United States of America v. David Lee Runyan

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
No. 10-3400
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
DAVID LEE RUNYAN,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Indiana, Hammond Division.
No. 2:09-cr-00213—James T. Moody, Judge.
ARGUED MARCH 1, 2011—DECIDED MAY 2, 2011
Before KANNE, ROVNER, and WOOD, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM. David Runyan appeals his 63-month
sentence for being a felon in possession of a firearm, see
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He argues that the district court
wrongly sentenced him to the high end of the Guide-
lines range without meaningfully considering his personal
history and characteristics, see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1)—
namely, the care he gave years ago to his then-terminally
ill father. We affirm.

-- 1 of 5 --

2 No. 10-3400
In the midst of a drinking binge late one evening,
Runyan—a four-time felon—walked through the streets
of Hammond, Indiana, and fired several shots from a
pistol. First he fired at a street sign on a residential
street. Later he shot towards a storefront and hit the
awning. And upon leaving a bar at 2 a.m. he fired into
a van parked in a nearby lot, shattering the van’s wind-
shield. A passerby called the police, and Runyan ditched
his pistol into a yard once he saw officers approaching him.
Runyan pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession
of a firearm, see 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). At his sentencing
hearing, the parties did not object to the presentence
report’s calculation that his total offense level (18) and
criminal history (category V) yielded a sentencing range
of 51 to 63 months. But defense counsel urged the court
to sentence him below the range to 30 months because
of mitigating factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553. Counsel
claimed, for instance, that “the intoxicated David
Runyan committed this offense,” and described Runyan
as a hard-working family man. “[D]ay in and day out”
for two years, counsel said, Runyan cared for his termi-
nally ill father, who passed away in 2007. Runyan also
claimed to have given unspecified care to the terminally
ill father of his girlfriend’s daughters before his death.
The government sought a maximum sentence, recounting
the reckless nature of Runyan’s shooting spree and an
extensive criminal history that included several juvenile
adjudications, as well as adult convictions for four
felonies and three misdemeanors. The district court
denied Runyan’s request for a below-range sentence,
and sentenced him to 63 months. In announcing this

-- 2 of 5 --

No. 10-3400 3
sentence, the court addressed Runyan’s offense conduct,
but did not comment on his past caregiving.
On appeal Runyan argues that the district court misap-
plied § 3553(a) by failing to comment upon his past
caregiving responsibilities, which he characterizes
as “extraordinary acts” that make him an “atypical of-
fender.” His “history of behavior in assuming extraordi-
nary responsibilities in caring for family members,” he
argues, is a mitigating factor that the court ignored.
We presume the reasonableness of Runyan’s within-
Guidelines sentence, see Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338,
341 (2007). A sentencing court need not comprehensively
discuss each of the factors listed in § 3553(a), e.g.,
United States v. Christiansen, 594 F.3d 571, 576-77 (7th Cir.
2010); United States v. Dean, 414 F.3d 725, 729 (7th Cir.
2005), but it must substantiate its sentence and it must
address all of a defendant’s principal arguments that
are “not so weak as not to merit discussion,” United
States v. Cunningham, 429 F.3d 673, 679 (7th Cir. 2005).
Runyan’s caregiving claim here was so thin as not to
require comment. He emphasizes the extent of his own
sacrifice, but “[w]hen a defendant presents an argu-
ment for a lower sentence based on extraordinary
family circumstances, the relevant inquiry is the effect
of the defendant’s absence on his family members.” United
States v. Schroeder, 536 F.3d 746, 756 (7th Cir. 2008). See also
United States v. Johnson, 964 F.2d 124, 129 (2d Cir. 1992)
(“The rationale for a downward departure here is not
that [the defendant’s] family circumstances decrease
her culpability, but that we are reluctant to wreak extra-

-- 3 of 5 --

4 No. 10-3400
ordinary destruction on dependents who rely solely on
the defendant for their upbringing.”); U.S.S.G. § 5H1.6
(family ties and responsibilities are “not ordinarily rele-
vant” in deciding whether to depart below a Guidelines
sentence, but application notes authorize departures
when the defendant’s sentence “will cause a substantial,
direct, and specific loss of essential caretaking”). At the
time Runyan was sentenced, he no longer was caring for
ill family members, as the two fathers had died years
earlier. His case is thus readily distinguishable from
Schroeder, in which we vacated the sentence because the
district court failed to consider and comment upon the
defendant’s claim for leniency based on his ongoing role
as caregiver for his daughter, whose compromised
immune system made daycare an implausible childcare
option. 536 F.3d at 756. Although “a sentencing court
cannot summarily disregard a defendant’s potentially
meritorious argument as it relates to extraordinary
family circumstances,” United States v. Gary, 613 F.3d
707, 711 (7th Cir. 2010), Runyan’s argument was any-
thing but potentially meritorious. His argument rested
on past rather than present caregiving, and was thus
doomed from the start; the district court need not
have addressed it.
Runyan also contends that the district court’s com-
mentary at sentencing was impermissibly one-sided;
he asserts that the court focused only on his past irrespon-
sible behavior and disregarded his past responsible
behavior. But the court was not required to discuss
Runyan’s caregiving that took place in the past, and
he concedes that the court adequately discussed his

-- 4 of 5 --

No. 10-3400 5
substance-abuse history, his employment history, and his
educational pursuits. Because the court addressed and
rejected these arguments in mitigation, its commentary
was not one-sided.
AFFIRMED.
5-2-11

-- 5 of 5 --