Larry D. Kemp v. JAMES B. PEAKE, Secretary of the Department of Veterans Affairs

08-1498United States Court Of Appeals For The 7th CircuitOct 2, 2008

Full text

*After examining the briefs and the record, we have concluded that oral argument is
unnecessary. Thus, the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the record. See FED. R. A PP. P.
34(a)(2).
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted October 2, 2008 *
Decided October 2, 2008
Before
JOEL M. FLAUM, Circuit Judge
MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge
TERENCE T. EVANS, Circuit Judge
No. 08‐1498
LARRY D. KEMP,
Plaintiff‐Appellant,
v.
JAMES B. PEAKE, Secretary of the
Department of Veterans Affairs,
Defendant‐Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Illinois.
No. 06‐cv‐0282‐MJR
Michael J. Reagan,
Judge.
O R D E R
In 2004, following a series of negative performance evaluations, the Department of
Veterans Affairs discharged Larry Kemp, a 56‐year‐old cemetery caretaker supervisor.
Kemp responded with this action, alleging age discrimination in violation of the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a), and unlawful retaliation. But
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with
Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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No. 08‐1498 Page 2
Kemp’s suit did not survive summary judgment. In its order the court noted that Kemp
lacked any direct evidence of discrimination and that the circumstantial evidence that Kemp
presented was not enough to permit a jury to infer intentional discrimination under the
direct method of proof. See Atanus v. Perry, 520 F.3d 662, 671‐73 (7th Cir. 2008). Moreover,
the court wrote, Kemp could not establish a prima facie case under the indirect method of
proof because he had not shown that younger, similarly situated individuals had received
superior treatment. See id. As for his second count, Kemp could not point to a statutorily
protected activity as the basis for retaliation, so that claim perished as well.
Kemp’s pro se brief is vexing. As far as we can tell, his sole argument is that as a
government actor Judge Reagan could not act impartially in this case brought against the
federal government (actually a cabinet secretary). Kemp asserts that only a jury without
“political ties to the current administration” is fit to consider his case. As evidence of this
bias, Kemp offers Judge Reagan’s denial of a motion to recruit counsel, see Pruitt v. Mote, 503
F.3d 647 (7th Cir. 2007) (en banc), and a portion of the summary‐judgment order in which
the district court acknowledged that Kemp was over 40 at the time of his discharge.
This argument is without merit. It takes more than an adverse ruling to demonstrate
judicial bias, see Grove Fresh Distribs., Inc. v. John Labatt, Ltd., 299 F.3d 635, 640 (7th Cir. 2002);
In re Golant, 239 F.3d 931, 938 (7th Cir. 2001), and the record does not bear a hint of animus,
prejudice, or favoritism.
AFFIRMED.

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