Angela Summerfield v. Jan Gorniak, in her personal and official capacity as Franklin County Coroner

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
File Name: 14a0234n.06
No. 13-3750
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
ANGELA SUMMERFIELD,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
JAN GORNIAK, in her personal and official
capacity as Franklin County Coroner,
Defendant-Appellee.
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ON APPEAL FROM THE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN
DISTRICT OF OHIO
Before: BOGGS and KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judges; RESTANI, Judge.*
KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judge. Angela Summerfield worked in the Franklin County
Coroner’s Office. Coroner Jan Gorniak fired Summerfield after she released an infant’s body to
a funeral home, which then cremated the body against the family’s wishes. Summerfield
thereafter brought this lawsuit, claiming that she was fired because of her gender. The district
court granted Gorniak’s motion for summary judgment. We affirm.
Summerfield was a forensic technician in the coroner’s office. Her duties included
releasing bodies to funeral homes for cremation or burial. Before doing so, she was required to
obtain a “body release form” signed by the decedent’s next of kin. She was also required to
confirm at the time of pickup that the body matched the name on the release form.
* The Honorable Jane A. Restani, Judge for the Court of International Trade, sitting by
designation.

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On May 19, 2010, a representative of the Marlan J. Gary Funeral Home, Charles
Snodgrass, went to the coroner’s office and told Summerfield that he was there to collect two
bodies. One of the bodies was that of an infant, J.T. Summerfield did not have release forms for
either body, so she told Snodgrass to call the funeral home and have it fax the forms over. While
they waited for the funeral home to do so, Summerfield went to get the bodies. She then released
them to Snodgrass—without looking at the forms, which remained on the fax machine. Had
Summerfield looked at the forms, she would not have found one for J.T. Instead, she would
have found a form for a different infant, C.F.
Thus, Summerfield had released the wrong infant’s body to the funeral home; and the
funeral home, thinking it had C.F.’s body rather than J.T.’s, proceeded to cremate it, against
(albeit unknowingly) the wishes of J.T.’s family. Thereafter, Gorniak held a disciplinary hearing
and fired Summerfield for “failure to perform [her] job . . . satisfactorily, safely and efficiently.”
This lawsuit followed.
We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary judgment. 1st Source Bank v.
Wilson Bank & Trust, 735 F.3d 500, 502 (6th Cir. 2013). Under Title VII and Ohio law,
Summerfield may prove gender discrimination with circumstantial evidence under the
McDonnell-Douglas burden-shifting framework. Mitchell v. Toledo Hosp., 964 F.2d 577, 582
(6th Cir. 1992). Under that framework, Summerfield must first make out a prima facie case of
gender discrimination, meaning that she (i) was a member of a protected group, (ii) suffered an
adverse employment action, (iii) was qualified for the position, and that (iv) “similarly situated
non-protected employees were treated more favorably.” Regan v. Faurecia Auto. Seating, Inc.,
679 F.3d 475, 481 (6th Cir. 2012).

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Here, the parties dispute only whether Summerfield has identified any similarly situated
male employees whom Gorniak treated more favorably than Summerfield. To be similarly
situated, employees must be “similar in all relevant respects.” Bobo v. United Parcel Serv., Inc.,
665 F.3d 741, 751 (6th Cir. 2012). One of those respects is that the employees “engaged in the
same conduct without such differentiating or mitigating circumstances that would distinguish
their conduct or the employer’s treatment of them for it.” Mitchell, 964 F.2d at 583.
Summerfield contends that two male forensic technicians—James Stanforth and Greg
Kessler—were similarly situated, but treated more favorably. The undisputed facts show that in
2009, the coroner’s office received a release form from the Frank E. Hill Funeral Home.
Stanforth read the form, but mistakenly called the Frank E. Smith Funeral Home to come pick up
the body. When a representative from the Smith funeral home arrived, Kessler checked the form
to make sure he had the right body, and released it—but without doublechecking that the Smith
home was the one shown on the form. But the Hill funeral home retrieved the body soon
thereafter. Stanforth received a warning; Kessler received no punishment.
We agree with the district court that Summerfield’s conduct differed materially from that
of Stanforth and Kessler. Specifically, Summerfield did not even look at a release form before
releasing J.T.’s body, whereas Stanforth and Kessler did look at a form before releasing a body
to the Smith funeral home. And an employee’s failure to look at a form at all is “qualitatively
more serious” than an employee’s mistake in reading a form. Clayton v. Meijer, Inc., 281 F.3d
605, 612 (6th Cir. 2002). Summerfield’s actions also brought more serious consequences, which
is a matter often cognizable in the law: her mistake caused an infant’s body to be cremated
against the wishes of the infant’s family, whereas the other employees’ mistakes had little

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consequence at all. Id. She therefore did not engage in the “same conduct” as Stanforth or
Kessler, and thus was not similarly situated to either. Mitchell, 964 F.2d at 583.
The district court’s judgment is affirmed.

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