Tarsem Singh v. ERIC H. HOLDER J R ., Attorney General of the United States

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 13‐2552
T ARSEM SINGH,
Petitioner,
v.
ERIC H. HOLDER J R ., Attorney General of
the United States,
Respondent.
____________________
Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals.
No. A074 –967 –132
____________________
A RGUED FEBRUARY 19, 2014 — D ECIDED A PRIL 16, 2014
____________________
Before BAUER , FLAUM, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.
HAMILTON , Circuit Judge. The tidy caption for this petition
for review belies the mystery of petitioner Singh’s true iden‐
tity. We are not confident of his full name or birthdate, for he
possesses abundant, purportedly official documentation for
several identities. Perhaps Mycroft Holmes, who solved
complex international mysteries without ever leaving his
armchair, would have been able to ferret out Singh’s true

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2 No. 13‐2552
identity over a cup of Earl Grey tea. Unfortunately, the facts
in this case leave us unable to distinguish the impossible
from the merely improbable, so Singh’s true identity remains
a mystery.
Our inability to ascertain Singh’s identity dooms his peti‐
tion for review of an order finding him removable from the
United States. Singh claims that the Board of Immigration
Appeals erred in concluding that he received constitutional‐
ly adequate notice of his immigration proceedings during
his detention by Immigration and Naturalization Services
officers in 1997. 1 He also argues that the Board erred in find‐
ing that he could not establish inspection and admission into
the United States. See 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a). Singh’s due process
claims hinge on establishing that he really is Tarsem Singh
and was just fifteen years old when he was detained by the
INS in 1997, which he is unable to do. Singh also cannot es‐
tablish by clear and convincing evidence that he was in‐
spected and admitted into the United States when he en‐
tered this country. We therefore deny his petition for review.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioner says he is Tarsem Singh, born on June 13,
1982. He also claims that he entered the United States in May
1995. The abundant documents he has provided to immigra‐
tion authorities, however, tell a more complicated story. In
these documents, we see that Mr. Singh uses two names:
Tarsem Singh and Simranjit Singh. He has provided to im‐
1 The INS ceased to exist in 2003 when most of its functions were trans‐
ferred to the newly‐created Department of Homeland Security. Since the
focus of this petition is on events under INS jurisdiction, we use that ref‐
erence for simplicity’s sake.

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No. 13‐2552 3
migration authorities at least three different birth certificate
translations (two for Tarsem Singh and one for Simranjit
Singh). These translations list birthdates that differ by as
much as four years. (Singh seems never to have provided an
original birth certificate to U.S. immigration authorities.) He
also possesses a photocopy of a passport for Tarsem Singh
and a passport for Simranjit Singh that have different
birthdates on them. (Singh claims that the passport photo‐
copy is a copy of the passport he showed INS officials when
he was detained in 1997; the original, he says, was lost.) Fi‐
nally, Singh has claimed three different dates of entry into
the United States separated by as much as three years.
Singh is a citizen of India and was born there in the late
1970s or early 1980s. At some point between 1994 and 1997,
Singh entered the United States illegally. According to Singh,
he was smuggled into the country on a commercial flight
while dressed as a young girl and with the smuggler’s
daughter’s passport. After he reached the United States and
his family paid the smuggler, Singh says, he was released to
his father and lived with him near Chicago.
We can say with confidence that in July 1997, while trav‐
eling to Virginia by bus to take a job there, Singh was de‐
tained by INS agents. The I‐213 charging document the INS
filled out during that detention lists his date of birth as
May 21, 1978, making him nineteen years old when he was
detained. It also shows a date of entry just one week prior to
the detention and says that Singh was admitted without in‐
spection. (Singh claims these entries were incorrect.) Finally,
the I‐213 also indicates that Singh was represented by coun‐
sel during his questioning, which Singh denies. Singh asserts

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4 No. 13‐2552
that he spoke very little or no English at the time and did not
understand the agents’ questions or statements to him.
The INS provided Singh with a Notice To Appear and re‐
leased him to his employer, a Mr. Kapania, whose address
was listed on the I‐213 as Singh’s United States address. Ka‐
pania completed an I‐134 affidavit of support but did not ex‐
ecute an agreement to care for Singh’s well‐being and ensure
his presence at all future immigration proceedings. See 8
C.F.R. § 236.3(b)(4).
Roughly a month after Singh’s detention and release,
Singh’s father collected him from Kapania’s house after he
quarreled with Kapania over Singh’s wages and treatment.
According to Singh, his father was very upset when Singh
told him that he had been stopped by police. (Singh says he
did not understand, let alone tell his father, that he had been
detained by the INS and was required to appear at an immi‐
gration hearing.) Singh claims that his father decided that
the stop made it necessary to create a new identity for him.
Singh contends that although he had previously been (and
truly is) fifteen‐year‐old Tarsem Singh born on June 13, 1982,
from then on he became nineteen‐year‐old Simranjit Singh
born on February 4, 1978. Singh asserts that his mother, who
was still living in India, procured a new Indian birth certifi‐
cate and passport for him with the new false identity and
that his father told him to use only the new identity from
that time. According to Singh, he has lived as Simranjit
Singh ever since.
After Singh’s detention in Virginia in 1997, the INS
mailed notice of the date and time of his immigration hear‐
ing to Kapania’s address in Virginia. There is no evidence
that Kapania passed along the information to Singh or his

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No. 13‐2552 5
father, or that Singh ever received notice of his hearing.
Singh did not appear at the hearing, and on November 20,
1997, he was ordered deported in absentia.
INS officials do not appear to have connected Singh’s
new identity to the 1997 deportation order until 2010, when
Singh himself filed a motion to reopen his 1997 immigration
proceeding on the ground that he did not receive notice of
that proceeding. The immigration court granted his motion
to reopen and conducted two new hearings in 2011. In those
hearings, Singh moved to terminate the proceedings, argu‐
ing that contrary to the I‐213, he was only fifteen when he
was detained in 1997 so that his detention violated INS regu‐
lations and his due process rights. See 8 C.F.R. § 236.3. He
also argued that he had been inspected and admitted into
the United States, so that he might be eligible for adjustment
of his immigration status. See 8 U.S.C. §1255(a).
The immigration judge ruled that Singh was removable.
The judge found that because Singh seemed to have told the
INS agents that he was nineteen when they detained him,
they had no reason to think he was actually fifteen instead.
Further, Singh was personally served with his Notice To Ap‐
pear. Under INS regulations, that is deemed effective service
for aliens over fourteen years old. 8 C.F.R. § 103.8(c)(2)(ii).
The judge therefore concluded that the proceedings against
Singh had been properly initiated and that there was no due
process problem. The judge also rejected Singh’s claim that
he had been inspected and admitted. His history of fraud
and deception since entering the United States made his sto‐
ry difficult to credit, and the story was not clearly and con‐
vincingly corroborated. The judge therefore concluded that

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6 No. 13‐2552
Singh was removable but granted his request for a voluntary
departure.
The Board of Immigration Appeals agreed on all points.
The Board held that even if Singh was actually fifteen rather
than nineteen when he was detained, he was still properly
served with the Notice To Appear. INS regulations do not
require service in the respondent’s native language, and per‐
sonal service is effective service for all minors over age four‐
teen. 8 C.F.R. § 103.8(c)(2)(ii). Further, according to the
Board, Singh’s post‐detention change of identity showed that
he had actual notice of the immigration proceedings, so no
due process violation occurred. The Board also held that
even if the INS’s special provisions for the release of juve‐
niles had been violated, see 8 C.F.R. § 236.3, reopening
Singh’s proceedings in 2010 cured any possible due process
problem. Finally, the Board agreed with the immigration
judge that Singh had not established inspection and admis‐
sion. His testimony was not clear and convincing in light of
his fraudulent and deceptive behavior since arriving in the
United States, as well as the lack of corroboration of his ac‐
count. This petition for review followed. We have jurisdic‐
tion under 8 U.S.C. § 1252.
II. Analysis
The Board issued a free‐standing opinion, rather than
merely adopting and supplementing the immigration judge’s
decision, so we review the Board’s decision. Moab v. Gonzales,
500 F.3d 656, 659 (7th Cir. 2007). The Board’s legal conclu‐
sions are reviewed de novo, but we review the Board’s factual
findings only for substantial evidence. Chen v. Holder,
604 F.3d 324, 330 (7th Cir. 2010). “[W]e will not overturn the
agency’s findings simply because we might have decided the

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No. 13‐2552 7
case differently;” rather, we may reverse only if the evidence
compels a contrary result. Id.
A. Due Process—Notice of the 1997 Proceeding
Singh argues first that the INS’s behavior when it de‐
tained him in 1997 was not reasonably calculated to provide
him with actual notice of his proceedings and a meaningful
opportunity to be heard, as required to satisfy due process.
See Nazarova v. INS, 171 F.3d 478, 482 (7th Cir. 1999). Specifi‐
cally, Singh argues that providing him with his Notice To
Appear in a language he did not understand and then releas‐
ing him to his employer without taking the special precau‐
tions required in juvenile releases by 8 C.F.R. § 236.3 did not
provide him with constitutionally adequate notice and thus
violated his right to due process. Reopening his case did not
cure the due process violation, Singh claims, because the INS
continues to treat the 1997 detention as valid, making him
ineligible for discretionary cancellation of removal. See
8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b) & (d).
Singh concedes that the INS personally served him with a
copy of his Notice To Appear before releasing him in 1997,
which complied with the INS’s notice regulations. See
8 C.F.R. § 103.8. He argues, however, that the personal ser‐
vice was ineffective in his case because he did not speak suf‐
ficient English to understand what the INS officers told him
and could not read the notice. In the immigration context,
personal service in English to a non‐English‐speaker typical‐
ly satisfies due process because it puts the alien on notice
that further inquiry is needed, leaving the alien to seek help
from someone who can overcome the language barrier. See
Nazarova v. I.N.S., 171 F.3d 478, 483 (7th Cir. 1999); Ojeda‐
Calderon v. Holder, 726 F.3d 669, 675 (5th Cir. 2013) (collecting

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8 No. 13‐2552
cases). It may be more difficult to put a juvenile on inquiry
notice than an adult because juveniles may not recognize a
need for further inquiry in circumstances where an adult
would. We know, however, that Singh was in fact placed on
inquiry notice of his proceeding by the 1997 detention be‐
cause he found the incident important enough to tell his fa‐
ther soon after.2 So whether Singh was a juvenile or not, he
was placed on inquiry notice by the 1997 detention.
Singh also argues that personal service of the Notice To
Appear was insufficient to satisfy due process requirements
in his case because he was a juvenile when the INS detained
him, and the INS failed to follow its regulations outlining
special protections when a juvenile is released from INS cus‐
tody. See 8 C.F.R. § 236.3. He claims that the release protec‐
tions in § 236.3 work in concert with the notice provisions in
8 C.F.R. § 103.8 to provide constitutionally adequate notice to
juveniles and that failing to comply with § 236.3 thus violat‐
ed his right to due process. See Flores‐Chavez v. Ashcroft,
362 F.3d 1150, 1159–61 (9th Cir. 2004) (in light of due process
concerns, construing regulations now codified as § 236.3 to
require notice to responsible adult for teenage aliens).3
2 Singh argues that telling his father does not show that he had actual
notice because he did not understand that he had been detained by the
INS. Actual notice is not required; inquiry notice suffices to satisfy due
process. Nazarova, 171 F.3d at 483.
3 Our conclusion that Singh was placed on inquiry notice by the 1997
proceeding does not resolve this argument. Singh argues that due pro‐
cess requires not only service to the juvenile, but also releasing the juve‐
nile into the custody of a parent, guardian, adult relative, or other adult
who will care for the juvenile and ensure his or her presence at future
immigration proceedings. See 8 C.F.R. § 236.3. This would imply that
placing the juvenile on inquiry notice, without also ensuring that he is

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No. 13‐2552 9
The factual foundation for this argument of course is that
Singh was only fifteen when he was detained in 1997, as he
now claims. This is not a self‐evident proposition. In 1997,
the INS noted on Singh’s I‐213 that he was born on May 21,
1978, making him nineteen when he was detained. (The
Board later found that Singh at least told the INS that he was
nineteen.) If the I‐213 is correct (which Singh disputes), then
the special protections for juveniles in 8 C.F.R. § 236.3 would
not have applied to Singh’s 1997 detention because they ap‐
ply only to persons under the age of eighteen. See 8 C.F.R.
§ 236.3(a). So, Singh’s due process argument regarding
§ 236.3 hinges on establishing that he was in fact only fifteen
when he was detained in 1997.
In other words, we could reach the merits of his due pro‐
cess challenge and reverse the Board’s decision on this
ground only if we found that the evidence compelled the
conclusion that Singh’s true birthdate is June 13, 1982, as he
contends now. See Zhu v. Gonzales, 465 F.3d 316, 318 (7th Cir.
2006) (“We will not grant the petition for review unless the
petitioner demonstrates that the evidence not only supports
reversal of the BIA’s decision, but compels it.”) (emphasis in
original, internal quotations omitted).
We cannot make that finding. Singh has fallen far short of
establishing that the evidence compels a conclusion that he
was born on June 13, 1982. The I‐213 lists his birthdate as
May 21, 1978. Singh possesses a birth certificate translation
shepherded through the immigration process by a responsible adult,
does not satisfy due process. See Flores‐Chavez, 362 F.3d at 1159 –61. We
do not decide that legal question, however, because the factual founda‐
tion is missing here.

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10 No. 13‐2552
for Tarsem Singh showing a birthdate of June 13, 1982, but
he also possesses a passport and birth certificate for Tarsem
Singh with a birthdate of May 21, 1982.4 And that’s only for
Tarsem Singh. He also possesses extensive documentation
showing that his name is Simranjit Singh and he was born
on February 4, 1978. 5 Given the array of conflicting, suppos‐
edly official documents that Singh has in his possession, the
record simply does not compel the conclusion that he was
born on June 13, 1982. Singh’s due process arguments re‐
garding his 1997 detention therefore fail.
B. Admission and Inspection
Singh also argues that we should reverse the Board and
hold that he established inspection and admission into the
United States. In general, “[a]n alien present in the United
States without being admitted” is inadmissible. 8 U.S.C.
4 Singh claims that the date on the I‐213 is a transcription error. He sub‐
mits an alleged photocopy of the passport he says he provided to the INS
in 1997. The photocopy has a birthdate of May 21, 1982, contradicting the
birthdate he asserts now. (Singh has not submitted a passport for Tarsem
Singh that lists a birthdate of June 13, 1982, which he claims is his true
birthdate.) Regardless of this discrepancy, the conflicting, supposedly
authentic documents he has submitted to immigration authorities make
it impossible to rely on this passport photocopy as conclusive evidence
of his true birthdate or even the birthdate that he gave the INS in 1997.
5 The Immigration Services Field Office Director who reviewed the I‐130
petition that Singh’s wife made on his behalf in 2011 appears to be the
only immigration official to have conducted a detailed examination of
Singh’s documentation. She concluded that the most credible documents
showed Singh’s date of birth to be February 4, 1978, which would of
course make him nineteen when he was detained in 1997. We do not rely
on that finding, but it gives us added confidence in concluding that
Singh cannot establish that he was fifteen when he was detained in 1997.

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No. 13‐2552 11
§ 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). However, an alien who was inspected and
admitted into the United States is eligible for adjustment of
status. 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a). The alien has the burden of estab‐
lishing inspection and admission by clear and convincing
evidence. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229a(c)(2)(B), 1361. So, if Singh can
establish by clear and convincing evidence that he was in‐
spected and admitted into the United States, he would be
eligible for adjustment of status. Otherwise, he is ineligible
for that relief. The Board held that Singh failed to meet this
burden.
The Board did not err on this point. Singh asserts that he
entered the United States via commercial airliner at JFK In‐
ternational Airport in New York. He admits, however, that
he does not specifically remember passing through customs
or being inspected by immigration officials. He has also
claimed three different dates of entry in different immigra‐
tion documents and proceedings, undercutting the credibil‐
ity of his story. Singh’s corroborating witnesses similarly at‐
test to the fact that Singh told them he had arrived on an air‐
plane, but they do not recall him saying anything about cus‐
toms. These accounts do not establish inspection and admis‐
sion. Even if Singh arrived in the United States via commer‐
cial airliner, we hesitate to assume that smugglers exit air‐
ports only by passing through immigration and customs
controls.
Singh’s I‐213 and the I‐130 petition filed on his behalf in
2001 reinforce our concerns.6 The I‐213 stated that there were
6 The 2001 I‐130 petition was filed by Singh’s wife at the time. Singh has
since divorced and remarried; his current wife filed an I‐130 petition on
his behalf in 2011, as discussed above in note 5.

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12 No. 13‐2552
no visa or entry stamps on the passport Singh provided to
the INS. The alleged photocopy of that passport that Singh
has provided in these proceedings similarly lacks any signs
of inspection or admission. The I‐213 also stated that Singh
had been admitted without inspection, as did the I‐130 peti‐
tion for an alien relative that Singh’s then‐wife filed on his
behalf in 2001. These documents strongly suggest that Singh
did not pass through immigration and customs when he ar‐
rived in the United States. The Board therefore did not err by
finding that Singh did not establish by clear and convincing
evidence that he was inspected and admitted into the United
States.
We therefore DENY Singh’s petition for review.

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