Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Konica Minolta Business Solutions U.s.a., Inc.

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
No. 10-1239
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
KONICA MINOLTA BUSINESS SOLUTIONS U.S.A., INC.,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 09 C 1902—Blanche M. Manning, Judge.
ARGUED SEPTEMBER 23, 2010—DECIDED APRIL 29, 2011
Before CUDAHY, FLAUM, and WOOD, Circuit Judges.
WOOD, Circuit Judge. In October 2005, Konica Minolta
Business Solutions (“Konica”) fired Elliot Thompson, who
had been working there as a salesman for only eight
months. Soon after, Thompson, an African-American,
filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Opportu-
nity Employment Commission (the “EEOC” or “Commis-
sion”). The charge alleged that Konica subjected him

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2 No. 10-1239
to different terms and conditions of employment, disci-
plined him for not meeting a sales quota, and ultimately
fired him after he filed a race-discrimination com-
plaint with the firm’s human resources department. In
June 2008, the EEOC issued a subpoena to Konica
seeking information about its hiring practices. Konica
refused to comply, arguing that the requested materials
were irrelevant to Thompson’s charge of race discrim-
ination. On March 29, 2009, the EEOC filed an applica-
tion with the district court for an order enforcing the
subpoena. The district court issued the order, and
Konica appealed. We affirm.
I
During Thompson’s tenure with Konica, the company
had four facilities in and around Chicago. In addition
to Tinley Park, where Thompson worked, Konica had
offices in Rolling Meadows, Downers Grove, and Chicago.
The Tinley Park facility is now closed. Thompson’s charge,
filed with the EEOC on November 1, 2005, stated:
Since the beginning of my employment, my Branch
Manager has subjected me to different terms and
conditions of employment. On or about October 5,
2005, I was disciplined for not meeting sales quotas,
whereas a non-Black similarly situated co-worker
was not disciplined for not meeting his quota. On or
about October 21, 2005, I complained to [the] Human
Resources Department about race discrimination. On
or about October 31, 2005, I was discharged. I believe
I have been discriminated against and retaliated

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No. 10-1239 3
against because of my race, Black, in violation of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended.
After receiving this charge, the EEOC initiated an
investigation; at first, Konica cooperated with the
agency’s requests for information. The Commission
discovered that there were only six blacks employed
at Konica, out of 120 total employees in the identified
facilities, and all six were employed in Tinley Park. Of
the approximately 100 employees at the other locations,
only one was a person of color. The EEOC also learned
that there were two sales teams at the Tinley Park
facility, and those teams were segregated largely along
racial lines. Thompson’s team was made up of five
black employees and two white employees. These facts
led the EEOC to suspect that Konica might have
engaged in discriminatory hiring practices. Specifically,
the Commission thought that the company may inten-
tionally have steered black employees to one sales
team, which was located at the Tinley Park facility and
worked in predominantly African-American neighbor-
hoods.
In June 2008, the EEOC issued a subpoena requesting
records relating to the hiring of sales personnel at all
four of Konica’s Chicago-area facilities. The subpoena
sought information about people who expressed
an interest in sales work at any of those offices; the ap-
plications Konica reviewed to fill sales positions; com-
munications with applicants about sales positions; evalu-
ations for each applicant considered for a sales position;
the personal information, including race, of each ap-

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4 No. 10-1239
plicant hired to fill a sales position and information
about whether that person was promoted or transferred;
and the criteria used to evaluate applicants for sales
positions. Konica filed a petition with the EEOC to
revoke the subpoena; the Commission denied its re-
quest. Konica then notified the EEOC by letter that it
was refusing to comply with the subpoena. On March 26,
2009, the EEOC filed an application with the district
court for an order enforcing the subpoena.
II
A
The district court granted the EEOC’s application,
largely for the reasons that Magistrate Judge Ashman
had set forth in his report and recommendation. While
the district court’s discussion of the report and recom-
mendation was cursory, and it would have been helpful
for all concerned if the court had given a better explana-
tion of its reasons for overruling Konica’s objections, its
order was adequate for purposes of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 72(b)(3) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). EEOC sub-
poena enforcement proceedings “ ‘are designed to be
summary in nature.’ ” EEOC v. United Air Lines, Inc., 287
F.3d 643, 649 (7th Cir. 2002) (quoting EEOC v. Tempel
Steel Co., 814 F.2d 482, 485 (7th Cir. 1987)). A district
court must enforce an administrative subpoena “[a]s
long as the investigation is within the agency’s authority,
the subpoena is not too indefinite, and the informa-
tion sought is reasonably relevant. . . .” Tempel Steel Co.,
814 F.2d at 485. We review aspects of the district court’s

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No. 10-1239 5
enforcement decision that depend on findings of fact
deferentially, but, as usual, we consider questions of law
de novo. United Air Lines, 287 F.3d at 649. As both parties
conceded at oral argument, this case presents a straight-
forward question of law.
B
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,
proscribes discriminatory employment practices on the
basis of “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2, 2000e-3. Congress entrusted the
EEOC with the primary responsibility for enforcing
Title VII. See EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54, 62 (1984)
(citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a)). Once a person files a
charge of discrimination with the Commission, it is
required to investigate. University of Pennsylvania v.
EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 190 (1990). The EEOC’s investiga-
tive authority, however, is limited to “evidence ‘relevant
to the charge under investigation.’ ” Shell Oil, 466 U.S. at
64 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(a)).
The Supreme Court in Shell Oil articulated a generous
standard of relevance for purposes of EEOC subpoenas.
The agency need only satisfy a burden we described
as “not particularly onerous,” United Air Lines, 287 F.3d at
652, to obtain “virtually any material that might cast
light on the allegations against the employer,” Shell Oil,
466 U.S. at 68-69. The agency must have “a realistic expec-
tation rather than an idle hope” that the information
requested will advance its investigation of the charge,

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6 No. 10-1239
United Air Lines, 287 F.3d at 652-53 (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted). This standard of relevance
is broader than the standard embodied in the Federal
Rule of Evidence 401. See United Air Lines, 287 F.3d at 652-
53 (citing United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S.
805, 814 (1984)). The better analogy, however, for this
purpose is to the standard found in Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 26, which says that “[r]elevant informa-
tion [for civil discovery purposes] need not be admis-
sible at the trial if the discovery appears reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evi-
dence.” FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). As the Supreme Court
recognized in Shell Oil, the role given to the Commission
in the statute calls for a relevance standard broad
enough to ensure that the “Commission’s ability to in-
vestigate charges of systemic discrimination not be im-
paired.” 466 U.S. at 69.
When the EEOC investigates a charge of race discrim-
ination for purposes of Title VII, it is authorized to con-
sider whether the overall conditions in a workplace
support the complaining employee’s allegations. Racial
discrimination is “by definition class discrimination,” and
information concerning whether an employer discrimi-
nated against other members of the same class for the
purposes of hiring or job classification may cast light on
whether an individual person suffered discrimination.
See United Air Lines, 287 F.3d at 653 (citing Blue Bell Boots,
Inc. v. EEOC, 418 F.2d 355, 358 (6th Cir. 1969)). For
that reason, the EEOC is authorized to subpoena
“evidence concerning employment practices other than
those specifically charged by complainants” in the course

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No. 10-1239 7
of its investigation. United Air Lines, 287 F.3d at 653 (inter-
nal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also
EEOC v. Bay Shipbuilding Corp., 668 F.2d 304, 311 n.8
(7th Cir. 1981) (“The courts uniformly uphold the
relevancy of EEOC subpoenas seeking information about
discrimination not specifically alleged in the charge.”).
Konica nonetheless argues that the information about
its hiring practices that the EEOC wanted to examine is
not relevant to Thompson’s charge of discrimination.
Its perspective is too narrow. The Commission is
entitled generally to investigate employers within its
jurisdiction to see if there is a prohibited pattern or
practice of discrimination. Here, Thompson alleged both
a specific instance and such a pattern of race discrim-
ination. He asserted that he was treated differently
from white co-workers in the “terms and conditions” of
his employment, and that he was unequally disciplined
for not meeting a sales quota. It is true that Thompson
was not saying that Konica had refused to hire him,
but that does not make hiring data irrelevant. The
question under Shell Oil and its progeny is not whether
Thompson specifically alleged discrimination in hiring,
but instead is whether information regarding Konica’s
hiring practices will “cast light” on Thompson’s race
discrimination complaint.
We have no trouble concluding that the information
the EEOC is seeking meets that standard. The answer to
the question whether Konica discriminates in hiring or
in assigning employees to its various facilities will
advance the agency’s investigation into possible discrimi-

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8 No. 10-1239
nation against Thompson based on his race, as well as
any more general case it might choose to bring. Addi-
tionally, although it was not required to do so, the
EEOC advanced another theory explaining how Konica’s
hiring information is relevant to Thompson’s claim. The
Commission says that the hiring data might also cast
light on whether Konica discriminated against Thompson
when it assigned him to a particular sales territory. This
is an issue that falls squarely within Thompson’s al-
legation of discrimination in the “terms and conditions”
of employment. Because the appeal now before us raises
only the question whether the subpoena is enforceable,
we express no opinion on whether Konica’s alleged
sales territory assignment based on race violates Title VII.
But see Chaney v. Plainfield Healthcare Center, 612 F.3d
908, 913 (7th Cir. 2010) (“It is now widely accepted
that a company’s desire to cater to the perceived racial
preferences of its customers is not a defense under
Title VII for treating employees differently based on
race.”).
From the perspective of the investigation, it is worth
recalling that a “charge of employment discrimination
is not the equivalent of a complaint initiating a lawsuit”;
its purpose is simply to notify the EEOC of an allega-
tion that an employer has violated Title VII. Shell Oil,
466 U.S. at 68. The Commission is required to investigate
a person’s charge of discrimination and pursue all
relevant leads to determine whether the charge warrants
a lawsuit. Only if the information collected during
the investigation suggests that “there is ‘reasonable
cause’ to believe that the employer has engaged in an

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No. 10-1239 9
unlawful employment practice, does the matter assume
the form of an adversary proceeding.” Id.
Nothing in this record suggests that the EEOC has
strayed so far from either Thompson’s charge or its
broader mission that it has embarked on the proverbial
fishing expedition. The Commission has a “realistic
expectation rather than an idle hope” that the hiring
materials it seeks will illuminate the facts and circum-
stances surrounding Thompson’s allegations of race
discrimination. Contrary to Konica’s argument, this
case does not present the problem we identified in
United Air Lines. There, an employee of American origin
residing in France alleged that United discriminated
against her by failing to contribute into the French
social security system on her behalf. Evidence sug-
gested that United did contribute for French employees.
In the course of its investigation, the EEOC sub-
poenaed extensive information on all United employees
residing abroad who had taken a medical leave. Id. at
654. We found that the information sought went “far
beyond” an inquiry about which of United’s employees
received the benefit of United’s making payments into
the French social security system. Id. In particular, we
noted that the EEOC did not limit its information
request to employees who may have been considered
“similarly situated” to the complainant, either in terms
of position or location. Id. Here, in contrast, the EEOC
limited its inquiry to the four Konica branches in the
Chicago area and to sales personnel. We conclude that
the information sought by the EEOC in this case is
properly tailored to matters within its authority.

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10 No. 10-1239
C
Finally, we briefly address two additional issues raised
by Konica. In its briefs, Konica expends considerable
energy arguing that the district court made clearly er-
roneous factual findings when it construed Thompson’s
charge. According to Konica, because Thompson
alleged only “discipline and discharge” discrimination,
the district court’s “finding” that the charge included
allegations about the discriminatory assignment of sales
territories is clearly erroneous. Konica’s focus on factual
findings is misguided. The interpretation of an EEOC
charge presents a question of law that we review de novo,
not a question of fact. See Conner v. Ill. Dep’t of Natural
Resources, 413 F.3d 675, 680 (7th Cir. 2005). We need not,
however, give further attention to the outer limits of
the charge, because our conclusion that the materials
subpoenaed by the EEOC are relevant to its investiga-
tion of Thompson’s charge resolves this appeal. As we
have noted, information about Konica’s hiring practices
will cast light on Thompson’s race discrimination com-
plaint. Moreover, although Konica does not explicitly
put it this way, it may be implying that Thompson’s
charge of discrimination is inadequate to permit the
EEOC to investigate broader practices of discrimination
at the Chicago facilities. We have already explained
why the EEOC is entitled to obtain access to the infor-
mation it has subpoenaed in this case, which should
be enough to put Konica’s argument to rest. We remind
the parties that should the agency later conclude that a
broader investigation is warranted, the Commission is
entitled to file its own charge, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b), in

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No. 10-1239 11
which it can allege a pattern or practice of discrimina-
tion and calibrate its investigation accordingly. See
United Air Lines, 287 F.3d at 655 n.7. Shell Oil’s
relevance standard would then need to be applied to
any such charge from the Commission.
Though Konica spared no effort in arguing for a
narrow construction of Thompson’s charge, it failed
adequately to develop its argument that compliance
with the subpoena would constitute an undue burden.
A court can “modify or exclude portions of a sub-
poena only if the employer ‘carries the difficult burden
of showing that the demands are unduly burdensome or
unreasonably broad.’ ” United Air Lines, 287 F.3d at 643
(quoting FTC v. Shaffner, 626 F.2d 32, 38 (7th Cir. 1980)).
There is a presumption in favor of requiring an em-
ployer’s compliance with a subpoena when the Com-
mission inquires into legitimate matters of public inter-
est. See Shaffner, 626 F.2d at 38. Race discrimination
continues to be a matter of grave public concern. A
conclusory statement that an EEOC request is burden-
some is insufficient to overcome the presumption that
Konica must comply with the subpoena. United Air Lines,
287 F.3d at 643. Here, Konica asserts that the informa-
tion sought would constitute an undue burden because
the company would have to obtain, organize, and
produce the materials. Konica’s argument merely recog-
nizes that any request for information requires the pro-
vider to collect and tender materials. This argument falls
far short of what is required to modify or quash a sub-
poena.

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12 No. 10-1239
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
4-29-11

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