Kirsten Kulik v. Medical Imaging Resources, Inc.; John Vartanian; Dean Tangalakis

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
File Name: 09a0310n.06
Filed: April 28, 2009
No. 08-1941
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
KIRSTEN KULIK,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
MEDICAL IMAGING RESOURCES, INC.; JOHN
VARTANIAN; DEAN TANGALAKIS,
Defendants-Appellees.
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ON APPEAL FROM THE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT FOR THE EASTERN
DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
BEFORE: DAUGHTREY, ROGERS, and KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judges.
ROGERS, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff Kirsten Kulik appeals the district court’s grant of
summary judgment in favor of defendants Medical Imaging Resources, Inc. (“MIR”) and its
principals, John Vartanian and Dean Tangalakis. Kulik brought this suit claiming gender and
pregnancy discrimination under Title VII and Michigan’s Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act
(“ELCRA”), and wage discrimination under the Equal Pay Act (“EPA”). After reviewing the record,
the parties’ briefs, and the applicable law, and hearing oral argument, this court determines that no
jurisprudential purpose would be served by a panel opinion. Therefore, we affirm the district court’s
decision for the reasons stated in Judge Friedman’s June 12, 2008, opinion and order, with the
following exceptions.

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No. 08-1941
Kulik v. Med. Imaging Res., Inc.
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In granting summary judgment in favor of defendants on Kulik’s Title VII and ELCRA
claims, the district court found that Kulik failed to make out a prima facie case of discrimination and
that she failed to show that defendants’ legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for her termination
were a pretext for illegal discrimination. We do not conclude as part of the prima facie analysis,
however, that Kulik was not qualified for her position.
The district court’s Title VII and ELCRA prima facie analysis arguably conflated the stages
of the familiar McDonnell Douglas test by relying on defendants’ non-discriminatory reasons for
discharging Kulik as grounds for finding her not qualified for the position at the prima facie stage.
Cline v. Catholic Diocese of Toledo, 206 F.3d 651, 660-61 (6th Cir. 2000). Instead, we consider
Kulik’s objective qualifications, such as her education, experience in the relevant industry, and
possession of the general skills required for this position. Wexler v. White’s Fine Furniture, Inc.,
317 F.3d 564, 576 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc). An evaluation of the Wexler criteria reveals elements
that work for and against Kulik. At the prima facie stage, however, Kulik appears to have presented
enough evidence to show that she was qualified for her position. “The prima facie requirement for
making a Title VII claim ‘is not onerous,’ and poses ‘a burden easily met.’” Cline, 206 F.3d at 660
(quoting Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981)).
Nonetheless, because the district court correctly found that Kulik had not presented evidence
creating a genuine issue as to pretext, summary judgment was warranted.
AFFIRMED.

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No. 08-1941
Kulik v. Med. Imaging Res., Inc.
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