Nonprecedential Disposition

United States Court of Appeals
FortheSeventhCircuit
Chicago,Illinois60604
ArguedNovember17,2009
DecidedNovember24,2009
Before
FRANKH.EASTERBROOK,ChiefJudge
ILANADIAMONDROVNER,CircuitJudge
DIANES.SYKES,CircuitJudge
No.091384
UNITEDSTATESOFAMERICA,
PlaintiffAppellee,
v.
KEITHCOOK,
DefendantAppellant.
AppealfromtheUnitedStatesDistrict
CourtfortheNorthernDistrictofIllinois,
EasternDivision.
No.07CR1121
RubenCastillo,
Judge.
ORDER
OnthesecondtolastdayofKeithCook’strialforembezzlementandfalsifying
unionrecords,justbeforethegovernmentrested,Cook’slawyersinformedthedistrictcourt
thathewouldtestifybuttheyneededtimetohelphimprepare.Counselaskedthecourtto
adjournfortheday,butthecourtdeniedthisrequest.Cookthentestified,andonthenext
dayoftrialwasfoundguiltyofbothcharges.Onappealhechallengesthedenialofhis
requestforacontinuance.Weupholdthedistrictcourt’srulingandaffirmCook’s
convictions.

Throughhisworkasarailroadconductor,Cookbecamesecretarytreasurerofhis
localtransportationunion.Heservedfrom2002until2004,whenanauditordiscovered
NONPRECEDENTIALDISPOSITION
Tobecitedonlyinaccordancewith
FED. R. A PP. P.32.1

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thatCookhadwrittenhimselfanumberofunauthorizedchecksonunionaccountstotaling
over$45,000.FollowinganinvestigationthegovernmentchargedCookwithembezzling
theassetsofalabororganization,29U.S.C.§501(c),andmakingafalseentryinunion
recordsrequiredtobekeptbylaw,id.§439(c).Overthenext17months,Cooktwice
succeededingettinghisappointedcounselreplaced—thesecondtimeontheeveof
trial—andtwicethepartiesreachedapleaagreementonlytohaveCookchangehismindat
thechangeofpleahearing.
Oncetrialbeganthedistrictcourt’sschedulerequiredmultiplebreaksinthe
proceedings,sothetrialranSeptember23,89,12,and15,2008.OnFriday,September12,
followingatwodayrecess,defensecounseltoldthecourtthatCookhaddecidedon
Tuesdaythathewouldtestify,buttheyhadnotsucceededinmeetingwithhimon
WednesdayorThursdaytogooverhistestimony.CounselexplainedthatCook,whowas
onbond,hadmissedmultipleappointmentswiththemduringtherecessbecausehewas
calledintowork,andtrafficthatmorninghadpreventedhimfromarrivingattheiroffice
earlyenoughtoprepare.Inlightofthislackofpreparation,Cook’scounselmovedfora
continuanceuntilMonday,September15.Prosecutorsopposedthemotion,arguingthat
theyalwayshadbelievedCookwouldtestifyandthathehadbeengivenadequatetimeto
preparegiventhedelaysinbringingthecasetotrial.Thecourtagreedthattherehadbeen
“ampleopportunity”toprepare.Thecourtexplainedthatthecasehadbeen“problematic”
togettotrialeventhoughitwasnotcomplicated,andoncethetrialgotunderwayCook
hadnotmadeitapriorityortakenadvantageofthe“veryliberal”schedule.Thecourtalso
notedthatithadanothercasescheduledfortrialimmediatelyafterCook’s,andwithonly
onejuryroomitcouldnot“riskanyfurtherday”inthecase.Inlightofwhatthecourt
characterizedasCook’s“machinations”inpreventingthetrialfromstartingsoonerandhis
“audacitytonotprepareandtowanttotestify,”thecourtdeniedthemotion.Butthecourt
didrecessforanearlyandlongerlunchtoallowCooksometimetoprepare;afterlunch
Cooktookthestand.TrialconcludedonMondaywithclosingarguments,andthejury
returnedguiltyverdictsonbothchargeslatethatsameday.ThecourtlatersentencedCook
toatotalofoneyearandadayinprison.
Wereviewthedenialofacontinuanceforabuseofdiscretionandwillnotreverse
absentashowingofactualprejudice.UnitedStatesv.Miller,327F.3d598,601(7thCir.
2003);UnitedStatesv.Tolliver,937F.2d1183,118788(7thCir.1991).Adistrictcourtmay
evaluateanynumberoffactorsindecidingwhetheracontinuanceisjustified,includingthe
ageandcomplexityofthecase,theamountoftimealreadymadeavailableforpreparation
andthedefendant’sroleinshorteningtheeffectivepreparationtime,whetherthedefendant
hastriedto“game”thesystem,theavailabilityofdiscovery,thelikelihoodthata
continuancewillsatisfythedefendant’sneeds,whetherthegovernmentopposesthe

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proposedcontinuance,theinconvenienceorhardshiptothecourtorothers,andthe
likelihoodthatdenyingacontinuancewillprejudicethedefendant.SeeUnitedStatesv.
Williams,576F.3d385,390(7thCir.2009);Miller,327F.3dat601;UnitedStatesv.Chiappetta,
289F.3d995,999(7thCir.2002).Theimportanceofanysinglefactordependsonthe
individualcircumstancesofacase,andassigningtherelativeweightofthefactorsisbest
lefttothediscretionofthedistrictcourt.Williams,576F.3dat389;Miller,327F.3dat601.
Twocaseswithoppositeoutcomeshelptoillustratetheapplicationofthesefactors.
InUnitedStatesv.Farr,weheldthatthetrialjudgedidnotabusehisdiscretionindenying
thedefendant’srequestforacontinuancemadeonthemorningoftrial.297F.3d651(7th
Cir.2002).Wereasonedthatthedenialwasproperbecausethedefendanthadbeengranted
twocontinuancesalreadyandcounsel’slackofpreparationfortrialclearlyresultedfrom
thedefendant’sconsistentrefusaltocooperatewithhisattorneyandassistinthe
preparationofhisdefense.Id.at656.Weconcludedthatwewouldnotfinderrorinthe
denialofacontinuance“[w]hereadefendant’sobstinatebehaviorplayedasignificantpart
inunderminingtheabilityofcounseltopreparefortrial.”Id.Conversely,inUnitedStates
v.Heron,weheldthatthedistrictcourtabuseditsdiscretionindenyingacontinuance
whereonthedaybeforetrialakeyprosecutionwitnesshadchangedhisplannedtestimony
inamannerthatportrayedthedefendantasanactive,ratherthanreluctant,participantin
thetransportationofdrugs.564F.3d879,88183(7thCir.2009).Wenotedthatthe
defendanthadessentiallynotimetoprepareforthechangedtestimonyanddidnot
contributetothetimepressure,andthatacontinuancewouldhaveallowedhimto
investigatethis“crucialpiece”ofnewevidence.Id.at883.

IndenyingCook’srequestforacontinuance,thedistrictcourtfocusedontheageof
thecase,Cook’sroleinshorteningtheavailabletimeforpreparation,Cook’sprevious
“machinations”indelayingthecasefortrial,andtheinconvenienceapostponementwould
causetothecourtgivenitspendingcaseload.Althoughtheseareacceptable
considerations,seeChiappetta,289F.3dat999;Williams,576F.3dat389,Cookarguesthatthe
districtcourtnonethelessabuseditsdiscretionbecauseanyinconveniencetothecourt
wouldhavebeenminimalwhiledenyingthecontinuancedirectlyprejudicedhisrightto
testify.Cook’sjuryreturnedguiltyverdictsatalmost5:00p.m.onMonday,sothecourt
guessedcorrectlythatpostponinghistestimonyuntilthatmorningwouldhavepushedthe
trialintoTuesdayanddelayedthestartofthecourt’snexttrial.WhateverCookmightthink
aboutthesignificancetothecourtoflosinganotherdayfromitsschedule,thejudgehad
discretiontoassesstheburdenonhiscaseloadalongwithanyoftheotherrelevantfactors.
SeeMiller,327F.3dat601.Wehavenotedthatthe“typicalreasonstodenyacontinuance
arethatthedefendantshortenedherownpreparationtimeandthatadelaywillburdenthe
court.”Williams,576F.3dat390.Cook’sfailuretomeetwithhisattorneysduringthetwo

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dayrecessbeforehetestifiedparallelsthedefendant’sactionsinFarr,whereweupheldthe
denialofacontinuanceinlightofthedefendant’s“obstinatebehavior”andconsistent
refusaltoassistinthepreparationofhisdefense.See297F.3dat656.UnlikeinHeron,
wherecircumstancesoutsidethedefendant’scontrolcreatedashortageoftimetoprepare,
Cookwasatfaultfordecidingthatgoingtoworkwasmoreimportantthankeepinghis
appointmentswithcounselduringthetwodayshecouldhavebeenpreparing.See564F.3d
at883.Evenifacontinuancewouldhavecausedonlyminimaldelaytothedistrictcourt’s
pendingtrialschedule,giventheamountoftimethathadelapsedbetweentheindictment
andthetrial,thetwodayrecessduringwhichCookcouldhavepreparedtotestifyifhehad
optedtomissadayofwork,andwhatthedistrictcourtperceivedasCook’shistoryof
“machinations”togamethesystem,wefindthatthecourtdidnotabuseitsdiscretionin
refusingtograntacontinuance.

ThatconclusionisreinforcedbyCook’sfailuretoexplainhowdenyingtherequested
continuanceprejudicedhim.Cookassertsthathislackofpreparationprejudicedhisright
totestify.Cookdidtestify,buthecontends—withoutelaboration—thatwithmore
preparationhewouldhavebeenbetterabletoanswerthegovernment’squestionsoncross
examination,andinturnthegovernmentwouldnothavebeenabletonegativelyfocuson
histestimonyduringitsclosingargument.Inordertofindprejudicewerequirea
defendanttoshowspecificallywhatmaterialdifferenceacontinuancewouldhavemade.
InUnitedStatesv.Vincent,weaffirmedthedenialofacontinuancewherethedefendant
claimedthatheneededmoretimetoexaminediscoverymaterialsandpreparetocross
examinethegovernment’switnessesbut“neitherpointedtoexculpatoryevidencehewould
havefoundinthediscoverynorproposedadditionalquestionshewouldhaveaskedthe
government’switnesses.”416F.3d593,599(7thCir.2005).Here,similarly,Cookdoesnot
explainhowhistestimonywouldhavedifferedandbenefittedhiscaseifhehadbeen
grantedacontinuance.Hedoesnotspecifywhatanswershewouldhavegivenduringthe
government’scrossexaminationifhehadadditionaltimetoprepareorhowthoseanswers
wouldhavepositivelyaffectedthejury.UnderVincenthisunsupportedassertionof
prejudiceisinsufficient.Seeid.

Accordingly,weAFFIRMthedistrictcourt’sjudgment.

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