United States of America v. Demetrius S. Partee

* After examining the briefs and the records, we have determined that oral argument
is unnecessary. The appeals are submitted on the briefs and the records. See F ED. R. APP. P.
34(a)(2)(B).
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted March 10, 2010 *
Decided March 22, 2010
Before
WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge
TERENCE T. EVANS, Circuit Judge
DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge
No. 08‐1481
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff‐Appellee,
v.
DEMETRIUS S. PARTEE,
Defendant‐Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.
No. 07‐CR‐200
Rudolph T. Randa,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with
Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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Nos. 08‐1481 , 08‐3546 , 09‐1673 Page 2
No. 08‐3546
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff‐Appellee,
v.
RITCHIE E. BUFFORD,
Defendant‐Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Western District of Wisconsin.
No. 08‐CR‐68‐C‐01
Barbara B. Crabb,
Chief Judge.
No. 09‐1673
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff‐Appellee,
v.
OSCAR A. RASH,
Defendant‐Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.
No. 07‐CR‐201
C. N. Clevert, Jr.,
Chief Judge.
O R D E R
We have consolidated for decision these three appeals because they all raise the same
issue: whether fleeing an officer in violation of Wisconsin Statute § 346.04(3) constitutes a
“violent felony” under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924, or a “crime of
violence” under the career offender guidelines, see U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1. The term “violent
felony” under the ACCA and “crime of violence” under the career offender guidelines are
nearly identical, and we apply the same interpretation to both provisions when determining
whether a prior conviction triggers increased penalties. United States v. Templeton, 543 F.3d
378, 380 (7th Cir. 2008); United States v. Spells, 537 F.3d 743, 749 n.1 (7th Cir. 2008); United
States v. Rosas, 410 F.3d 332, 335‐36 (7th Cir. 2005). Here Demetrius Partee’s and Oscar
Rash’s prior convictions for fleeing an officer (when added to convictions for serious drug
offenses and a violent felony) triggered 15‐year mandatory minimum sentences under the
Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). Ritchie Bufford’s prior conviction for
fleeing an officer was treated as a “crime of violence” for purposes of the career offender
guideline, see §§ 4B1.1‐1.2, and he was eventually sentenced to 200 months’ imprisonment.
We affirm all three sentences.
The Wisconsin statute at issue here makes it unlawful to use a vehicle to knowingly
flee or elude a police officer by willfully and wantonly disregarding the officer’s signal so

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Nos. 08‐1481 , 08‐3546 , 09‐1673 Page 3
1 We note as an aside, should there be any doubt as to the violent nature of vehicular
flight, that on March 1, 2010, a woman in Milwaukee was killed when she was hit by a van
being pursued by police—becoming the fourth person in two months to be killed by a
driver fleeing Milwaukee police. Jesse Garza, Milwaukee woman killed by van fleeing police,
M ILWAUKEE J OURNAL S ENTINEL, Mar. 2, 2010, available at 2010 WLNR 4319589.
that one endangers the police, pedestrians, or other vehicles; or by speeding away in the
vehicle or extinguishing its lights. W IS. STAT . § 346.04(3). The Armed Career Criminal Act
defines a “violent felony,” and the sentencing guidelines define a “crime of violence,” to
include “burglary, arson, or extortion, [or a crime that] involves use of explosives, or
otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to
another.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B). See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2). In Begay v. United States, 128
S. Ct. 1581, 1586‐87 (2008), the Supreme Court construed such crimes to involve
“purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct.”
Defendants argue that the Wisconsin statute does not require “purposeful” conduct.
They contend that “purposeful” requires intent, and claim that the statute requires only
reckless, but not intentional conduct. This argument, however, is foreclosed by our recent
opinion in United States v. Dismuke, 593 F3d. 582, 2010 WL 292671 (7th Cir. 2010), which
issued after briefing in these cases had finished. In Dismuke, which directly addressed
§ 346.04(3) under the ACCA, we observed that vehicular flight easily satisfied Begay’s
“purposeful” requirement because the statute requires that one “knowingly flee or attempt to
elude.” Dismuke, 2020 WL 292671, at *8.
Defendants also argue that the conduct prohibited by the statute is not “violent” or
“aggressive” because, they contend, the act of using a vehicle to flee an officer does not
inherently involve violence or aggression. This argument is also foreclosed by Dismuke.
There we examined “whether fleeing is ‘violent’ in the way required by Begay” and
concluded that it was. Dismuke, 2020 WL 292671, at *9 (“We . . . hold that Wisconsinʹs crime
of vehicular fleeing involves conduct that is similarly ‘violent and aggressive’ to burglary,
arson, extortion, or crimes that involve the use of explosives.”).1
AFFIRMED.

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