Chicago, Illinois 60604 Argued September 10, 2014 Decided September 24, 2014 Before… v. CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of Social Security

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Argued September 10, 2014
Decided September 24, 2014
Before
DIANE P. WOOD, Chief Judge
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge
JOHN DANIEL TINDER, Circuit Judge
No. 13-­‐‑3627
LUCIAN R. DEAN,
Plaintiff-­‐‑Appellant,
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner
of Social Security,
Defendant-­‐‑Appellee.
Appeal from the United
States District Court for the
Southern District of Indiana,
Indianapolis Division.
No. 1:12-­‐‑cv-­‐‑00509-­‐‑TWP-­‐‑MJD
Tanya Walton Pratt, Judge.
Order
Lucian Dean’s application for Social Security disability benefits was denied, and a
district judge concluded that the agency’s decision is supported by substantial evidence
and free from procedural error. The district court’s thorough opinion covers the im-­‐‑
portant issues, and we add only a few words about the main appellate argument.
Dean contends that the ALJ violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amend-­‐‑
ment by doing research on the Internet about the sort of jobs he had held, and in partic-­‐‑
ular about his experiences in rappelling and as a guide of rafting tours. To the extent
that the ALJ wanted to find out what rappelling is, and similar matters of “legislative

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No. 13-­‐‑3627 Page 2
fact,” there is no greater problem in doing research on the Internet than in more tradi-­‐‑
tional ways, such as reading books or magazines. Judges do not violate the Constitution
by consulting their own funds of knowledge about the world, or by augmenting that
knowledge. This court does so regularly. No judge is required to approach a case in
complete ignorance. An open mind is required; an empty mind is not. See Liteky v. Unit-­‐‑
ed States, 510 U.S. 540 (1994).
Nor do judges (under either Article I or Article III) violate the Constitution by learn-­‐‑
ing “adjudicative facts” about the litigants in pending cases—though judges must put
in the record what they believe they have learned and permit the litigants to reply. The
ALJ did just that. Dean says that his mental condition prevents him from dealing ade-­‐‑
quately with surprises, such as the statements the ALJ made about what she had found.
But Dean was represented by counsel, who neither objected nor asked for a continuance
to allow the presentation of additional evidence. Dean’s current lawyer does not con-­‐‑
tend that the lawyer who represented him at the hearing was unable to cope with sur-­‐‑
prises; no one with such a limitation should represent a client at a trial or a hearing.
The Social Security Administration discourages but does not prohibit ALJs from
making factual inquiries before or after a hearing. See Social Security Administration,
Hearings, Appeals and Litigation Law Manual (HALLEX) I-­‐‑2-­‐‑5-­‐‑1 (“If the claimant does not
provide medical or other evidence … the ALJ will generally make a decision based on
the evidence in the record, including evidence the ALJ has obtained directly.”). Dean
does not contend that any regulation, or even a statement in the HALLEX manual, un-­‐‑
conditionally forbids gathering information on the Internet, so we need not decide
whether the manual, which is designated as a guide rather than a regulation, establishes
rights enforceable by claimants. Dean cites HALLEX I-­‐‑2-­‐‑5-­‐‑69, which was amended after
his hearing to limit ALJs’ use of the Internet, but does not contend that it is retroactive.
That’s another reason why we need not decide whether it creates rights that litigants
can enforce in court.
In this case, as in most other administrative proceedings, statutes and regulations of-­‐‑
fer the claimant a better chance of success than does a generic appeal to due process.
See, e.g., Portillo-­‐‑Rendon v. Holder, 662 F.3d 815 (7th Cir. 2011). The statutory question
here is whether the record, including the additions made by the ALJ, supplies substan-­‐‑
tial evidence for the decision. The district court’s evaluation shows that the answer is
yes. The regulation most helpful to Dean is 20 C.F.R. §404.940, which requires ALJs to
recuse themselves when prejudiced. As Liteky shows, however, knowing facts about a
litigant differs from prejudice.
AFFIRMED

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