Angel Rodriguez v. Cook County, Illinois

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
No. 11-1401
ANGEL RODRIGUEZ,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 10 C 4207—Suzanne B. Conlon, Judge.
SUBMITTED NOVEMBER 30, 2011—DECIDED DECEMBER 15, 2011
Before EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge, and CUDAHY and
TINDER, Circuit Judges.
EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge. A jury convicted Angel
Rodriguez of murder, but the state’s appellate court
reversed after concluding that the evidence was insuffi-
cient. People v. Rodriguez, 312 Ill. App. 3d 920 (2000). He
then filed a federal suit under 42 U.S.C. §1983, accusing
two police officers of violating his constitutional rights
by unduly influencing a witness to identify him as the

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2 No. 11-1401
killer. The district judge granted judgment in favor of one
officer as a matter of law and submitted the claim
against the second (plus the City of Chicago) to a jury,
which returned a verdict against Rodriguez. He appealed,
and we affirmed. Rodriguez v. Woodall, 189 F. App’x 522
(7th Cir. 2006).
Four years later, Rodriguez decided to try again. He
filed this new suit against the three defendants he had
sued before, plus three of the prosecutors and the gov-
ernmental entities that employed them. The district
court dismissed the claims against the original three
defendants on the basis of claim preclusion (res judicata)
and the claims against the additional defendants on the
basis of the two-year period of limitations that applies
to §1983 litigation in Illinois. 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115743
(N.D. Ill. Oct. 29, 2010). The court also concluded that
claims against the prosecutors under state law must be
dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, because
federal courts follow state immunity rules and Illinois
wants claims of this kind to be presented to its Court of
Claims.
A state statute enacted in 2008 supplies the basis for
Rodriguez’s contention that the district judge erred with
respect to preclusion and the statute of limitations. The
2008 statute permits a person who served time in prison
on a conviction that is later set aside to seek a “certificate
of innocence” from the court that had convicted him.
735 ILCS 5/2–702. A state court issued such a certificate
to Rodriguez in July 2009. He says that this creates a
new claim, restarting the time for suit against all potential

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No. 11-1401 3
defendants and overriding the rules of issue and claim
preclusion.
No state statute can authorize relitigation of a federal
claim resolved by a federal court. The preclusive effect
of a federal court’s judgment in a suit resting on federal
law (as Rodriguez’s first suit did) itself depends on
federal law. See Semtek International Inc. v. Lockheed Martin
Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 507–08 (2001). An element of the
judicial power under Article III of the Constitution is the
authority to make a conclusive decision, one not subject
to legislative revision. Even the powers of Congress are
severely limited once a federal court has resolved a
case. See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211 (1995).
State legislatures have no power at all to direct federal
courts to disregard their own judgments. No more need
be said to show that the 2008 statute does not permit
new litigation against the defendants who prevailed in
the first suit. (Not that Illinois has tried to reopen judg-
ments, state or federal. The 2008 statute provides
that it “shall not have a res judicata effect on any . . . pro-
ceedings” other than a claim against the state. 735 ILCS
5/2–702(j).)
A state legislature has greater authority to control the
time for litigation against new parties, because federal
courts borrow from state law the period of limitations
for §1983 suits. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985).
But 735 ILCS 5/2–702 does not purport to toll or extend
the period of limitations for ordinary personal-injury
suits, which Garcia held (as a matter of federal law) sup-
plies the outer bound for §1983 litigation. Indeed, 735 ILCS

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4 No. 11-1401
5/2–702 does not affect claims against any person or
entity other than the State of Illinois.
The statute provides that a person who secures a certifi-
cate of innocence may file a petition in the state’s court
of claims seeking compensation. 735 ILCS 5/2–702(a). And
the Illinois Court of Claims entertains suits against only
one entity: the state itself. 705 ILCS 505/8. Likewise the
Court of Federal Claims entertains suits against only the
United States, not against its agencies or employees. Thus
although the issuance of a certificate of innocence
creates a new claim for relief against Illinois, it does not
have any effect on the time to sue a prosecutor or the
Office of the State’s Attorney.
Rodriguez does not rely on any language in 735 ILCS
5/2–702, or cite any decision of a state court, for the propo-
sition that the 2008 statute extends the period of limita-
tions for a suit against a natural person, such as a police
officer or prosecutor. Instead he relies on Kitchen v. Burge,
781 F. Supp. 2d 721, 735 (N.D. Ill. 2011), which he reads
as holding that the issuance of a certificate of innocence
starts a new period of limitations for suit against
anyone involved in the proceedings that led to the con-
viction. That is not, however, what Kitchen holds.
The initial problem facing Kitchen was not the expira-
tion of the period of limitations, but the rule of Heck v.
Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). The Court held a suit
under §1983 cannot be used to contest a criminal con-
viction. The Justices inferred from this principle that,
when a person has been convicted and imprisoned, a §1983
claim that is inconsistent with the validity of that con-

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No. 11-1401 5
viction (see Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 392–94 (2007))
does not accrue until the conviction has been set aside
in some other manner, such as a collateral attack under
28 U.S.C. §2254 or the equivalent procedure in state
court. (Although the period of limitations for §1983
litigation comes from state law, the date of the claim’s
accrual is defined by federal law under Garcia and later
decisions.) The district court held in Kitchen that a certifi-
cate of innocence can serve the same function as a suc-
cessful collateral attack and thus cause the claim to
accrue under Heck, which starts the period of limitations.
That approach does not do Rodriguez any good,
because his claim accrued in 2000, when the state’s court
of appeals reversed his conviction for insufficient
evidence—a ruling that made a new prosecution impos-
sible, given the double jeopardy clause. See Burks v.
United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978). A suit filed in 2010 is
thus eight years past the allowed time.
What’s more, Kitchen does not get this subject entirely
right. Heck holds that a §1983 claim that would call a
conviction into question accrues when the conviction
has been reversed or otherwise set aside. The district
court in Kitchen assumed that a certificate of innocence
is one way that Illinois provides for vitiating a convic-
tion. It isn’t. Under the 2008 statute, a conviction’s
vacatur is a precondition to obtaining a certificate; it is
not something that can be accomplished by a certificate.
In order to obtain a certificate of innocence the
petitioner must prove by a preponderance of
evidence that:

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6 No. 11-1401
(1) the petitioner was convicted of one or more
felonies by the State of Illinois and subse-
quently sentenced to a term of imprisonment,
and has served all or any part of the sentence;
(2)(A) the judgment of conviction was
reversed or vacated, and the indictment or
information dismissed or, if a new trial was
ordered, either the petitioner was found not
guilty at the new trial or the petitioner was not
retried and the indictment or information
dismissed; or (B) the statute, or application
thereof, on which the indictment or informa-
tion was based violated the Constitution of
the United States or the State of Illinois;
(3) the petitioner is innocent of the offenses
charged in the indictment or information or
his or her acts or omissions charged in the
indictment or information did not constitute a
felony or misdemeanor against the State; and
(4) the petitioner did not by his or her own
conduct voluntarily cause or bring about his
or her conviction.
735 ILCS 5/2–702(g). Thus the claim in Kitchen—and this
case too—accrued when the conviction was vacated, not
when a state court issued the certificate of innocence.
Rodriguez’s conviction was reversed in 2000. His
current suit is much too late.
Rodriguez sought to use the supplemental jurisdiction
of 28 U.S.C. §1367 to support state-law claims against

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No. 11-1401 7
the prosecutors. The prosecutors invoked not only the
statute of limitations but also absolute prosecutorial
immunity and state sovereign immunity. The district
court responded:
The state law claims against the State’s Attorney’s
Office, the State’s Attorney, and the ASAs are
dismissed without prejudice for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. FED R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1). Federal
courts exercising supplemental jurisdiction over
state law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 follow
state immunity rules. Omosegbon v. Wells, 335 F.3d
668, 673 (7th Cir. 2003). The State’s Attorney and
ASAs are state employees, and Illinois law
requires suits against them to be brought in the
Illinois Court of Claims. 745 ILCS 5/1; Sneed v.
Howell, 306 Ill. App. 3d 1149, 716 N.E.2d 336, 339-
41, 240 Ill. Dec. 203 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999).
This passage assumes that the prosecutors have been
sued in their official capacity. If so, then they are treated
as the State, see Will v. Michigan Department of State
Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989), and a suit against a state belongs
in state court. Omosegbon, which the district judge cited,
dealt with an official-capacity claim. If the prosecutors
have been sued in their official capacity, then they are
not entitled to immunity; they are simply dismissed. But
if the prosecutors have been sued in their personal capac-
ity, then the litigation proceeds in the regular civil
courts, and the prosecutors are entitled to whatever
benefit official immunity provides.

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8 No. 11-1401
Rodriguez is not entirely clear about the capacity in
which he has sued the prosecutors, but we think that his
complaint is best understood as presenting a personal-
capacity claim—which is the only way he could get
damages from them, his apparent objective. The supple-
mental jurisdiction covers such a claim. That immunity
depends on state law has no effect on a federal court’s
subject-matter jurisdiction. Illinois does not treat pros-
ecutorial immunity as a limit on a court’s jurisdiction;
instead it is an affirmative defense, which can be waived
or forfeited. And if Illinois had purported to insist that
all civil litigation against prosecutors occur in state
courts, that could not curtail federal jurisdiction. Congress,
not the states, determines the jurisdictional authority
of the federal courts. This means that, apart from
invoking their rights under the eleventh amendment,
states cannot insist that any particular category of litiga-
tion be conducted only in state court. See Chicago v.
International College of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156 (1997).
Individual-capacity claims against prosecutors are not
covered by the eleventh amendment, see Ex parte Young,
209 U.S. 123 (1908), or the residual principle of state
sovereign immunity recognized in Hans v. Louisiana, 134
U.S. 1 (1890). There is thus no jurisdictional obstacle
to litigating all of this suit in federal court.
It is apparent from the district court’s discussion, how-
ever, that the court would have relinquished supple-
mental jurisdiction under §1367(c) whether or not
litigation in federal court is forbidden. We therefore
modify the judgment to provide that all state-law claims

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No. 11-1401 9
are dismissed without prejudice under §1367(c). As
modified, the judgment is
AFFIRMED.
12-15-11

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