Olaronke Olufunmilayo Champion, also known as OLARONKE ADEYEMI v. ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General of the United States

The Honorable Sandra Day O’Connor, Associate Justice of the 1
United States Supreme Court (Ret.), sitting by designation
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 294(a).
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
No. 09-3065
OLARONKE OLUFUNMILAYO CHAMPION,
also known as OLARONKE ADEYEMI,
Petitioner,
v.
ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General
of the United States,
Respondent.
____________
Petition for Review of an Order
of the Board of Immigration Appeals
No. A072-571-274
____________
ARGUED MAY 19, 2010—DECIDED NOVEMBER 22, 2010
____________
Before O’CONNOR , Associate Justice, and WILLIAMS and 1
SYKES, Circuit Judges.
WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge. Olaronke Champion, a citizen of
Nigeria, legally entered the United States in 1988. The

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2 No. 09-3065
government initiated removal proceedings against her in
2005. Champion applied for cancellation of removal based
on the hardship that would result to her minor children if
she would be deported. The immigration judge (“IJ”)
denied her application, in part because he concluded that
other family members, including the children’s father who
was also under removal proceedings, were available to
support the children in the event that Champion was
deported. The Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”)
affirmed the denial of relief, and Champion petitioned this
court for review. We affirm the BIA’s findings with respect
to Champion’s due process claims because she had a full
opportunity to present her case and the IJ did not consider
improper information. However, because the BIA did not
address Champion’s claim that the possibility of the
deportation of the children’s father would constitute an
extremely unusual hardship, we remand for further
consideration.
I. BACKGROUND
Olaronke Champion is a native and citizen of Nigeria.
She entered the United States in 1988 under a tourist visa.
In 1991, she married a United States citizen and applied for
status adjustment based on her marriage. Immigration and
Naturalization Services denied her application, finding that
Champion had failed to provide sufficient evidence that an
earlier Nigerian marriage had been officially terminated. In
2005, the government commenced removal proceedings
against Champion. The government initially charged her
with committing visa fraud under the Immigration and

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No. 09-3065 3
Section 1229b(b) provides relief from removal proceedings if 2
an alien establishes: (1) continuous presence in the United States
for at least 10 years immediately preceding the cancellation
application; (2) good moral character for that time period; (3) no
convictions for any offense under §§ 1182(a)(2), 1227(a)(2), and
1227(a)(3); and (4) “that removal would result in exceptional and
extremely unusual hardship to the alien’s spouse, parent, or
child, who is a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully
admitted for permanent residence.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1).
Nationality Act (“INA”) § 212(a)(6)(C)(i) based on the
government’s belief that Champion had submitted a
fraudulent Nigerian divorce decree in conjunction with her
application for status adjustment. The government twice
amended these charges, first alleging that she had at-
tempted to enter the United States without a valid entry
document in violation of INA § 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I), and then
asserting that she had overstayed her visa in violation of
INA § 237(a)(1)(B). Ultimately, the government only
pursued the charge concerning Champion’s stay in the
United States past the expiration of her visa.
Champion conceded removability but requested cancella-
tion of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1). At her2
hearing before the IJ, the government stipulated that
Champion satisfied the cancellation requirements for moral
character, lack of convictions, and physical presence for
cancellation, leaving “exceptional or extremely unusual
hardship” to her family as the sole issue before the court.
As grounds for finding exceptional hardship, Champion
testified that she was the primary caregiver for her two
minor daughters, Tomi and Toni Adeyemi (aged 14 and 11

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4 No. 09-3065
at the time), both of whom were born in the United States.
Champion stated that she was concerned about taking her
daughters to Nigeria not only because it would be very
foreign to them, but also because she feared that they
might be subjected to female circumcision. Champion also
has a son, Tobi, who was 20 years old at the time and was
attending college in New York. Tobi was also under
removal proceedings. Champion and her two daughters
share a home in Hinsdale, Illinois with Champion’s
Nigerian ex-husband, Yomi Adeyemi, who is also the
father of the three children. Champion explained that
she and Yomi came to the United States together, after
which he became a physician and she a registered nurse.
According to Champion, Yomi has played an active role
in supporting the children emotionally and financially.
As for the rest of Champion’s relatives in the United
States, she has three siblings who have obtained lawful
resident status, including two sisters who reside in
Illinois and a brother who lives in Atlanta.
At the end of the hearing, Champion’s attorney re-
quested closing argument, but the IJ declined, saying that
he “would ask [counsel] to reserve on the closing argu-
ment” because there were “no significant issues of law or
really even fact, that needed to be discussed.” The IJ then
asked whether there was “anything else before he issue[d]
an oral decision,” and Champion’s attorney did not reply.
The IJ determined that Champion had not demonstrated
that she qualified for cancellation of removal because she
had not shown that her daughters would suffer the requi-
site exceptional or extremely unusual hardship if she were

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No. 09-3065 5
removed. The IJ specified that the children could still rely
on their father’s support in the United States as well as that
of other close relatives. Champion appealed, arguing that
the IJ failed to consider a number of factors important to
the hardship analysis, including Yomi’s potential deporta-
tion. Champion also asserted that her due process rights
were violated when the IJ refused to allow closing argu-
ment and when he referenced the marriage fraud allega-
tion. The BIA adopted and affirmed the IJ’s findings.
Champion now petitions this court for review.
II. ANALYSIS
Where, as here, the BIA affirms the IJ’s decision and
supplements with its own explanation for denying the
appeal, we review the IJ’s decision as supplemented by
the BIA’s reasoning. Juarez v. Holder, 599 F.3d 560, 564
(7th Cir. 2010). Before we turn to the merits, however,
we must first consider whether we have jurisdiction to
review the IJ’s discretionary and factual determination
that Champion was ineligible for cancellation of removal.
Generally, we do not have jurisdiction to evaluate discre-
tionary decisions made by the Attorney General, see 8
U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i). So we lack jurisdiction over
the BIA’s ultimate determination that Champion was
ineligible for cancellation of removal. Nonetheless,
under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D), we retain jurisdiction to
review constitutional claims and questions of law raised
in a petition for review.
We conclude that one of Champion’s central arguments
on appeal—that the BIA failed to consider the impact of

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6 No. 09-3065
The IJ cursorily mentioned that Yomi is under removal 3
proceedings, but only did so in the context of hypothesizing
about why he and Champion had not yet remarried.
Yomi’s potential removal—is a question of law appropriate
for our review. In large part, the BIA and the IJ based their
finding that Champion’s children would not suffer extreme
hardship on an assumption that Yomi, the children’s
father, would be available to emotionally and financially
support the children if Champion were deported to
Nigeria. At several points in the IJ’s oral ruling, he refer-
enced Yomi’s profession as a “physician in Chicago,”
saying that “Tomi and Toni can rely on their father’s
support”. The IJ went on to recount Yomi’s salary and the
various ways in which he had financially supported
Champion and their children over the years, including
lending Champion $40,000 to use as the down payment for
the family’s home and his contributions to the monthly
mortgage. The BIA also appeared to assume that Yomi3
would continue to be a source of support for the children
in the event that Champion is deported. For instance, the
BIA stated that “[i]t also appears that the two children
would likely have the companionship and assistance of
their father and two aunts, all of whom live either with or
near them,” and in a separate part of the opinion, again
noted that Yomi “is a physician and he could conceivably
provide continued financial support.”
We find that Champion’s allegation that the BIA ignored
the evidence she presented concerning Yomi’s potential
deportation was a good faith claim of legal error that we
may review. As we have previously held, “a claim that the

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No. 09-3065 7
However, we find that the BIA’s determination that Cham- 4
pion had clearly indicated her intention to leave her children in
the United States was supported by substantial evidence. As the
BIA found, Champion indicated her intent to leave her daugh-
ters in the United States in her application for cancellation and
during her testimony at the hearing.
BIA has completely ignored the evidence put forth by a
petitioner is an allegation of legal error.” Iglesias v.
Mukasey, 540 F.3d 528, 531 (7th Cir. 2008). And the
“failure to exercise discretion or to consider factors ac-
knowledged to be material to such an exercise—such as the
wholesale failure to consider evidence—would be an error
of law . . . .” Id. (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted). Here, both the IJ and the BIA virtually ignored
the possibility that Yomi could also be deported, an
oversight that we have found may warrant remand.
See, e.g., Kone v. Holder, 620 F.3d 760, 765 (7th Cir. 2010)
(remanding to BIA to determine, inter alia, whether peti-
tioner had a claim for constructive deportation when both
parents were under removal proceedings). Finding that the
BIA erred by failing to consider the impact of Yomi’s
potential deportation, we remand this matter in order for
the BIA to address this critical component of the hardship
analysis.4
Champion also attempts to raise two constitutional
claims, alleging that she was deprived of due process when
the IJ refused to allow her to present a closing argument
and when he referenced the visa fraud allegation in his oral
decision. Both arguments fail because Champion has not
articulated a protected liberty or property interest and, in

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8 No. 09-3065
any event, she was afforded due process. To articulate a
due process claim, Champion must demonstrate that she
has a protected liberty or property interest under the Fifth
Amendment. See Khan v. Mukasey, 517 F.3d 513, 518 (7th
Cir. 2008) (“[I]t is well-established that a party complaining
of a due-process violation must assert a liberty interest in
order to maintain [her] due-process claim.”). Aliens have
a Fifth Amendment right to due process in some immigra-
tion proceedings, but not in those that are discretionary.
Id. (no due process right in “proceedings that provide
only . . . discretionary relief because an appeal to discretion
is not a substantive entitlement”) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). Because cancellation of removal
is a discretionary form of relief, it does not confer onto
Champion a liberty or property interest.
Even assuming Champion had a protected interest, a
review of the record indicates that she was afforded due
process. Champion first claims that she was denied due
process when the IJ refused to allow her to give a closing
argument. But immigration judges have wide discretion to
“receive and consider material and relevant evidence, rule
upon objections, and otherwise regulate the course of the
hearing,” 8 C.F.R. § 1240.1(c), and declining to allow a
closing argument after extensive testimony and argument
is within the judge’s broad authority. See Yap v. Immigration
and Naturalization Service, 318 F.2d 839, 841 (7th Cir.
1963) (holding that immigration adjudicator did not abuse
discretion by ruling on alien’s deportability before hearing
closing argument). The IJ’s refusal to allow closing argu-
ment does not contravene the INA’s requirement that
aliens “have a reasonable opportunity to examine the

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No. 09-3065 9
evidence against [them], to present evidence on [their] own
behalf, and to cross-examine witnesses presented by the
Government . . . .” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(B). Here, it does
appear that Champion had a full opportunity to present
evidence, as demonstrated by her own testimony and that
of her eldest daughter, Tomi, which detailed Champion’s
background and the ways in which her deportation would
adversely affect her children. Thus, while it might have
been preferable for the IJ to allow a closing statement, his
decision not to do so did not violate any statutory or
regulatory requirements, and, therefore, did not deprive
Champion of due process. See Juarez, 599 F.3d at 566
(“[I]mmigration proceedings satisfy due process so long as
they conform to the applicable statutory and regulatory
standards . . . .”); Ndonyi v. Mukasey, 541 F.3d 702, 709
(7th Cir. 2008) (“[I]mmigration proceedings that meet
statutory and regulatory standards comport with due
process and, as such, aliens are better-served by arguing
instead that immigration proceedings infringed upon the
statutory and regulatory right to a reasonable opportunity
to present evidence.”) (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted).
Finally, Champion’s claim that the IJ’s passing references
to the visa fraud allegation violated due process also lacks
merit. There is no indication that the IJ took the alleged
marriage fraud into consideration when making his
ultimate decision. At most, the IJ referred to the allegations
during his summary of the testimonial and documentary
evidence at the beginning of his decision. He stated:
The respondent’s immigration history includes a
belief, by the government, that the respondent,

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10 No. 09-3065
back in Nigeria perpetrated some type of fraud in
connection with a divorce petition overseas. . . . As
previously indicated, because these allegations
occur outside of the 10-year period, they have not
been fully discussed for the record.
The IJ’s use of the terms “allegations” and “belief by the
government” indicate that he did not necessarily accept the
allegations as true, but rather was merely restating them to
provide context. At no point in his discussion of whether
Champion had demonstrated “exceptional or extremely
unusual hardship”—the sole issue in contention at the
hearing—did the IJ ever reference the alleged fraud. And
his passing reference to the allegation does not indicate
that he relied on it in making his hardship determination,
which distinguishes this case from Zhang v. Gonzales, 434
F.3d 993 (7th Cir. 2006), on which Champion relies. There,
we found that the IJ had inappropriately “dwelled at
length” on charges of visa fraud (which the government
had subsequently withdrawn) as the basis for his adverse
credibility determination. Id. at 997. In contrast, the IJ here
only made brief mention of the earlier fraud allegations
when explaining the background of the case, and he never
indicated that the withdrawn charge had any bearing on
his ultimate decision. Based on this record, we do not
believe that the IJ considered the fraud allegations when
making his hardship determination.
III. CONCLUSION
We AFFIRM the BIA’s decisions as to Champion’s due
process claims. With respect to the hardship analysis

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No. 09-3065 11
under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D), we GRANT the petition for
review, VACATE the BIA’s decision, and REMAND for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
11-22-10

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