Joshua Hoskins v. Thomas Dart

The appellees were never served with process in the å
district court and are not participating in these appeals. After
examining the appellant’s brief and the record, we have con-
cluded that oral argument is unnecessary. Thus, the appeals
are submitted on the appellant’s brief and the record. See Fed.
R. App. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Nos. 10-1619, 10-1627, 10-1629, 10-1640 & 10-1643
JOSHUA HOSKINS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
THOMAS DART, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
Nos. 10 C 0677, 10 C 0703, 10 C 0705, 10 C 0702 &
10 C 0676—Blanche M. Manning, Judge.
SUBMITTED DECEMBER 22, 2010 —DECIDED JANUARY 20, 2011 å
Before BAUER, TINDER, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.

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2 Nos. 10-1619, 10-1627, 10-1629, 10-1640 & 10-1643
PER CURIAM. Joshua Hoskins, a prisoner in Illinois,
brought five suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the
Sheriff of Cook County, Illinois, and various prison offi-
cers. The district court dismissed Hoskins’ suits after
concluding that he fraudulently misrepresented his
litigation history to the court. We affirm.
Hoskins’ five complaints allege that the officers used
excessive physical force against him and others, left
him naked overnight in a cold, drafty cell during the
winter, denied him prescribed psychiatric medication,
and refused to process prisoner grievances adequately.
Hoskins completed his five complaints on court-issued
forms. Each form ordered him to list “ALL lawsuits”
that he had filed or risk dismissal of his case. The warning
for violating the order appears in bold, capitalized font:
“YOU WILL NOT BE EXCUSED FROM FILLING OUT
THIS SECTION COMPLETELY, AND FAILURE TO DO
SO MAY RESULT IN DISMISSAL OF YOUR CASE.” A
year earlier, Hoskins had filed three federal civil rights
cases on similar claims, all of which he was still
litigating, but Hoskins did not list them on any of the
five complaints. Instead, he prominently made large X’s
through the litigation-history portion of his complaints.
He then certified the accuracy of his complaints by
signing each of them below a warning cautioning him
that if his certification was incorrect, he “may be subject
to sanctions by the court.”
The district court screened the cases and discovered
that Hoskins had omitted his litigation history. The
district court found that the omissions were fraudulent

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Nos. 10-1619, 10-1627, 10-1629, 10-1640 & 10-1643 3
and then dismissed each case with prejudice. The court
reasoned that Hoskins made material and false omis-
sions because he failed to identify the three cases that he
was currently litigating before the court. The court noted
that Hoskins certified the complaints’ accuracy even
though they were incorrect. Because Hoskins had
recently filed those three pending cases and was still
actively litigating them, the court concluded that the
omissions were not accidental, so dismissal with pre-
judice was an appropriate sanction. Hoskins appeals.
We review the district court’s finding of fraud for clear
error and its dismissal of Hoskins’ claims with prejudice
for abuse of discretion. See Thomas v. General Motors
Acceptance Corp., 288 F.3d 305, 307-08 (7th Cir. 2002).
The district court did not clearly err in finding that
Hoskins’ omissions were both material and intentional,
and thus fraudulent. Hoskins does not deny that he
filed and was still actively litigating the three cases. Nor
does he deny that his signed complaints contained
the highlighted instructions ordering him to list those
lawsuits. Hoskins insists, instead, that his omission
was innocent. He claims that he trusted another inmate
who helped him on a previous case and who told him
that he could ignore the portion of the complaint form
requiring that he list his litigation history. But he
signed the complaints, and the signature page (which
he does not deny reading) advised him that his signa-
ture certified the truth of the entire complaint, including
the litigation-history section that Hoskins crossed out.
The court was within its rights in rejecting his claim of

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4 Nos. 10-1619, 10-1627, 10-1629, 10-1640 & 10-1643
innocence and finding fraud. See generally Dugan v. R.J.
Corman R.R. Co., 344 F.3d 662, 667 (7th Cir. 2003) (noting
that there is no “I didn’t read it” defense to signed con-
tracts).
Having found fraud, the district court had the discre-
tion to dismiss Hoskins’ cases as a sanction. In general,
courts may impose appropriate sanctions, including
dismissal or default, against litigants who violate
discovery rules and other rules and orders designed to
enable judges to control their dockets and manage the
flow of litigation. See, e.g., Wickens v. Shell Oil Co., 620
F.3d 747, 759 (7th Cir. 2010) (affirming district court’s
discretionary decision to impose lesser sanction for
failure to make disclosure under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1));
In re Thomas Consolidated Industries, Inc., 456 F.3d 719, 724-
25 (7th Cir. 2006) (affirming dismissal as discovery sanc-
tion); Newman v. Metropolitan Pier & Exposition Auth., 962
F.2d 589, 591 (7th Cir. 1992) (affirming dismissal as dis-
covery sanction); Hindmon v. National-Ben Franklin Life
Ins. Corp., 677 F.2d 617, 618 (7th Cir. 1982) (affirming
dismissal and default as discovery sanction). Sanctions
may include dismissing complaints containing fraud-
ulent information. See Sloan v. Lesza, 181 F.3d 857, 858-59
(7th Cir. 1999) (dismissing appeal for deception about
“striking out” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)); see also
Ammons v. Gerlinger, 547 F.3d 724, 725 (7th Cir. 2008)
(dismissing appeal for deception about financial status);
Taylor v. Chicago Police Dept., 2008 WL 2477694, at *4
(N.D. Ill. June 18, 2008) (Dow, J.) (dismissing action in
part for fraudulent omission of litigation history), aff’d,
Taylor v. City of Chicago, 334 F. App’x 760 (7th Cir. June 23,

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Nos. 10-1619, 10-1627, 10-1629, 10-1640 & 10-1643 5
2009). Such sanctions are permissible in a case like
this because a district court relies on a party’s descrip-
tion of his litigation history to manage its docket. Disclo-
sure of a prisoner’s litigation history enables a court to
adhere to the three-strike requirement of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(g). See Sloan, 181 F.3d at 858-59 (describing need
for reliable information about prior litigation).
We have considered cases with similar facts before,
albeit in non-precedential decisions and without having
to decide whether a fraudulent litigation history justi-
fied the sanction of dismissal with prejudice. See, e.g.,
Taylor v. City of Chicago, 334 F. App’x at 761 (affirming on
alternative grounds without reaching issue of fraud on
the court by omission of litigation history); Heard v.
Blagojevich, 216 F. App’x 568, 571 (7th Cir. Feb. 7, 2007)
(noting that a district court has discretionary authority
to dismiss a case as a sanction for filing a fraudulent
complaint, but remanding on other grounds). Other
circuits have decided that a fraudulent litigation history
warrants dismissal, but again in non-precedential deci-
sions. See Greer v. Schriro, 255 F. App’x 285 (9th Cir.
Nov. 26, 2007); Hood v. Tompkins, 197 F. App’x 818, 819
(11th Cir. Aug. 7, 2006) (per curiam); Byrd v. Romley, 131
F. App’x 548, 549 (9th Cir. May 13, 2005); Albright v.
Holden, 99 F.3d 1145 (9th Cir. Oct. 15, 1996). Because of the
importance of affirming a district court’s discretion to
impose sanctions, including dismissal, against litigants
who intentionally misrepresent their litigation history,
we publish our decision today.
Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion
in this case. The court correctly acknowledged that it

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6 Nos. 10-1619, 10-1627, 10-1629, 10-1640 & 10-1643
should generally consider lesser sanctions before dis-
missing a complaint with prejudice, citing Oliver v.
Gramely, 200 F.3d 465, 466 (7th Cir. 1999). We view the
court’s citation of Oliver as demonstrating that it con-
sidered lesser sanctions. Monetary sanctions are gen-
erally not as effective against a pro se plaintiff proceeding
as a pauper, as Hoskins does here. Furthermore, the
form complaint prominently warned Hoskins of the
potential consequence of sanctions and dismissal. We
have upheld dismissals after district courts have warned
litigants about consequences of disobeying other court
rules that are needed to manage judicial business. See
Fischer v. Cingular Wireless, LLC, 446 F.3d 663, 665-66
(7th Cir. 2006); Ball v. City of Chicago, 2 F.3d 752, 755-56
(7th Cir. 1993). Although the district court would have
been well within its discretion in choosing a less severe
sanction, dismissal was permissible without further
warning or opportunity to cure in light of the warning
on the complaint form and the district court’s finding
of fraud.
The five dismissals were sanctions for disobeying a
court rule, not rulings that the suits failed to state a
claim or were frivolous or malicious (which requires a
finding, absent here, of an intent to harass, see Lindell v.
McCallum, 352 F.3d 1107, 1109-10 (7th Cir. 2003)) under 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Therefore
Hoskins incurs no strikes, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); Turley
v. Gaetz, 625 F.3d 1005, 1008-09 (7th Cir. 2010), but
remains liable for all applicable filing fees.
AFFIRMED.
1-20-11

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