Gilbert Aponte v. CITY OF CHICAGO and JOHN ADREANI

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
No. 12‐3099
G ILBERT A PONTE ,
Plaintiff‐Appellant,
v.
C ITY OF C HICAGO and J OHN A DREANI ,
Defendants‐Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 09 C 8082 — John W. Darrah, Judge.
A RGUED J ULY 10, 2013 — D ECIDED A UGUST 29, 2013
Before BAUER , T INDER , and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.
T INDER , Circuit Judge. The issue in this appeal is whether
plaintiff Gilbert Aponte should receive attorney’s fees in this
civil‐rights suit. Aponte sued four Chicago police officers,
seeking over $100,000 in damages, but a jury awarded him
only $100 against just one defendant. Aponte then requested
attorney’s fees of over $100,000, which the district court
denied. He appeals that decision, arguing that the district court

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2 No. 12‐3099
applied the wrong legal test to determine his eligibility for
attorney’s fees. Because the court applied a permissible test in
evaluating the fee request, we affirm the judgment.
I. Background
Aponte sued Sergeant Donald DeVito and Officers John
Adreani, Henry Via, and Kimberly Valenti under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 for a search in violation of the Fourth Amendment. He
brought eight claims: one against each of the officers for
unreasonably executing a warrant, and one against each of
them for failing to prevent an unreasonable search. (He also
brought a state‐law claim for indemnification against the City
of Chicago. See 745 ILCS 10/9‐102.) After more than two years
of pretrial litigation, a three‐day jury trial was held. The
evidence at trial showed that the circuit court of Cook County,
Illinois, had issued a warrant to the officers to search Aponte’s
home for cocaine, drug paraphernalia, money, records detail‐
ing illegal drug transactions, or “any other instrumentalities”
that could be used for a drug offense. Nine police officers plus
a canine unit performed the search. Aponte contended that the
officers significantly damaged his property while they
searched his home. The officers, he elaborated, ripped open his
mattress, sofa, and chair seats with a knife, broke his bedroom
sets, dining set, and television, and threw his clothes onto the
floor. His landlord, who owned all the home’s furnishings,
spent $9,462.56 refurnishing it, and Aponte contended that he
reimbursed her.
At the end of the trial, the jury was instructed to consider
awarding compensatory and punitive damages if it found any
defendant liable. Compensatory damages were defined as

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No. 12‐3099 3
“[d]amages for the loss of and/or damages to Plaintiff’s
personal property; [d]amages for Plaintiff’s suffering, mental
anguish, emotional distress, humiliation and embarrassment.”
The jury was also instructed that if they “find in favor of
Plaintiff but find that Plaintiff has failed to prove compensa‐
tory damages, you must return a verdict for Plaintiff in the
amount of one dollar ($1.00),” a figure we often refer to as
“nominal” damages, see Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978),
but that term was not mentioned in the instructions. The
verdict form, however, allotted the jury only two places to
record any damages awarded: one labeled “Total Compensa‐
tory Damages” and one labeled “Total Punitive Damages.”
There was no space identified for the “one dollar” verdict in
favor of the Plaintiff to be awarded if compensatory damages
were not proved.
Aponte’s counsel urged the jury to award him $25,000 in
compensatory damages ($10,000 for property damages and
$15,000 for emotional damages) and $100,000 in punitive
damages ($25,000 from each individual defendant). The jury
found for Aponte on one claim against only one defendant,
Adreani, and it awarded Aponte $100, which it recorded in the
space designated for “compensatory damages.” (Punitive
damages were not awarded.) Aponte moved the district court
to amend the judgment for indemnification against the City of
Chicago, see FED . R. C IV . P. 59(e), which the court granted.
Aponte moved for attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988,
which empowers courts to award attorney’s fees as part of the
costs to the “prevailing party” of a § 1983 lawsuit. He sought
$116,437.50 for the 450 hours that his counsel spent working on
the case. Aponte argued that, because he had successfully

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4 No. 12‐3099
litigated his constitutional claim against Adreani, he was a
prevailing party and thus entitled to recover a reasonable fee.
Aponte anticipated that the defendants would respond that his
recovery was merely nominal and therefore unworthy of a fee
award. He answered that the jury must have concluded that he
had suffered actual, compensatory damages because it implic‐
itly rejected the instruction to award only $1 if it found no
compensatory damages, and, he argued, a more‐than‐nominal
recovery deserves a fee award.
The defendants contested that Aponte is a prevailing party
under § 1988, but argued—as anticipated—that even if he is,
the court should significantly reduce or eliminate any award
of attorney’s fees. The defendants explained that because
Aponte was, at best, a prevailing party who received only
minimal damages, an award of no fees was appropriate.
See Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103 (1992). The court should not,
they insisted, calculate a lodestar of a reasonable fee times
reasonable hours, the methodology from Hensley v. Eckerhart,
461 U.S. 424, 433–37 (1983), for conventional prevailing parties.
Farrar v. Hobby holds that plaintiffs who bring § 1983 claims
and win only “nominal” damages are still “prevailing parties”
under § 1988 and thus eligible to receive reasonable attorney’s
fees. See Farrar, 506 U.S. at 113. But a reasonable attorney’s fee
for a nominal victor is usually zero. Id. at 115. In a concurring
opinion, Justice O’Connor elaborated on how a court should
calculate a reasonable fee once it has decided that the plaintiff
achieved a mere “technical or de minimis” victory. See id. at
120–22 (O’Connor, J., concurring). A reasonable fee for a de
minimis victory, she wrote, should reflect (1) the difference
between the amount recovered and the damages sought,

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No. 12‐3099 5
(2) the significance of the issue on which the plaintiff prevailed
relative to the issues litigated, and (3) whether the case
accomplished some public goal. See id. at 121–22. If a court
decides that the victory is minimal, it should not calculate the
traditional lodestar. See id. at 117. This court has followed
Justice O’Connor’s three‐factor elaboration when assessing fee
awards to trifling victories. See Hyde v. Small, 123 F.3d 583, 585
(7th Cir. 1997); Simpson v. Sheahan, 104 F.3d 998, 1001 (7th Cir.
1997); Maul v. Constan, 23 F.3d 143, 145–47 (7th Cir. 1994).
The district court concluded that, although Aponte is a
prevailing party, he should receive no attorney’s fees. Farrar is
appropriately applied in cases like this one, the court con‐
cluded, because the damages awarded were “minimal in
relation to the amount of damages sought.” Applying Farrar’s
three factors, the court concluded that (1) Aponte’s 0.4%
success rate ($100 in damages ÷ $25,000 requested = 0.4%) was
insignificant; (2) Aponte lost seven of his eight Fourth Amend‐
ment claims and three of four defendants were victorious; and
(3) his victory merely vindicated his own personal rights.
II. Analysis
On appeal Aponte argues only one point: that the district
court legally erred by applying Farrar rather than Hensley to his
motion for attorney’s fees. He does not argue that, if Farrar
governs his motion, the district court applied its three factors
incorrectly.
A. Technical, De Minimis, and Nominal Damages
Aponte argues that Farrar applies only to cases of “nominal
damages” of $1 (which he contrasts with “technical” or “de

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6 No. 12‐3099
minimis” damages of more than $1). Citing our decisions in
Hyde v. Small, 123 F.3d 583, and Estate of Enoch ex rel. Enoch v.
Tienor, 570 F.3d 821 (7th Cir. 2009), Aponte insists that this
narrow view is the approach we have consistently taken. He
explains that the plaintiffs in those cases received small
compensatory‐damage awards greater than $1, like he did
here, and this court concluded that Farrar did not apply to
them. He also quotes Enoch, which says, “In cases in which the
recovery is not merely nominal … the Farrar analysis is not
relevant.” Enoch, 570 F.3d at 823.
But Aponte misreads those cases. First of all, we have on
several occasions explained that Farrar can apply to cases, like
Aponte’s, where the plaintiff received a monetary award that
is more than a nominal $1 but “minimal” relative to the
amount sought. See Cole v. Wodziak, 169 F.3d 486, 487–88 (7th
Cir. 1999) (noting that district court may apply Farrar “[w]hen
recovery is low enough in relation to the demand”; recovery of
$4,500 was 6% of amount sought); Hyde, 123 F.3d at 585 (ruling
that Farrar can apply when plaintiff receives a small monetary
award (in that case, $500) greater than $1); Simpson, 104 F.3d at
1001–02 (affirming district court’s use of Farrar where plaintiff
sought $75,000 but jury awarded $140; remanding because fee
imposed was unreasonably high under Farrar’s three‐part test.
Second, Aponte ignores how the facts of Hyde and Enoch
materially differ from his case. In Hyde, a jury awarded the
plaintiff $500 in compensatory damages, and we concluded
that because the plaintiff had not requested a specific sum of
money he was not “aiming high”and did not “fall far short” of
his requested relief. See Hyde, 123 F.3d at 585. Unlike the Hyde
plaintiff, Aponte’s recovery of only 0.4% of his requested

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No. 12‐3099 7
compensation is reasonably considered quite “far short” of his
“high” goal of $25,000. (And this is without even considering
the $100,000 in punitive damages for which Aponte vigorously
but unsuccessfully pressed.) In Enoch, we concluded that Farrar
was not appropriate because the plaintiffs obtained $635,000,
an amount that was an objectively significant recovery even if
it was only about 6% of the plaintiff’s $10 million objective.
See Enoch, 570 F.3d at 823. By contrast, Aponte’s recovery of
$100 is less than a scintilla of the damages awarded in Enoch.
These cases therefore do not compel disturbing the district
court’s decision to apply Farrar.
But even if, as Aponte contends, a jury award greater than
$1 should be considered compensatory, Farrar still may be
appropriately applied because we do not think the logic of
Farrar is confined to cases in which the plaintiff received no
more than $1. It is true that Farrar involved a plaintiff who won
just $1 in nominal damages after requesting $17 million. Farrar,
506 U.S. at 116 (O’Connor, J., concurring). Justice O’Connor
commented “If ever there was a plaintiff who deserved no
attorney’s fee at all, that plaintiff is Joseph Farrar.” Id. But that
does not mean that only for plaintiffs exactly like the Farrar
plaintiff does Justice O’Connor’s analysis apply. Otherwise,
she would not have used the words “nominal,” “technical,”
and “de minimis” interchangeably in her analysis, without
taking the more expedient route of simply using “$1ʺ as the
maximal amount. See id. at 117–23; see also Cole, 169 F.3d at
487–88 (recognizing that $1 is an example of a paltry award that
does not merit attorneys fees); Simpson, 104 F.3d at 1001 (noting
that amount and nature of award determine whether Farrar
applies).

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8 No. 12‐3099
Because of the apparent uncertainty about the meaning of
the terms “nominal,” “technical,” or “de minimis” in the
context of damages awards, we wish to add some further
clarity. Justice O’Connor used the terms interchangeably in
Farrar, and we cannot see how any of these terms differ.
Whether we call an award nominal, technical, or de minimis,
no specific dollar amount can be assigned to these kinds of
trifling awards. Their meaning is contextual and will vary on
a case‐by‐case basis. Our earlier decisions provide helpful
guidance on determining whether a monetary award is, in fact,
nominal or technical. Hyde instructs the district court, on the
one hand, to apply Farrar if the plaintiff was “aiming high and
fell short, [and] in the process inflict[ed] heavy costs on his
opponent and wast[ed] the time of the court,” and, on the other
hand, to use Hensley if “the case was simply a small claim and
was tried accordingly.” Hyde, 123 F.3d at 585. So in determin‐
ing whether an award should be analyzed under Farrar, district
courts should look at the entire litigation history, including the
number of victorious versus unsuccessful claims, the amount
of damages sought versus recovered, time expended by the
parties, and judicial resources.
B. Decision to Apply Farrar
Turning to the specifics of this case, the parties contest
which standard governs our review of the district court’s
decision to apply Farrar, i.e., its threshold decision that
Aponte’s victory was “minimal in relation to the amount of
damages sought.” See Simpson, 104 F.3d at 1001. As Aponte
presses, de novo review is typically applied when a party
challenges the district court’s choice to adopt a particular legal
test. See Jaffee v. Redmond, 142 F.3d 409, 412–13 (7th Cir. 1998)

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No. 12‐3099 9
(reviewing de novo a district court’s denial of fees based
“solely [on] applying rules of law”). The defendants counter
that the threshold decision to apply Farrar is a mixed fact‐and‐
law‐based inquiry, and just as the discretionary decision to
grant or deny attorneys’ fees is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion, so should the decision to apply Farrar. See Leffler v.
Meer, 60 F.3d 369, 372 (7th Cir. 1995).
The idea of abuse‐of‐discretion review has some support in
our case law. We identified in Hyde the case‐specific details
(magnitude of victory relative to amount sought and resources
expended) for a district court to weigh in deciding if Farrar
governs a case. See Hyde, 123 F.3d at 585. In general, case‐
specific rulings that are “judgmental, managerial, or otherwise
discretionary, rather than being either legal or factual,” are
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Thomas v. Gen. Motors
Acceptance Corp., 288 F.3d 305, 308 (7th Cir. 2002). Thus, the
decision to impose a sanction on a plaintiff is a “classic
judgmental ruling” of judicial management, see Thomas, 288
F.3d at 308, because a judge must determine if a plaintiff
needlessly burdened its opponent or the court, see Kunz v.
DeFelice, 538 F.3d 667, 677 (7th Cir. 2008); Brandt v. Schal
Assocs., Inc., 960 F.2d 640, 646–47 (7th Cir. 1992). Likewise, the
comparison under Hyde of the size of an award to a case’s goals
and costs on the parties and the court is a case‐specific and
management‐oriented inquiry that might be better reviewed
for abuse of discretion. See Strange v. Monogram Credit Card
Bank of Ga., 129 F.3d 943, 945–46 (7th Cir. 1997) (reviewing for
abuse of discretion argument that district court erred by
straying from Hensley).

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10 No. 12‐3099
But for now we need not decide which standard of review
governs because Aponte loses whether we review de novo or
for an abuse of discretion. We begin by examining the district
court’s decision for abuse of discretion. In terms of Hyde’s
inquiry into whether Aponte was “aiming high and fell far
short,” the district court reasonably concluded that his victory
was negligible. After pursuing four defendants during more
than two years of litigating eight constitutional claims on
which he requested $25,000 in property and emotional dam‐
ages, the jury valued his injury at only $100 against just one
defendant. This reasonably suggests that Aponte was “aiming
for the big bucks,” and his paltry recovery of only 0.4% of his
requested relief is, practically, more of a failure than a victory.
See Hyde, 123 F.3d at 584–85; see also Cole, 169 F.3d at 487–88
(concluding that recovery of $4,500 in § 1983 suit, though
“more than a pittance,” was low enough, compared to re‐
quested $75,000, to invoke Farrar); Simpson, 104 F.3d 998
(approving of district court’s choice to apply Farrar to § 1983
suit where plaintiff sought $75,000 and jury awarded $140).
Hyde also suggests that, in addition to comparing monetary
recovery to damages requested, the district court also assess
whether court resources or defense costs were needlessly
exhausted. But neither the court nor the parties discuss these
factors, so in this case the decision to apply Farrar rests solely
on the “aim high, fall short” factor. On this factor, the decision
to apply Farrar appears reasonable.
Aponte fares no better under de novo review. The district
court generously compared only the compensatory damages
Aponte received to the compensatory damages that he sought;
the court did not consider that he also asked for $25,000 in

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No. 12‐3099 11
punitive damages from Officer Adreani and received zero, or
that he asked for another $75,000 in punitive damages from the
three victorious defendants. Considering those amounts—as
we may, see Briggs v. Marshall, 93 F.3d 355, 358, 361 (7th Cir.
1996) (considering entire damage award sought against all
defendants, including those who received favorable ver‐
dicts)—Farrar would properly apply because Aponte’s recov‐
ery is even more minimal in comparison to what he sought, a
barely noticeable 0.08% ($100 ÷ $125,000 = 0.08%).
Aponte contends that, based on the jury instructions and
the verdict form, the award of $100 is not nominal, and so
Farrar should not apply under de novo review. The jury was
instructed that if Aponte failed to prove compensatory
damages, it “must return a verdict” of $1. Aponte believes that
because the jury wrote “$100ʺ in the space for compensatory
damages, and because it presumably followed the instruction
to give only $1 if Aponte did not prove compensatory dam‐
ages, the jury therefore did not award nominal damages. Even
if Aponte is correct, we have already explained that small
compensatory awards above $1 may nonetheless warrant the
Farrar test.
But Aponte’s premise that the jury intended to compensate
him, rather than accord him a mere nominal victory, is ques‐
tionable for two reasons. First, as previously noted, the verdict
form contained no place to record anything other than com‐
pensatory or punitive damages; it essentially forced the jury to
award either compensatory or punitive damages, or both,
without a place for listing a one‐dollar award if they found in
favor of Aponte but he failed to prove compensatory damages.
So Aponte’s inference from the verdict form about the jury’s

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12 No. 12‐3099
intent is unconvincing. Second, Aponte’s inference about the
jury’s intent also ignores the inconsistency between his
evidence of the cost of replacement furniture and the $100
award. His evidence, a receipt listing each replacement
furnishing and corresponding purchase price, contains no item
or items that cost $100. If Aponte’s monetary award matched
any of the prices on the receipt, we might have been more
inclined to conclude that the $100‐award was designed to
compensate him for property damages resulting from the
search. None do, and so it would seem that, at best, the $100
was pegged on the jury’s assessment of Aponte’s “suffering,
mental anguish, emotional distress, humiliation and embar‐
rassment.” Nonetheless, it is still a very small award for such
harms, diluting the notion of compensation.
Last, Aponte argues that, by denying him attorneys’ fees,
the district court has rewarded the defendants for prolonging
an easily settled suit because they could have readily made an
offer of judgment to resolve his relatively small claim short of
trial. See FED . R. C IV . P. 68; Payne v. Milwaukee Cnty., 288 F.3d
1021, 1024 (7th Cir. 2002). But Aponte ignores that he produced
in discovery early in the lawsuit the receipt for nearly $10,000,
the cost to him of replacing his furnishings damaged during
the search. This receipt alone tells us that he was not seeking a
modest award that the defendants could have readily settled,
but rather he was seeking substantial damages. We thus
conclude that the decision to apply Farrar was correct, regard‐
less of the standard of review.

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No. 12‐3099 13
C. Application of Farrar
Aponte does not argue that, if Farrar governs this case, the
district court unreasonably applied the three Farrar factors in
determining the amount of the fee; nonetheless, we briefly
address whether the district court abused its discretion in
ruling that under Farrar a reasonable fee here is no fee.
See Briggs, 93 F.3d at 361. Those three factors, articulated in
Justice O’Connor’s concurrence, are the difference between
amounts sought and recovered, the significance of the legal
issue on which the plaintiff prevailed compared to those
litigated, and public goal achieved. See Farrar, 506 U.S. at
121–22; Simpson, 104 F.3d at 1001. Of these three factors, the
sum‐awarded‐versus‐requested (which is also part of the
threshold inquiry into whether to apply Farrar) is the most
important. See Simpson, 104 F.3d at 1001. As with the threshold
inquiry, the district court reasonably concluded that a recovery
of $100, just 0.4% of the compensation Aponte requested, is
trivial. The other two factors also justify no award because a
victory on just one of eight legal claims is not significant, and
the minimal money awarded reflected a mere personal victory
without any identifiable, broader import to the public.
See Briggs, 93 F.3d at 361.
III. Conclusion
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

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