United States of America v. Aaron Michael Linzy, Sr.

The Honorable Amy J. St. Eve, District Judge for the United 1
States District Court, Northern District of Illinois, sitting by
designation.
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
No. 09-2046
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
AARON MICHAEL LINZY, SR.,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of Illinois.
No. 08-CR-40009—Michael M. Mihm, Judge.
ARGUED FEBRUARY 26, 2010—DECIDED APRIL 27, 2010
Before FLAUM and WOOD, Circuit Judges, and ST. EVE,
District Judge.1
ST. EVE, District Judge. On January 29, 2008, a federal
grand jury indicted Defendant Aaron Michael Linzy, Sr.
and his co-defendant Jarvell Jones with one count of

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2 No. 09-2046
In his appellate brief, Linzy also challenged the district 2
court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence. At oral
argument, defense counsel conceded that the district court’s
decision under the circumstances was proper under Illinois
v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409, 125 S.Ct. 834, 160 L.Ed.2d
842 (2005).
conspiracy to distribute various controlled substances,
namely, crack cocaine, methylenedioxy-methamphetamine
(ecstasy), and marijuana (Count I), and one count of
unlawful possession with intent to distribute crack
cocaine, ecstasy, and marijuana (Count II). See 21 U.S.C.
§§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A, C, D), 846. On October 15, 2008,
a jury convicted Linzy on both counts of the Indictment,
and on April 17, 2009, the district court sentenced Linzy
to a term of life imprisonment on both counts, to run
concurrently, ten years’ supervised release, and a $200
special assessment. On appeal, Linzy challenges his
conviction arguing that the district court abused its
discretion in restricting defense counsel’s cross-exam-
ination of his co-defendant Jones. We affirm the2
district court.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In early 2007, Linzy and two other men, Deshawn
Hemphill and Marquis Gentry, lived in an apartment in
Charles City, Iowa from which they sold crack, ecstasy,
and marijuana. In April 2007, Jarvell Jones, who was
living in Elgin, Illinois, contacted Hemphill and said he
needed to get out of the Chicago area because there was

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No. 09-2046 3
a warrant for his arrest on first-degree murder charges.
At Hemphill’s suggestion, Jones joined Hemphill, Gentry,
and Linzy in the Charles City apartment and soon
started selling drugs with them. Jones’ girlfriend,
Jasmine Spates, also moved into the Charles City apart-
ment later that year.
Linzy, Hemphill, Gentry, and Jones worked in shifts
selling drugs. Together, the four men sold about 63 grams
or 1/16 of a kilogram of crack a week. When their crack
supply was running low, Hemphill contacted his crack
supplier, a man named “Kane,” who lived in Maywood,
Illinois, a suburb of Chicago, to obtain another “63”.
Because Linzy was the only one in the group with a
driver’s license, he often traveled to Maywood to pick up
the crack.
In early November 2007, Jones went to Chicago for a
friend’s birthday. While he was there, Jones purchased
ecstasy and marijuana to take back to Iowa. On Novem-
ber 6, 2007, Hemphill called Jones in Chicago informing
him that Linzy was coming to Chicago to “cop some” and
that Jones could ride back to Iowa with Linzy. Around
10:30 p.m. on November 6, 2007, Linzy, accompanied
by Jones’ girlfriend Spates, arrived in Chicago and
picked up Jones at the house where he was staying. They
then drove to Kane’s house in Maywood. Upon arrival,
Linzy and Jones went into the house where Linzy
paid Kane approximately $1,200 and received a quantity
of crack from him. After going to Kane’s house, Linzy,
Jones, and Spates made another stop in Chicago
where Jones picked up a red suitcase that contained his

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4 No. 09-2046
clothes, along with the ecstasy and marijuana that Jones
previously had purchased. Thereafter, Linzy put the
crack in Jones’ red suitcase, which was in the trunk of
Linzy’s silver Cadillac. Linzy, Jones, and Spates then
began to drive back to Iowa.
At about 1:30 a.m. on November 7, 2007, while driving
westbound on Interstate 80 in Rock Island County, Illinois,
State Trooper Jared Steen observed a silver Cadillac
with Iowa license plates improperly crossing over a
lane line in violation of Illinois law. Trooper Steen
followed the Cadillac because he was concerned the
driver might be under the influence of alcohol. He also
activated his in-vehicle video camera and used his on-
board computer to run the silver Cadillac’s registration
information. From his computer inquiry, Trooper Steen
learned that the Cadillac was registered to Linzy, who
lived in Charles City, Iowa. Trooper Steen also learned
that Linzy had a valid Iowa driver’s license, but that
his driving privileges in Illinois had been suspended.
As Trooper Steen continued to follow the silver
Cadillac, he saw it improperly cross over the line sepa-
rating the driving lane from the passing lane for a
second time. At that point, Trooper Steen turned on his
emergency lights and initiated a traffic stop. After the
Cadillac pulled over, Trooper Steen approached the
driver who identified himself as Linzy. Trooper Steen
then saw that the Cadillac had two passengers, a woman
in the front and a man in the back. Thereafter,
Trooper Steen asked Linzy for his driver’s license and
registration. Linzy provided Trooper Steen with the

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No. 09-2046 5
requested documents and answered Trooper Steen’s
questions “in an almost frantic manner.”
After he obtained Linzy’s driver’s license and registra-
tion, Trooper Steen returned to his squad car, radioed
his headquarters, and confirmed that Linzy’s Illinois
driving privileges had been suspended. Trooper Steen
went back to the Cadillac, arrested Linzy for driving on
a suspended license, and placed him in the back of the
squad car. Trooper Steen asked Linzy if either of his
passengers had a driver’s license. Linzy answered
that they did not and then Trooper Steen spoke to the
passengers. The woman identified herself as Jasmine
Spates. The man, who was later determined to be Jarvell
Jones, identified himself as “Deeric Mosley.” Neither
Spates nor “Mosley” had a driver’s license. Because
neither passenger could drive Linzy’s car, Trooper
Steen called another trooper for assistance to transport
the passengers from the roadside. Trooper Steen also
called for a tow truck.
Approximately fifteen minutes later, Trooper Dan
Erickson, who was a K-9 handler, arrived at the scene
to assist with transporting the passengers. Troopers
Steen and Erickson decided to have Erickson’s dog,
who was certified to detect the odor of drugs, conduct
a “free air sniff” of Linzy’s car. At the car’s trunk, the
dog alerted to the presence of drugs. Trooper Steen
then searched the trunk and found the red suitcase con-
taining crack, ecstasy, and marijuana.
On June 11, 2008, Jones pleaded guilty to the con-
spiracy charge in Count I of the Indictment pursuant to

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6 No. 09-2046
a plea agreement. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 11(c)(1)(C), the government agreed to cap
Jones’ sentence at the mandatory minimum sentence of
20 years. In return, Jones agreed to cooperate fully with
the government, including to testify at Linzy’s trial.
Before trial, Linzy moved in limine to impeach Jones
with his use of the alias “Deeric Mosley” and with the
fact that he had an active arrest warrant and a pending
first-degree murder charge in Cook County, Illinois. The
district court ruled that Linzy could question Jones about
the alias, but could only refer to the pending murder
charge as a “very serious felony charge.”
At Linzy’s jury trial, Jones testified that he had pleaded
guilty to participating in a federal drug conspiracy and
that pursuant to his plea agreement, he agreed to
cooperate with the government. Jones further testified
that he called Hemphill in Iowa in April 2007 because
he had an active arrest warrant and was trying to get
out of Chicago. Jones admitted that he sold drugs in
Charles City, Iowa starting in April 2007 and that he
sold drugs with Linzy. In addition, Jones testified that
Kane, who lived in the Chicago suburb of Maywood,
supplied their crack. He further stated that his source
for ecstasy was in Chicago.
Moreover, on direct examination, Jones conceded that
he smoked marijuana every day and used ecstasy and
drank alcohol on the weekends or special occasions. He
further admitted to using PCP (phencylidine) during
the November 2007 weekend in Chicago before he was
arrested. Jones stated that his drug use did not affect

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No. 09-2046 7
his ability to testify. He also testified that he had a prior
felony conviction for possession of a controlled sub-
stance. In addition, Jones explained the details leading
up to his and Linzy’s arrest, admitting that he gave
Illinois State Trooper Steen the false name, Deeric
Mosley. He also testified that he had an outstanding
warrant for a “serious felony offense back in Chicago”
and that this was a separate case from the federal drug
case. Jones was not promised and did not expect any
benefit as part of his cooperation deal with the govern-
ment in connection with this “serious felony offense.”
On cross-examination, defense counsel questioned
Jones about his 2002 felony offense of a controlled sub-
stance in Cook County, to which he pleaded guilty and was
sentenced to probation. Counsel specifically questioned
Jones about using and selling drugs while he was on
probation to which Jones admitted. Defense counsel also
questioned Jones about his guilty plea to the conspiracy
charge, including the sentencing cap at the mandatory
minimum of 20 years. In addition, defense counsel im-
peached Jones about his drug and alcohol use because
he told the United States Probation Officer that he had
used different amounts of drugs than what he testified
to on direct examination. Furthermore, when defense
counsel asked Jones why he did not turn himself in
when there was a warrant out for his arrest on a very
serious felony charge, Jones replied that he did not want
to go to jail. Counsel also questioned Jones about his
alias, and Jones explained that Deeric Mosley was his
cousin. Jones conceded that he gave Trooper Steen a
false name and date of birth because he wanted to

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8 No. 09-2046
avoid being arrested on the outstanding warrant. Jones
further admitted that when he first decided to cooperate
with federal law enforcement officers, he gave the alias
Deeric Mosley to the officers. Finally, Jones admitted
on cross-examination that he was a truthful person
“sometimes.”
ANALYSIS
On appeal, Linzy challenges the district court’s restric-
tion of Jones’ testimony and cross-examination re-
garding his active arrest warrant for first-degree
murder charges in Cook County. Linzy specifically
argues that Jones was a material government witness
whose testimony was essential to the government’s
case, and thus the defense theory required that counsel
attack Jones’ credibility “with every weapon at hand.”
A criminal defendant’s right to confront witnesses is
a fundamental right essential to a fair trial as guaranteed
by the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause. See
Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 678, 106 S.Ct. 1431,
89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403-04,
85 S.Ct. 1065, 13 L.Ed.2d 923 (1965). Under the Sixth
Amendment’s Confrontation Clause, a district court
must allow effective cross-examination. See Davis v.
Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 317, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347
(1974) (“We have recognized that the exposure of a wit-
ness’ motivation in testifying is a proper and important
function of the constitutionality protected right of cross-
examination.”). “[W]hen deciding whether limits on
cross-examination are permissible, we must first distin-

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No. 09-2046 9
guish between the core values of the Confrontation
Clause and more peripheral concerns which remain
within the trial court’s ambit.” United States v. Reyes, 542
F.3d 588, 593 (7th Cir. 2008). “If the ‘core values’ of the
Confrontation Clause remain intact, we merely ensure
that the district court’s exercise of its wide discretion
in limiting cross-examination was not abusive.” Id.; see
also United States v. Recendiz, 557 F.3d 511, 530 (7th Cir.
2009) (“A judge has broad discretion to place reasonable
limits on cross-examination, based on concerns of, inter
alia, confusion of the issues and relevance.”). In deter-
mining whether the district court abused its discretion
by limiting cross-examination, we must examine whether
the jury had sufficient details about the witness to
assess the witness’ motives and biases. See Recendiz, 557
F.3d at 530-31. On the other hand, where the limit
imposed on cross-examination implicates the core values
of the Confrontation Clause, we review the limitation
de novo. See id. at 530; United States v. Khan, 508 F.3d
413, 418 (7th Cir. 2007).
In Recendiz, we explained that “[o]ne such core value
is the ability to expose a witness’s motivation for
testifying, his bias, or his possible incentives to lie,” but
“once a trial court permits a defendant to expose a wit-
ness’s motivation, ‘it is of peripheral concern to the
Sixth Amendment how much opportunity defense
counsel gets to hammer that point home to the jury.’ ” Id.
at 530 (citation omitted). We further explained that the
“right to confrontation is not implicated where ‘limita-
tions on cross-examination did not deny the defendants
the opportunity to establish that the witnesses may

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10 No. 09-2046
have had a motive to lie; rather, the limitations denied
them the opportunity to add extra detail to that motive.’ ”
Id. (emphasis in original, citation omitted). In other
words, “the Confrontation Clause guarantees only ‘an
opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-
examination that is effective in whatever way, and to
whatever extent, the defense might wish.’ ” Kentucky v.
Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 739, 107 S.Ct. 2658, 96 L.Ed.2d
631 (1987) (citing Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20, 106
S.Ct. 292, 88 L.Ed.2d 15 (1985) (per curiam) (emphasis
in original)).
Here, defense counsel conceded that we would have
to extend Davis and its progeny to find the core values
of the Confrontation Clause at issue. We are not willing
to do so given the peripheral concerns implicated by
the limitation. Based on Jones’ trial testimony, Linzy’s
counsel was given ample opportunity to establish Jones’
motivation for lying and to attack Jones’ credibility. See
Davis, 415 U.S. at 317. In particular, defense counsel
questioned Jones about his 2002 felony offense for pos-
session of a controlled substance in Cook County to
which he pleaded guilty. Defense counsel further ques-
tioned Jones about using and selling drugs, his guilty
plea in the present matter, his use of an alias, and the
warrant for his arrest concerning a “serious felony
offense back in Chicago.” The specific nature of the felony,
namely, first-degree murder, may have added “extra
detail” to Jones’ motive to lie, but its omission did not
deprive Linzy of his opportunity to effectively cross-
examine Jones. See Stincer, 482 U.S. at 739; Recendiz, 557
F.3d at 530. Defense counsel throughly cross-examined

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No. 09-2046 11
Jones. Because the jury had abundant evidence to
appraise Jones’ motivation for testifying, the district court
did not abuse its discretion in limiting Jones’ cross-exami-
nation concerning the nature of his arrest warrant. See
Recendiz, 557 F.3d at 530-31. In sum, “there was no
shortage of cross-examination exposing [Jones’] motive
to lie.” United States v. McLee, 436 F.3d 751, 762 (7th Cir.
2006).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of
the district court.
4-27-10

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