Natasha W. Cornett v. CHERRY LINDAMOOD, Warden

The Honorable James S. Gwin, United States District Judge for the Northern*
District of Ohio, sitting by designation.
NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
File Name: 06a0782n.06
Filed: October 20, 2006
No. 04-5776
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
NATASHA W. CORNETT,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
CHERRY LINDAMOOD, Warden,
Respondent-Appellee.
/
On Appeal from the United
States District Court for the Eastern
District of Tennessee
BEFORE: RYAN and COOK, Circuit Judges; and GWIN, District Judge.*
RYAN, Circuit Judge. Natasha W. Cornett appeals the district court’s order
denying her 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus petition. Pursuant to a package plea
agreement in which the state of Tennessee agreed not to seek the death penalty, Cornett
and her five codefendants pleaded guilty to three counts of first degree murder, one count
of attempted first degree murder, two counts of especially aggravated kidnaping, two
counts of aggravated kidnaping, and one count of theft of property valued between
$1,000.00 and $10,000.00. Cornett was sentenced to life in prison. She now argues that
her guilty pleas were unconstitutionally coerced because the plea agreement offered her
was “packaged” with and conditional upon the plea agreements offered her confederates.

-- 1 of 8 --

(No. 04-5776) - 2 -
We AFFIRM the district court’s denial of Cornett’s habeas corpus petition because
she fails to establish that her guilty pleas were obtained in violation of established federal
law as determined by the Supreme Court.
I.
On April 6, 1997, Cornett and five friends acquired two guns and set out on a road
trip from Pikeville, Kentucky, to New Orleans, Louisiana. State v. Howell, 34 S.W.3d 484,
487 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000). They soon realized that their car would not survive the trip,
and they discussed the possibility of stealing a car from a parking lot or dealership. Id.
The group stopped at a rest stop along Interstate 81 near Greenville, Tennessee, where
another traveler, Vidar Lillelid, an active Jehovah’s Witness, approached them. Id. A
conversation ensued with Vidar Lillelid, his wife Delfina, their six-year-old daughter Tabitha,
and their two-year-old son Peter. Id. At some point, one of Cornett’s companions
displayed a gun and directed the family to its van, stating: “I hate to do you this way, but
we are going to have to take you with us for your van.” Id. Vidar Lillelid offered his keys
and wallet in exchange for permission to remain at the rest stop, but his request was
denied. Id.
Vidar Lillelid, still at gunpoint, was directed to leave the interstate at the next exit and
to drive to a secluded place. Id. at 488. One of the members of Cornett’s group then shot
Vidar Lillelid six times, once in the eye, and five times in the chest, killing him. Id. at 489.
Three of the wounds in his chest formed the shape of an equilateral triangle. Id. Delfina
Lillelid was shot eight times. Id. Bones in her left arm and thigh were shattered, but her
wounds were not immediately fatal; she died shortly thereafter. Id. Three of the wounds

-- 2 of 8 --

(No. 04-5776) - 3 -
in her back formed a triangular pattern. Id. Tabitha Lillelid received one shot to the head,
from which she died the next day. Id. at 489-90. Peter Lillelid was shot twice from behind;
he survived, but lost his right eye. Id. at 490.
Cornett and her companions fled the scene in the Lillelids’ van, running over Delfina
Lillelid, who was possibly still alive. Id. at 489. They drove to Mexico where they were
stopped by the Mexican authorities, arrested, and eventually returned to Tennessee. Id.
at 488-89. Several members of the group had personal items belonging to the Lillelids in
their possession when they were arrested. Id.
The state of Tennessee filed charges and notified Cornett and her three adult
codefendants that the state would request the death penalty. Id. at 489. Shortly before
trial, and after extensive pretrial proceedings, the state offered, in writing, to withdraw its
intent to seek the death penalty against the adult defendants if each of the defendants
would plead guilty to three counts of first degree murder and one count of attempted first
degree murder. Id. All the defendants, including Cornett, accepted the offer. Id. Cornett
and all of her codefendants entered guilty pleas consistent with the agreement. In
February 1998, Cornett was sentenced to three consecutive terms of life in prison with no
chance of parole, plus an additional 25 years. Id. at 489, 490-91.
A few years later, on July 19, 2001, Cornett filed a petition for post-conviction relief
in the state court, claiming, among other things, that her guilty pleas were not voluntary
because of the coercive effect of the package plea offer, which, in effect, was that only if
Cornett pleaded guilty would her companions avoid the death penalty.
The state court reviewed the record made at Cornett’s guilty plea hearing three
years earlier, which revealed that the court explained to all six defendants, as a group,

-- 3 of 8 --

(No. 04-5776) - 4 -
each of the charges and the consequences of pleading guilty. The defendants answered
together that they understood the consequences of pleading guilty to the charges. The
court also asked the defendants, as a group, whether their pleas were voluntarily made;
whether any force or threats were used to cause them to plead guilty; whether they were
satisfied with counsel; and whether they had used drugs or alcohol in the previous 24
hours. The transcript indicates that Cornett answered that her pleas were voluntary, and
she gave no indication that she was not satisfied with her counsel. The court also asked
Cornett individually about her education level and ability to read and write, and whether she
was pleading guilty to the charges because she was, in fact, guilty. She stated that she
could read and write, and that she was pleading guilty because she was guilty.
At the completion of the post-conviction proceedings, the court found that Cornett’s
pleas were knowing and voluntary, were made upon the sound advice of her attorneys, and
were not made as a result of stress caused by the package plea offer. The court also
noted that Cornett was fully aware of the consequences of her pleas and represented at
the sentencing hearing that she was not under the influence of drugs or alcohol.
After she exhausted her post-conviction remedies in state court, on May 2, 2003,
Cornett filed a pro se application for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254,
arguing that her guilty pleas were unconstitutionally obtained and that her counsel provided
ineffective assistance. The district court granted the warden’s motion to dismiss,
explaining that, although the Supreme Court has indicated that a plea offer which promises
lenient treatment of a third party creates a greater danger of imposing a false guilty plea,
it has not indicated that such offers are per se unconstitutional. The district court also
found that Cornett’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims were procedurally defaulted.

-- 4 of 8 --

(No. 04-5776) - 5 -
On June 7, 2005, this court granted Cornett a certificate of appealability on the issue
whether the package plea offer unconstitutionally coerced her guilty pleas, and granted her
leave to proceed in forma pauperis.
II.
We review the district court’s legal conclusions in a habeas proceeding de novo and
its factual findings for clear error. Jones v. Jamrog, 414 F.3d 585, 590 (6th Cir. 2005).
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), a federal court
may grant habeas relief only if the state court adjudication:
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined
by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court
proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2) (West Supp. 2006). We presume that the state court’s factual
findings are correct unless the petitioner offers clear and convincing evidence to rebut the
presumption of correctness. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) (West Supp. 2006).
A state court adjudication is contrary to “clearly established Federal law” only if the
state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by the Supreme Court on a
question of law, or if it decides a case differently than the Supreme Court has on a set of
materially indistinguishable facts. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 413 (2000). The state
court’s adjudication is unreasonable if the state court identifies the correct governing legal
principle from Supreme Court decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts
of the prisoner’s case. Id.

-- 5 of 8 --

(No. 04-5776) - 6 -
The Supreme Court has established that a trial court may not accept a guilty plea
“without an affirmative showing that it was intelligent and voluntary.” Boykin v. Alabama,
395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969). Although the Supreme Court has indicated, in dicta, that “a
prosecutor’s offer during plea bargaining of adverse or lenient treatment for some person
other than the accused” may “pose a greater danger of inducing a false guilty plea by
skewing the assessment of the risks a defendant must consider,” Bordenkircher v. Hayes,
434 U.S. 357, 364 n.8 (1978), it has not specifically addressed the constitutional
implications of such offers, much less determined that plea agreements resulting from
them are per se unconstitutional.
III.
The state court found that Cornett’s pleas were not coerced by the package offer,
but were “in all respects voluntarily, knowingly, understandingly and intelligently made.”
The court first noted that, under Tennessee precedent, package plea offers are an
acceptable means of reaching a plea agreement. The court then determined that Cornett
discussed the plea offer in great detail with her experienced, prepared attorneys, and was
aware of the consequences of her guilty pleas. The court noted that Cornett’s attorneys
testified that she “exhibited nothing to indicate coercion by the package offer.” The court
explained that “[t]actically the attorneys had no choice but to recommend the plea[s],”
because the record clearly refuted Cornett’s contention that she was not a knowing and
willing participant in the shootings. The court also determined that there was no evidence
to indicate that Cornett was under the influence of drugs at the time she made her pleas.
The court noted that, at the plea colloquy, Cornett told the court that she had not used any

-- 6 of 8 --

(No. 04-5776) - 7 -
drugs in the 24 hours prior to the plea colloquy and that she was pleading voluntarily. She
also answered in the affirmative when asked whether she was satisfied with her counsel.
Cornett argues that the package plea offer unconstitutionally coerced her guilty
pleas because: 1) contrary to the state court’s findings, there was no factual basis for her
guilty pleas; 2) the state’s promise to withdraw its intent to seek the death penalty against
her codefendants was the primary consideration in her decision to plead guilty; 3) the
sentencing court failed to carefully examine the voluntariness of her guilty pleas because
it conducted a group plea colloquy and accepted group answers to some of the questions
asked during the plea colloquy; and 4) other factors, such as antidepressant medication,
impermissibly influenced her guilty pleas.
Cornett fails to present clear and convincing evidence to rebut the presumption that
the state court’s factual findings are correct, and her argument is meritless given the high
burden AEDPA places on habeas petitioners. The Supreme Court has not determined that
package plea agreements are per se unconstitutional, and the record supports the state
court’s conclusion that Cornett voluntarily and knowingly pleaded guilty to the charges
against her after being fully informed of the consequences her guilty pleas. We agree with
the district court that the state court’s determination that Cornett’s guilty pleas were not
unconstitutionally coerced by the package plea offer is neither contrary to, nor an
unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme
Court.
IV.

-- 7 of 8 --

(No. 04-5776) - 8 -
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court denying
Cornett’s 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus petition.

-- 8 of 8 --