Trent L. Chapin v. Fort-Rohr Motors, Inc.

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Nos. 09-1347, 09-2177
TRENT L. CHAPIN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
FORT-ROHR MOTORS, INC.,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Indiana, Fort Wayne Division.
No. 1:06-CV-00034—Theresa L. Springmann, Judge.
ARGUED DECEMBER 9, 2009—DECIDED SEPTEMBER 3, 2010
Before FLAUM, WILLIAMS, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.
WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge. Trent L. Chapin was em-
ployed by the Bob Rohrman Auto Group as a car sales-
man. Following his termination at one Rohrman-owned
dealership, Chapin filed a complaint with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, alleging that
the manager discriminated against white Christians
in favor of Pakistani Muslims. His new employer, a
second Rohrman-owned dealership, heard about this

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2 Nos. 09-1347, 09-2177
Although the parties refer to Mid-States as “Acura” and Fort- 1
Rohr as “Toyota” in their briefs, we will refer to them by
their legal names, Mid-States and Fort-Rohr, when it is neces-
sary to distinguish between the two.
and threatened to fire Chapin unless the complaint was
withdrawn. After this threat was made, Chapin left
work and never returned, despite Fort-Rohr Motors,
Inc.’s (“Fort-Rohr”) repeated efforts to have him return.
Chapin sued both dealerships, alleging discrimina-
tion because of his race and retaliation under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. After a jury trial, the
jury returned a favorable verdict on Chapin’s retalia-
tion claim. Fort-Rohr appeals, arguing that it was
entitled to judgment as a matter of law because Chapin
failed to show that Fort-Rohr actually or constructively
discharged Chapin in retaliation for his complaint.
We agree that Fort-Rohr was entitled to judgment as a
matter of law because Chapin did not produce suf-
ficient evidence to support an actual or constructive
discharge. Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the
district court.
I. BACKGROUND
Bob Rohrman owns multiple car dealerships in
Indiana and Illinois, including several in the Fort
Wayne, Indiana area. One of these is Mid-States Motors,
Inc. (“Mid-States”), and another is Fort-Rohr Motors, Inc.
(“Fort-Rohr”). The two dealerships are separate corpora-1
tions with separate management and employees.

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Nos. 09-1347, 09-2177 3
Chapin had been employed at various Rohrman-owned
dealerships in his many years as a salesman, working
specifically for Larry Kruse on and off at various dealer-
ships beginning in the early 1990s. At some point,
Chapin left Indiana and spent a few years elsewhere,
returning to the Fort Wayne area in the spring of 2004.
Again, as he had done many times in the past, Kruse
offered him a position in the spring of 2004 as a used car
sales manager at Mid-States. Nadeem Baig, a Pakistani
Muslim, became General Manager of the Mid-States
dealership in April 2004, taking over this position from
Kruse. On April 30, 2004, Baig called Chapin into a
meeting and terminated Chapin’s employment. During
trial, Baig testified that as a new manager, he made
the decision to replace Chapin because Chapin failed to
be available, to train the sales force, and had failures
in production. Chapin claimed he was terminated
because he was a white Christian and Baig wished to
replace the current employees with Pakistani Muslims.
In June 2004, Rohrman opened its Fort-Rohr dealership
under the management of Kruse, who recruited and
hired Chapin to work as a used car sales manager.
Chapin worked without incident from July 2004 until
February 2005. On February 10, 2005, Chapin filed a
charge of discrimination with the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), alleging that
the Mid-States dealership had discriminated against him
on the basis of his race. Chapin alleged that Baig was
systematically replacing white Christians with Pakistani
Muslims. Mid-States’s management informed Kruse
about Chapin’s EEOC complaint.

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4 Nos. 09-1347, 09-2177
Kruse asked Chapin to meet with him on February 28,
2005. Also present at this meeting were Sales Manager
Shane Housholder and Human Resources Manager
Luke Luther. Chapin surreptitiously brought a tape
recorder to this meeting and secretly recorded it.
During this meeting, which only lasted a minute, Kruse
raised his voice and was very upset. The recorded con-
versation, in transcript form, went as follows:
KRUSE: I need to ask you, what is your mental-
ity in filing the EEOC claim against
Bob Rohrman?
CHAPIN: What do you mean?
KRUSE: What do I mean?
CHAPIN: It is actually against Nadeem, is that
correct?
KRUSE: Who does Nadeem work for?
CHAPIN: Rohrman.
KRUSE: Who do you work for?
CHAPIN: Rohrman.
KRUSE: What the hell is your mentality? Did
you have a brain fart or what?
CHAPIN: I suppose. I didn’t think that -
KRUSE: Do you want to work here?
CHAPIN: Yes, I do.
KRUSE: If I wanted to work here on the floor, I
wouldn’t file suit against him.

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Nos. 09-1347, 09-2177 5
CHAPIN: I think that I was misfairly treated
down there.
KRUSE: It had nothing to do—he brought his
own people in. It had nothing to do
with anything with you. If you want to
file a claim, you need to work some-
where else, because you are not per-
forming here. I can let you go for non-
performance.
CHAPIN: No, I want to work here.
KRUSE: Then you need to fucking reverse the
claim right away, and it needs to be
done today.
CHAPIN: Okay. I have to go down there.
KRUSE: Go do it right now. You aren’t going to
work here until you get it reversed.
Period.
CHAPIN: Okay.
KRUSE: You decide if you are working here or
not.
CHAPIN: All right. I am going to do it. I want to
work here.
KRUSE: Go get it handled.
Following this conversation, Chapin did not withdraw
his EEOC complaint, and he did not return to work.
Kruse testified that he made multiple calls attempting
to reach Chapin after this meeting. A woman who

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6 Nos. 09-1347, 09-2177
lived with Chapin also testified that she had taken a
message from Kruse wishing to speak to Chapin, and
that she had delivered the message. Chapin denied re-
ceiving any phone calls or messages. He stated that
he called Fort-Rohr to send him his February commis-
sion check but that Fort-Rohr refused to mail it until
he came in for a meeting.
On March 4, 2005, Chapin met again with Kruse,
Housholder and Luther, and again, secretly taped
the meeting. As compared to the first tape-recording,
this tape-recording was considerably less clear and the
transcript is not verbatim. A transcribed version of the
relevant parts of the conversation states:
KRUSE: What is going on?
. . .
CHAPIN: You told me, don’t come back unless I
reversed it. That is your exact words.
You made it very clear.
KRUSE: I didn’t tell you that.
CHAPIN: Yes, you did. You said, until I can clear
that, I didn’t have a job.
KRUSE: —I didn’t fire you, if that is what—
CHAPIN: I took it as me being fired. You said I
didn’t have a job.
KRUSE: I didn’t fire you.
. . .
KRUSE: I suggest that you go get dressed and
report back to work.

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Nos. 09-1347, 09-2177 7
. . .
CHAPIN: I was under the impression that you
didn’t want me up here.
KRUSE: That is not the—.
CHAPIN: That was the total impression. You
said I was going to get fired for pro-
duction.
KRUSE: I didn’t say anything about getting
fired.
CHAPIN: You said, “I could fire you.”
KRUSE: I said I could fire you. I didn’t say I
was firing you.
. . .
KRUSE: So, my question is, do you want to
work here?
CHAPIN: I do. I need a little time off.
KRUSE: Time off?
CHAPIN: I am in the middle of a painting pro-
ject, and I want to get it done.
Following this conversation, Fort-Rohr sent several
letters to Chapin. One dated March 8, 2005 states that
“you clearly understood that you are still employed
with us and expected to be at work” and that “you
would be able to return to work.” Another letter dated
March 14, 2005 states that “[d]espite numerous attempts
to contact you by mail as well as by phone, we have
failed to receive any response from you regarding your

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8 Nos. 09-1347, 09-2177
intentions to continue your employment with us.”
Chapin also acknowledges receiving a letter dated
March 18, 2005 from Luther indicating that he still had
a position at Fort-Rohr. Chapin never formally resigned
his position or returned to work.
Chapin filed this lawsuit, alleging racial discrimination
and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., and a jury returned
a verdict in favor of Mid-States on Chapin’s reverse
discrimination claim. It also found for Chapin on his
retaliation claim, awarding him $100,000 in com-
pensatory damages and $1,000,000 in punitive damages.
After the trial, the district court denied Fort-Rohr’s
motion for judgment as a matter of law, and Fort-Rohr
appealed.
II. ANALYSIS
We review de novo the district court’s denial of a
motion for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(b).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b); Tate v. Executive Mgmt. Servs., Inc.,
546 F.3d 528, 531 (7th Cir. 2008). We construe the facts
in favor of the party who prevailed before the jury, and
we will only overturn a jury verdict for the plaintiff if
we conclude that no rational jury could have found for
the plaintiff. Tate, 546 F.3d at 532.
At trial, Chapin presented two alternatives to the jury
as to how Fort-Rohr retaliated against him for filing his
EEOC complaint—that Fort-Rohr either actually or con-
structively terminated his employment. The jury was

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Nos. 09-1347, 09-2177 9
instructed that Chapin could succeed on his claim
only if he proved by a preponderance of the evidence
that Fort-Rohr “either directly or constructively dis-
charged him for filing a charge of discrimination.” Fort-
Rohr argues that it was entitled to judgment as a matter
of law because Chapin did not establish that Fort-Rohr
actually or constructively discharged Chapin in retalia-
tion for making his EEOC complaint of discrimination.
Title VII prohibits an employer from taking an adverse
employment action against an employee simply because
he has filed an unfair employment charge. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-3(a); Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v.
White, 548 U.S. 53, 62 (2006). The antiretaliation provision
prohibits employers from taking actions that would
be likely to deter victims of discrimination from com-
plaining to the EEOC. Stephens v. Erickson, 569 F.3d 779, 786
(7th Cir. 2009). Under the direct method of proof, to
establish a prima facie case of retaliation, the plaintiff
was must show that: (1) he engaged in a statutorily pro-
tected activity; (2) he suffered a materially adverse
action by his employer; and (3) a causal link between
the two. Id. While Chapin proceeds under the direct
method of proof, a materially adverse action is required
in the indirect method of proof as well. Id.
A. Chapin Was Not Actually Terminated
The parties agree that Chapin engaged in a protected
activity because he filed a charge of discrimination with
the EEOC. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). The primary issue
in this appeal is whether any adverse employment

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10 Nos. 09-1347, 09-2177
action was taken against Chapin because of his com-
plaint. “The antiretaliation provision protects an indi-
vidual not from all retaliation, but from retaliation
that produces an injury or harm.” Burlington Northern,
548 U.S. at 67. To determine if an action is “materially
adverse,” we ask whether the action would dissuade
a reasonable worker from making or supporting a
charge of discrimination. Id. at 68; Nagle v. Vill. of Calumet
Park, 554 F.3d 1106, 1119 (7th Cir. 2009). In determining
the significance of any given act of retaliation, the test
is objective but “context matters” and we look at the
“constellation of surrounding circumstances, expecta-
tions, and relationships which are not fully captured by
a simple recitation of the words used . . . .” Burlington
Northern, 548 U.S. at 69; Fischer v. Avanade, Inc., 519
F.3d 393, 401 (7th Cir. 2008).
As an initial matter, Chapin claims he was actually
fired on February 28, 2005, and that this firing estab-
lishes an adverse action. The quintessential example of
an adverse action is a tangible employment action, such
as the termination of the employment relationship. See
Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998);
Crady v. Liberty Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of Ind., 993 F.2d 132,
136 (7th Cir. 1993). Chapin argues that the jury could
have reasonably concluded that, because he did not
withdraw his EEOC complaint after his meeting with
Kruse, Chapin was then immediately and automatically
fired. If Chapin had filed suit on February 28 after his
meeting with Kruse, and all we had to analyze was
his first tape-recorded conversation with Kruse, Chapin
could plausibly argue that it was a question of fact

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Nos. 09-1347, 09-2177 11
whether he was actually fired. But here, where several
exchanges occurred after February 28, we would need to
look at the February 28 events in a vacuum and ignore
all subsequent actions of the parties to conclude that
there was an actual termination.
The sequence of events was as follows: Kruse became
aware that Chapin filed an EEOC charge, and he asked
Chapin to meet with him. During this short, heated
meeting, Kruse asked him why he would file an EEOC
claim and then stated that if Chapin wanted to work on
the floor, he would need to withdraw the claim. Chapin
responded by saying that he did want to work there and
he would withdraw his claim. Chapin left work that
day, but did not withdraw his claim.
Chapin claims that he was automatically terminated
as soon as he left work on February 28 because the with-
drawal of the EEOC claim was a precondition to
him keeping his job. However, the actions of Fort-Rohr
when Chapin did not return to work, show that an auto-
matic termination never occurred. Kruse and Fort-
Rohr did not consider Chapin to be fired and Kruse
actively and continually encouraged Chapin to return to
work. Most importantly, Chapin himself testified that
his understanding from the February 28 meeting was
that “I assumed Kruse would fire me if I didn’t reverse
the claim, which I did not,” and not that he was
terminated at the meeting itself. Furthermore, Chapin
returned to Fort-Rohr on March 4, 2005 to pick up his
commission check because Fort-Rohr refused to mail it
to him without having him come in for a meeting.

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12 Nos. 09-1347, 09-2177
During this meeting, Chapin acknowledged that he was
still employed by Fort-Rohr and claimed to want to
return to work once he was done with a painting pro-
ject. Kruse never fired Chapin, and so an actual termina-
tion from Fort-Rohr cannot be the basis of Chapin’s
retaliation claim. Based on the record and evidence pro-
duced at trial, no rational juror could have found that
Kruse actually fired Chapin on February 28.
B. No Constructive Discharge
In the alternative, Chapin claimed that he was con-
structively discharged from his employment, and that
this constructive discharge provides the basis of his
retaliation claim. A constructive discharge constitutes
an adverse employment action. Pa. State Police v. Suders,
542 U.S. 129, 147 (2004). It occurs when the plaintiff
shows that he was forced to resign because his working
conditions, from the standpoint of the reasonable em-
ployee, had become unbearable. Id. at 147; Roby v. CWI,
Inc., 579 F.3d 779, 785 (7th Cir. 2009); see also EEOC v.
Univ. of Chi. Hosps., 276 F.3d 326, 331 (7th Cir. 2002).
Our circuit has recognized two different forms of con-
structive discharge, but neither dispenses with the re-
quirement that the work environment had become in-
tolerable. See Pa. State Police, 542 U.S. at 141 (“Under
the constructive discharge doctrine, an employee’s rea-
sonable decision to resign because of unendurable
working conditions is assimilated to a formal discharge
for remedial purposes.”); Cigan v. Chippewa Falls Sch.
Dist., 388 F.3d 331, 333 (7th Cir. 2004); Univ. of Chi. Hosps.,
276 F.3d at 332.

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Nos. 09-1347, 09-2177 13
In the first form, an employee resigns due to alleged
discriminatory harassment. Such cases require a plain-
tiff to show working conditions even more egregious
than that required for a hostile work environment claim
because employees are generally expected to remain
employed while seeking redress, Roby, 579 F.3d at 785,
thereby allowing an employer to address a situation
before it causes the employee to quit. Boumehdi v. Plastag
Holdings, LLC, 489 F.3d 781, 789-90 (7th Cir. 2007). For
example, we have found constructive discharge when
there is a threat to a plaintiff’s personal safety. See, e.g.,
Porter v. Erie Foods, Int’l, Inc., 576 F.3d 629, 640 (7th Cir.
2009) (claim for constructive discharge possible where
harassment includes repeated use of noose and implied
threats of physical violence); Taylor v. W. & S. Life Ins. Co.,
966 F.2d 1188, 1198-99 (7th Cir. 1992) (constructive dis-
charge where supervisor brandished a firearm and held
it to the plaintiff’s head). Chapin can have no success
under this form of constructive discharge, as he has not
suggested he has suffered any harassment. One threat
and raised voices would not rise to the level of a hostile
work environment, and so it also cannot be the basis
for Chapin’s constructive discharge claim. See Tutman v.
WBBM-TV, Inc./CBS, Inc., 209 F.3d 1044, 1050 (7th Cir.
2000).
The second form of constructive discharge we have
recognized occurs “[w]hen an employer acts in a
manner so as to have communicated to a reasonable
employee that she will be terminated. . . .” Univ. of Chi.
Hosps., 276 F.3d at 332. In this situation, if the plain-
tiff employee resigns, the employer’s conduct may

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14 Nos. 09-1347, 09-2177
amount to constructive discharge. Id. This form of con-
structive discharge, however, does not eliminate the
need for the plaintiff to show that his working condi-
tions had become intolerable. Id.; Cigan, 388 F.3d at 333.
And a working condition does not become intolerable
or unbearable merely because a “prospect of discharge
lurks in the background.” Cigan, 388 F.3d at 333.
In EEOC v. University of Chicago Hospitals, we ruled
that a claim of constructive discharge could move
forward to trial where an employee, Victoria Leyva,
arrived at work to find her belongings packed and her
office being used as storage. 267 F.3d at 332. In that
case, the packing of belongings came after a super-
vising employee was fired for refusing to fire Leyva,
Leyva received suddenly negative performance evalua-
tions, and she was told a minor mistake was “the
last straw.” Id. at 329-30. We similarly found a construc-
tive discharge in another case, where it was undisputed
by both parties that had the employee not resigned he
would have been terminated immediately. Kodish v.
Oakbrook Terrace Fire Prot. Dist., 604 F.3d 490, 502 (7th
Cir. 2010). In contrast, we found there was no construc-
tive discharge where an employee was asked derisively
about her motives for filing an EEOC claim, the employer
required the employee to transfer offices or move, and
only offered one unattractive transfer option, among
other claims. Fischer, 519 F.3d at 410. We also observed
that the employee may have been able to survive sum-
mary judgment if she stayed in her transferred position
long enough to show that it truly was a dead-end path
towards termination. Id. at 411.

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Nos. 09-1347, 09-2177 15
Here, even construing all the evidence in Chapin’s
favor, no reasonable employee standing in Chapin’s
shoes would believe that had he not resigned, he would
have been immediately fired. Unlike in University of
Chicago Hospitals, there is nothing to indicate that a firing
here was an imminent and inevitable event. This is not
a situation where the “handwriting was on the wall” and
the plaintiff quit “just ahead of fall of the axe.” Lindale
v. Tokheim Corp., 145 F.3d 953, 956 (7th Cir. 1998).
Instead, Chapin quit after the axe had been put away. On
February 28, 2005, Chapin may have had ample reason
to believe his termination to be imminent—Kruse threat-
ened to fire him and very clearly tied that threat to
his EEOC complaint. But, Chapin had no reason to con-
tinue to believe that after his subsequent and multiple
contacts with Fort-Rohr. Fort-Rohr made efforts to
have Chapin return to work, explained that Chapin’s
employment was not terminated, and expressed a desire
to keep Chapin on as an employee. At that point,
Chapin’s decision not to return to work was his own:
he had a painting project to finish. Cf. Levenstein v.
Salafsky, 414 F.3d 767, 774 (7th Cir. 2005) (stating that a
person who leaves employment because of a distaste or
impatience for investigation or termination procedures
voluntarily resigns and is not compelled to resign).
In fact, Chapin never formally resigned and indeed just
never returned to work. If Chapin had returned to work,
without having withdrawn the EEOC charge, perhaps
Kruse would have fired him. Or, his supervisors or co-
workers may have constantly harassed him to the point
where his safety was at risk. See Boumehdi, 489 F.3d at 790.

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16 Nos. 09-1347, 09-2177
Kruse may also have done nothing. Any of these pos-
sibilities would require speculation on our part, as
would a finding that the workplace would have become
intolerable if Chapin had resumed his position, because
Chapin unilaterally gave up his position. Chapin him-
self asks us to speculate when he argues that “construc-
tive discharge would have occurred given the setup
created by Kruse under the pretext of nonperformance.”
Appellee’s Br. at 8 (emphasis added). In Cigan, we em-
phasized that it is not a court’s position to speculate on
“what ifs,” stating that “[t]he only way to know how
matters will turn out is to let the process run its course.
Litigation to determine what would have happened . . . is
a poor substitute for the actual results of real delibera-
tion within the employer’s hierarchy.” Cigan, 388 F.3d at
333-34. This is particularly true in the constructive dis-
charge context, where we recognize that the burden
remains on the employee to show why he would have
had to “quit immediately, before he found the other job;
why, in other words, his duty to mitigate damages
did not require him to remain.” Lindale, 145 F.3d at 956;
see Boumehdi, 489 F.3d at 790.
To find that one singular threat, followed by multiple
reassurances that the employee has retained his job, was
a constructive discharge is to lower the threshold
of the “intolerable” workplace so far as to be unrecog-
nizable. A reasonable person in Chapin’s position would
not have felt that he had no choice but to resign. No
rational jury could have concluded that Fort-Rohr con-
structively discharged Chapin. Because there was no
adverse action under either of the theories Chapin pre-

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Nos. 09-1347, 09-2177 17
We briefly note that we do not foreclose the possibility that a 2
plaintiff could argue that a singular threat of termination
had the impact of dissuading a reasonable worker from sup-
porting a discrimination complaint, which might act as the
necessary adverse action underlying his retaliation claim.
See, e.g., Pantoja v. Am. NTN Bearing Mfg., 495 F.3d 840, 849
(7th Cir. 2007) (allowing warnings of termination or other
adverse actions to proceed to jury); Beckel v. Wal-Mart Assocs.,
301 F.3d 621, 624 (7th Cir. 2002) (suggesting that a threat to
fire would be an actionable “anticipatory retaliation.”). But see
Dunn v. Washington County Hosp., 429 F.3d 689, 690 (7th Cir.
2005) (stating that one unfulfilled threat could not be
actionable and finding that “nasty” requests to withdraw a
complaint did not cause injury). Neither here or at the
district court has either party explored this possibility, and
we decline to do so as well. See Ocean Atlantic Dev. Corp. v.
Aurora Christian Schs., Inc., 322 F.3d 983, 1005 (7th Cir. 2003).
9-3-10
sented to the jury, Chapin’s retaliation claim under
Title VII fails and we reverse the district court’s denial
of Fort-Rohr’s motion for judgment as a matter of law.2
III. CONCLUSION
We REVERSE the jury verdict and REMAND the case to
the district court to enter judgment as a matter of law
for Fort-Rohr Motors, Inc. Because we reverse the
jury verdict, we do not reach the remaining issues in
the appeal.

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