United States of America v. Darrin Maranda

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 13‐3917
U NITED STATES OF A MERICA ,
Plaintiff‐Appellee,
v.
D ARRIN MARANDA ,
Defendant‐Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of Illinois.
No. 4:99‐CR‐40087 — Sara Darrow, Judge.
____________________
A RGUED MAY 28, 2014 — D ECIDED J ULY 31, 2014
____________________
Before FLAUM, MANION, and T INDER , Circuit Judges.
FLAUM, Circuit Judge. This appeal requires us to decide
when the clock starts on a criminal defendant’s term of su‐
pervised release. Ordinarily, the answer is straightforward—
supervised release begins once the defendant leaves prison
and reenters society. Darrin Maranda’s case, however, pre‐
sents an unusual situation: a defendant who has completed
his prison sentence, but who remains in federal custody
while he awaits a determination of whether he will be civilly

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2 No. 13‐3917
committed pursuant to the Adam Walsh Child Protection
and Safety Act. The government argues that because the Ad‐
am Walsh Act stayed Maranda’s release pending the out‐
come of his civil‐commitment hearing, his term of super‐
vised release did not begin until these proceedings were re‐
solved in his favor and the stay was lifted. Maranda argues
that his term of supervised release began on the date his
criminal sentence expired, even though he remained in pris‐
on at that time. If Maranda is right, then his term of super‐
vised release was over long before his civil‐commitment
proceedings ended—and long before he committed the vio‐
lations of his conditions of release that he’s now accused of.
The district court held that Maranda’s term of supervised
release did not begin until he was actually freed from custo‐
dy. We agree. Read together, the relevant supervised‐release
provision, 18 U.S.C. § 3624(e), and the stay‐of‐release provi‐
sion in the civil‐commitment statute, 18 U.S.C. § 4248(a), es‐
tablish that Maranda was not “released from imprisonment”
while awaiting the outcome of his Adam Walsh Act proceed‐
ings. We therefore join two of the three circuits to have ad‐
dressed this question, see United States v. Neuhauser, 745 F.3d
125 (4th Cir. 2014), petition for cert. filed (U.S. July 22, 2014)
(No. 14‐5372); United States v. Mosby, 719 F.3d 925 (8th Cir.
2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 905 (2014), and affirm the district
court’s revocation of Maranda’s supervised release.
I. Background
Darrin Maranda committed his first sex offense in 1994,
and he has been in and out of prison ever since. In February
1994, Maranda exposed himself to a six‐year‐old girl. Four
days later, he exposed himself to a female cashier at a drive‐
through window and attempted to pull her into his car. He

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No. 13‐3917 3
pleaded guilty to state charges of public indecency and was
sentenced to home confinement and conditional discharge.
Six months later, Maranda molested a six‐year‐old boy. He
pleaded guilty to a state charge of criminal sexual assault
and was sentenced to eight years in prison. He was released
on parole in May 1998, taken back into custody a few
months later due to his failure to gain employment, and then
released again in October of that year.
While on parole, Maranda downloaded and stored child
pornography on his computer. He was arrested by federal
authorities, and in April 2000, he pleaded guilty to one count
of receipt and one count of possession of child pornography
before the United States District Court for the Central Dis‐
trict of Illinois, in the case that is now before us. The district
court sentenced him to a total of 40 months’ imprisonment
and five years of supervised release.
In December 2002, Maranda was released from federal
prison and began serving his first term of supervision. How‐
ever, in January 2005, he was arrested on a state charge of
aggravated criminal sexual abuse based on the allegation
that he molested the nine‐year‐old daughter of his then‐
girlfriend. In June 2005, he pleaded guilty to aggravated
domestic battery instead. Maranda’s probation officer peti‐
tioned the district court to revoke his supervised release
based on this state conviction as well as other violations of
the conditions of his release; the district court did so in Au‐
gust 2005. The court then sentenced Maranda to another 30
months in prison and two years of supervised release.
Maranda began serving his sentence at the Federal Cor‐
rectional Institution in Butner, North Carolina (“FCI But‐
ner”). This sentence was set to expire on March 16, 2008. But

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4 No. 13‐3917
on March 10, the government filed a certificate in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of North Caroli‐
na stating that Maranda was a “sexually dangerous person”
under the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of
2006, 18 U.S.C. § 4248, a federal civil‐commitment statute
that “authorizes the Department of Justice to detain a men‐
tally ill, sexually dangerous federal prisoner beyond the date
the prisoner would otherwise be released.” United States v.
Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 129 (2010). As a result, Maranda’s re‐
lease from prison was automatically stayed pending the out‐
come of his civil‐commitment hearing. 18 U.S.C. § 4248(a)
(“A certificate filed under this subsection shall stay the re‐
lease of the person pending completion of procedures con‐
tained in this section.”); see also Comstock, 560 U.S. at 130
(“When [a certificate] is filed, the statute automatically stays
the individual’s release from prison … thereby giving the
Government an opportunity to prove its claims at a hearing
through psychiatric (or other) evidence … .”).
The district court did not hold Maranda’s civil‐
commitment hearing until more than four years later. 1 For
the court to order Maranda’s commitment under the Act, it
had to find by clear and convincing evidence that he (1) had
previously “engaged or attempted to engage in sexually vio‐
lent conduct or child molestation,” (2) “suffer[ed] from a se‐
rious mental illness, abnormality, or disorder,” and (3) “as a
result of” that mental illness, abnormality, or disorder,
1 The delay was partially caused by the Eastern District of North Caroli‐
na’s decision to hold the proceedings in abeyance until the Supreme
Court ruled on a challenge to the Adam Walsh Act as exceeding Con‐
gress’s powers under Article I, § 8 of the Constitution. The Comstock de‐
cision, upholding the Act, was announced in May 2010.

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No. 13‐3917 5
“would have serious difficulty in refraining from sexually
violent conduct or child molestation if released.” 18 U.S.C.
§§ 4247(a)(5)–(6), 4248(d); Comstock, 560 U.S. at 130. During
questioning at the hearing, Maranda affirmed that if he were
released, he would “be subject to very intense supervised
release conditions … for a period of two years.” When asked
whether he intended to comply with those conditions, Ma‐
randa responded, “Fully and to completeness.” To empha‐
size the point, his attorney recited eleven of the conditions
out loud and asked Maranda whether he would comply
with each one. Maranda answered affirmatively to each.
The district court ultimately ruled that Maranda was not
a sexually dangerous person subject to commitment under
the Act. The court found that Maranda met the first two re‐
quirements: (1) he had been convicted in 1994 for criminal
sexual assault, and (2) he had been diagnosed with pedo‐
philia and antisocial personality disorder. However, the
court concluded that the government failed to prove that
Maranda would have serious difficulty refraining from sex‐
ually violent conduct or child molestation if released. The
court’s written opinion showed that in reaching this deter‐
mination, the court considered Maranda’s affirmation that he
would be subject to conditions of supervised release for two
years—including conditions tailored to Maranda’s back‐
ground as a sex offender—and Maranda’s apparent willing‐
ness to comply with those conditions. The court also stated
that “[w]ere Maranda to be released unconditionally, the
court might be persuaded that Maranda poses a significant
likelihood of reoffending.” Order at 12, United States v. Ma‐
randa, No. 5:08‐HC‐2033‐H (E.D.N.C. Sept. 6, 2012), ECF No.
58.

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6 No. 13‐3917
On September 6, 2012, the district court entered judg‐
ment in favor of Maranda, lifted the stay of release, and or‐
dered Maranda to report to the Central District of Illinois to
begin serving his term of supervised release. Pursuant to the
government’s request, the court once again stayed Maranda’s
release until the denial of the government’s motion to amend
the judgment. The district court denied that motion, and
Maranda was released from FCI Butner on December 21,
2012.
Maranda returned to Illinois and reported for supervi‐
sion. Three days later, he began receiving phone calls from
another convicted sex offender who he had met at FCI But‐
ner. Over the next couple of months, Maranda had 20 con‐
versations with this inmate, some of which revealed that
Maranda had been in contact with another convicted sex of‐
fender, as well. These communications were in violation of
the condition of Maranda’s release that he not associate with
any person convicted of a felony without his probation of‐
ficer’s permission. Accordingly, in October 2013, Maranda’s
probation officer petitioned the district court in the Central
District of Illinois to revoke his supervised release for a sec‐
ond time.
Maranda filed a motion to dismiss the petition for lack of
jurisdiction. He argued that his term of supervised release
began on the day his 30‐month sentence of imprisonment
ended—that is, March 16, 2008—even though he remained
in prison during the pendency of his civil‐commitment pro‐
ceedings. That being the case, Maranda argued, his two‐year
term of supervised release expired on March 16, 2010, and
he was no longer subject to the probation office’s supervision
when he participated in the phone calls. The government

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No. 13‐3917 7
disputed Maranda’s theory, maintaining that his term of su‐
pervised release began on the day that he was actually re‐
leased from custody. The government also argued that Ma‐
randa should be barred from asserting this theory because
he avoided civil commitment only by taking a contrary posi‐
tion before the North Carolina district court. By now claim‐
ing that his term of supervised release had ended long be‐
fore his civil‐commitment hearing even took place, the gov‐
ernment argued, Maranda was “seeking to whipsaw the two
District Courts.”
The district court evaluated the relevant federal statutes
and agreed with the government that the supervised‐release
clock did not start until Maranda was actually freed from
prison at the conclusion of his civil‐commitment proceed‐
ings. (The court did not discuss the government’s equitable
argument.) The court then revoked Maranda’s supervised
release and sentenced him to credit‐for‐time‐served on the
possession count—Maranda had been in custody again dur‐
ing the revocation proceedings—and 26 additional months
of supervised release on both the receipt and possession
counts. Maranda appeals.
II. Discussion
Maranda argues that the district court lacked jurisdiction
to revoke his supervised release because his term of release
had already run. We review this legal question de novo. See
United States v. Russell, 340 F.3d 450, 452 (7th Cir. 2003).
A. Judicial estoppel
The government argues that we need not reach the merits
because judicial estoppel bars Maranda from claiming that
his term of supervised release expired on March 16, 2010.

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8 No. 13‐3917
See, e.g., Davis v. Wakelee, 156 U.S. 680, 689 (1895) (“[W]here a
party assumes a certain position in a legal proceeding, and
succeeds in maintaining that position, he may not thereafter,
simply because his interests have changed, assume a contra‐
ry position, especially if it be to the prejudice of the party
who has acquiesced in the position formerly taken by him.”).
In his civil‐commitment hearing, Maranda repeatedly af‐
firmed to the district court for the Eastern District of North
Carolina that he would be subject to a two‐year term of su‐
pervised release upon his leaving custody. And that court
apparently credited Maranda’s representations and relied on
them to find that the government had not established a case
for Maranda’s commitment. But before the district court for
the Central District of Illinois, of course, Maranda argued
that his period of supervised release was over long before
his Adam Walsh Act proceedings ended. Understandably,
the government accuses Maranda of “playing ‘fast and loose’
with the courts” by attempting to “prevail[] twice on oppos‐
ing theories.” In re Airadigm Commc’ns, Inc., 616 F.3d 642, 661
(7th Cir. 2010).
However, we cannot decide the case on grounds of judi‐
cial estoppel. Maranda’s about‐face aside, his current argu‐
ment goes to the district court’s subject‐matter jurisdiction. If
Maranda is right that his term of supervised release expired
before he received the unauthorized phone calls, the district
court would have no authority to revoke his release and im‐
pose a new sentence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(i) (a sentencing
court only has the power to revoke a term of supervised re‐
lease that has expired if a warrant or summons has been is‐
sued on the basis of an allegation of a violation before the
term’s expiration).

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No. 13‐3917 9
We cannot rely on judicial estoppel to give the district
court jurisdiction that it may not otherwise have had.
E.g., Ins. Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de
Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982) (because “no action of the
parties can confer subject‐matter jurisdiction upon a federal
court … principles of estoppel do not apply”); Erie Ins. Exch.
v. Erie Indem. Co., 722 F.3d 154, 162–63 (3d Cir. 2013) (federal
courts cannot apply judicial estoppel “in a way that would
impermissibly expand federal judicial power in violation of
Article III”). Indeed, in the Eighth Circuit case presenting the
same question as our own, the government agreed that the
defendant could raise the argument that his term of super‐
vised release began when his prison sentence expired—
notwithstanding the defendant’s earlier stipulation that his
supervised release would begin only upon his freedom from
custody—“since [the defendant’s claim] involves the district
court’s jurisdiction to supervise him under 18 U.S.C. § 3583.”
Mosby, 719 F.3d at 928 n.3. 2 Thus, we will not decide the ap‐
peal on this basis.
2 The government seems to make that same concession here, acknowl‐
edging—in a footnote—that judicial estoppel cannot cure a jurisdictional
deficiency. See Appellee’s Br. 16 n.3. Yet in the very next sentence, the
government maintains that estoppel should nonetheless “preclude [Ma‐
randa] from arguing he was released from confinement when his crimi‐
nal sentence expired.” Id. We do not understand the government’s dis‐
tinction. Even if we forbade Maranda from advancing that argument
before us, we would still have to consider its merit. See, e.g., Gonzalez v.
Thaler, 132 S. Ct. 641, 648 (2012) (“When a requirement goes to subject‐
matter jurisdiction, courts are obligated to consider sua sponte issues that
the parties have disclaimed or have not presented.”).

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10 No. 13‐3917
B. The merits
We therefore continue to the merits of Maranda’s argu‐
ment that his term of supervised release began on the day
his prison sentence expired, rather than on the day he was
physically released from custody.
There are two federal statutes relevant to this issue. The
first is 18 U.S.C. § 3624, titled “Release of a prisoner.” Sub‐
section (a), “Date of Release,” instructs (in relevant part):
A prisoner shall be released by the Bureau of
Prisons on the date of the expiration of the prison‐
er’s term of imprisonment, less any time credited
toward the service of the prisoner’s sentence as
provided in subsection (b).
Id. § 3624(a) (emphasis added). The other important subsec‐
tion for our purposes is (e), “Supervision after release.” It
holds (again in relevant part):
A prisoner whose sentence includes a term of
supervised release after imprisonment shall be
released by the Bureau of Prisons to the super‐
vision of a probation officer who shall, during
the term imposed, supervise the person re‐
leased to the degree warranted by the condi‐
tions specified by the sentencing court. The
term of supervised release commences on the day the
person is released from imprisonment and runs
concurrently with any Federal, State, or local
term of probation or supervised release or pa‐
role for another offense to which the person is
subject or becomes subject during the term of
supervised release. A term of supervised release

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No. 13‐3917 11
does not run during any period in which the person
is imprisoned in connection with a conviction for a
Federal, State, or local crime unless the impris‐
onment is for a period of less than 30 consecu‐
tive days.
Id. § 3624(e) (emphasis added). We will often refer to the first
italicized portion as § 3624(e)’s “commencement provi‐
sion”—the phrase that explains when a term of supervised
release begins—and the second italicized portion as the
“tolling provision”—the phrase that explains what will
pause and postpone an ongoing term.
The other relevant statute is 18 U.S.C. § 4248, “Civil
commitment of a sexually dangerous person,” which codi‐
fies the Adam Walsh Act. The important subsection is (a),
“Institution of proceedings.” It holds:
In relation to a person who is in the custody of
the Bureau of Prisons … the Attorney General
or any individual authorized by the Attorney
General or the Director of the Bureau of Pris‐
ons may certify that the person is a sexually
dangerous person, and transmit the certificate
to the clerk of the court for the district in which
the person is confined. … The court shall order
a hearing to determine whether the person is a
sexually dangerous person. A certificate filed
under this subsection shall stay the release of the
person pending completion of procedures contained
in this section.
18 U.S.C. § 4248(a) (emphasis added).

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12 No. 13‐3917
Maranda’s statutory argument can be paraphrased as fol‐
lows: § 3624(a) instructs that Maranda should have been “re‐
leased” from prison on the date of the expiration of his term
of imprisonment. As a result, he was “released from impris‐
onment” on that date within the meaning of § 3624(e), which
triggered the commencement of his term of supervised re‐
lease.
But Maranda’s reading ignores the Adam Walsh Act’s
stay‐of‐release provision in § 4248(a). That provision says
that the government’s certifying Maranda as a sexually dan‐
gerous person “stay[ed]” his “release”—which, in operation,
meant that Maranda remained in federal prison. When
§ 4248(a) is taken into account, Maranda’s position amounts
to an understanding that he was “released from imprison‐
ment” during the time he remained at FCI Butner, even
though the government’s certificate “stay[ed]” his “release”
under § 4248(a). This interpretation would require us to read
the word “release” in a figurative sense when it is used as a
verb in § 3624(e)—to refer to an abstract concept, not a phys‐
ical reality—but read the term literally when it is used as a
noun in § 4248(a)—to refer to Maranda’s physical freedom
from confinement. This is a strained understanding, and
there is no indication that Congress intended it.
It makes far more sense to read the phrase “released from
imprisonment” in § 3624(e)’s commencement provision to
refer to the defendant’s physical release from confinement.
And in fact, the Supreme Court has already interpreted
§ 3624(e) this way. See United States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53
(2000). After being convicted of multiple felonies, Johnson
was sentenced to 111 months in prison plus three years of
supervised release; two of his convictions were later vacated,

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No. 13‐3917 13
and his prison sentence was reduced to 51 months. By that
time, he had already served more than 80 months. Johnson
argued that the time he spent unlawfully imprisoned should
count toward his term of supervised release. He theorized
that under § 3624(e), his term of supervised release began,
by operation of law, on the date his lawful sentence ended,
not on the date he was physically released from custody.
The Supreme Court disagreed. Invoking the “ordinary,
commonsense meaning” of the word “release,” the Court
construed § 3624(e)’s phrase “released from imprisonment”
to mean “freed from confinement.” Id. at 57. And the Johnson
Court was clear that that means the day the prisoner is actu‐
ally freed from confinement: “The phrase ‘on the day the
person is released’ … suggests a strict temporal interpreta‐
tion, not some fictitious or constructive earlier time.” Id. “To
say respondent was released while still imprisoned,” the
Court reasoned, “diminishes the concept the word intends to
convey.” Id. Thus, the Court concluded, “[t]he statute’s direc‐
tion is clear and precise. Release takes place on the day the
prisoner in fact is freed from confinement.” Id. at 58; see also
id. at 57 (“Supervised release does not run while an individ‐
ual remains in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons.”).
Given the different factual contexts, Johnson does not
squarely control here. That said, we see no reason to inter‐
pret § 3624(e)’s commencement provision to mean anything
other than how the Supreme Court defined it in Johnson: the
defendant’s actual release from custody, regardless of
whether that custody was pursuant to a lawful sentence of
imprisonment.
Resisting Johnson’s application, Maranda argues that one
can only be subject to “imprisonment” if he is being detained

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14 No. 13‐3917
as punishment for a criminal conviction (even one that is lat‐
er found invalid, as in Johnson). And he points out, rightly,
that his detention pending the outcome of his Adam Walsh
Act hearing was not meant to be punitive. Cf. Kansas v. Hen‐
dricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361–65 (1997) (evaluating a state civil‐
commitment statute and finding it non‐punitive because the
statute did not seek retribution, only incapacitation). Thus,
in Maranda’s view, because “imprisonment” necessarily
means detention as a result of a criminal sentence—and be‐
cause he was detained from 2008 to 2012 in connection with
a civil proceeding—Maranda must have been “released from
imprisonment” when his prison sentence ended in 2008.
We do not find this syllogism convincing. First, we are
unwilling to accept Maranda’s premise that the word “im‐
prisonment” necessarily implies a connection to criminal
punishment. “On the contrary, to imprison someone is simp‐
ly to ‘put [a person] in prison.’” Neuhauser, 745 F.3d at 128
(citing Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary 572 (1979)); see also
id. (pointing to “numerous dictionaries” that “confirm that
the term ‘imprisonment’ ‘focuses on the … nature of con‐
finement, not the reasons for its imposition’” (quoting Tobey
v. United States, 794 F. Supp. 2d 594, 598 (D. Md. 2011)));
United States v. Goins, 516 F.3d 416, 422 (6th Cir. 2008) (con‐
cluding that “the plain meaning of ‘imprison’ … includes not
only confinements as a result of a conviction, but any time
the state detains an individual”); Garner’s Dictionary of Legal
Usage 490 (3d ed. 2011) (explaining that the verbs “jail,”
“imprison,” “incarcerate,” “immure,” “lock up,” and “in‐
tern” all “share the sense ‘to sequester and confine in a se‐
cure place so as to prevent escape’”). And indeed, Congress
has used the term elsewhere in the federal criminal code to
refer to detentions that are not pursuant to a criminal sen‐

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No. 13‐3917 15
tence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3041 (“For any offense against the
United States, the offender may … be arrested and impris‐
oned or released [on personal recognizance or bond] for tri‐
al … .”).
But even granting that the word “imprisonment” often
connotes a connection to a conviction, Maranda’s argument
fails in the specific instance of § 3624(e)’s commencement
provision. This is because the very next sentence of
§ 3624(e)—the tolling provision—uses the phrase “impris‐
onment in connection with a conviction.” Why would Congress
specify this link to a conviction if “imprisonment” necessari‐
ly implied it? See Neuhauser, 745 F.3d at 128–29 (making this
same point). Maranda’s understanding therefore runs head‐
long into the “cardinal principle of statutory construction”
that “a statute ought, upon the whole, to be so construed
that, if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall
be superfluous, void, or insignificant.” TRW Inc. v. Andrews,
534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001) (quoting Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167,
174 (2001)).
There is another reason favoring our interpretation: it ef‐
fects the objectives underlying a sentence of supervised re‐
lease. Cf. Johnson, 529 U.S. at 59 (“While the text of § 3624(e)
resolves this case, we observe that our conclusion accords
with the statute’s purpose and design.”). It would serve little
purpose for defendants like Maranda to serve a term of su‐
pervision while they remain in prison. As the Supreme
Court observed in Johnson, “[s]upervised release has no stat‐
utory function until confinement ends,” because this part of
the sentence “fulfills rehabilitative ends, distinct from those
served by incarceration.” Id. Many of the standard condi‐
tions imposed on a releasee—such as the requirement that

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16 No. 13‐3917
the person not use controlled substances, or possess a fire‐
arm—are unnecessary if the person is locked up. And as the
government points out, some of the conditions of Maranda’s
release would have been virtually impossible for him to
comply with while remaining at FCI Butner—for instance,
the condition (which formed the basis for his revocation)
that he not communicate with another felon.
Maranda’s reading would not only render many of the
conditions of supervised release useless or nonsensical. It
would undermine their very purpose. Mosby, 719 F.3d at 929
(“To start a term of supervised release while an individual is
still physically confined by federal authorities would frus‐
trate one of its key purposes which is to help individuals as
they transition into the community.”); see also S. Rep. No. 98‐
225, p. 124 (1983) (stating that “the primary goal [of super‐
vised release] is to ease the defendant’s transition into the
community after the service of a long prison term … or to
provide rehabilitation to a defendant who has spent a fairly
short period in prison for punishment or other purposes but
still needs supervision and training programs after release”),
quoted in Johnson, 529 U.S. at 59. As the district court for the
Eastern District of North Carolina reasoned in declining to
order Maranda’s commitment, conditions of supervised re‐
lease can serve as a less drastic alternative to commitment in
borderline cases. Under Maranda’s reading of § 3624 and
§ 4248, however, if the government certified an individual as
a sexually dangerous person but then failed to meet the high
threshold for that person’s commitment, the government
could forfeit the ability to supervise that person’s reentry in‐
to society. We very much doubt that Congress intended for
this consideration to weigh in the government’s calculus of

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No. 13‐3917 17
whether to pursue an individual’s commitment under the
Act. 3
In interpreting § 3624(e) and § 4248(a) this way, we reach
the same result as two other circuits. See Neuhauser, 745 F.3d
at 131; Mosby, 719 F.3d at 930. We part ways, however, with
the Ninth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Turner, 689
F.3d 1117 (9th Cir. 2012). In a divided opinion, the Turner
court found that a defendant’s term of supervised release
runs once his sentence of imprisonment expires, even if he is
still detained pursuant to § 4248(a) after that time. Id. at 1121,
1126. To the Ninth Circuit majority, its result followed from
the tolling provision of § 3624(e), which instructs that “[a]
term of supervised release does not run during any period in
which the person is imprisoned in connection with a convic‐
tion for a Federal, State, or local crime.” The Ninth Circuit
reasoned that a defendant awaiting the result of a civil‐
commitment hearing under the Adam Walsh Act is not being
“imprisoned in connection with a conviction”—instead, he is
being detained in connection with a civil proceeding. Id. at
1123–24.
We agree with the Fourth and Eighth Circuits and the
Turner dissent that the Ninth Circuit majority was looking at
3 This is not to diminish the potential for unfairness in this situation. As
the district court observed, “[i]t is deeply troubling that the government
can unilaterally postpone a prisoner’s release indefinitely through the
certification mechanism of the Adam Walsh Act. But the problem is with
the way the Adam Walsh Act is drafted, in that there appears to be no
limit on the duration of a ‘stay of release’ pending conclusion of civil
commitment proceedings—and that issue is not before this Court.” Unit‐
ed States v. Maranda, No. 4:99‐CR‐40087, 2013 WL 6500138, at *3 (C.D. Ill.
Dec. 11, 2013).

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18 No. 13‐3917
the wrong part of § 3624(e). See Neuhauser, 745 F.3d at 130;
Mosby, 719 F.3d at 930; Turner, 689 F.3d at 1126–27 (Smith, J.,
dissenting). Rather than analyzing the circumstances that
will toll an ongoing term of supervised release, we need to
determine the circumstance that causes a term of supervised
release to commence. After all, “[w]hat never begins cannot
end,” Turner, 689 F.3d at 1127 (Smith, J., dissenting)—and,
similarly, what never begins cannot be tolled. Again,
§ 3624(e) states that “the term of supervised release com‐
mences on the day the person is released from imprison‐
ment.” Unlike the tolling provision, there is no qualifying
language about the imprisonment being “in connection with
a conviction.” We are thus unpersuaded by Turner. 4
4 We note that the Ninth Circuit had another reason for concluding that
an individual’s term of supervised release begins at the time his prison
sentence expires, even in the Adam Walsh Act context: the government’s
concession, before that court, that a term of supervised release would
begin to run if the person was actually civilly committed under the Act
(as opposed to being detained while awaiting a determination). See
Turner, 689 F.3d at 1121–22. In the Ninth Circuit’s view, this concession
called into question the government’s interpretation of the stay‐of‐
release provision in § 4248(a), because that provision instructs that the
stay lasts “pending completion of procedures contained in this sec‐
tion”—which include the procedures by which an individual is ultimate‐
ly discharged from civil commitment if it has been imposed. Id. at 1122;
see also 18 U.S.C. § 4248(a), (e). In the Ninth Circuit’s understanding, the
government’s interpretation required the stay‐of‐release provision to
apply differently to pre‐hearing detainees and post‐hearing, civilly
committed detainees, a result the court found untenable. Turner, 689 F.3d
at 1122.
The government has not advanced that interpretation in our case,
however. And, of course, Maranda was not civilly committed. Thus, “our
disposition in this case does not preordain the outcome of that very dif‐
ferent situation.” Neuhauser, 745 F.3d at 131 n.5.

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No. 13‐3917 19
III. Conclusion
Having found that Maranda was still subject to the con‐
ditions of his supervised release at the time he committed
the violations he’s accused of, we A FFIRM the judgment of the
district court.

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