Debra Pratt v. Wisconsin Aluminum Foundry

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 24-1901
DEBRA PRATT,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
W
ISCONSIN ALUMINUM FOUNDRY,
Defendant-Appellee.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Wisconsin.
No. 1:22-cv-00568 — William C. Griesbach, Judge.
____________________
ARGUED JANUARY 28, 2025 — DECIDED JULY 23, 2026
____________________
Before HAMILTON, KIRSCH, and MALDONADO, Circuit
Judges.
MALDONADO, Circuit Judge. After reporting claims of dis-
crimination and harassment at the Wisconsin Aluminum
Foundry (WAF), human resources manager Debra Pratt
found herself under attack. Other managers targeted her, she
received a poor performance review, and after she com-
plained about discrimination and retaliation, she was fired.
Pratt sued, alleging sex discrimination, pay discrimination,

2 No. 24-1901
and retaliation. WAF said it fired Pratt because of the perfor-
mance review as well as a lack of trust in Pratt’s department
and confidentiality issues. The district court granted sum-
mary judgment in favor of WAF on all of Pratt’s claims.
We reverse in part. Pratt presented sufficient evidence of
sex discrimination and retaliation under Title VII such that a
reasonable jury could find in her favor on those claims. To be
sure, WAF presented an alternative narrative that Pratt was
fired for poor performance, but summary judgment is not the
time to decide which narrative to believe. The time for weigh-
ing competing evidence is trial, and the job is for a jury not a
judge. See Wallace v. SMC Pneumatics, Inc., 103 F.3d 1394, 1396
(7th Cir. 1997) (“[C]ourts should be careful in a discrimination
case as in any case not to grant summary judgment if there is
an issue of material fact that is genuinely contestable, which
an issue of intent often though not always will be.”); Johnson
v. Advoc. Health & Hosps. Corp., 892 F.3d 887, 893 (7th Cir. 2018)
(“As we have said many times, summary judgment cannot be
used to resolve swearing contests between litigants.” (citation
omitted)). We agree with the district court, however, that
WAF is entitled to summary judgment on Pratt’s pay discrim-
ination claim. Accordingly, we remand for trial on Pratt’s sex
discrimination and retaliation claims.
BACKGROUND
The following facts are undisputed, except where other-
wise noted, and viewed in the light most favorable to Pratt as
the non-movant. Gaddis v. DeMattei, 30 F.4th 625, 628, 630 (7th
Cir. 2022).

No. 24-1901 3
I. Factual Background
WA F i s a family-owned aluminum foundry in Manitowoc,
Wisconsin. Pratt began working for WAF in 2016 in the hu-
man resources department. In 2017, she was promoted to hu-
man resources manager. Her new responsibilities included
developing and implementing personnel policies, maintain-
ing personnel records, and responding to and investigating
employee complaints.
The parties dispute the scope of her responsibilities for en-
vironmental health and safety, which bears on her pay dis-
crimination claim. Pratt’s predecessor performed those du-
ties, but WAF contends that Pratt did not when she was pro-
moted. A few months after Pratt was promoted, WAF hired
Emery Coonen to be its Environmental Health and Safety
Manager, and he took over these responsibilities. Coonen was
hired at an annual salary of $85,328. Pratt’s starting salary as
HR manager was $65,016.
Pratt performed well in her first year as HR manager and
received a bonus and a raise at the end of 2017, bringing her
annual salary to $69,567. But she experienced some early set-
backs. In early 2018, she committed errors on a benefits
spreadsheet and did not catch a rate change for insurance pre-
miums. S he also filled a union position with an external can-
didate, which WAF contends violated its collective bargaining
agreement.
Pratt also began to ruffle some feathers within the com-
pany by reporting concerns of discrimination and harassment
to her supervisor, Ben Jacobs, WAF’s Senior Vice President
and Chief Product Officer. She believed her predecessor, who
had been in the role for over thirty years, did not do enough

4 No. 24-1901
to investigate employee complaints. So, she took it upon her-
self to ensure that, under her direction, the department would
take complaints seriously and report them to WAF leadership.
Between 2017 and 2018, Pratt reported multiple employee
complaints of harassment and discrimination to Jacobs and
other managers. Employees complained to Pratt about dis-
crimination based on sex, race, ethnicity, and disability.
She
also shared with Jacobs her personal experiences as a female
manager at WAF.

Eugene Boyd, WAF’s Vice President of Operations, was
the subject of many of these complaints. Pratt not only re-
ported other employees’ complaints about Boyd, but her own
as well. For instance, in conversation with Pratt, Boyd referred
to another female manager as a “bitch” and told Pratt he could
“rile her up.” Boyd also treated Pratt and her employees in the
HR department—composed wholly of women—as secretar-
ies, asking them to do menial tasks not related to their job du-
ties.
One of Pratt’s reports to Jacobs involved Boyd discussing
a female employee’s “ass” at a meeting. During that meeting,
Boyd’s female subordinate, Lili Goehring, remarked that she
fell down the stairs and bruised her buttocks. The parties dis-
pute what happened next, but they agree that Pratt later told
Jacobs that, after Goehring’s remarks, Boyd told Goehring to
get up on the table and show him her “ass.” One meeting at-
tendee told Pratt that Boyd also stuck his thumb up on the
table and told Goehring to “sit on it and he would spin her.”
Another attendee informed Pratt that while the jokes did not
seem to bother Goehring, the innuendo made them uncom-
fortable.

No. 24-1901 5
After learning about this incident, Pratt prepared a written
report for Jacobs summarizing her conversations with the wit-
nesses who approached her. The report included her “find-
ings,” in which she wrote that the “sexual harassment” be-
tween Boyd and Goehring was her “biggest concern.” She
noted that the interaction “appear[ed] to be of a joking na-
ture,” but it was “still unprofessional and against the law.”
She advised that any witnesses to the interaction would “have
the ability to file a sexual harassment complaint with the com-
pany as well as the EEOC” and that it “would be a difficult
case to defend.”
Pratt sent the report to Jacobs a few weeks later. She did
not know, however, that Jacobs already had a copy of it. An-
other manager at WAF told Jacobs that he found the report on
a copy machine near where Pratt worked. Jacobs was con-
cerned that a confidential report was apparently left out in the
open, so WAF engaged its outside counsel to investigate. The
investigator spoke to Pratt, who admitted preparing the re-
port but was surprised that someone else had found it. Pratt
was later reprimanded for breaching confidentiality. Jacobs
was also concerned about the way Pratt conducted her inves-
tigation before compiling the report, and she was given addi-
tional training on conducting and documenting HR investiga-
tions. Neither Boyd nor Goehring were disciplined for their
part, although Jacobs testified they were given additional
“training.”
The problems with Boyd were not isolated incidents. The
same female manager Boyd called a “bitch” complained to
Pratt about Boyd barring her from necessary work meetings.
Pratt reported another incident to Jacobs in which Boyd ob-
scenely flipped off a female receptionist with his middle fin-

6 No. 24-1901
ger after she asked him to move his car from a visitor parking
lot.
Pratt’s reports to Jacobs also involved complaints of race
discrimination, including a number complaining of Tom
Culp, a white shift leader at WAF. Based on complaints she
received, Pratt grew concerned that Culp treated his minority
employees differently than his white employees and reported
multiple incidents to Jacobs and to Boyd, Culp’s supervisor.
Finally, Pratt also told Jacobs about her own experiences
with discrimination and harassment a t WA F. She reported
that another manager called her a “cunt” and “bitch” because
she asked him to sign a payroll change form. Pratt also re-
ported that Boyd’s subordinates hounded an HR employee
for a date, and one of them sent her an email stating “U
Smoken Hot.” Pratt and the other employees in the HR de-
partment felt uncomfortable with these remarks and the
email, and Pratt reported as much to Jacobs.
Pratt’s reporting did not make her popular within the
company. Jacobs testified that managers complained to him
about the “direction” the HR department was moving in and
expressed their distrust of Pratt. Suspicions about Pratt were
later memorialized when she was reviewed by a third-party
consulting group, Utech. Utech, which WAF engaged to help
manage its growth, interviewed about 50 WAF employees
and managers, including Pratt, about the strengths and weak-
nesses of the company and its leaders.
Utech compiled the employee feedback into a September
2018 report that identified strengths and weaknesses with
WAF’s culture generally. Utech noted that “[m]orale [had]
gone downhill over [the] last 3 years,” (predating Pratt’s hir-

No. 24-1901 7
ing) and that there was a lack of trust and accountability. Fur-
ther, Utech observed that “[t]he current culture at WAF is one
of gossip and drama. Issues are avoided or talked about indi-
rectly, causing more division within the organization. Sides
are being taken, people are protective of their areas and peo-
ple are really unsure who to trust . . . This starts with leader-
ship.”
Utech also provided individual feedback for WAF’s man-
agers, including Pratt, Boyd, and Jacobs. Under Pratt’s
strengths, the report said that she worked hard to “make
things better” and knew her job well. The Utech report elabo-
rated that “Deb hasn’t been in her role long[,] yet is seen as
trying to make improvements within the HR department and
the organization, but has been met with some resistance.” The
report also said that Pratt lacked the trust of other employees
who believed that she had a “hidden agenda,” gossiped, and
held grudges. The report further stated that many employees
thought Pratt “[i]nvestigates people instead of focusing on
what’s best for the company.”
The Utech report also criticized each of the other WA F
managers. Some of the criticism was starkly similar to Pratt’s.
The report stated that employees did not trust Jacobs because,
for example, he shared “information with others that was told
to him in confidence.” Employees at WAF also found that he
lacked assertiveness. The report stated that Kory Brockman,
WAF’s Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer, had
a “hidden agenda” and perpetuated “drama” within the com-
pany. Boyd, who was at a similar level within the organiza-
tion as Pratt, received feedback that he lacked “respect and
professionalism” and “instigate[d] and perpetuate[d]
drama.” The report stated that Tom Behnke, also at a similar

8 No. 24-1901
level, talked “badly about people” and could be “hot-headed
and unprofessional.” Of the 11 managers reviewed in the
Utech report, Pratt was the only woman.
In November 2018, relying on the Utech report, Jacobs
gave Pratt a yearly performance review. Out of a total possible
score of 32, Pratt received a 10. Citing the Utech report, Jacobs
wrote that Pratt had been a “very [divisive] figure at WAF.”
He also stated that while she was “good on the benefits side,”
she required more training on the “HR side.” Because of her
low score, Pratt did not receive a performance bonus for 2018
as she had in 2017.
Concerned with her score, Pratt met with Jacobs in Decem-
ber 2018 to ask for additional feedback. During that meeting,
Pratt shared that she felt she was being retaliated against for
making reports about harassment and discrimination, partic-
ularly her report about Boyd and Goehring. She felt like she
had a target on her back.
Pratt was unsatisfied with Jacobs’ response during that
meeting and raised her concerns again in an email to Jacobs
on March 7, 2019. She wanted specific examples of her work
that warranted the low scores. In this email, she also ex-
pressed her concerns that Jacobs told other WAF employees
not to approach her for HR purposes and that, by doing so, he
was perpetuating a culture of distrust and gossip. She con-
cluded by explaining that she felt she had been retaliated
against because she reported the incident between Boyd and
Goehring and could not “turn a blind eye” to it.
One week later, on March 15, 2019, Pratt was fired.

No. 24-1901 9
II. Procedural History
Pratt brought claims against WA F under Title VII for retal-
iation, sex discrimination, hostile work environment, and pay
discrimination. The district court dismissed Pratt’s hostile
work environment claim at the pleading stage but allowed the
remainder of her claims to proceed. Pratt does not challenge
this dismissal on appeal.
After discovery, the district court granted summary judg-
ment in favor of WAF on all the remaining c laims. Applying
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), it con-
cluded that Pratt could not state a prima facie claim for sex
discrimination because she was not meeting WAF’s legitimate
performance expectations. As to Pratt’s pay discrimination
claim, the court concluded that she had not identified a suffi-
ciently close comparator. Finally, on Pratt’s retaliation claim,
the court concluded that she did not engage in a protected ac-
tivity.
DISCUSSION
We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment
de novo. Joll v. Valparaiso Cmty. Schs., 953 F.3d 923, 928 (7th
Cir. 2020). Summary judgment is appropriate if there are no
disputes of material fact and the movant is entitled to judg-
ment as a matter of law. F
ED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). In viewing the
facts in the light most favorable to Pratt, we must “try to focus
on the most persuasive story possible on [her] behalf when
asking whether a verdict in her favor would be reasonable or
could result only from irrational speculation.” Joll, 953 F.3d at
928. At summary judgment, we are careful not to usurp the
role of the jury. See Wince v. CBRE, Inc., 66 F.4th 1033, 1041
(7th Cir. 2023) (We “try to discern what the record shows” to

10 No. 24-1901
ensure a plaintiff is not “wrongly deprived of a trial.”). As
long as there is “at least one reasonable way to tell the story in
favor of” the non-movant, “a jury rather than appellate judges
must choose among them.” Joll, 953 F.3d at 935 (emphasis in
original).
I. Title VII Sex Discrimination
In granting summary judgment to WAF on Pratt’s Title VII
sex discrimination claim, the district court concluded that she
abandoned this claim because her arguments opposing sum-
mary judgment focused only on her retaliation claim. Argu-
ments may be waived if they are “perfunctory and underde-
veloped” or if they are so “unsupported by pertinent author-
ity” that the court must conduct research and form arguments
on behalf of the party. United States v. Holm, 326 F.3d 872, 877
(7th Cir. 2003) (citing United States v. Berkowitz, 927 F.2d 1376,
1384 (7th Cir. 1991)). Because waived claims cannot be consid-
ered on appeal, we do not find waiver lightly. If there is even
“a (barely) adequate basis on which to follow [the] argu-
ment,” we will not find waiver. Id.
Applying this principle, we disagree that Pratt abandoned
her discrimination claim. Pratt’s brief in opposition to sum-
mary judgment argued that WAF was not entitled to judg-
ment on her discriminatory discharge claim and was suffi-
ciently fleshed out over multiple paragraphs with citations to
both record evidence and case law. S he argued that her evi-
dence was sufficient to meet each prima facie element of a dis-
crimination claim. While some of these arguments bled into
her retaliation arguments, that is no basis to find waiver of an
entire claim. We therefore turn to the merits.

No. 24-1901 11
Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to discrimi-
nate against an employee “because of” the employee’s sex. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Pratt sets out her arguments in the
framework of McDonnell Douglas, but the question before us
is simple: “whether the evidence would permit a reasonable
factfinder to conclude that the plaintiff’s race, ethnicity, sex,
religion, or other proscribed factor caused the discharge . . . .”
Ortiz v. Werner Enters., Inc., 834 F.3d 760, 765 (7th Cir. 2016);
see also Tyburski v. City of Chicago, 964 F.3d 590, 598 (7th Cir.
2020) (“A plaintiff may put forth and a court may analyze ev-
idence using the McDonnell Douglas framework, but neither
must do so.”); Skiba v. Ill. Cent. R.R., 884 F.3d 708, 720 (7th Cir.
2018) (“However the plaintiff chooses to proceed, at the sum-
mary judgment stage the court must consider all admissible
evidence . . . .” (citation omitted)).
Here, as in many Title VII cases, the “sole question that
matters” is causation: “whether a statutorily proscribed factor
caused” a discharge. Joll, 953 F.3d at 929 (citation omitted). Put
another way, the issue is whether the employer would have
fired Pratt if she had been a man and everything else had re-
mained the same. Gehring v. Case Corp., 43 F.3d 340, 344 (7th
Cir. 1994).
To assess causation in employment discrimination cases,
we “ask whether the totality of the evidence shows discrimi-
nation, eschewing any framework or formula.” Igasaki v. Ill.
Dep’t of Fin. & Pro. Regul., 988 F.3d 948, 958 (7th Cir. 2021) (cit-
ing Ortiz, 834 F.3d at 765). “[A]ll evidence belongs in a single
pile,” Ortiz, 834 F.3d at 766, because “[d]irect as well as cir-
cumstantial evidence may support an inference of causation,
and thus intent” in Title VII cases, Joll, 953 F.3d at 929 (citing
Ortiz, 834 F.3d at 764); see also Ames v. Ohio Dep’t of Youth

12 No. 24-1901
Servs., 605 U.S. 303, 325 (2025) (Thomas, J. concurring) (quot-
ing Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 99 (2003)) (“That
‘[c]onventional rul[e] of civil litigation’—that a plaintiff can
proceed with direct or circumstantial evidence—applies with
full force to Title VII cases.”).
“The reason for treating circumstantial and direct evi-
dence alike is both clear and deep-rooted: ‘Circumstantial ev-
idence is not only sufficient, but may also be more certain, sat-
isfying and persuasive than direct evidence.’” Desert Palace,
539 U.S. at 100 (quoting Rogers v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S.
500, 508, n. 17 (1957)). The import of circumstantial evidence
is especially acute in the employment discrimination context
given that it is the rare discrimination case that might “permit
easy inferences, such as the fabled employer who admits to
firing an employee because of race.” Ortiz, 834 F.3d at 765. Be-
cause “[f]ew discrimination cases are so straightforward—in-
deed they are often factually complex and require sifting
through ambiguous pieces of evidence,” id., we have made
clear that “[a] plaintiff may use circumstantial evidence to
prove discrimination through a chain of inferences.” Downing
v. Abbott Lab’ys, 48 F.4th 793, 804 (7th Cir. 2022).
Broadly, three types of circumstantial evidence can sup-
port an inference of intentional discrimination: “[1] ambigu-
ous or suggestive comments or conduct; [2] better treatment
of people similarly situated but for the protected characteris-
tic; and [3] dishonest employer justifications for disparate
treatment.” Joll, 953 F.3d at 929. Pratt has produced substan-
tial evidence falling within each of these categories. Viewing
this evidence holistically, we conclude that there is at least one
reasonable way to tell the story in favor of her sex discrimina-
tion claim.

No. 24-1901 13
A. Ambiguous or Suggestive Comments or Conduct
The record reflects the culture at WAF as one in which
“suggestive comments” flowed freely. WAF does not dispute
that men in managerial roles regularly made i nappropriate
comments and jokes to and at the expense of women employ-
ees. Pratt’s own experience reflects this. She and her HR em-
ployees felt that they were treated like secretaries and not
asked to perform their actual job duties because of their sex.
Pratt also received pushback for reporting workplace harass-
ment and discrimination and was called a “bitch” and a
“cunt” for trying to do her job. Such offensive commentary is
far from “suggestive.” It is definitively sexist. See Passananti v.
Cook Cnty., 689 F.3d 655, 665 (7th Cir. 2012) (noting that
“bitch” and “cunt” are “sexually degrading, gender-specific
epithets” (citation omitted)).
Pratt reported this conduct to Jacobs repeatedly and he
took little to no action to address it. Pratt’s declaration that
Jacobs “did not” address discrimination at WAF is particu-
larly telling because Pratt, of all WAF employees, was best sit-
uated to know what actions Jacobs was or was not taking in
response to reports. After all, she maintained personnel rec-
ords and investigated complaints. At a certain point, a reason-
able jury could view Jacobs’ inaction as acquiescence, even
tacit approval of the conduct Pratt experienced firsthand.
1

1

Our dissenting colleague suggests that Pratt’s claim fails because Ja-
cobs did not make any of the alleged sexist comments, and “stray remarks
made by nondecisionmakers are not evidence that the decision had a dis-
criminatory motive.” Post at 33 (quoting Crabtree v. Nat’l Steel Corp., 261
F.3d 715, 723 (7th Cir. 2001)). But Crabtree found only that the district court
did not abuse its discretion by excluding, at trial, a single suggestive re-
mark, made two years after the alleged adverse employment action. See

14 No. 24-1901
Culture is often set by those at the top. See Burlington
Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 69 (2006)
(“The real social impact of workplace behavior often depends
on a constellation of surrounding circumstances.” (citation
omitted)). Considering Jacobs’ senior executive role at WAF,
a jury might reasonably deduce that he was influenced by this
sexist environment, and in fact, had lent it his imprimatur by
failing to intervene and address Pratt’s complaints. See Hasan
v. Foley & Lardner LLP, 552 F.3d 520, 528 (7th Cir. 2008), as cor-
rected (Jan. 21, 2009) (courts are “not require[d]” to “ignore
comments made by someone who is not directly responsible
for an employee’s supervision” especially where such com-
ments “incited” discriminatory comments from other em-
ployees and “may have instigated” an employee’s termina-
tion). Further, Jacobs had knowledge of his subordinates’ bias
and of their participation in the Utech report, but appar-
ently—and in spite of Pratt’s complaints to him on the sub-
ject—did not question whether the report could have been
tainted by a broader culture of sexism a t WA F. This is a theory
of sex discrimination that we have blessed in the past. See Pe-
rez v. Thorntons, Inc., 731 F.3d 699, 709 (7th Cir. 2013) (panel
majority rejected dissent’s argument that non-deci-
sionmaker’s sexist comments were “stray remarks” where
those remarks did not “st[an]d alone,” and the decisionmaker
“was informed of [the non-decisionmaker’s] bias,” but “chose

261 F.3d at 723. Crabtree is silent on whether a panoply of sexist remarks
and conduct by managers leading up to, and possibly contributing to a
termination, can be considered on de novo review at summary judgment.
See id.; see also Hunt v. City of Markham, 219 F.3d 649, 652–53 (7th Cir. 2000)
(making clear that courts must take care not to over-read “stray remarks”
cases).

No. 24-1901 15
to credit” the non-decisionmaker’s account of the employee’s
alleged infractions).
As a result, a jury could find that because Jacobs relied on
input he understood to be discriminatory and acceded to the
discriminatory atmosphere, his own decision to discharge
Pratt was made because of her sex. Context matters, and
where derogatory comments do not stand alone, and are im-
plicated within a larger web of investigations and complaints
to decisionmakers, “we allow the jury to hear such evidence
and weigh it for what it is worth.” Id. at 710; cf. Dey v. Colt
Constr. & Dev. Co., 28 F.3d 1446, 1459 (7th Cir. 1994) (collecting
cases) (“Summary judgment generally is improper where the
plaintiff can show that an employee with discriminatory ani-
mus provided factual information or other input that may
have affected the adverse employment action.”).
In highly similar contexts, several of our sister circuits
long have recognized the importance of assessing workplace
culture in discrimination claims by considering discrimina-
tory comments and actions by non-decisionmakers. See, e.g.
Merritt v. Old Dominion Freight Line, Inc., 601 F.3d 289, 301 (4th
Cir. 2010) (reversing summary judgment for employer be-
cause, while the views/actions of other employees cannot be
attributed to an ultimate decisionmaker, “at some point the
corporate environment in which [the decisionmaker] worked
places” the employment decision in a “less neutral context”);
Risch v. Royal Oak Police Dep’t, 581 F.3d 383, 393 (6th Cir. 2009)
(reversing summary judgment for employer because “dis-
criminatory remarks, even by a nondecisionmaker, can serve
as probative evidence of pretext” and that type of circumstan-
tial evidence may establish the evidence of a “discriminatory
atmosphere”); Brewer v. Quaker State Oil Refin. Corp., 72 F.3d

16 No. 24-1901
326, 333 (3d Cir. 1995) (reversing summary judgment for em-
ployer because, although “stray remarks by non-deci-
sionmakers or by decisionmakers unrelated to the decision
process are rarely given great weight,” such statements “may
provide some relevant evidence of discrimination” at trial).
Because we treat the evidence holistically, we cannot ignore
the environment Pratt worked in and must consider those
facts in the light most favorable to her. See Ortiz, 834 F.3d at
766.
On its own, this discriminatory culture evidence may not
be enough to conclude that Pratt’s discrimination claim sur-
vives summary judgment. But viewed with the rest of the rec-
ord evidence, the alleged sexist “remarks are part of the evi-
dence of pretext that the jury should have the opportunity to
weigh at trial.” Perez, 731 F.3d at 710.
B. Dishonest Justifications for Disparate Treatment
Pratt also presented evidence of “dishonest employer jus-
tifications for disparate treatment.” Joll, 953 F.3d at 929. WA F
claims it had three reasons for terminating Pratt in March
2019: (1) the negative feedback she received in the Utech re-
port, particularly that employees did not trust her; (2) con-
cerns about her ability to keep sensitive HR information con-
fidential; and (3) errors she made in early 2018 related to a
change in WAF’s benefits plan for its employees and hiring an
external candidate for a union position.
But none of these reasons compel us to rule for WAF as a
matter of law. Some occurred a year before she was fired, and
other employees who had similarly negative feedback in the
Utech report received bonuses, not notices of termination. A
reasonable jury could infer that these stated reasons were dis-

No. 24-1901 17
honest. Evidence of Pratt’s performance issues does not jus-
tify automatically keeping her claims from a jury. “Federal
employment discrimination laws do not limit their protection
to perfect employees.” Paterakos v. City of Chicago, 147 F.4th
787, 797 (7th Cir. 2025).
Starting with the Utech report, Pratt was the only woman
reviewed in the report. Even though her negative feedback
was not unique, she was the only one punished for it. Jacobs,
Brockman, and Boyd, who all received negative feedback,
some very similar to Pratt ’s, were rewarded with performance
bonuses at the end of 2018. This differential treatment sup-
ports an inference that WAF’s reliance on the Utech report to
justify Pratt’s termination is dishonest. See Marnocha v. St. Vin-
cent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc., 986 F.3d 711, 719 (7th Cir.
2021) (quoting McDaniel v. Progress Rail Locomotive, Inc., 940
F.3d 360, 368 (7th Cir. 2019)) (“All things being equal, if an
employer takes an action against one employee in a protected
class but not another outside that class, one can infer discrim-
ination.”).
Regarding Pratt’s handling of confidential information
and early 2018 errors as justifications for WAF’s decision to
fire Pratt, both occurred nearly a year before she was fired. As
for the union hiring issue, it is unclear from the record when
this occurred. Beyond their staleness, these reasons are incon-
sistent with the feedback Pratt received; in her 2018 perfor-
mance report, Jacobs stated that she was “good on the benefits
side” and made no mention of issues with union hiring or
confidentiality. WAF’s reliance on this stale evidence and its
conflict with Pratt’s 2018 performance review combined with
the culture evidence discussed above could lead a jury to con-
clude that the real reason for its decision to terminate Pratt

18 No. 24-1901
was based on her sex. See Joll, 953 F.3d at 932; Loudermilk v.
Best Pallet Co., 636 F.3d 312, 315 (7th Cir. 2011) (collecting
cases) (“[A]n employer who advances a fishy reason takes the
risk that disbelief of the reason will support an inference that
it is a pretext for discrimination.”).
C. Better Treatment of Employees Outside Pratt’s Pro-
tected Group
Pratt has also presented evidence of “better treatment of
people similarly situated but for [her] protected characteris-
tic.” Joll, 953 F.3d at 929. Namely, the male managers in the
Utech report. Pratt points to two similarly situated employ-
ees, Boyd and Behnke, both men, who were at a similar man-
agerial level as Pratt, reported to the same supervisor, and
were subject to the same feedback process through the Utech
report. Even though Boyd and Behnke also received negative
feedback, neither was disciplined or fired, and Boyd received
a bonus in 2018. They therefore provide a “meaningful com-
parison” to Pratt “to permit a reasonable jury to infer discrim-
ination.” Coleman v. Donahoe, 667 F.3d 835, 841 (7th Cir. 2012).
While it is true that Boyd and Behnke were not HR man-
agers like Pratt, we have been clear that a comparator need
not be “identical.” Id. at 846. Pratt must only point us to an
analogue, not a twin. See Johnson, 892 F.3d at 895 (quoting
Coleman, 667 F.3d at 841) (noting that Coleman “warned
against using a mechanical ‘magic formula’ for the similarly-
situated inquiry”). Here, it would be impossible to find Pratt’s
twin given that Pratt was the sole leader of WAF’s HR depart-
ment, and thus, no one else at WAF had the same job descrip-
tion as her (or, most likely, comparable experience, education,
and other qualifications). We decline to read a gaping hole

No. 24-1901 19
into Title VII precluding executives, without direct profes-
sional peers, from proving their discrimination claims.
Because “this is not a hard and fast test . . . the require-
ment to find a similarly situated comparator is really just the
same requirement that any case demands—the requirement
to submit relevant evidence.” Id. Here, the Utech report pro-
vides strong evidence that Behnke and Boyd are similarly sit-
uated comparators insofar as they were reviewed in the same
category as Pratt under the same criteria. See Mitchell v. Exxon
Mobil Corp., 143 F.4th 800, 810 (7th Cir. 2025) (relying on com-
pany’s “annual performance assessment,” which “assign[ed]
employees to assessment groups based on similar roles and
with similar experience, even if employees have different job
titles, report to different supervisors, and work in different lo-
cations across the country” to identify similarly situated com-
parators). The Utech report grouped Boyd, Behnke, and Pratt
in the “individual leaders” section and provided a review of
each leader’s strengths and weaknesses based on standard-
ized interviews with the same staff members. The weaknesses
identified for Boyd, Behnke, and Pratt centered around the
same key issues: a purported penchant for drama, as well as
a lack of professionalism. Boyd was said to “ha[ve] people do
his dirty work,” “be intimidating and aggressive,” and “insti-
gate[] and perpetuate[] drama.” Behnke, meanwhile was said
to “talk[] badly about people” and “be hot-headed and un-
professional.” And Pratt was said to “ha[ve] a hidden
agenda,” engage in “[g]ossip and backstabbing,” and “hold[]
grudges against people.” These reviews suggest a climate of
distrust in Boyd’s, Behnke’s, and Pratt’s departments at WAF.
Pratt has therefore provided us with “evidence about how
[Boyd and Behnke] compared in the [Utech] assessment pro-

20 No. 24-1901
cess,” as well as evidence “show[ing] that [Pratt, Boyd, and
Behnke] were assessed unfavorably in comparison to others
in their assessment group[],” namely, individual leaders at
WA F. Mitchell, 143 F.4th at 812. Boyd and Behnke were not
disciplined or demoted based on the Utech report’s findings
(like Pratt was).
Considering the totality of the evidence, there is “at least
one reasonable way to tell the story” in Pratt’s favor, support-
ing an inference that she was fired because of her sex. Joll, 953
F.3d at 935. And rather than “weigh[ing] any conflicting evi-
dence” ourselves, we must allow a jury to connect the dots.
Omnicare, Inc. v. UnitedHealth Grp., Inc., 629 F.3d 697, 705 (7th
Cir. 2011). Accordingly, WAF is not entitled to summary judg-
ment on Pratt’s Title VII sex discrimination claim.
2

2
Our dissenting colleague does not consider the totality of the evi-
dence and instead insists that we are breaking “our rules on stray remarks,
cat’s paw liability, [and] hostile work environment.” Post at 33. But we
have made clear that to assess causation in employment discrimination
cases, we “ask whether the totality of the evidence shows discrimination,
eschewing any framework or formula.” Igasaki, 988 F.3d at 958 (citing
Ortiz, 834 F.3d at 765). The “sole question that matters” is “[w]hether a
reasonable juror could conclude that [Pratt] would have kept [her] job if
[s]he had a different [sex], and everything else had remained the same.”
Ortiz, 834 F.3d at 764. We stray from this fundamental inquiry and mis-
takenly step into the jury’s role if we dismiss evidence as unworthy of our
consideration because it does not fall neatly into a doctrinal bucket. After
all, evidence that might support a discriminatory discharge might also
support a hostile work environment claim, and vice versa. And evidence
of other managers’ remarks and biases might place Pratt’s termination in
a “less neutral context.” Merritt, 601 F.3d at 301. We cannot disregard the
cumulative impact of such evidence simply by isolating bits and pieces of
evidence and labeling it as relevant only to one particular theory of dis-

No. 24-1901 21
II. Title VII Retaliation
We turn next to Pratt’s retaliation claim. Pratt contends she
was fired in retaliation for reporting harassment and discrim-
ination at WAF and for complaining to Jacobs that she be-
lieved she was being retaliated against.
Title VII prohibits employers from “retaliating against an
employee for opposing or participating in an investigation of
an unlawful employment practice.” Lewis v. Wilkie, 909 F.3d
858, 866 (7th Cir. 2018) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)). Our
analysis focuses on one fundamental question: “could a rea-
sonable trier of fact infer retaliation . . . ?” Castro v. Devry
Univ., Inc., 786 F.3d 559, 564 (7th Cir. 2015) (collecting cases).
To prevail, Pratt must offer evidence that would permit a rea-
sonable juror to find that: (1) she engaged in protected activ-

crimination. A jury must sort through and weigh all the evidence Pratt has
put forward.
At any rate, this is not a stray remarks case. See supra at n. 1. This is
also not a cat’s paw case. Pratt does not suggest that Jacobs was an “un-
witting manager” or an “unbiased individual” who terminated her solely
because he was beguiled by Pratt’s sexist coworkers, Schandelmeier-Bartels
v. Chicago Park Dist., 634 F.3d 372, 379 (7th Cir. 2011); instead, Pratt con-
tends Jacobs knew of, and adopted, his colleagues’ sexist bias. Last, while
Pratt abandoned her hostile work environment claim on appeal, we need
not put blinders on and automatically dismiss evidence merely because it
more self-evidently fits into one sort of sex discrimination theory than an-
other. Cf. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) (acknowl-
edging overlap between hostile work environment claim and sexual har-
assment claim). Rather, per Ortiz’s instruction, we consider all of the evi-
dence “in a single pile,” 834 F.3d at 766, and focus on “whether a statuto-
rily proscribed factor caused” Pratt’s discharge, Joll, 953 F.3d at 929. More
precisely, we consider whether a reasonable jury considering all that evi-
dence could reasonably find that the employer discharged Pratt because
of her sex. The answer is yes.

22 No. 24-1901
ity; (2) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) a
causal connection exists between the protected activity and
that adverse employment action. Gnutek v. Ill. Gaming Bd., 80
F.4th 820, 824 (7th Cir. 2023). There is no dispute that Pratt
meets the second element; she was fired. We focus our analy-
sis on the first and third elements.
A. Protected Activity
For her claim to survive, Pratt must show that she sin-
cerely and reasonably believed that she was reporting con-
duct prohibited by Title VII. Castro, 786 F.3d at 564. Her claim
falls within the opposition clause in Title VII, which protects
an employee who opposes “any practice made an unlawful
employment practice by [Title VII].” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
“Oppose” carries its ordinary meaning: “to resist or antago-
nize; to contend against; to confront; resist; withstand.” Craw-
ford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., 555 U.S. 271,
276 (2009) (citation modified). “When an employee communi-
cates to her employer a belief that the employer has engaged
in . . . a form of employment discrimination, that communica-
tion virtually always constitutes the employee’s opposition to
the activity.” Id. (emphasis in original) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted).
Title VII does not just protect employees who can accu-
rately divine whether a claim has merit before reporting it to
a supervisor. Rather, it protects all who honestly and reason-
ably believe they are reporting prohibited conduct. On this
point, the district court held Pratt to too high of a standard. It
concluded that WAF was entitled to judgment on her retalia-
tion claim because she did not engage in a protected activity.
The court focused solely on Boyd’s jokes to Goehring during
the January 2018 meeting and concluded that those jokes were

No. 24-1901 23
not unwelcome or intended to harass and therefore did not
amount to sexual harassment. But for a Title VII retaliation
claim, we do not consider whether the reported conduct “was
persistent or severe enough to be unlawful.” Magyar v. Saint
Joseph Reg’l Med. Ctr., 544 F.3d 766, 771 (7th Cir. 2008).
Whether Boyd’s conduct constituted sexual harassment un-
der Title VII “does not matter.” Castro, 786 F.3d at 564. What
does matter is that Pratt reasonably and honestly believed she
was reporting prohibited conduct. See id.
Pratt honestly believed she was opposing unlawful behav-
ior. In February 2018, Pratt wrote that the comments between
Boyd and Goehring were “unprofessional and against the
law” and that “any witnesses to [it] have the ability to file a
sexual harassment complaint with the company.” Her belief
that this conduct was unlawful under Title VII was certainly
sincere.
Her belief also appears reasonable. A joke about an em-
ployee exposing her buttocks or being told to sit on another
employee’s thumb might be considered actionable sexual har-
assment by some. Regardless of whether it was later deter-
mined that Boyd did not make the jokes, at the time she re-
ported it, Pratt had a reasonable belief that she was reporting
conduct prohibited by Title VII.
And this was not the only incident Pratt reported. She par-
ticipated in a host of protected activity by repeatedly com-
municating conduct to Jacobs that she believed was prohib-
ited under Title VII. She r eported multiple instances where
Boyd made inappropriate comments to women, including
that he called another employee a “bitch,” and that she be-
lieved he treated women employees worse than men. She also

24 No. 24-1901
reported another WAF manager for treating minority employ-
ees differently than white employees.
And not all of Pratt’s reports were on behalf of other em-
ployees. She also reported that a male supervisor called her a
“bitch” and a “cunt.” It is not hard to understand how Pratt
believed that the use of these blatantly sexist insults against
her was more than just inappropriate. Nothing in the record
suggests that Pratt did not honestly and reasonably believe
she was reporting conduct prohibited by Title VII. See Craw-
ford, 555 U.S. at 276.
In addition to these reports, Pratt twice told Jacobs that she
believed she was being retaliated against: once during her
performance review and again in an email one week before
she was terminated. Between her reports and her personal
complaints of retaliation, Pratt established that she had a rea-
sonable and good faith belief that she was opposing unlawful
conduct under Title VII.
In reaching the opposite conclusion, the district court
adopted a unique retaliation rule applicable only to HR em-
ployees. Relying on an out-of-circuit case, Littlejohn v. City of
New York, 795 F.3d 297, 318 (2d Cir. 2015), the district court
concluded that in order to bring a retaliation claim, Pratt
needed to show that she was not simply performing her job
duties in passing along complaints, but that she was actively
supporting other employees in asserting their Title VII rights
or personally complaining about discriminatory conduct.
We are doubtful that Littlejohn’s heightened standard for
retaliation claims by HR employees passes muster. By its text,
Title VII requires only that Pratt oppose an unlawful employ-
ment practice. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (making it “unlaw-

No. 24-1901 25
ful . . . for an employer to discriminate against any . . . em-
ployee[] . . . because he has opposed any practice made an un-
lawful employment practice by this subchapter”). We should
not graft judge-made requirements onto the text requiring
plaintiffs who work in HR departments to show “personal”
opposition or “active[] support[]” of other employees. See Lit-
tlejohn, 795 F.3d at 318 (quoting Sumner v. U.S. Postal Service,
899 F.2d 203, 209 (2d Cir. 1990)). Further, the Supreme Court
has never interpreted the opposition clause to be restricted to
only certain types of employees. See Crawford, 555 U.S. at 276.
To the extent WAF argues that policy considerations warrant
an exception, such concerns “cannot override” the plain text
of the statute. Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, 601 U.S. 346, 358
(2024). But we need not decide whether to accept the height-
ened standard in Littlejohn here. Pratt vigorously opposed
conduct directed both at her and others.
WA F also argues that Pratt’s evidence of reporting, which
was mostly admitted through her affidavit filed in opposition
to summary judgment, cannot be considered based on the
sham affidavit rule. WAF argues that when asked in her dep-
osition to identify all instances of discrimination and harass-
ment that she reported to Jacobs, Pratt did not explain all of
the incidents she later cited in her affidavit and never at-
tempted to amend or supplement her testimony. Accordingly,
WAF contends that Pratt may not rely on this evidence.
It is true that “a plaintiff cannot manufacture a genuine
dispute of material fact by contradicting her prior deposition
testimony with an affidavit.” Leibas v. Dart, 108 F.4th 1021,
1026 (7th Cir. 2024). But an affidavit that “clarifies ambiguous
or confusing deposition testimony” is permissible. Perez v.

26 No. 24-1901
Staples Cont. & Com. LLC, 31 F.4th 560, 570 (7th Cir. 2022) (ci-
tation omitted).
This is no sham affidavit. First, Pratt provided deposition
testimony about many of these incidents that she reported to
Jacobs. See R.33-1 at 46:1–47:1 (Pratt believed Culp engaged in
racial discrimination); 56:7–57:16 (Boyd referred to Rabitz as a
“bitch”); 202:6–8 (Behnke retaliated against an employee);
202:9–10 (Pratt believed Boyd was mocking her due to her
sex); 203:1–204:14 (a manager sent an email to a woman em-
ployee in the HR department which stated “U Smoken Hot”);
208:18–209:5 (Pratt felt disrespected by Jacobs when he yelled
at her and believed it was heightened due to her gender);
209:13–25 (women employees were being given secretarial
work because they were women). To the extent there were
any incidents that Pratt did not testify about in her deposition,
her notes, which were available to counsel during her deposi-
tion, contained even more descriptions of reports that Pratt
made to Jacobs.
Pratt therefore has met the first element of her retaliation
claim. Whether this claim proceeds to trial thus depends on
whether a jury could find that she established a causal con-
nection between this protected activity and her termination.
B. Causal Connection
The “key question” on causation is “whether a reasonable
juror could conclude that there was a causal link between the
protected activity or status and the adverse action.” Rozumal-
ski v. W.F. Baird & Assocs., Ltd., 937 F.3d 919, 924 (7th Cir.
2019). To establish that the protected activity caused the ad-
verse employment decision, a plaintiff may offer evidence of
“suspicious timing, ambiguous statements, behavior toward

No. 24-1901 27
or comments directed at other employees in the protected
group, and other bits and pieces from which an inference of
discriminatory intent might be drawn.” Boumehdi v. Plastag
Holdings, LLC, 489 F.3d 781, 792 (7th Cir. 2007). Of these, cau-
sation is most “frequently established by showing that there
was a suspiciously short period of time between the em-
ployee’s complaint and the adverse employment action.” Id.
at 793.
To establish a causal link between her protected reporting
and her termination, Pratt cites the timing of her termination
decision and the lack of non-pretextual explanations for it. As
to timing, Pratt was fired one week after raising concerns
about retaliation to Jacobs. This is certainly close enough in
time to support an inference of causation.
But WA F contends that Jacobs decided to fire Pratt before
she sent the March 7, 2019 email. In other words, WAF insists
that Jacobs decided to fire Pratt before she engaged in any
protected activity, and therefore the timing is not suspicious.
WAF relies on Jacobs’ declaration filed at summary judgment
to support its argument. But this argument fails for two rea-
sons.
First, the March 7, 2019 email is just one example of the
protected activity that Pratt engaged in. She was a serial re-
porter of discrimination and harassment to Jacobs throughout
her tenure as HR manager. Pratt also raised concerns about
being retaliated against during her 2018 performance review,
which occurred on December 8, 2018. This was still relatively
close in time to her termination and could establish a suffi-
cient causal connection. Boumehdi, 489 F.3d at 793; see also Huff
v. Buttigieg, 42 F.4th 638, 650 (7th Cir. 2022) (whether five

28 No. 24-1901
months between protected activity and adverse employment
action was suspicious timing was a question for the jury).
Second, Jacobs’ declaration statement that he decided to
fire Pratt before March 7 is in tension with his own deposition
testimony. During his deposition, Jacobs could not remember
when Pratt was fired. In his declaration, however, he states
that he “made the decision to terminate Pratt’s employment
prior to March 7, 2019.” One could argue that Jacobs’ later-in-
time recollection of the specific timing of the decision, without
any corroboration, smacks of sham testimony that a jury
should evaluate. Yet, even credited, Jacobs’ declaration does
not foreclose Pratt’s causation theory because she engaged in
a surplus of protected activity before March 7 too. At the very
least, a question of fact remains as to when Jacobs made the
decision to terminate Pratt in relation to all her protected ac-
tivity. See Perez, 731 F.3d at 707 (genuine issue of fact existed
where employer’s statement of facts contradicted its own ev-
idence).
Pratt also contends that her evidence of pretext supports
the causal link. Specifically, she emphasizes that Jacobs wrote
in her performance review that she was “good on the benefits
side,” but then cited issues with benefits as a reason for her
termination. She also contends that no other employee who
received negative feedback in the Utech report was termi-
nated. If a Title VII retaliation plaintiff “offers specific evi-
dence from which the finder of fact may reasonably infer that
the proffered reasons do not represent the truth, the case then
turns on the credibility of the witnesses.” Collier v. Budd Co.,
66 F.3d 886, 893 (7th Cir. 1995). That is precisely the case here,
and Pratt’s retaliation claim therefore must survive summary
judgment.

No. 24-1901 29
III. Pay Discrimination
Finally, we turn to Pratt’s pay discrimination claim. Pratt
identifies Emery Coonen as a comparator. She argues that
even though her job duties initially included those of the en-
vironmental health and safety manager, when WAF later
hired Emery Coonen to fill that role, he was paid more than
she was, raising the inference that she was paid less because
of her sex.
To establish a claim of pay discrimination under Title VII,
Pratt must produce evidence that a similarly situated male
employee was treated more favorably. Johnson, 892 F.3d at
895. While similarly situated means “directly comparable in
all material aspects,” the “proposed comparator need not be
identical in every conceivable way,” and courts “must con-
duct a common-sense examination.” Id. (quoting Reed v. Free-
dom Mortg. Corp., 869 F.3d 543, 549 (7th Cir. 2017) (internal
quotation marks omitted)). We ask, “are there enough com-
mon features between the individuals to allow a meaningful
comparison?” Id. (quoting Coleman, 667 F.3d at 841). Relevant
evidence on this question includes whether the employees
were supervised by the same person, were subject to the same
standards, and engaged in similar conduct “without such dif-
ferentiating or mitigating circumstances as would distinguish
their conduct or the employer’s treatment of them.” Id. (cita-
tion omitted).
The record in this case is simply too undeveloped for us to
determine whether Coonen is a sufficient comparator. For ex-
ample, neither WAF nor Pratt put forward any evidence that
Pratt and Coonen were subject to similar or different work-
place standards. The record is similarly devoid of any facts
regarding whether Pratt and Coonen had similar qualifica-

30 No. 24-1901
tions and credentials, especially related to environmental
health and safety. Pratt stated generally that Coonen was not
more experienced or qualified than she was but did not pro-
vide any facts supporting this conclusion other than her be-
lief. See id. at 895 (“Evidence of what has happened to other
employees is only relevant if that employee is in the same boat
as the plaintiff.”). Accordingly, Pratt did not meet her burden
to survive summary judgment on her pay discrimination
claim.
CONCLUSION
The grant of summary judgment for WAF on Pratt’s pay
discrimination claim is AFFIRMED. The grant of summary
judgment for WAF on Pratt’s claims for Title VII discrimina-
tion and retaliation is REVERSED and the case is
REMANDED for trial on those claims.

No. 24-1901 31
KIRSCH, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment in part
and dissenting in part. I agree with the majority that the Wis-
consin Aluminum Foundry is entitled to summary judgment
on Debra Pratt’s pay discrimination claim. I disagree that her
other claims warrant a trial. To salvage Pratt’s suit, the major-
ity ignores the distinction between direct discrimination and
hostile work environment claims and creates a special com-
parator analysis for executives. A faithful application of our
precedent should result in summary judgment for the
Foundry. Sexist comments by non-decisionmakers, employ-
ees who weren’t similarly situated to Pratt, and a delay be-
tween some of Pratt’s failures and the decision to fire her do
not add up to a Title VII discrimination claim. Similarly,
Pratt’s retaliation claim fails because she cannot show that
WAF’s stated, legitimate reasons for ending her employment
were a lie.
I
For Debra Pratt’s sex discrimination claim, the only ques-
tion that matters is whether a reasonable factfinder could con-
clude that the Wisconsin Aluminum Foundry ( WA F ) fired her
because she’s a woman. Ortiz v. Werner Enters., Inc., 834 F.3d
760, 766 (7th Cir. 2016); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. On this record, no
reasonable jury could make that finding.
A
The majority says that a jury could find a culture of sexism
existed at WAF and that Senior Vice President Ben Jacobs con-
doned that atmosphere. Ante, at 13–16. But there’s insufficient
evidence to impute discriminatory motives based on other
employees’ conduct to Jacobs, who actually made the decision
to fire Pratt. See Coleman v. Donahoe, 667 F.3d 835, 848 (7th Cir.

32 No. 24-1901
2012) (a discrimination claim “requires proof that the deci-
sionmaker acted for a prohibited reason”) (citation modified).
Jacobs didn’t participate in the problematic conduct Pratt re-
ported on, and he didn’t witness it. The majority reasons that
perhaps biased employees provided feedback that informed
the Utech report ( which then informed Jacobs’s decision), and
that because Jacobs didn’t take action to address the discrim-
inatory conduct of other employees, he must have condoned
it. Ante, at 13–15. This is speculation, and these are not reason-
able inferences. See Van Houdnos v. Evans, 807 F.2d 648, 655
(7th Cir. 1986) (considering a claim for sexual discrimination
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and observing that “Silence alone ... is
not evidence of discriminatory intent.”); E.E.O.C. v. Pipefitters
Ass’n Loc. Union 597, 334 F.3d 656, 660 (7th Cir. 2003) (apply-
ing Title VII and noting that “inaction, unless invidious, is not
discrimination in any accepted sense of the term. Most people
don’t take active measures to combat discrimination; their in-
action does not condemn them as discriminators.”).
It should matter to us that Pratt isn’t suing Eugene Boyd,
the subject of many of her complaints. Instead, she’s suing her
employer—WA F. And in such a suit, Title VII requires Pratt
to prove that WA F fired her because of her sex. See Ortiz, 834
F.3d at 765 (noting that the legal standard “is simply whether
the evidence would permit a reasonable factfinder to con-
clude that the plaintiff’s race, ethnicity, sex, religion, or other
proscribed factor caused the discharge or other adverse em-
ployment action”). To be precise, Pratt must show that dis-
crimination was a motivating factor in WA F’s decision. See
Comcast Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Afr. Am.-Owned Media, 589 U.S.
327, 337 (2020).

No. 24-1901 33
Ordinarily, when a plaintiff tries to prove discrimination
through evidence about an employer’s culture, we are consid-
ering a hostile work environment claim. And when a plaintiff
attempts to prove direct discrimination by using the conduct
or speech of non-decisionmakers, we apply our rules for stray
remarks and cat’s paw liability. The majority says this case is
special—that it isn’t governed by our rules on stray remarks,
cat’s paw liability, or hostile work environment. See Ante, at
13 n.1 & 20 n.2. But those rules should guide us here, and they
demonstrate the ways in which the majority’s novel theory
about discriminatory culture evidence extends and disrupts
our Title VII doctrine.
For instance, our law says that “stray remarks made by
nondecisionmakers are not evidence that the decision had a
discriminatory motive.” Crabtree v. Nat’l Steel Corp., 261 F.3d
715, 723 (7th Cir. 2001); see Mlynczak v. Bodman, 442 F.3d 1050,
1057–58 (7th Cir. 2006) (finding that a number of discrimina-
tory comments made by a non-decisionmaker did not show
that an employer discriminated); Brooks v. Avancez, 39 F.4th
424, 439–40 (7th Cir. 2022) (applying similar standards under
the ADEA and ADA and concluding that discriminatory com-
ments made by three employees did not “singularly influ-
ence[]” a decisionmaker to terminate an employee). And, un-
der the cat’s paw doctrine, to impute discriminatory remarks
or conduct from Boyd and other WAF employees to Jacobs
(the decisionmaker), Pratt must show that discrimination was
the proximate cause of her termination, which requires “some
direct relation between the injury asserted and the injurious
conduct alleged,” and excludes links that are “too remote,
purely contingent, or indirect.” Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S.
411, 419 (2011) (citation modified); see Johnson v. Koppers, Inc.,
726 F.3d 910, 915 (7th Cir. 2013).

34 No. 24-1901
Pratt cannot make that showing. Sexist comments made
by WA F employees who had nothing to do with Pratt’s termi-
nation are remote and indirect from the decision that mat-
ters—they are not a proximate cause of WAF’s action. See
Staub, 562 U.S. at 419; Vega v. Chi. Park Dist., 954 F.3d 996, 1006
(7th Cir. 2020) (observing that proof of discrimination re-
quires “a causal link between an employment decision made
by an unbiased individual and the impermissible bias of a
non-decisionmaking co-worker”) (citation modified); Rozu-
malski v. W.F. Baird & Assocs., Ltd., 937 F.3d 919, 925 (7th Cir.
2019) (“At a minimum, the person with discriminatory animus
must influence the ultimate employment decision enough to
be a ‘proximate cause’ of that action.”); Hunt v. City of Mark-
ham, 219 F.3d 649, 652–53 (7th Cir. 2000) (“[T]he fact that
someone who is not involved in the employment decision of
which the plaintiff complains expressed discriminatory feel-
ings is not evidence that the decision had a discriminatory
motivation.”) (citation modified).
Relying on precedent from outside our circuit, the major-
ity undermines the causal relationship required by Title VII,
reasoning that if enough non-decisionmakers make serious
enough discriminatory comments, and a decisionmaker
doesn’t act or speak out in response, we can impute discrimi-
natory motives to the decisionmaker. Ante, at 13–16. That ap-
proach ignores our precedent and collapses the distinction be-
tween a hostile work environment claim (which Pratt does not
raise on appeal) and a claim for direct discrimination. See,
e.g., Alexander v. Casino Queen, Inc., 739 F.3d 972, 979–83 (7th
Cir. 2014) (discussing the two theories); N at ’l R.R. Passenger
Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 115 (2002) (“Hostile environ-
ment claims are different in kind from discrete acts.”). This
case isn’t like Perez v. Thorntons, Inc., 731 F.3d 699 (7th Cir.

No. 24-1901 35
2013), either, because a biased non-decisionmaker in that case
played a central role in the employee’s termination. Id. at 709.
I agree with my colleagues that in discrimination cases,
evidence (direct or circumstantial) must be considered as a
whole. See Ortiz, 834 F.3d at 765. But not everything that hap-
pens at a workplace tends to show that an employer violated
Title VII. As this court has considered discrimination claims,
we’ve carefully drawn the line between evidence that proves
that an employer discriminated and evidence that does not.
We’ve drawn that line by distinguishing between claims for
hostile work environment and direct discrimination, and by
applying our rules for cat’s paw liability and stray remarks.
My colleagues ignore that careful work. They assert that if
evidence doesn’t fit into a “doctrinal bucket” it must still be
somehow relevant to our analysis. Ante, at 20–21 n.2. Ye t we
don’t start with the assumption that all the evidence pre-
sented will support a plaintiff’s claim—that’s a determination
we make now, in assessing whether WA F is entitled to sum-
mary judgment. According to the majority, this is the rare sit-
uation where evidence of discriminatory culture that doesn’t
involve a decisionmaker is relevant to a Title VII direct dis-
crimination claim (rather than to a claim based on a hostile
work environment). And they say this is the rare case where
our usual doctrines for assessing that kind of evidence (stray
remarks, cat’s paw) aren’t adequate. If that sounds suspi-
ciously like cover for extending our law in new ways, that’s
because it is. Title VII imposes liability on employers only for
their own deeds. See Dunn v. Wash. Cnty. Hosp., 429 F.3d 689,
691 (7th Cir. 2005). That’s why we focus on what motivates
the decisionmaker who fires an employee—not what other bi-
ased employees may have said or done. It’s undisputed that

36 No. 24-1901
Jacobs fired Pratt. And there is nothing to connect the sexism
or discriminatory attitudes of other WAF employees to Jacobs.
The evidence of sexist comments by others at WAF doesn’t
prove that Pratt was fired because she is a woman.
B
Disparate treatment can prove discrimination where em-
ployees (who do not share a protected characteristic) are sim-
ilarly situated, but one was treated better. Coleman, 667 F.3d
at 845–46. “Employees are similarly situated if they dealt with
the same supervisor, were subject to the same standards, and
had engaged in similar conduct without such differentiating
or mitigating circumstances as would distinguish their con-
duct or the employer’s treatment of them.” Dunlevy v.
Langfelder, 52 F.4th 349, 353 (7th Cir. 2022) (quotation omit-
ted). While these requirements are well-established, my col-
leagues suggest that we may ignore them if an employee (here
Pratt) has no “direct professional peers.” Ante, at 19. The ma-
jority says that two employees a t WA F—Eugene Boyd and
Tom Behnke—were similarly situated to Pratt and received
better treatment, because WAF’s independent consulting re-
view (the Utech report) criticized all three, but only Pratt was
disciplined. Ante, at 18–20. Neither of these men is a suitable
comparator, however.
Because WAF’s outside consulting review looked at Pratt,
Boyd, and Behnke, the majority assumes that they were sub-
ject to the same standards. But that’s not right. To show that
her comparators were subject to the same standards, Pratt
needs to prove that she, Behnke, and Boyd worked under the
same employment policies, and that their professional roles
were not “so different from [Pratt’s] as to render the compar-

No. 24-1901 37
ison effectively useless.” Coleman, 667 F.3d at 848–49 (quota-
tion omitted). Pratt cannot make that showing.
The Utech report was a one-off analysis conducted by an
outside consulting firm: it wasn’t an employment policy and
didn’t include a statement of standards explaining how em-
ployees were being assessed. Cf. id. (standards of conduct are
policies or rules, set by the employer, that apply to employ-
ees). The report centered on feedback that was specific to each
employee and their particular work areas. That matters be-
cause Boyd and Behnke did different work than Pratt: Boyd
was a vice president, Behnke was a foreman, and Pratt was
manager of HR. Cf. Mitchell v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 143 F.4th
800, 804 (7th Cir. 2025) (“Assessment groups comprise em-
ployees in similar roles with similar experiences.”). Position
and rank can show that employees weren’t subject to the same
standards “provided that the employer took these factors into
account when making the personnel decision in question.”
Coleman, 667 F.3d at 849–50 (quotation and emphasis omit-
ted). WA F did that in Pratt’s case—in her performance review
following the Utech report, Jacobs gave Pratt low marks be-
cause “HR is supposed to be a safe confidential place for the
organization, and I believed under Deb it was not [a safe
space].” And Jacobs fired Pratt because of failings that were
specific to her work in HR.
Nor did Pratt, Behnke, and Boyd engage in similar con-
duct. Pratt needed to prove that she and her co-workers “en-
gaged in comparable rule or policy violations.” Id. at 850 (quo-
tation omitted). It’s true that all three received negative feed-
back in the report, but e very other employee did too—that
was how the report worked. The negative feedback for these
three employees wasn’t comparable. The consultants noted

38 No. 24-1901
that others at the company didn’t trust Pratt, that she con-
ducted unnecessary investigations instead of focusing on
what was best for the company, and that she had a hidden
agenda. By contrast, Behnke was hot-headed, unprofessional,
and protective of his people. Boyd was unprofessional, inex-
perienced, avoided responsibility, and lacked a leadership
presence.
Even if receiving negative feedback in the Utech report for
different reasons counts as comparable conduct (it doesn’t),
Pratt wasn’t disciplined or fired only for the report’s findings.
Jacobs gave her a poor review because of the report, a lack of
trust in Pratt’s department, and confidentiality issues. He
fired her based on a pattern of problems, of which the report
was only one example. Pratt makes no argument that Behnke
and Boyd had similar trust problems in their departments, or
that they engaged in similar conduct that raised questions
about their confidentiality.
In our circuit, we take a flexible and common-sense ap-
proach to identify suitable comparators in discrimination
cases. Coleman, 667 F.3d at 846. But our law still requires that
similarly situated employees be directly comparable to the
plaintiff in all material respects. Id. (citation modified). When
a plaintiff cannot make that showing, our job is to say so and
consider the discrimination evidence that exists. The majority
instead suggests that we should lower the bar for some special
employees, and that refusing to do so would create a “gaping
hole” in Title VII. Ante, at 18–19. But there’s nothing unfair or
unequal about applying Title VII consistently. If there’s a gap-
ing hole in our doctrine, it’s the rule my colleagues write to-
day—that we examine whether employees dealt with the
same supervisor, were subject to the same standards, and en-

No. 24-1901 39
gaged in similar conduct without differentiating circum-
stances, except when doing so would leave an employee with-
out a comparator. Pratt, Boyd, and Behnke weren’t subject to
the same standards, didn’t engage in similar conduct, and
aren’t suitable comparators.
C
What’s left of Pratt’s sex discrimination claim? Just legiti-
mate reasons for her termination. Pratt was fired because the
organization wanted a change in HR leadership and because
of ongoing performance problems: lack of trust, an inability
to maintain confidentiality, the Utech report, an error related
to a benefits plan, and the hiring of an external candidate for
a union position.
That other employees weren’t punished for negative feed-
back in the Utech report isn’t suspicious. Pratt hasn’t shown
that she was comparable to any other employees considered
in that report, or that other employees committed similar mis-
conduct in addition to being written up by the consulting
firm. Likewise, the fact that Pratt was told she was “good on
the benefits side” at a performance review (which included
largely negative feedback) three months before she was fired,
isn’t inconsistent with her subsequent termination. Pratt per-
formed well in the benefits area at a time when she was per-
forming poorly in general, but WAF cited a previous error in
that part of her work when it terminated her.
Some of the reasons WA F gave for Pratt’s termination
weren’t recent, but there’s no rule requiring an employer to
fire an employee as soon as they learn of mistakes or miscon-
duct. Moreover, Jacobs decided to fire Pratt because of a pat-
tern of problems, not because of any particular issue. Even if

40 No. 24-1901
some of the reasons cited were old, delay between cited mis-
conduct and termination doesn’t, standing on its own, prove
that an employer is lying. See Hitchcock v. Angel Corps, Inc., 718
F.3d 733, 737–42 (7th Cir. 2013) (reversing a grant of summary
judgment when evidence of pretext included shifting, incon-
sistent explanations (some of which involved stale miscon-
duct), an immediate change in treatment after learning of a
pregnancy, and potentially offensive statements by a supervi-
sor); Peirick v. Ind. Univ.-Purdue Univ. Indianapolis Athletics
Dep’t, 510 F.3d 681, 691–94 (7th Cir. 2007) (finding an em-
ployer’s reasons pretextual when one of the reasons for termi-
nation was stale, the employee exceeded expectations, she
wasn’t warned about her misconduct, and management
didn’t discuss the employee’s performance with her direct su-
pervisor).
The majority seems to acknowledge that the evidence of
sex discrimination in this case is entirely circumstantial. Ante,
at 12. But without connecting Jacobs to others’ sexually dis-
criminatory conduct, absent meaningful points of compari-
son, and with no evidence that the company was lying, the
circumstances of Pratt’s firing do not show that she was dis-
criminated against. No reasonable jury could find that Pratt
was terminated because she is a woman.
II
Pratt cannot succeed on her retaliation claim, either. Title
VII prohibits firing an employee because she opposes an un-
lawful employment practice. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). As to
whether Pratt engaged in protected activity, I agree with the
majority that we need not decide in this case whether an HR
professional must show something more than that she was
merely passing along complaints of discrimination affecting

No. 24-1901 41
others. See id. (protected action is opposition to “any practice
made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter”).
Pratt opposed conduct that was directed at her. Rather, at is-
sue is whether there’s “sufficient evidence to permit a reason-
able fact finder to conclude that retaliatory motive caused the
discharge[.]” See Igasaki v. Ill. Dep’t of Fin. & Pro. Regul., 988
F.3d 948, 959 (7th Cir. 2021) (quotation omitted). Terminating
an employee close on the heels of her protected activity can
indicate that an employer’s stated reasons for the firing are
pretextual. See Daza v. Indiana, 941 F.3d 303, 309 (7th Cir.
2019). But suspicious timing alone is rarely enough, and usu-
ally requires other evidence to support the inference of a
causal link. See id.
In this case, all we have is timing. Viewing the facts in the
light most favorable to Pratt, WAF decided to fire her eight
days after protected activity (the March 2019 email to Jacobs).
There is no set legal rule for deciding when events are close
enough together for an inference of causation to be drawn
solely on the basis of suspicious timing. Kidwell v. Eisenhauer,
679 F.3d 957, 966 (7th Cir. 2012). In such a case, “we typically
allow no more than a few days to elapse between the pro-
tected activity and the adverse action,” but the inference still
“depends on context.” Id. (quotation omitted). Here, the gap
between Pratt’s email and the company’s decision to fire her
is small. But drawing an inference of causation in this case
would be inappropriate given the context: a complete absence
of other evidence of pretext, Pratt’s poor performance review
just a few months prior, and evidence that Pratt’s perfor-
mance issues were ongoing at the time of her termination. See
id.

42 No. 24-1901
The majority says there’s other evidence of pretext: that
Jacobs told Pratt she was doing well handling benefits in De-
cember 2018 but cited a failure in that area when he decided
to fire her, and that other employees received negative feed-
back in the Utech report but weren’t fired. Ante, at 28. For rea-
sons already discussed, I disagree. Neither Pratt’s perfor-
mance evaluation nor the experience of other, non-similarly
situated employees shows that WAF lied about why it de-
cided to fire Pratt.
Because “a suspicion is not enough to get past a motion
for summary judgment,” Kidwell, 679 F.3d at 966 (quotation
omitted) , I would affirm the district court’s grant of summary
judgment as to Pratt’s retaliation claim.