United States of America v. United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee RICHARD GLEN MILBURN

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NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
File Name: 08a0642n.06
Filed: October 21, 2008
No. 07-5617
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Plaintiff-Appellee,
On Appeal from the
v. United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Tennessee
RICHARD GLEN MILBURN
Defendant-Appellant.
______________________________
Before: KENNEDY, SUTTON, and MCKEAGUE, Circuit Judges.
KENNEDY, J. Richard Milburn appeals his convictions for various drug- and firearm-
related offenses. He raises three arguments on appeal: (1) venue is improper as to the drug and
firearm offenses relating to his arrest in Georgia; (2) the variance between the quantity of marijuana
charged and the amount determined in the jury’s verdict on Count One is impermissible and should
result in the dismissal of that count; and (3) the district court failed to consider fully all factors
underlying the application of a reasonable sentence. For the following reasons, we AFFIRM the
judgment of the district court.
BACKGROUND
Milburn’s multiple-count indictment and conviction was based on two somewhat
independent series of events involving his narcotics dealings. Milburn was arrested at a hotel in
Georgia on September 8, 2004, and on a separate occasion, Milburn was arrested at a gas station in
Tennessee on December 1, 2005.

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Milburn traveled to Georgia after leaving Tennessee with cash to purchase methamphetamine
from a contact of Troy Ward, an acquaintance. J.A. at 312. Ward had done drugs at Milburn’s
house and Ward was involved with an associate of Milburn’s by the name of Mark Saults. J.A. at
305. Saults had bought methamphetamine from and sold marijuana to Milburn. J.A. 181-83. In
September of 2004, Milburn asked Ward to purchase methamphetamine in Georgia from a drug
dealer known to Ward only as “Julio” and bring it back to Tennessee. J.A. at 310. Milburn met
Ward in Baileyton, Tennessee–in the Eastern District of Tennessee–and gave Ward $5,400 in cash
for the methamphetamine and $100 for gas money. J.A. at 308. Ward took that money to Georgia
that night and gave Julio $4,200 of Milburn’s cash to purchase a quarter pound of methamphetamine.
J.A. at 311. Julio took the money and never returned. J.A. at 311. Ward then called Milburn, told
him what happened with Julio, and indicated that he had found another source for methamphetamine.
J.A. at 311-12. Milburn decided to go to Georgia from Tennessee himself with between $10,000 and
$12,000 in cash to purchase more methamphetamine from Ward’s contact. J.A. at 312. Milburn met
Ward at the hotel and they were arrested. The police officers searched the room and Milburn’s
person and found 37.25 grams of methamphetamine, cash, three guns, and digital scales. Both Count
Four, attempt to possess with the intent to distribute methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C §§
846 and 841(b)(1)(C) and 18 U.S.C. § 2, and Count Five, carrying a firearm during and in relation
to a drug trafficking offense in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1), arise out of this series of events.
Police arrested Milburn in Tennessee during a drug deal between Milburn and Saults on one
side, and Thomas Turner on the other. Turner was a former drug trafficker who now worked for the
police. J.A. at 276. Turner set up a deal to sell methamphetamine and marijuana to Saults, but
Saults did not have the money to purchase the drugs, so Milburn agreed to buy the drugs. J.A. at

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189-90. Saults would sell part of the drugs purchased by Milburn, and then Saults would use the
proceeds to repay Milburn and they would split the profit. J.A. at 191. On December 1, 2005,
Turner met with Saults and Milburn at a gas station in Boones Creek, Tennessee where the police
were waiting. J.A. at 222. Turner gave the signal and the police arrested Saults and Milburn on the
spot. J.A. at 223. In searching Milburn’s pickup truck and his person, officers discovered
methamphetamine, tens of thousands of dollars in cash, two guns, digital scales with drug residue,
a methamphetamine pipe, methlsulfonal monohydrate (used to dilute methamphetamine), and a drug
ledger. J.A. at 224-31. Count Six, attempt to possess with the intent to distribute marijuana in
violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(b)(1)(D) and 18 U.S.C. § 2; Count Seven, attempt to possess
with the intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846
and 841(b)(1)(A) and 18 U.S.C. § 2; Count Eight, possession with the intent to distribute
methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(b)(1)(C); and Count Nine, carrying a
firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking offense in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) all
arose out of the events relating to Milburn’s arrest in Tennessee.
Counts One and Two dealt with conspiracy to distribute and possession with the intent to
distribute marijuana and methamphetamine, respectively, arising out of the events leading up to both
arrests mentioned above–in addition to other dealings–between approximately January 1995 and
December 13, 2005. J.A. at 46, 54. Count Ten, possession of an unregistered short barreled firearm
in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d), came out of the discovery of a sawed-off shotgun during a
lawful search of Milburn’s house. The last count, Count Eleven, was for possessing contraband in
prison.

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In the district court, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss Counts Four and Five for lack of
venue which the district court denied. J.A. at 71. Defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal for
lack of venue was also denied by the district court. J.A. at 330. The district court also rejected
Defendant’s other arguments that Count One should be stricken, Counts Five and Nine should fall
with Count One, and Defendant’s sentence should be adjusted accordingly. J.A. at 336-37.
Convicted as to Counts One and Two and Counts Four through Eleven, Defendant was sentenced
to 480 months in prison, the statutory minimum. J.A. at 344.
ANALYSIS
I. Venue as to Counts Four and Five
Separate analyses guide the determination of whether venue is proper for Counts Four and
Five. Count Five is for carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking offense in
violation of § 924(c). Its analysis must proceed under the framework of United States v. Rodriguez-
Moreno, 526 U.S. 275 (1999) which held that venue is appropriate for a violation of § 924(c)
wherever venue is appropriate as to the underlying continuing crime. 526 U.S. at 281. As for Count
Four, the underlying continuing crime, United States v. Cabrales, 524 U.S. 1 (1998) held that venue
is appropriate wherever the offense is “‘begun, continued, or completed.’” 524 U.S. at 7 (quoting
18 U.S.C. § 3237(a)).
Defendant argues that venue for the Georgia offenses is improper where “[t]he alleged
offenses took place many hundreds of miles from one another,” “[m]ore than one full year separated
the Georgia and Tennessee offenses,” and “[a]side from the fact that both states’ offenses involved
generic drug charges, no other similarities existed.” Def. Br. at 11. These arguments misconstrue
the relationship the law focuses on for the purposes of venue as that between the charges brought

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The court in Zidell also held that since “[t]he effects of the attempted distribution, if1
successful, would have been felt in Memphis,” venue was proper under a substantial contacts test.
323 F.3d at 423. While the court in Zidell seemingly analyzed substantial contacts as a sufficient,
alternative ground on which to find venue, 323 F.3d at 423 (following an analysis of whether venue
is proper under § 3237(a), the court wrote: “[m]ore generally, we have evaluated challenges to venue
under a ‘substantial contacts’ test . . .”), other Sixth Circuit panels have determined whether an
offense was begun, continued, or completed per § 3237(a) through the application of the substantial
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against Defendant, when the real issue in consideration of venue is the relationship between the place
of the criminal behavior and the place of trial. Accordingly, Defendant’s arguments fail where the
facts establish that the crime of attempted possession with the intent to distribute began in the
Eastern District of Tennessee with a meeting between Milburn and Ward.
United States v. Zidell, 323 F.3d 412 (6th Cir. 2003) controls here. In Zidell, the defendant
lived in Dallas, Texas, but he had met with his associates in Memphis, he had induced his associates
to travel from Memphis to Dallas on two occasions, and his associates had taken methamphetamine
from the defendant in Dallas with the aim to sell the drugs received from the defendant in Memphis
and then pay the defendant back with the proceeds before they were arrested prior to their arrival in
Memphis. 323 F.3d at 423. The defendant was convicted of attempt to possess with intent to
distribute methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, the same crime at issue here. He
argued that venue was improper in the Western District of Tennessee since “he supplied the drugs
in question solely in Texas[] and without traveling to Memphis.” Id. at 422. The Sixth Circuit panel
in Zidell rejected that argument, and instead looked at a broader scope of events, indicating that
venue was established where the attempted distribution began in Memphis with the defendant’s
meeting with his associates, continued in Memphis because it was the point of departure for his
associates, and terminated in Memphis since the defendant’s associates intended to return there to
sell the methamphetamine. Id at 423. Similarly, in the instant case, Defendant met with Ward in1

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contacts test. See United States v. Beddow, 957 F.2d 1330, 1335-36 (6th Cir. 1992); see generally
United States v. Williams, 788 F.2d 1213, 1215 (6th Cir. 1986)(holding that venue generally is
evaluated under substantial contacts in the Sixth Circuit). Like the United States Supreme Court in
Cabrales, we look only at locus delicti, determined from “‘the nature of the crime alleged and the
location of the act or acts constituting it,’” 524 U.S. at 7 (quoting United States v. Anderson, 328
U.S. 699, 703 (1946)), which prescribes the constitutional minimums for venue of Article III, § 2,
cl. 3 and the Sixth Amendment, and the statutory requirements of § 3237(a). 524 U.S. at 6-7.
That Rodriguez-Moreno dealt with an underlying crime of violence–kidnaping–and the case2
before us deals with drug trafficking is a distinction without a difference as they are both continuing
crimes that occur across geographic boundaries and § 924(c) makes carrying a gun a crime in relation
to both.
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the Eastern District of Tennessee, Ward departed from the Eastern District of Tennessee to purchase
methamphetamine in Georgia, and Ward intended to return to the Eastern District of Tennessee to
deliver the drugs to Defendant for distribution.
Because venue for the underlying offense–here drug trafficking–is appropriate in the Eastern
District of Tennessee, venue is proper for Count Five, namely the carrying of a firearm during and
in relation to a drug trafficking offense in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). See Rodriguez-Moreno,
526 U.S. at 281-82. Rodriguez-Moreno held that “[w]here venue is appropriate for the underlying
crime”–in Rodriguez-Moreno the crime was kidnaping–so too is venue appropriate “for the §
924(c)(1) offense.” Id. Therefore, venue is not improper as to both Count Four and Count Five.2
II. Variance as to Count One
Count One charged Defendant with conspiracy to distribute and possession with the intent
to distribute 1000 kilograms or more of marijuana. J.A. at 47. On the verdict form, the jury checked
the “Guilty” blank as to Count One, but they also checked “100 kilograms or more but less than 1000
kilograms” as to the amount of marijuana. J.A. at 80. Defendant argues that since the count itself
was for 1000 kilograms or more of marijuana but the amount determined by the jury was between

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Defendant also argues that, where “‘inconsistencies . . . indicate that the jury verdict was a3
product of irrationality,’ the verdict must be set aside.” Def. Br. at 23 (quoting United States v.
Johnson, 223 F.3d 665, 675-76 (7th Cir. 2000)). However, Johnson dealt specifically with a death
penalty statute and there are no inconsistencies in the jury findings here as there were in Johnson
where two separate jury forms which had some of the exact same questions on both the jury marked
with different answers. Id.
Although Solorio relied upon Vazquez, an unpublished opinion, the precedential value of4
Solorio is not in question because its reasoning is sound and the case is cited favorably by United
States v. Martinez, 430 U.S. F.3d 317 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that the defendant could be convicted
on a conspiracy count even where the indictment alleged greater quantities of narcotics under §
841(b)(1)(A) than found by the jury in its special verdict which corresponded to lesser penalties
under § 841(b)(1)(B)).
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100 and 1000 kilograms, there was a “fatal variance between pleading and proof . . . .” Def. Br. at
2. Defendant’s argument has been foreclosed by United States v. Solorio, 337 F.3d 580 (2003).3
In Solorio, one count of the indictment alleged that the defendant “conspired to possess with
intent to distribute 5 kilograms of cocaine,” but the jury found the defendant guilty of “conspiring
to possess with intent to distribute 500 grams of cocaine.” 337 F.3d at 589. Solorio is “identical”
to United States v. Vazquez, 49 Fed. Appx. 550, 2002 WL 31367162 (6th Cir. 2002) (unpublished)
which Solorio relies upon. Solorio, 337 F.3d at 591. In both cases, the indictment charged the4
defendant with one count of conspiracy involving more than 5 kilograms under § 841(b)(1)(A); but
having found the defendant guilty of that count, the jury went on to specifically find that the
defendant conspired to distribute more than 500 grams but less than 5 kilograms of cocaine, which
“made out the requirements of § 841(b)(1)(B).” Id. Both courts held that this did not constitute a
prejudicial variance nor was it a constructive amendment, both of which might have called for
reversal of the district court. Id.
Nearly identically here, though Count One charged Defendant with one count of conspiracy
involving over 1000 kilograms of marijuana under § 841(b)(1)(A), the jury found that Defendant

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That rule reads: “A defendant may be found guilty of any of the following: (1) an offense5
necessarily included in the offense charged; (2) an attempt to commit the offence charged; or (3) an
attempt to commit an offense necessarily included in the offense charged, if the attempt is an offense
in its own right.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 31(c).
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conspired as to between 500 grams and 1000 kilograms of marijuana, making out the requirements
under § 841(b)(1)(B). Then, as in Solorio and Vazquez, the jury merely convicted Defendant of a
lesser offense necessarily included in the offense charged, permissible under Fed. R. Crim. P.
31(c)(1). Defendant’s ability to defend himself was left unaffected, which is the underlying concern5
of both variance and constructive amendment. Id. at 590.
III. Sentencing
Defendant’s remaining arguments concerning sentencing all rely upon vacating Count One.
Counts Five and Nine, Defendant argues, must be invalidated because they are premised upon Count
One and the sentence should be lowered accordingly. Since Count One remains, the 480-month
statutory minimum stands. Remand for sentencing is inappropriate because the statutory minimum
is mandatory and a district court is not permitted to depart below it. See United States v. Hoosier,
442 F.3d 939, 944 (6th Cir. 2006).
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

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