United States of America v. Harold N. Rosen

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
No. 12‐2101
U NITED STATES OF A MERICA,
Plaintiff‐Appellee,
v.
HAROLD N. R OSEN,
Defendant‐Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Illinois.
No. 3:11‐cr‐30017‐MJR‐1 — Michael J. Reagan, Judge.
A RGUED OCTOBER 22, 2012 — D ECIDED A UGUST 14, 2013
Before BAUER and R OVNER , Circuit Judges, and R ANDA,*
District Judge.
BAUER , Circuit Judge. On October 2, 2011, Harold N. Rosen
pleaded guilty to seven counts of wire fraud for his perpetra‐
tion of a fairly elaborate fraud scheme, centered around the
* Of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin,
sitting by designation.

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2 No. 12‐2101
development of an affordable housing project that was to be
built in East St. Louis, Illinois. Rosen now appeals the district
court’s calculation of the loss amount, the determination that
Rosen was an organizer or leader of criminal activity, and the
reasonableness of his sentence. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Rosen, the owner of Kully Construction, LLC, submitted a
development plan to the city of East St. Louis (“the City”) to
develop an affordable housing project known as the Bowman
Estates. The project was to be constructed through a combina‐
tion of private and public investment and was to be developed
by Kully Construction and Rosen. The project’s plans called for
a $5,624,050 development, approved by the City council, that
allowed for the contribution of $800,000 of federal grant funds,
$1,124,810 in Tax Increment Financing (“TIF”), and a contribu‐
tion of $3,699,240 in private funding by Rosen and Kully
Construction, as a condition of receiving the public financing
funds.
To obtain this contract, Rosen lied at nearly every turn.
First, Rosen submitted a development plan to the City. The
proposal was almost entirely fictitious. The plan falsely stated
that Kully Construction had over twenty years of experience in
completing successful housing projects. The plan named Tracy
Hawkins as CEO of Kully Construction and lauded her more
than ten years’ of housing development experience; in reality,
Hawkins was a secretary and part‐time hairdresser. The plan
falsely asserted that Rosen was a seasoned project manager
with over twenty years of experience on major housing
projects; in truth, he had never worked as a developer.

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No. 12‐2101 3
There was even a news article published in the St. Louis
Post Dispatch on March 17, 2006, supporting Rosen’s business
proposal and affirming his credentials. The article recounted
how Rosen obtained a forty‐million‐dollar contract with the
Philippine Government to develop a trash‐to‐energy power
plant. Rosen claimed he became involved in the business of
converting trash into usable power as a result of his deep‐
rooted sympathy for the children exposed to garbage dumps
in the Philippines. The article also noted that Rosen was
awarded a twenty‐five year contract, at the conclusion of
which he would turn the plant over to the Philippine Govern‐
ment. Rosen now admits that he had no such investment in the
Philippines and that the entire story was concocted in hopes of
bolstering his reputation as a successful developer.
A. Scheme to Substitute Prefab Modular Housing for
New Construction
Duped by his ploy, the City contracted with Rosen for the
construction of a thirty‐two unit housing project. After meeting
with a consultant on July 1, 2008, however, it was brought to
Rosen’s attention that his project was underfunded by approxi‐
mately $2.7 million dollars because the projected rental income
was inadequate to support the anticipated expenses. Rosen
concealed his under funding problem from the City, and
instead addressed the issue by offering to “upgrade” the
project—from thirty‐two units to fifty‐six units—at no addi‐
tional cost. Rosen misrepresented to the City that he could
increase the scope of the project so that the anticipated income
from the additional twenty‐four rental units would appear to
support the projected expenses. The East St. Louis Financial
Advisory Authority (“FAA”) questioned how Rosen could

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4 No. 12‐2101
increase the scope of the project without increasing the
construction expenses. Rosen told the FAA that construction
costs had fallen so significantly, due to the recent economic
downturn, that it allowed him to add twenty‐four more units
to the project with no additional costs.
Of course Rosen could not actually build a fifty‐six unit
property for the same cost as a thirty‐two unit property. In
order to make up the difference, Rosen chose to substitute less
expensive prefab modular housing units in place of the new
construction that was contracted for in the development
agreement—without notifying or receiving approval from the
FAA, the East St. Louis Planning Commission, or the City
Council. To prevent the FAA from discovering that he in‐
tended to substitute prefab modular housing, Rosen sent the
FAA two facsimile transmissions misrepresenting his plans for
the construction of the project. The first fax, dated June 16,
2009, contained an itemized list of materials and expenses
related to the construction of the housing units. The list was
created by the manufacturer of the prefab modular housing
units. Rosen, however, removed the manufacturer’s name,
address, phone number, and fax number from the document
to prevent the FAA from discovering that he planned to
substitute prefab modular housing. The second fax was sent on
June 18, 2009, and outlined a construction timeline for the
project. The timeline listed the anticipated completion date of
each phase of the new construction, including framing exterior
walls, plumbing, insulation, drywall, and painting. Of course
none of these phases of construction would occur because the
prefab modular housing is completely manufactured off‐site
and then shipped to the project’s location.

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No. 12‐2101 5
B. Scheme to Fraudulently Obtain Private Financing
The terms of the agreement between Rosen and the City
required Rosen to obtain $3,699,240 in private funding toward
the completion of the project. The FAA granted approval for
the project subject to the condition that Rosen verify that Kully
Construction actually obtained private financing through a
commercial loan by submitting a copy of the closing docu‐
ments. As neither Rosen nor Kully Construction were credit‐
worthy, Rosen solicited his accounting firm to create false
financial statements and tax returns to exaggerate his income
and assets.
On November 10, 2009, Rosen faxed his newly‐created
fictitious 2006 tax return to Amerisource Funding, in support
of his application for private financing of the project. The
submitted tax return falsely stated that Rosen owned a
separate business with gross sales of $2,014,019, had an
ordinary business income of $272,572, and total assets of
$898,991. On November 20, 2009, Rosen again had his accoun‐
tant send to Amerisource similarly false and fraudulent
financial statements, balance statements, and statements of
retained earnings for tax years 2006 and 2007.
Rosen then supplied the City with a series of letters that
purported to verify that Kully Construction had obtained
private financing for the developer’s contribution to the
Project. The FAA accepted a “commitment letter” from MDE
Capital as verification of private financing so that construction
could begin on the project. On June 23, 2009, the FAA passed
FAA Resolution No. 09–0623–89, which granted an approval
for the project, subject to the condition that Rosen actually

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6 No. 12‐2101
close a commercial loan and provide proof of the loan closing
to the FAA. In reality, Rosen had not obtained a commitment
to lend from MDE Capital, as he had represented; rather, MDE
Capital refused to do business with Rosen after he requested
that a representative provide him with a fraudulent closing
document. Even without private financing, however, Rosen
moved ahead on the development of the project, and began
incurring costs, including the purchasing and clearing of the
land on the proposed construction site.
Meanwhile, as Rosen was still representing to the City that
he had obtained private financing through MDE Capital, he
continued to secretly, and unsuccessfully, seek private financ‐
ing through other financial institutions. When the FAA tried to
confirm that Rosen had actually closed the commercial loan
with MDE Capital, Rosen responded by supplying the FAA
with closing documents from a different lender, First Monetary
Group, Inc. The documents represented that Rosen had
fulfilled his obligation and falsely evidenced the existence of a
$3,699,240 line of credit.
Unbeknownst to the City and the FAA, First Monetary
Group is not a financial lender; rather it is a brokerage service
that matches potential borrowers to actual lenders. Rosen paid
First Monetary Group $30,000 to create a closing document
that would satisfy the FAA’s requirements. In truth, no loan
was closed, no line of credit was established, and no private
funds were available to Rosen.

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No. 12‐2101 7
C. Fraudulent Reimbursement
The next phase of Rosen’s scheme occurred when he duped
the City into reimbursing him for construction costs with
public funds. According to the terms of the development
agreement, public funds were to be used to reimburse eligible
expenses that were actually paid by the developer. The
development agreement required evidence in support of each
request for reimbursement (e.g., bills, contracts, invoices, lien
waivers) to verify that each expense was legitimate and eligible
for reimbursement.
On September 11, 2009, Rosen submitted a request for
reimbursement that falsely asserted that Kully Construction
had paid each of the itemized expenditures listed on the
invoice. Among the itemized expenses listed was a $40,000
expenditure supposedly paid to a subcontractor for clearing
the land on the construction site. In reality, Rosen paid only
$3,000 to clear the acreage. Rosen then forged the signature of
the subcontractor on a lien waiver, which was submitted to
falsely corroborate that the subcontractor had been paid in full,
when in truth the subcontractor had performed the work but
was still owed payment. After reviewing the documentation
Rosen submitted with the reimbursement request, the FAA
determined there was no evidence to support Kully Construc‐
tion’s claim that it had actually paid the subcontractor $40,000,
and the FAA refused to reimburse that expense.
In total, Rosen made three “draw requests” for reimburse‐
ment of expenses incurred by Kully Construction—$47,036.15,
$60,449.04, and $21,000. Rosen was actually reimbursed
$66,449.04 by the City.

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8 No. 12‐2101
D. The Investigation
In December 2009, a search warrant was executed for
Rosen’s home. During the investigation Rosen was interviewed
three times by federal agents, over the course of which he
admitted to forging a lien waiver, submitting falsified billing
invoices and lying to investigators.
In September 2010, Rosen, now fully aware that he was the
subject of a federal criminal investigation, met with an aspiring
developer named Cheryl Pratt. Rosen told Pratt he was retiring
due to health concerns and that the City was looking for a new
developer to take over his project. Rosen, however, did not
mention that the project was the subject of a federal criminal
investigation. Rosen further told Pratt that $1.9 million dollars
in public financing would be transferred to her and that she
would be taking over a “fully functional, fully feasible project”
that was “ready to go.”
Relying on these misrepresentations, Pratt agreed to pay
Rosen $100,000 to acquire the land, architectural plans,
engineering plans, construction plans, and environmental
studies. Pratt gave Rosen an initial $6,000 in earnest money and
scheduled a formal closing for October 14, 2010. Rosen failed
to turn over the plans to Pratt at the closing, but she gave
Rosen an additional $44,000, and withheld the remaining
$50,000 until he provided her with the missing documentation.
On October 22, 2010, Rosen dropped off a box of
documents to Pratt’s office and she issued a check to Rosen for
the remaining $50,000. Pratt reviewed the documents, how‐
ever, and learned that Rosen intended to substitute prefab
modular housing in lieu of the on‐site construction that was

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No. 12‐2101 9
required under the terms of the contract. Pratt also discovered
that the City had not passed the ordinance transferring the $1.9
million dollars in public funding from Rosen to her. Shortly
after, Pratt received a call from Rosen’s engineering firm
informing her that Rosen did not have authority to use or
transfer the engineering plans because he had not yet paid the
engineering firm. Pratt then contacted her bank and stopped
payment on her $50,000 check before it was cashed.
During the fall of 2010, Pratt had several meetings with city
officials to try to resolve the issues surrounding the project. In
December 2010, Pratt was informed, for the first time, that the
project was subject to a federal criminal investigation, and that
Rosen did not actually own all the land at the site; one parcel
was still owned by another individual and a second parcel was
under the control of a Bankruptcy Trustee. Pratt then called
Rosen, in December 2010, and told him she wanted to rescind
their deal and have her initial $50,000 payment refunded.
Rosen agreed. Predictably, however, no refund was ever
remitted. Pratt attempted to contact Rosen approximately
twenty times in the following months, but to no avail.
Pratt did not hear from Rosen again until May 2011, when
she received a demand letter threatening to sue her if she did
not pay Rosen the second $50,000 installment payment that she
had cancelled. Eventually, Rosen filed a civil suit against Pratt.

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10 No. 12‐2101
E. Proceedings Below
On January 21, 2011, a grand jury in the Southern District
of Illinois returned an indictment charging Rosen with nine
counts of wire fraud. On October 2, 2011, Rosen pleaded guilty
to counts one through seven of the indictment. In Rosen’s plea
agreement, the Government calculated his total offense level at
twenty‐seven, based on an offense level of seven, a sixteen
level enhancement for the loss amount, and a four‐level
increase based on Rosen’s role as an organizer or leader of the
charged offenses. Rosen, on the other hand, calculated his
offense level at seventeen, starting with a base offense level of
seven and a ten‐level enhancement for the loss amount.
Rosen was sentenced on April 20, 2012. The parties argued
three primary issues at the sentencing hearing. First, Rosen
objected to the probation officer’s calculation of the intended
loss. Second, Rosen objected to the application of a role‐in‐the‐
offense adjustment for being a leader or organizer of criminal
activity that involved five or more participants or was other‐
wise extensive, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a).Third, the
parties differed on what constituted a reasonable sentence in
this case under the § 3553(a) factors.
Ultimately, the district court calculated that under a
technical application of the law, the intended loss figure in this
case was approximately $4.6 million dollars. However, the
court granted Rosen’s motion for a downward departure after
determining that a technical application of the Guidelines
would substantially overstate the offense. The district court
calculated the intended loss amount to be $1,924,810—the
amount of public funding that Rosen was approved to receive

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No. 12‐2101 11
from the City. Next, the district court determined Rosen to be
an organizer or leader of criminal activity that involved five or
more participants and applied an additional four‐level en‐
hancement.
The district court’s resolution of these issues resulted in the
calculation of a total offense level of twenty‐four, which called
for a Guidelines range of fifty‐one to sixty‐three months’
imprisonment. The district court granted Rosen’s request for
a below‐Guidelines sentence, though not to the full extent he
sought. Rosen argued for leniency based upon his age, medical
condition, family circumstances, and that the actual loss in this
case was substantially less than the intended loss. In the end,
the district court sentenced Rosen to a below‐Guidelines range
sentence of forty‐eight months’ imprisonment.
II. DISCUSSION
Rosen appeals the district court’s calculation of the in‐
tended loss amount under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1, the determination
of Rosen’s role in the offense as a leader or organizer, pursuant
to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a), and the reasonableness of his sentence
under U.S.S.G. § 3553(a).
A. Intended Loss Calculation
We review a district court’s calculation of loss for clear
error. United States v. Green, 648 F.3d 569, 583 (7th Cir. 2011).
However, threshold questions concerning the meaning of
“loss” and the methodology to be used in measuring that loss
present questions of law that call for de novo review. United
States v. Wasz, 450 F.3d 720, 726 (7th Cir. 2006). The Sentencing
Guidelines provide for an increase in offense level based upon

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12 No. 12‐2101
the amount of loss resulting from the offense. U.S.S.G.
§ 2B1.1(b). A loss is defined as either the actual or intended
loss, whichever is greater. § 2B1.1, cmt. n.3 (A). Further,
“intended loss” refers to the pecuniary harm that was intended
to result from the offense, including that which would have
been impossible or unlikely to occur. § 2B1.1, cmt. n.3 (A)(i‐ii)
(2011).
In determining the loss amount in this case, the district
court found that the intended loss was $1,924,810, which was
the amount of public funding the City earmarked for Rosen’s
affordable housing project. Rosen argues using the amount of
public funding as the intended loss amount was an error that
expands the Guidelines’ definition of “intended loss” because
it requires a presumption that he would have taken additional
affirmative steps in furtherance of the fraud. In support of this
claim, Rosen points out that he was never actually eligible to
receive any public funds because he did not meet the condition
of his agreement with the City that he obtain private financing.
Rosen argues that the “intended loss” amount set by the
district court is based on speculation as to the harm the
defendant might have caused had his scheme persisted to its
intended conclusion.
We disagree that the calculated intended loss amount was
based on speculation. Rather it was based upon the amount
Rosen was eligible to receive from the City had his scheme
been successful. As we noted in United States v. Schneider, 930
F.2d 555, 558 (7th Cir. 1991), “‘loss’ within the meaning of the
Guidelines includes intended, probable, or otherwise expected
loss, a qualification of vital importance in a case … where
fraud is discovered or otherwise interrupted before the victim

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No. 12‐2101 13
has been fleeced.” Rosen qualifies as a “true con artist.” Id. He
had no intention of upholding his end of the agreement with
the City, and clearly had no qualms about doing whatever he
deemed necessary in order to carry out his fraudulent scheme
to its most lucrative end. Accordingly, we find that the district
court did not err in its determination of the appropriate
intended loss amount.
B. Role‐In‐The‐Crime Enhancement
The district court applied a four‐level enhancement to
Rosen’s sentence, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a), after deter‐
mining that Rosen was an organizer or leader of a criminal
activity that involved five or more participants or was other‐
wise extensive. Whether a defendant exercised a leadership or
managerial role in the charged offense is a determination that
we review for clear error. United States v. Johnson, 489 F.3d 794,
796 (7th Cir. 2007).
The “central concern” of § 3B1.1 is the defendant’s relative
responsibility for the commission of the offense. United States
v. Vasquez, 673 F.3d 680, 685 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing United States
v. Mendoza, 576 F.3d 711, 717 (7th Cir. 2009)). In making that
determination, the district court should consider factors such
as “the defendant’s decision‐making authority, nature of
participation, recruitment of accomplices, claimed right to a
larger share of the fruits of the crime, role in planning and
organizing, scope of illegal activity, and control and authority
exercised over others.” Vasquez, 673 F.3d at 685 (citing U.S.S.G.
§ 3B1.1 cmt. n.4; United States v. Knox, 624 F.3d 865, 874 (7th
Cir. 2010)). In order to appropriately apply a § 3B1.1(a)
adjustment to a defendantʹs sentence, “the defendant must

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14 No. 12‐2101
have exercised some degree of control over others involved in
the commission of the offense or he must have
been responsible for organizing others for the purpose of
carrying out the crime.” Vasquez, 673 F.3d at 685 (citing Knox,
624 F. 3d at 874).
Even though the record clearly reflects that Rosen was the
sole mastermind behind this scheme, and recruited additional
accomplices as he deemed necessary, he argues that this
enhancement was in error as he was not the organizer of a
unified criminal plot. Rosen admits he had “associations” with
people he used to further his criminal conduct, however, he
argues that those associates’ roles were too limited in scope
and objective for them to be considered participants in a larger,
cohesive criminal scheme. The Presentence Report identified
seven individuals who participated in Rosen’s scheme. Rosen
concedes he recruited each of these individuals, but he argues
that he solicited each person only as his need for their individ‐
ual services arose. Meaning each individual was solicited by
Rosen for a specific objective rather than all acting in concert
within a larger unitary criminal scheme, and he did not
exercise authority or control over the participants.
Relying on United States v. Wasz 450 F.3d 720 (7th Cir. 2006),
the district court found that Rosen’s organizational role
consisted of “efforts to marshal other individuals for the
purpose of executing the crime” thereby satisfying § 3B1.1(a).
Id. at 730. Rosen argues his case is distinguishable from Wasz
because here there was no unified scheme; rather each partici‐
pant was recruited by Rosen to perform a specific role (such as
creating a fictitious tax return) and there is insufficient evi‐
dence to suggest that all these participants were working

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No. 12‐2101 15
towards the same end. We disagree. In Wasz, we noted that
though the defendants contracted individually with each co‐
defendant, their actions still reflected “a guiding influence over
the other participants in the offense.” Id.
Here, we agree with Rosen that he recruited each additional
participant to perform specific illegal handiwork, but that does
not diminish his culpability as an organizer under § 3B1.1(a).
Rosen alone owned Kully Construction, the “development”
business at the center of this fraud scheme, and he alone had
decision‐making control over every aspect of this crime. Rosen
chose who was recruited, for what purpose, and solely
determined each participant’s appropriate compensation. For
example, Hawkins was a secretary Rosen solicited to pose as
Kully’s fictional CEO. In exchange, Rosen promised her future
employment in the company. It is clear that Rosen was in
control of this ploy all along. He recruited and compensated
his cohorts as needed to bring his fraudulent plan to its
intended conclusion. We find no clear error in the the district
court’s determination that Rosen was the organizer of this
brazen scheme and deserving of a four‐level enhancement
pursuant to § 3B1.1.(a).
C. Unreasonable Sentence
Rosen’s final challenge is to the reasonableness of his
sentence. When considering the overall reasonableness of a
sentence, we review for an abuse of discretion. United States v.
Jackson, 547 F.3d 786, 792 (7th Cir. 2008). This review involves
a two‐step analysis. First, we ensure that the district court did
not make any procedural errors; if it did not, then we evaluate
the sentence’s substantive reasonableness. Id. Here, Rosen faces

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16 No. 12‐2101
a particularly uphill battle, given that his sentence is presump‐
tively reasonable because it is below the applicable Guidelines
range. See United States v. Poetz, 582 F.3d 835, 837 (7th Cir.
2009).
1. Sentencing Procedures
The Supreme Court has made clear that a, “a district court
should begin a sentencing hearing by calculating the advisory
guidelines range.” United States v. Long, 639 F.3d 293, 299 (7th
Cir. 2011) (citing Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49, 128 S.Ct.
586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007)). The district court must then
subject its proposed sentence to adversarial testing, hearing
arguments as to whether the advisory sentence should apply.
Long, 639 F.3d at 299 (citing Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338,
351, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 168 L.Ed.2d 203 (2007)). Finally, the district
court must evaluate the § 3553(a) factors and impose a sen‐
tence, providing an “adequate statement of the judge’s reasons,
consistent with § 3553(a), for thinking the sentence that he has
selected is indeed appropriate for the particular defendant.”
Long, 639 F.3d at 299 (citing United States v. Dean, 414 F.3d 725,
729 (7th Cir. 2005)).
Here, the crux of Rosen’s argument is that the procedural
sequence of his sentencing hearing was improper because the
district court failed to adhere to the “strict” sentencing proce‐
dures outlined in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1. Specifically, Rosen argues
the district court erred when it made the determination that he
was entitled to a downward departure regarding the intended
loss amount at issue contemporaneously with its determina‐
tion of the applicable Guidelines range. In support of his
contention, Rosen relies upon a case in which the Third Circuit,

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No. 12‐2101 17
held that the district court procedurally erred when it analyzed
steps of the sentencing procedures out of order. United States
v. Friedman, 658 F.3d 342, 361 (3d Cir. 2011). In Friedman, the
district court began its analysis by first discussing the disputed
loss calculation, then discussing a departure motion, then
discussing two additional Guidelines disputes, then engaging
in some discussion of the § 3553(a) factors, then stating that it
would impose something less than a offense level of twenty‐
two before continuing its discussion of § 3553(a) factors. Id.
Finally the district court imposed a thirty‐four month sentence,
based on an offense level of “either nineteen or twenty.” Id.
Our sister circuit reasoned that the convoluted record in
Friedman inhibited its “ability to review the sentence for
reasonableness and thus required remand.” Id.
That situation is not present here. A review of the sentenc‐
ing transcript shows that the district court correctly calculated
the appropriate Guidelines range, granted a sufficient down‐
ward departure based upon the intended loss amount in this
case, sufficiently considered the arguments of both Rosen and
the Government, and crafted a reasonable sentence based upon
the § 3553 (a) factors. Unlike Friedman, we have no trouble
reviewing the district court’s sentence in this case and find no
procedural error.
2. Substantive Reasonableness
Rosen raises two challenges to the substantive reasonable‐
ness of his sentence. First, Rosen argues that his sentence is
unreasonable because the intended loss amount calculated by
the district court overstates the seriousness of his offense,
when compared to the actual loss that occurred. The commen‐

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18 No. 12‐2101
tary to U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 notes that “there may be cases in which
the offense level determined under this Guidelines substan‐
tially overstates the seriousness of the offense.” U.S.S.G.
§ 2B1.1 cmt. n. 19(C).
In this case, the district court calculated the intended loss
amount at $1.9 million dollars—the amount of public funding
that Rosen stood to receive had his scheme progressed as he
hoped. Rosen argues that in order to even be eligible to receive
the $1.9 million dollars in public funding, he would need to
first obtain private financing, and then submit draw requests
to the City asking for reimbursement. Since Rosen was
unsuccessful, after multiple attempts, to obtain private
financing, he argues that the $1.9 million dollar loss amount set
by the court is unreasonably high because there was little
possibility that Rosen’s scheme could have successfully
progressed to that point. Rosen argues that his ploy was
doomed never to materialize beyond fraudulent private
financing applications; the actual loss amount ($66,449.04) is a
more accurate barometer of the seriousness of his offense.
We have held that a “court can consider the amount of
variance between the intended loss and the realistic possibility
of loss when considering an appropriate sentence.” United
States v. Portman, 599 F.3d 633, 640 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing United
States v. Stockheimer, 157 F.3d 1082, 1091 (7th Cir. 1998)). This
decision, however, remains in the sentencing judgeʹs wide
discretion, and our review may only evaluate the overall
reasonableness of the sentence imposed. Id. A review of the
record demonstrates that the district court thoroughly consid‐
ered the substantial difference between the intended loss in
this case ($1.9 million dollar) and the actual loss amount

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No. 12‐2101 19
($66,449.04); when the district court granted Rosen a below
Guidelines sentence, which we hold to be presumptively
reasonable. See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 347, 127 S.Ct.
2456, 168 L.Ed.2d 203 (2007). Therefore, we find no abuse of
discretion, nor any support for Rosen’s contention that his
sentence is unreasonable because the intended loss amount
overstates the seriousness of his offense.
Second, Rosen contends that the court failed to adequately
consider the mitigating factors applicable under § 3553(a). We
will determine a sentence to be reasonable “if the district court
gives meaningful consideration to the factors enumerated in 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a), including the advisory Sentencing Guidelines,
and arrives at a sentence that is objectively reasonable in light
of the statutory factors and the individual circumstances of the
case.” United States v. Shannon, 518 F.3d 494, 496 (7th Cir. 2008)
(citing Gall, 552 U.S. at 49–50, 128 S.Ct. 586; United States v.
Wachowiak, 496 F.3d 744, 748 (7th Cir. 2007)).
Here, Rosen contends that the district court did not give
proper weight to his family circumstances, advanced age, and
poor health. On the contrary, the sentencing transcript in this
case illustrates that the district court throughly considered all
appropriate § 3553(a) factors in crafting Rosen’s sentence. The
district court specifically noted Rosen’s advanced age and
failing health, but also saw his crime as outrageous. Rosen
sought to swindle an already impoverished City out of millions
of dollars in public funding through an elaborate fraud
scheme, couched under the guise of creating “affordable
housing” for the benefit of the residents of East St. Louis.
Rosen failed to rebut the presumption of reasonableness

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20 No. 12‐2101
attached to his sentence, as such, we find no abuse of discretion.
III. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, we AFFIRM.

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