and “[t]he bias or prejudice must be
grounded in some personal animus or malice that the judge harbors . . . of a kind that a
fair‐minded person could not entirely set aside when judging certain persons or causes.”
Grove Fresh Distribs., Inc. v. John Labatt, Ltd., 299 F.3d 635, 640 (7th Cir. 2002) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Muhammad’s asserted bases for recusal—that the judge got
two degrees from the University 60 years ago and formerly taught there as adjunct
faculty—fall far short of meeting this standard.
We also reject Muhammad’s contention that the district judge erred by denying
without analysis Muhammad’s motion to change venue. The motion was frivolous: As
the plaintiff, Muhammad had chosen the venue by filing suit in the Central District of
Illinois, and his motion provided no reason warranting a change of venue. See In re IKO
Roofing Shingle Prods. Liab. Litig., 757 F.3d 599, 601 (7th Cir. 2014) (noting that venue rules
“give[] plaintiffs a right to proceed in their chosen forum”). Anyway, if Muhammad
wanted to change venue, he could have simply moved to dismiss his suit voluntarily and
paid the fee to refile in another, appropriate venue. See FED. R. C IV. P. 41(a); Netwig v.
Georgia‐Pacific Corp., 375 F.3d 1009 (10th Cir. 2004).

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Muhammad next contends that, by dismissing his suit, the district judge violated
his right to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment. But a proper dismissal of a suit
because it is legally insufficient or barred does not violate the Seventh Amendment.
See Smart v. Local 702 Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 562 F.3d 798, 811 n.15 (7th Cir. 2009); Haase
v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 748 F.3d 624, 631 n.5 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 754
(2014). And as we have already observed, Muhammad does not challenge the validity of
the district judge’s legal grounds for dismissing the suit.
Muhammad’s remaining arguments object to statements in the district judge’s
order of dismissal, but the arguments go nowhere. He maintains that the judge should
not have referred to him by the name Michael Gardner (a name that is in the University
records that he submitted but one he says he no longer uses) and that the judge should
not have referred to him as an “African‐American” (Muhammad states that he is an
“Indigenous American Man of the Cherokee‐Choctaw and Tamazight, Moroccan
descent”). He also objects to the judge’s comment that he had written a bad check in the
amount of $1,690 (Muhammad says that he does not recall writing the check). These
objections all concern statements that preceded the district court’s judgment but do not
implicate the validity of the judgment, which is the only subject of our review. See Rhodes
v. Dittman, 2015 WL 1637623, at *6 (7th Cir. April 14, 2015). We have considered
Muhammad’s other arguments and conclude that they lack merit.
AFFIRMED.

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