Kirsha Brown-Younger v. STATE OF ILLINOIS and CITY OF CHICAGO

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted March 7, 2012 *
Decided March 9, 2012
Before
RICHARD A. POSNER, Circuit Judge
DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judge
JOHN DANIEL TINDER, Circuit Judge
No. 11‐3308
KIRSHA BROWN‐YOUNGER,
Plaintiff‐Appellant,
v.
STATE OF ILLINOIS and CITY OF
CHICAGO,
Defendants‐Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois,
Eastern Division.
No. 11 C 6071
Robert W. Gettleman,
Judge.
O R D E R
Kirsha Brown‐Younger appeals the dismissal of her civil rights complaint against the
State of Illinois and the Chicago Police Department for failure to state a claim. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B). We affirm.
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with
Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
* The appellees were not served with process in the district court and are not
participating in this appeal. After examining the appellant’s brief and the record, we have
concluded that oral argument is unnecessary. Thus, the appeal is submitted on the brief and
the record. See FED. R. A PP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).

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No. 11‐3308 Page 2
In her complaint, filed in part under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Brown‐Younger claimed that
police, the State, the CIA, and the FBI were monitoring her behavior, organizing hate groups
to attack her, and otherwise harassing her. The district court screened the complaint and
dismissed it because Brown‐Younger failed to name an individual defendant, specify how
her rights were violated, or allege that any violation of her rights resulted from an official
policy of the State of Illinois or the Chicago Police Department.
On appeal Brown‐Younger rehashes the allegations of her complaint and argues that
the district court abused its discretion by failing to serve process on the defendants and by
dismissing the complaint without a hearing. But dismissal here was appropriate because a
complaint must contain sufficient facts to state a claim that is plausible on its face, see
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949–50 (2009); Bausch v. Stryker Corp., 630 F.3d 546, 558 (7th
Cir. 2010); Sharp Elecs. Corp. v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 578 F.3d 505, 510 (7th Cir. 2009); Brooks v.
Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 581 (7th Cir. 2009). Brown‐Younger’s implausible allegations—that state
and federal officials are organizing hate groups to attack her, using various technologies to
monitor her activities and thoughts, psychologically harassing her, and attempting to drive
her to suicide and financial ruin—do not meet this standard.
AFFIRMED.

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