Sandra K. Parrott v. Troy Corley

The Honorable David L. Bunning, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Kentucky, sitting *
by designation.
NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
File Name: 08a0082n.06
Filed: January 28, 2008
Case No. 06-2333
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
SANDRA K. PARROTT,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
TROY CORLEY,
Defendant-Appellee.
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ON APPEAL FROM THE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT FOR THE EASTERN
DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
BEFORE: BATCHELDER and MOORE, Circuit Judges; BUNNING , District Judge.*
DAVID L. BUNNING, District Judge. This appeal arises out of litigation between Sandra
K. Parrott and Troy Corley. Plaintiff’s counsel, Jon D. Kreucher, appeals the district court’s order
imposing sanctions on him pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927. Kreucher argues that the district court
abused its discretion by imposing sanctions based on erroneous assessments of the law and the
evidence. We disagree and affirm the judgment of the district court.
I. BACKGROUND
Defendant publishes “CorleyGuides,” books that highlight free and fun activities in large
cities. Parrott v. Corley, No. 05-74552, 2006 WL 2471943, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 24, 2006).

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Plaintiff began working with Defendant in November of 2004, authoring “write-ups” to be used in
the Orange County CorleyGuide. Id. On December 17, 2004, the parties entered into a contract
whereby Plaintiff agreed to contribute at least 350 write-ups for inclusion in Free New York City:
The Ultimate Guide to the Big Apple. Id. Relevant to this appeal, the contract contained an
arbitration clause, which provided that “[a]ll disputes or claims arising out of or relating to this
Agreement, or breach thereof, shall be settled by arbitration.” Id.
On December 1, 2005, Attorney Kreucher filed a verified complaint on behalf of his client,
Sandra K. Parrott. Id. at *2. In her amended complaint, Plaintiff alleged claims for: (1) breach of
contract; (2) unjust enrichment; (3) tortious interference with Plaintiff’s prospective business
relationships; (4) statutory infringement of Plaintiff’s copyrights; (5) unfair trade practice in violation
of the Lanham Trade-Mark Act; (6) idea misappropriation; and (7) conversion. Id. Plaintiff sought
both money damages and injunctive relief. Id. Defendant filed a motion to compel arbitration and
to dismiss or, in the alternative, to stay proceedings. Id. Defendant also moved for sanctions. Id.
The day before the hearing on Defendant’s motion, Plaintiff, through her counsel, voluntarily
dismissed her Amended Complaint. Id. Thus, the only part of the motion that was left for the
district court to address was Defendant’s request for sanctions under 28 U.S.C. § 1927. Id. After
the hearing, the district court entered an order imposing sanctions on Kreucher. Id. at 3. Kreucher
filed a Motion for Relief from Order, J.A. at 110-28, which was denied by the district court, Dist.
Ct. Doc. Entry #29. This appeal follows.
II. ANALYSIS
The imposition of sanctions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927 is reviewed for an abuse of

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discretion. Ridder v. City of Springfield, 109 F.3d 288, 298 (6th Cir. 1997) (citing In re Ruben, 825
F.2d 977, 984 (6th Cir. 1987)). See also Jones v. Cont’l Corp., 789 F.2d 1225, 1229 (6th Cir. 1986).
Section 1927 provides:
Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any court of the United
States or any Territory thereof who so multiplies the proceedings in any case
unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally the
excess costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees reasonably incurred because of such
conduct.
“An attorney is liable under § 1927 solely for excessive costs resulting from the violative conduct.”
Ridder, 109 F.3d at 299. “A sanctioned attorney is thus required to personally satisfy the excess
costs attributable to his misconduct.” Red Carpet Studios Div. of Source Advantage, Ltd. v. Sater,
465 F.3d 642, 646 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing In re Ruben, 825 F.2d at 983).
This Court set forth the standard for imposing fees under § 1927 in Shepherd v. Wellman, 313
F.3d 963, 969 (6th Cir. 2002), providing:
[S]anctions may be awarded against an attorney who “multiplies the proceedings in
any case unreasonably and vexatiously.” 28 U.S.C. § 1927. We construe
“vexatiously multiplying proceedings” to include conduct where “an attorney knows
or reasonably should know that a claim pursued is frivolous, or that his or her
litigation tactics will needlessly obstruct the litigation of non-frivolous claims.”
Jones v. Cont’l Corp., 789 F.2d 1225, 1232 (6th Cir. 1986). We have also held that
§ 1927 sanctions are appropriate where “an attorney has engaged in some sort of
conduct that, from an objective standpoint, ‘falls short of the obligations owed by the
member of the bar to the court and which, as a result, causes additional expense to
the opposing party.’” Holmes v. City of Massillon, 78 F.3d 1041, 1049 (6th Cir.
1996) (quoting In re Ruben, 825 F.2d 977, 984 (6th Cir. 1987)). Simple inadvertence
and negligence are not grounds for imposing § 1927 sanctions. See Ridder v. City of
Springfield, 109 F.3d 288, 298 (6th Cir. 1997).
On the facts of this case, the Court cannot conclude that the district judge abused her
discretion by imposing sanctions for “unreasonably multipl[ying] the proceedings by contesting

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Defendant’s motion to compel arbitration and simultaneously pursuing a motion for preliminary
injunction on claims it should have known were arbitrable” – conduct which clearly falls within the
parameters of the conduct prohibited by § 1927. Parrott, 2006 WL 2471943, at *3. The district
court was within its discretion to find that Plaintiff’s voluntary dismissal on the eve of the hearing
served as “evidence that Plaintiff’s counsel knew or should have known that resistance to arbitration
... was frivolous.” Id.
Importantly, the district court did not merely “rubberstamp” the monetary sanction requested
by Defendant. Defendant’s counsel submitted an affidavit, requesting $10,345.77 in attorney fees
and costs. Id. The district court reviewed the affidavit and supporting documentation and concluded
that Defendant’s counsel “improperly included fees associated with settlement, review of complaints
and other issues unrelated to the excessive costs associated with the motion to compel arbitration and
response to Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction.” Id. After applying Defendant’s
counsel’s practice of reducing allowable attorney fees by 30 percent and paralegal or intern fees by
80 percent, the court approved $6,570.75 in sanctions ($3,812.50 in connection with Defendant’s
motion to compel arbitration and $2,758.25 in connection with Defendant’s response to Plaintiff’s
motion for preliminary injunction). Id. The district court refused to award any excess costs, citing
the absence of documentation supporting such a request. Id. This detailed analysis evidences the
pains the district court took to arrive at an appropriate monetary sanction and undermines any
suggestion that the district court abused its discretion by imposing sanctions on Kreucher.
Kreucher made various other arguments on appeal, only a few of which warrant further
comment. For example, he argues that his actions fall exclusively within the conduct proscribed by

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To the extent that Kreucher argues that his due process rights were violated and that the district court erred in 1
its statutory interpretation, the applicable standard of review is de novo. See Anmex, Inc. v. United States, 367 F.3d 530,
533 (6th Cir. 2004).
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Rule 11. However, the Court finds that the district court was well within its discretion to impose
sanctions under § 1927. Nothing required the district court to construe Defendant’s motion for
sanctions as a request for Rule 11 sanctions, as opposed to § 1927 sanctions. Plaintiff’s counsel also
argues that his due process rights were violated by the imposition of sanctions. This argument lacks1
merit. “[B]efore the imposition of sanctions, the attorney must be given notice and an opportunity
to be heard.” Cook v. Am. Steamship Co., 134 F.3d 771, 775 (6th Cir. 1998) (citing Roadway
Express Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 767 (1980)). The notice provided by the district court in this
case did not violate Kreucher’s due process rights. Kreucher argued his case in writing and at a
hearing which specifically addressed the issue of sanctions.
III. CONCLUSION
1 For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court imposing sanctions
2 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927.
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