Jay Stone v. Board of Election Commissioners for the City of Chicago

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
No. 11-1085
JAY STONE, et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
BOARD OF ELECTION COMMISSIONERS FOR THE
CITY OF CHICAGO,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 10-cv-7727—Robert M. Dow, Jr., Judge.
ARGUED APRIL 4, 2011—DECIDED MAY 4, 2011
Before KANNE, ROVNER, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.
KANNE, Circuit Judge. Most major American cities
have some mechanism—a filing fee, a signature require-
ment, or both—to limit the number of mayoral candidates
on the election ballot. In Chicago, however, where it
regularly appears that money and politics go hand and
hand, there is no filing fee for mayoral candidates. On
the other hand, candidates must gather signatures from

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2 No. 11-1085
12,500 registered voters over a 90-day period in order to
become ballot-eligible. Jay Stone, Frederick White, Frank
Coconate, Denise Denison, Bill “Doc” Walls, and Howard
Ray (“Plaintiffs”) claim Chicago’s signature requirement
violates several of their constitutional rights. Chicago’s
Board of Election Commissioners argues the signature
requirement is essential to keeping the ballot from be-
coming a phone book.
Plaintiffs brought their dispute with the Election
Board to federal court, seeking a declaratory judgment
that the signature requirement is unconstitutional. In
December 2010, Plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunc-
tion prohibiting the Board from enforcing the require-
ment in the municipal election on February 22, 2011.
The district court denied the injunction, and Plaintiffs
appealed that denial. Because the election has taken
place, Plaintiffs’ appeal is now moot.
“[F]ederal courts are without power to decide questions
that cannot affect the rights of litigants in the case before
them.” North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246 (1971) (per
curiam). If an event occurs during appeal that eliminates
the court’s power to provide relief, the appeal is moot.
Dorel Juvenile Grp., Inc. v. DiMartinis, 495 F.3d 500, 503
(7th Cir. 2007). The only relief Plaintiffs seek from us is
an injunction pertaining to the municipal election on
February 22, 2011. That election has passed, the require-
ment was enforced, and the requested injunction is now
worthless. Perhaps if Plaintiffs had sought an injunction
forcing a new election, we would have jurisdiction. See
Stewart v. Taylor, 104 F.3d 965, 970 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding

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No. 11-1085 3
the appeal of a denial of a preliminary injunction not
moot because “if we find merit in [plaintiff’s] claim, we
could order a new election”). But Plaintiffs seek no
such remedy, and the injunction they do seek could
no longer affect the litigants’ rights.
To be sure, there is an exception to the mootness
doctrine for challenges to actions that are “capable of
repetition, yet evading review.” S. Pac. Terminal Co. v.
Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911). But
the action Plaintiffs challenge—enforcement of Chicago’s
signature requirement—does not evade review. Plaintiffs
remain free to pursue their underlying suit, in which
they should be able to obtain review of the signature
requirement before Chicago’s next mayoral election in
2015. Accordingly, the “capable of repetition, yet evading
review” exception does not apply. Gjertsen v. Bd. of
Election Comm’rs of the City of Chicago, 751 F.2d 199, 201-
02 (7th Cir. 1984); see also Worldwide Street Preachers’
Fellowship v. Peterson, 388 F.3d 555, 559 (7th Cir. 2004).
This is an interlocutory appeal, asking us only to
review the denial of an injunction that no federal court
could now grant. We have no jurisdiction to evaluate
the appeal, so it is DISMISSED.
5-4-11

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