Opinion

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
December2,2010

Before

RICHARD A. P OSNER,CircuitJudge

MICHAEL S. K ANNE ,CircuitJudge

TERENCE T. E VANS ,CircuitJudge


No.10–2407

STEVEN J. THOROGOOD, individually and
onbehalfofallotherssimilarlysituated,
PlaintiffAppellee,

v.

SEARS , ROEBUCKAND C OMPANY,
DefendantAppellant.



AppealfromtheUnitedStates
DistrictCourtfortheNorthern
DistrictofIllinois,EasternDivision.

No.06C1999

HarryD.Leinenweber,Judge.




ORDER
The plaintiffappellee filed a petition for panel rehearing, and rehearing en banc, on
November16,2010.Allthejudgesonthepanelhavevotedtodenythepetition,andnojudge
hasrequestedavoteonrehearingthecaseenbanc.Butinviewoftheaccusationsleveledinthe
petition by the plaintiff’s lawyer, Clinton A. Krislov, against the panel’s decision, we have
decidedthatafurtherstatement,beyondmerelyreportingthedenialofthepetition,wouldbe
helpfultoreadersofthepanelopinion(2010WL4286367,Nov.2,2010;ourearlieropinionsin
thisprotractedlitigationarereportedat547F.3d742and595F.3d759),readersofthepetition
forrehearing—andperhapsevenMr.Krislov,whoseaccusationsareoverthetop,asweshall
nowexplain,andwhomaywishtomoderatehisfury.
The petition expresses in tones of outrage (1) disagreement with the merits of our
decision,includingthescopeoftheinjunctionthatweorderedthedistrictcourttoenter;and(2)
outrageatthepanel’scharacterizationofKrislov’sandBoling’slitigationtactics.MarkBolingis
Krislov’scocounselintheCaliforniacopycatclassactionsuitthatweorderedenjoinedonthe

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authority of the All Writs Act. Krislov is the colorful attorney (and Illinois politician 1 ) who in
theoralargumentofthefirstappealinthislawsuitaboutallegedruststainsinclothesdryers
sold by Sears Roebuck asked us to quiz our wives as to whether they worry that a “stainless
steel“clothesdryermightcauseruststainsontheclothesbeingdriedunlessthedryer’sdrum
was made entirely of stainless steel. The wives unanimously answered “no.” Given Krislov’s
challenge(askyourwives),thatshouldhaveendedthislitigation.(Andspeakingofgender,we
noteKrislov’sremarkattheoralargument:“Nottobesexist,yourhonor,butmaybeweshould
havethisenbancsosomeofthefemalejudgesonthiscourtcouldsitandmightweighin.”This
may be an unacknowledged ground on which he is seeking not only panel rehearing but
rehearingenbanc.)
Thepetitionnotesatensionbetweenourinjunction(againsttheCaliforniaclassaction),
andoursimilarinjunctioninInreBridgestone/Firestone,Inc.TiresProductsLiabilityLitigation,333
F.3d763(7thCir.2003),ontheonehand,andtheSupremeCourt’sdecisionsinTaylorv.Sturgell,
553U.S.880(2008),andPhillipsPetroleumCo.v.Shutts,472U.S.797(1985),ontheotherhand.
But its failure to acknowledge the grant of certiorari in Smith v. Bayer, 131 S. Ct. 61 (2010)
(discussedinouropinion),istelling:theholdingsinthecasesthatKrislovcitesdonotriseto
the level of a “clear directive” from the Supreme Court. Instead a circuit split has developed
concerning whether and when class certification orders can serve as the basis for collateral
estoppel in other forums. Our opinion notes this tension and the possibility that the merits
decisioninSmithv.Bayer,whenitisissued,maywarrantmodificationoftheinjunctionthatwe
haveordered.
Thepetitionignorestheprincipalreasonsouropiniongaveforenjoiningthecopycatclass
action.ItsaysvirtuallynothingabouttheAllWritsAct,thoughthatwastheverygroundofour
decision, and makes a number of disingenuous statements such as that “rather than seeking
interlocutory review in the Ninth Circuit, Sears filed an All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. §1651 (‘All
Writs Act’) petition in the closed Thorogood case in the Northern District of Illinois seeking to
enjointhepreviousunnoticedclassmembersfrombringingclassclaimselsewhere.”Searscould
notappealtheCaliforniacourt’sorderbecauseitwasnotanappealableorder.
The petition ignores our point that class certification is improper given the nature of the
ruststains claim, which does not present “common issues of law or fact” that can support a
classaction.ItignoresourpointthatMurray’ssuitisindeedacopycat.Itignoresourcriticisms
of the twodistrict court opinions. It says that“the Panel…ordered the district judge to enjoin
classmembersfrompursuingcausesasaclassactionagainstSears,anywhere,”yetignoresthat
theopinionisexplicitthatindividualclaimsarenottobeenjoined.Evenclassactions“against
Sears, anywhere” are permitted, provided they are not based on theories rejected in our
1 As he explains in the petition, ““Whileitmaybethatsomenumberofattorneyswhobringclassactionsseekmerelyto
fattentheirpocketsattheexpenseoftheirclients,counselhereincannotbecountedamongthem.Since1983—over
thecourseofalmostfortyyears[actuallyjust27years]—Plaintiff’scounselhastakenontoughbattlesagainstdifficult
defendantsondifficultissuesinclass,derivative,andpublicinterestcases….Moreover,Ihaverunforpublicoffice,
always,onplatformsthatchallengedthestatusquoinourstate,andwhenIhavesucceededfinancially,Ihaveused
thatforthepublicgoodaswell….In2009,IfoundedandfundedtheCenterforOpenGovernmentlawclinicatIIT
ChicagoKentCollegeofLaw,whichuniquelyassistsindividualsingainingaccesstotheirgovernment,generally
undertheFreedomofInformationandOpenMeetingsActs,wherecurrentlysixcasesareproceeding”(emphasisin
original).

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decision.AnditignoresthatthepressuresonSearstosettleinthefaceofKrislov’sonslaughtof
litigationamountstoirreparableharm;weexplainedthat“thereisnowayinwhichSearscan
recoup the expense of responding to Murray’s extravagant discovery requests and of filing
preclusiondefensesagainstduplicativeclassactionsinotherstates.Theharmitfacesfromthe
denial of the injunction is irreparable and its remedy at law against settlement extortion
nonexistent.”
The petition states, without substantiation, that “this case was brought by a highly
educated metallurgic engineer, Steven Thorogood (‘Thorogood’), who carefully evaluated his
claims against Sears before taking action.” Even if this is true, there is no suggestion that
Murray,thenamedplaintiffinthecopycataction,hasanyrelevantbackgroundthatmighthave
helpedhimto“carefullyevaluatehisclaimsagainstSearsbeforetakingaction.”
ThefocusofKrislov’sconcernislanguageinouropinionthatheregardsasadhominem.
He insists that “the tone and rampant mischaracterizations of the opinion must be modified
eveniftheconclusionremains,becausetheopinionunjustifiablyportraysthecaseasmeritless,
lawyerdriven litigation, an accusation thoroughly belied by the record and the distinguished
careersofthelawyersinvolved….[T]hemeritsoftheclaims,thesuitabilityofcertifyingthecase
asaclassactionandtherefusaltoenjoinplaintiff’sCaliforniaonlystateclassactionhavebeen
legitimized by two independent federal district courts. Thus, to disparage the merits or
professional motivations of the parties or their counsel [i.e., Krislov and Boling] is unjustified
andmustbecorrectedbecauseitrunsafouloftheCodeofConductforUnitedStatesJudges.”
Hisspecificconcerniswiththephrases“settlementextortion,”“nearfrivolous,”“pugnacious,”
“pertinacioustoafault,”and“anuisance”thatappearintheopinion.Heignorestheevidence
and analysis that supports these characterizations, and similar characterizations by other
judges, and commentators, concerned with class actions that are believed to be abusive. He
ignorestherightandindeedthedutyofjudgestocriticizelawyerswhotrythepatienceofother
membersofthebar,andthecourts.
Krislov criticizes what he calls “the Panel’s choice to personally attack Plaintiff’s counsel
[himself],inlieuofrecognizingthesounddiscretionoftwofederaldistrictcourts”(emphasisin
original). The opinion explains that the district judge in Illinois, whose decision we were
reviewing, appeared to have overlooking several relevant considerations: “He seems to have
believedthatpleadingresjudicataorcollateralestoppelalwaysprovidesadequatereliefagainst
vexatiouslitigation.Thiscaseshowsthatitdoesnot,asdothesimilarcaseswecitedearlierand
the cases that say that enjoining vexatious litigation is preferable to the harassment of an
expensive,timeconsumingproceduretoprove[adefendant’s]resjudicataorestoppelclaimsin
another court.” And the district judge in California—whose ruling, to repeat, cannot be
appealed,eventhough,ifitstands,itforcesSearstoengageincostlydiscovery,asemphasized
byBolinginurgingasettlementfavorabletotheclass—wasconfusedabouttherecord,asour
opinionexplains.
Krislovsaysthat“Sears’resorttothisCircuitforthepreclusiveshotistransparentforum
shopping,lookingforthisCourt’sderisoryviewoftheclaimtoinfluenceitintobindingallclass
members nationwide, because the Ninth Circuit’s standards are decidedly more favorable to
plaintiffs’claims.”Thisiswhatisknownaschutzpah,sinceKrislovbroughthiscopycatsuitin
Californiabecause,ashesaysunguardedly,“theNinthCircuit’sstandardsaredecidedlymore

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favorable to plaintiffs claims.” Sears was not engaged in forum shopping. Only one forum
offered the possibility of relief. Because it could not appeal the interlocutory order of the
Californiajudge,theonlyplacetogotoseekreliefagainstbeingsuedalloverthecountryon
frivolousgroundsaimedatsecuringasettlementwasthedistrictcourtinIllinois.
Krislovsays:“IfthelogicofRhonePoulenc[InreRhonePoulencRorer,Inc.,51F.3d1293(7th
Cir. 1995)] remains accurate, then Sears had an adequate remedy to seek mandamus in the
NinthCircuit,overtheNorthernDistrictofCalifornia’sdenialofDefendants’MotiontoStrike.”
Thismissesthepoint:theAllWritsActpermitscourtstoissueinjunctiverelieftoprotectand
effectuatetheirownjudgments,sothatwinningpartieswillnotbeforcedtolitigateadefenseof
collateral estoppel (or seek mandamus orders) in every subsequent forum in which they are
harassedwiththesamelegalclaimuntiltheycry“Uncle!”
He says: “Just as the court is entitled to be treated with the respect [sic] by litigants and
their counsel, litigants and their counsel are entitled to be treated with respect by the court.”
Well,hedoesn’ttreatuswithmuchrespect,statinginthepetitionforrehearingenbancthathe
filedafterourfirstopinion:“thePanel’sopinionreadsmorelikeapostinginitsauthor’swell
known blog (www.beckerposnerblog.com), declaring its view of class actions,
mischaracterizingclasscounselasbeinginherentlycorruptedbytheinducementtoselloutits
clients’ small claims for its own fees obtained through a collusive settlement…. [T]he panel
opinion blatantly ignored the record evidence and substituted the authoring judge’s personal
economic theories and baseless factual declarations for the developed record.” And in his
currentpetitionhesaysthat“theCourt’sclearlyprejudicedopinionpresentsanunsupported,
oped style portrayal of class action attorneys that paints with a brush so broad that it
demonizes all class action attorneys as inherently motivated to sell out their clients for small
recoveries,toobtainlargefees,andgoeswelloverthetopinitscharacterizationofundersigned
counsel’sactionsandmotivation.Moreover,itappearstorunafoulofCanon3oftheCodeof
ConductforUnitedStatesJudges….Indeed,thePanel’sroleastheselfassuredSimonCowell
oftheCircuitsdemeansnotjustus,buttheCourtaswell”(emphasisinoriginal).
(Who,youask,isSimonCowell?Hewasthecantankerousjudgeon“AmericanIdol.”See
www.youtube.com/watch?v=a3cTEQFP3VQ(visitedDec.1,2010).)
Attorney Krislov says that the panel’s “exceedingly facile approach disregards the
highlydesirableroleofpersuasiveauthorityanditsunderlyingreasoningintheAmericanlegal
system…. In the real world, whichever way the first decision goes stands as some persuasive
authority for subsequent ones. Cumulatively, the decisional tide of opinions would trend
toward one competing theory until one or the other was ultimately accepted as either
consensus, or simply correct, or correct in that jurisdiction.” Translated, this means that
Krislov’sstrategyistobringidenticalorsimilarsuitsindifferentjurisdictionsuntilhewinsone,
thenusethejudgmentinthatsuitasresjudicataorcollateralestoppelinthenextsuit,andthe
next,andthenext,untilSearsgivesup.Aswenotedinouropinion,Krislovwantedajudgment
(ratherthandismissalongroundsofmootness,Searshavingofferedanuisancesettlementwell
inexcessofthemaximumamountofmoneythatThorogood’sindividualclaimwasworth)so
that he could use it to block Sears from defending the next suit, which turned out to be the
Californiasuit.

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“Zestingtosmeartheplaintiff’scounsel,”saysKrislov,”thePanel’scharacterizationofthe
letter[thereferenceistococounselBoling’slettertoSears,whichwereprintedasanappendix
toouropinion]as‘settlementextortion’lackssupportintherecord,sameasthePanelauthor’s
declarationthatMr.Boling’s‘olivebranch’lettersoughttosellouttheclass….Thelettersimply
detailsthatthecaseisgoingforward,discoverywilllikelyproducemoredamagingevidence,
which could generate greater damages, and plaintiffs are offering an ‘olive branch,’ exploring
defendants’appetitefornegotiatinganagreedresolution.Thereisnothingimplyingasellout.
Instead, the letter proposes discussing a solution that would be in the best interest of both
sides—preciselywhatcounselareoftendirectedtodobycourtsalloverthecountry.”Thisisa
joke. Both parties know the letter is a demand for favorable settlement terms. The letter itself
contradicts Krislov’s claim. It declares that “discovery will likely produce more damaging
evidence, which could generate greater damages…. [I]f plaintiff is successful on a motion for
class certification, the court as the gate keeper will demand a more significant recovery for
resolution.”
Krislovisconcernedwithharshlanguageinouropinion,butoverstatesthecasewhenhe
decries “characterization of plaintiff class action lawyers as inherently corrupt and motivated
primarilytosellouttheclassinordertogainlargefees.”Whatwesaidwasthatthestructureof
class actions under Rule 23 of the federal rules gives class action lawyers an incentive to
negotiatesettlementsthatenrichthemselvesbutgivescantrewardtoclassmembers,whileat
thesametimetheburdenofrespondingtoclassplaintiffs’discoverydemandsgivesdefendants
anincentivetoagreetoearlysettlementthatmaytreattheclassactionlawyersbetterthanthe
class.Classactionattorneyshavean“inherentmotivation”toenrichthemselvesattheexpense
of the class (and with the connivance of defendants), but motivation is not a synonym for
action; any actual corruption or selling out is gauged case by case. The Boling letter is some
indicationthatthepresentcaseissuchacase.
Thecriticismsinouropinionofthetacticsemployedbysomeclassactionlawyersarenot
criticismsmadebyjudgesalone,letalonebyjudgesoftheSeventhCircuitaloneormembersof
thispanelalone.Ouropiniongavesomeexamples:“Thedefendantwantstominimizeoutflow
of expenditures and the class counsel wants to increase inflow of attorneys’ fees. Both can
achievetheirgoalsiftheycolludetosacrificetheinterestsoftheclass.”ChristopherR.Leslie,
“TheSignificanceofSilence:CollectiveActionProblemsandClassActionSettlements,”59Fla.
L.Rev.71,79–81(2007)(footnoteomitted);seealsoJohnC.Coffee,Jr.,“LitigationGovernance:
Taking Accountability Seriously,” 110 Colum. L. Rev. 288, 326–27 (2010). Two of the examples
were opinions by Judge Henry Friendly, the very respected Second Circuit judge: Saylor v.
Lindsley,456F.2d896,900–01(2dCir.1972);AlleghanyCorp.v.Kirby,333F.2d327,347(2dCir.
1964)(dissentingopinion).Wegaveadditionalexamplesinourfirstopinionintheclothesdryer
litigation:Parker v. Time Warner Entertainment Co., L.P., 331 F.3d 13, 22 (2d Cir. 2003); Newtonv.Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 165–68 (3d Cir. 2001); Jeffrey W. Stempel,
“Class Actions and Limited Vision,” 83 Wash. U. L.Q. 1127, 1213–14(2005); Bruce L. Hay &
DavidRosenberg,“’Sweetheart’and‘Blackmail’SettlementsinClassActions,”75NotreDameL.
Rev.1377,1389–92(2000);BruceL.Hay,“AsymmetricRewards:WhyClassActions(May)Settle
forTooLittle,”48HastingsL.J.479,485–89(1997);SusanP.Koniak&GeorgeM.Cohen,“Under
CloakofSettlement,”82Va.L.Rev.1051,1053–57(1996)(describingtheclassactionas“lawyer

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selfdealing on a grand scale,” id. at 1053); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, “The
Plaintiff’s Attorney’s Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation,” 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 22–
26(1991). And the criticisms can be found in other opinions of this court. See, e.g., Szabo v.
BridgeportMachines,Inc.,249F.3d672(7thCir.2001);Blairv.EquifaxCheckServices,Inc.,
181 F.3d 832, 834 (7th Cir. 1999); Vollmer v. Selden, 350 F.3d 656, 660 (7th Cir. 2003); In re
RhonePoulencRorer,Inc.,supra,51F.3dat1298–99.
Wantmore?Thereisplentymore,includingreferencesinSupremeCourtaswellascourt
of appeals opinions to the danger of collusion between class action lawyers and defendants’
lawyers.StoneridgeInvestmentPartners,LLCv.ScientificAtlanta,552U.S.148,163–64(2008);Ortiz
v.FibreboardCorp.,527U.S.815,852–53(1999);AmChemProducts,Inc.v.Windsor,521U.S.591,
621–22(1997);BlueChipStampsv.ManorDrugStores,421U.S.723,740–41(1975);Sullivanv.DB
Investments,Inc.,613F.3d134,149–50(3dCir.2010);InreGeneralMotorsCorp.PickUpTruckFuel
Tank Products Liability Litigation, 55 F.3d 768, 802 (3d Cir. 1995); Weinberger v. Great Northern
NekoosaCorp.,925F.2d518,524(1stCir.1991);InreAgentOrangeProductLiabilityLitigation,818
F.2d216,223–25(2dCir.1987);Piambinov.Bailey,757F.2d1112,1139andn.68(11thCir.1985);
Shelton v. Pargo, Inc., 582 F.2d 1298, 1306–07 (4th Cir. 1978); Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe
Co., 576 F.2d 1157,1169 (5th Cir.1978). Thereare also references tosettlement extortion: Jones
MotorCo.v.Holtkamp,Liese,Beckemeier&Childress,P.C.,197F.3d1190,1193(7thCir.1999);Byrne
v.Nezhat,261F.3d1075,1129–31(11thCir.2001);Duhaimev.JohnHancockMutualLifeIns.Co.,
183F.3d1,6–7(1stCir.1999).
Neither the judges on this panel nor other federal judges so far as we are aware have
deniedthattheclassactionisaworthwhiledevice,andindeedisindispensableforthelitigation
ofmanymeritoriousclaims.Butlikemanyothergoodthingsitissubjecttoabuse.Ithasbeen
abusedinthestainlesssteelclothesdryerlitigation.
Thepetitionforrehearingis denied.Nojudgeofthiscourtinregularactiveservicehaving
requestedavoteonthepetitionforrehearingenbanc,rehearingenbancisalsodenied.

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